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SECTION A

INTRODUCTION & OVERVIEW OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS
REGARDING PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
I. THE KENTUCKY CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
Many statutes in Kentucky have the effect ofprotecting consumers. The largest
concentration ofconsumer protection statutes can be found in KRS 367. However; by statute the
Consumer Protection Act is designated as that portion ofthe Chapter extending from KRS
367.110-300. (See KRS 367.120(2))
A. History
In the late 1960's, early 1970's, commentators called Kentucky a "Happy Hunting
Ground" for fraud and deception. Consumers in the state were being victimized by a get rich
quick scheme promoted by Glenn Turner called Dare To Be Great. At the same time, Ralph
Nader was making headlines through his book, "Unsafe at Any Speed". Bait and Switch and
price gouging were the norm. Vacuum cleaners were sold with claims that they would clean the
air and, as a result, the consumer would not "catch cancer". Into this breach, a tiny consumer
protection movement began to emerge and grow.
Most states enacted their Consumer Protection Statutes between 1965 and 1975. (Unfair
and Deceptive Acts and Practices 5th Edition-National Consumer Law Center p. 1.) Kentucky
was no exception.
In 1968 the Kentucky Attorney General and the Governor both established Consumer
Advisory Councils.! The Governor's Council proposed a methodology for processing consumer
complaints. The Attorney General's council concentrated on protecting consumers from
deceptive practices. The Governor and the Attorney General who were ofdifferent parties were
often at odds. At that time, Consumer Protection was considered such a radical proposal that a
business group circulated a flyer suggesting that consumer advocates were furthering the
Communist conspiracy.
A proposed Consumer Act failed in the 1970 session of the General Assembly. A
Consumer Protection Act was finally enacted and became effective June 15, 1972. The first
portion of the Act, KRS 367.110-150 was the result ofthe recommendations ofthe Governor's
Council and the second portion (KRS 367.160-300), which mainly involves law enforcement,
resulted from the Attorney General's Council.
Originally the Consumer Protection Act did not contain a prohibition against "Unfair"
acts or practices. This portion ofthe Act was added in 1976. The operative portion of the Act
now reads "Unfair, false, misleading or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or
IThe Governor at the time was Louie Nunn. The Attorney General was John B.
Breckinridge followed by Ed Hancock.
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commerce are hereby declared unlawful." The tenn "unfair" is to be construed as
"unconscionable". (KRS 367.170)
B. UDAP
The concept of Consumer Protection was slow to emerge in Kentucky as well as most
southern and rural states in the 1960's and 1970's. Caveat Emptor or Buyer Beware was the
predominant theme in Business/Consumer relations. The then Attorney General, John
Breckinridge was careful to appoint members ofhis Council from business, labor, consumer
groups, farm and law. This Counsel used as its model what was then generally known as a
"Little FTC Act". The "Little FTC Act" originated from the Federal Trade Commission and has
evolved into what today is known as the UDAP laws. (Unfair, Deceptive Acts or Practices) The
prohibition clause of the UDAP laws was generally modeled after the FTC's which prohibits
"Unfair or Deceptive" acts or practices. (15 U.S.C. 45(a)(1»
C. Kentucky Modifications of the "Little FTC Act" or UDAP
As a result ofthe competing factions on the Attorney General's Council, the Kentucky
UDAP or Little FTC Act was modified from the Model act proposed by the FTC. For instance,
Kentucky is the only state with a prohibition clause in its Consumer Protection Act that reads
"unfair, false, misleading or deceptive" instead of simply "unfair or deceptive". The tenns
"false" and "misleading" add little or nothing to the prohibition against "deceptive" practices and
are essentially a duplication.
D. Anti-Trust
An Anti-Trust Act, patterned after the Shennan Anti-Trust Act, was placed in the middle
of the Consumer Protection Act. (See Borg-Warner Protective Servs. Corp. V Guardsmark,
Inc, 946 F. Supp 495 (E.D. Ky. 1996) affirmed 156 F. 3d 1228 (6th Cir. 1998» The Anti-Trust
Act prohibits every contract, combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in the
Commonwealth. (KRS 367.175) This statute was enacted in 1976 subsequent to the enactment
of the original Consumer Protection Act in 1972. The Anti-Trust Act did not reference the
Consumer Protection Act; therefore, other provisions of the Act such as the investigative
authority of the Attorney General may not apply. The placement in the statute books ofthe Anti-
Trust Act was made by the then Statute Revisor ofthe Legislative Research Commission. Its
placement may result in confusion or misinterpretation; although, there are no known cases on
the subject at this time.
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II. THE PROVISIONS OF THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT
The Consumer Protection Act can be divided into several parts as follows:
A. Collecting Complaints, Educating and
Disseminating Information and Legislative Advice (KRS 367.150)
When the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act was drafted it was envisioned that the
Attorney General's Office would be a "One-Stop Shop" for Consumer redress. Accordingly, the
Act requires the Attorney General to:
1. Promote the coordination ofconsumer protection activities of all departments of state,
county and city governments concerned with activities involving consumer interests;
2. Study the operation of all laws and state policies affecting consumers and recommend
to the Governor and the Legislature, new legislation, rules, regulations, orders and policies in the
consumers' interest;
3. Provide a central clearing house of information by collecting and compiling consumer
complaints and inquiries, and forwarding them to the proper governmental agencies if
appropriate.
4. Organize, promote and conduct consumer education programs within the
Commonwealth and to hold conferences on problems affecting consumers.
5. Appear before any federal, state or local governmental branch, commission,
department, rate-making or regulatory body or agency, to represent consumers' interests and to
be made a real party in interest to any action on behalf of consumer interests involving a quasi-
judicial or rate-making proceeding of any state or local governmental branch, commission,
department, agency, or rate-making body.
B. The Consumers' Advisory Council (KRS 367.130)
The Consumers' Advisory Council is made up of sixteen members appointed by the Governor.
In addition, the Attorney General serves as Chairman. The Council is attached to the Attorney
General's Office for administrative purposes. The Council is to act in an advisory capacity on
consumer affairs as they deem necessary and as directed by the Governor, the Attorney General
or the legislative branch of government. The Council is the successor to the Consumer
Protection Councils initiated by Governor Nunn and Attorney General Breckinridge noted in
footnote # 1. It has advised on consumer legislation which has been forwarded to the Governor
and the General Assembly for consideration. This function works in coordination with the
Attorney General's role as the consumer advocate before the General Assembly or what might be
termed the chief consumer lobbyist.
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As a result of these powers enumerated in KRS 367.150 the Attorney General's Office
has developed several sections or programs, in addition to its law enforcement functions. These
include:
1. Mediators who collect consumer complaints and attempt to find a satisfactory
solution to matters that do not generally involve unfair or deceptive acts or practices. These
complaints may be discoverable through the Kentucky Open Records Act. KRS 61.870 et seq.
2. A consumer education program in which material and talks are disseminated
throughout Kentucky.
3. Appearances before the Kentucky General Assemble on behalfof consumer
interests to promote laws benefitting and protecting consumers and to defend consumer interests
when necessary. By this statute, the Attorney General became the lobbyist for consumers.
4. An office ofRate Intervention to appear before rate making and regulatory Boards and
Commissions to represent consumer interests. This has resulted primarily in appearances before
the state Public Services Commission for utility rates and the Department of Insurance in Health
Insurance rate cases.
c. The law enforcement function of the Attorney General
for violations of the Consumer Protection Act
The primary function ofthe Attorney General with respect to the Consumer Protection
Act is to enforce that portion of the Act which prohibits "Unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive
acts or practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce." (KRS 367.170) To pursue this
function the Act provides for the following powers:
D. Investigation (KRS 367.240 and 250)
Consumer Protection cases are generally complex in nature. As a result, the investigation
of a consumer case is the most important function. Usually if the facts are there, the case is there.
However; the facts must be developed and meticulously documented.
Prior to filing litigation pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act the Attorney General
may investigate allegations by using compulsory process. The General Assembly provided for
investigations by the Attorney General through either an Investigative Demand or a Subpoena.
E. Investigative Demand (KRS 367.240)
When the Attorney General has reason to believe that a person has engaged in, is
engaging in, or about to engage in any act or practice made unlawful by the Consumer Protection
Act, or when he believes it to be in the public interest that an investigation be made, he may issue
an investigative demand to obtain information or other evidence. However; no person who has a
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place ofbusiness in Kentucky shall be required to appear or present documentary material or
evidence outside the county where he has his principal place ofbusiness in the Commonwealth.
At any time prior to the return date specified in an investigative demand, or within twenty days
after the demand has been served, a petition to extend the return date, or to modify or set aside
the demand, stating good cause, may be filed in the Circuit Court.
F. Subpoenas (KRS 367.250)
In addition to other powers conferred upon him by the Consumer Protection Act, the
Attorney General may issue subpoenas to any person or conduct hearings in aid of any
investigation or inquiry. A portion ofthis statute; however, states that any information obtained
pursuant to the powers conferred by the Consumer Protection Act shall not be made public or
disclosed by the Attorney General or his employees beyond the extent necessary for law
enforcement purposes. Although there are no direct cases on the subject, it appears likely that the
term "powers" in this section refers to information obtained as a result of an investigative
demand or subpoena. It is unlikely that this section refers to consumer complaints which the
Attorney General collects and compiles pursuant to KRS 367.150(6) since that section anticipates
that the Attorney General's office will be a central clearing house for such information. A
private practitioner may find consumer complaints collected by the Attorney General very useful
in assessing his or her case. As noted, such information is generally available through an open
records request (KRS 61.870 et seq.)
If a person fails to obey any subpoena or investigative demand issued by the Attorney
General, the Attorney General may apply to a Circuit Court and request an order:
A. Granting injunctive reliefto restrain the person from engaging in the
advertising or sale of any merchandise or the conduct of any trade or commerce involved in the
alleged violation; and
B. Vacating, annulling, or suspending the corporate charter of a corporation
created under the laws of the Commonwealth or revoking the authority to do business in the
Commonwealth of a foreign corporation; and
C. Granting other appropriate relief.
Prior to the issuance of a final order, the person charged with failing to answer an investigative
demand or subpoena shall be afforded an opportunity for a hearing on the merits ofthe demand
or subpoena. Disobedience of a final order entered by the court shall be punished as a contempt
thereof.
Any person may apply to a Circuit Court for an order to protect such person from any
unreasonable investigative action taken pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act.(KRS 367.260)
This section ofthe Act may be broader than the similar section in KRS 367.240 and could
conceivably protect a person or business from unreasonable investigative action pursuant to the
private cause of action section of the Act (KRS 367.220).
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G. Cases interpreting the investigative powers of the Attorney General
The leading Kentucky case on the Attorney General's authority to issue compulsory
process pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act is Commonwealth ex rei Hancock v Pineur
Ky. 533 S.W.2d 527 (1976). Citing u.s. v. Morton Salt Co. 338 u.s. 632, 70 S. Ct 3577,94 L.
Ed. 401 (1950) the court held that a governmental investigation into corporate matters may be of
such a sweeping nature and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the
investigatory power. But it is sufficient if the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the
demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant. The court
recognized the requirements of the statute, but noted that nowhere does it say or imply that the
conditions for the issuance of an investigative demand must be stated on its face and there is an
even less suggestion that there is a requirement that factual details be so provided that it may be
determined upon the face of the demand that the grounds upon which the Attorney General acted
are in fact reasonable.
Two years later, the Kentucky Court of Appeals issued an opinion which, while
acknowledging Pineur, appeared to attempt to modify its holding. The court in Ward v
Commonwealth Ky App 566 S.W.2d 426 (1978) held that the Attorney General did not have the
authority to issue an investigative demand based upon one letter of complaint from only one
person. The court's reasoning appears to be bottomed upon a belief that the issuance ofa demand
based upon only one letter was arbitrary and an abuse ofpower. Had that case been appealed, it is
doubtful that it would have been upheld in the Supreme Court.
H. Attorney General's Injunctive Relief (KRS 367.190)
Whenever the Attorney General has reason to believe that any person is using, has used,
or is about to use any method, act or practice that is unfair or deceptive, he may move for a
restraining order, or a temporary or permanent injunction in a Circuit Court to prohibit such
practice. In order to obtain a restraining order it is necessary for the Attorney General to show
that a person will suffer immediate harm, loss or injury. If a defendant moves for the dissolution
of a restraining order the court shall hold a hearing within five business days. In order to obtain a
temporary or permanent injunction, it is not necessary for the Attorney General to allege or prove
that an adequate remedy at law does not exist or that irreparable injury, loss or damage will result
if the injunctive relief is denied. The requirements for the Attorney General in a consumer
protection action is less stringent than the requirements found for injunctions in general found in
C.R. 65.
I. Restitution (KRS 367.200)
In addition to injunctive relief to halt unfair or deceptive acts or practices, the Attorney
General may seek and obtain restitution for victimized consumers. KRS 367.200 states that the
court may make such additional orders or judgments as may be necessary to restore to any person
in interest any money or property which they may have lost as a result of a violation of the
Consumer Protection Act.
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In Commonwealth ex rei. Beshear v. ABAC Pest Control, Inc., Ky. App. 621 S.W.2d
705 (1981) the court held that in enacting KRS 367.200, the legislature intended to vest the
Attorney General with the authority to seek restitution on behalfofdefrauded consumers, and
that the authority may be exercised concurrently with his authority to maintain an action for
injunctive relief. The case ofIn re Glenn Turner Enterprises Litigation, 521 F.2d 775 (3d Cir.,
1975); however, accepted the Attorney General's position that he does not represent individual
consumers pursuant to this statute.
J. Assurance of Voluntary Compliance
As an alternative to injunctive relief, the Attorney General can accept what is generally
thought to be a lessened remedy in the form of an Assurance ofVoluntary Compliance (AVC).
An AVC must be filed with a Circuit Court but shall not be considered an admission of violation
for any purpose. If a person fails to comply with a AVC; however, such failure shall be
considered a willful violation of the act and possibly subject the person to civil penalties pursuant
to KRS 367.990(2).
K. Private Cause of Action (KRS 367.220)
Ofparticular interest to the private practitioner is that portion of the Consumer Protection
Act which permits a private cause of action for a violation of the Act. KRS 367.220 provides
that any person who purchases goods or services primarily for personal, family or household
purposes and thereby suffers an ascertainable loss of money or property as a result of the use of
an unfair or deceptive act or practice may maintain an action in the Circuit Court to recover
actual damages and that the court may also provide such equitable relief as it deems necessary or
proper. Nothing in the statute is to be construed to limit a person's right to seek punitive
damages where appropriate.
It is important to note that for a private cause of action to succeed, the party bringing the
action must be able to allege and prove that they purchased "goods or services" and that those
goods or services were primarily for "personal, family or household purposes". Such person
must also be able to show an ascertainable loss ofmoney or property. The courts have made it
clear that while the Attorney General may prosecute an action that might not involve goods or
services primarily used for "personal, family or household purposes" Commonwealth v North
American Van Lines, Inc, Ky. App. 600 S.W.2d 459 (1979), a private cause of action pursuant
to KRS 367.220 does not have that latitude Hunt Enters. J': John Deere Indus. Equip. Co., 18
F. Supp. 2d 697 (W.D. Ky.1997); Stephens v North American Van Lines, Inc., Ky. App. 600
S.W.2d 459 (1979); Aud v Illinois Cent. R.R., 955 F. Supp. 757 (W.D. Ky 1997).
L. Where to Bring a Private Cause of Action (KRS 367.220(1)
A private cause of action must be brought in a Circuit Court. That Circuit Court may be:
A. Where the seller or lessor resides;
A-7
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B. Where the seller or lessor has his principal place ofbusiness;
C. Where the seller or lessor is doing business;
D. Where the purchaser or lessee resides; or
E. Where the transaction occurred.
It has been suggested that the wide choice of forums provides a means for "forum shopping";
however, it also encourages private consumer actions. (See Baxter, Private Right ofAction
Under the Consumer Protection Act-New Avenues for Recovery, Vol.43, No.4, October 1979,
Ky. Bench and Bar P. 8) The court may, at its discretion, award actual damages and may provide
such equitable relief as it deems necessary or proper. The statute does not provide for punitive
damages; however, it states that nothing shall be construed to limit a person's right to seek
punitive damages where appropriate. Upon commencement of an action, the clerk of the court
shall mail a copy ofthe complaint to the Attorney General. Likewise any judgment or decree
shall be mailed to the Attorney General.
The practitioner may want to check to be sure that the Clerk mails a copy ofthe
complaint in their action to the Attorney General. The purpose of this provision is to alert to
Attorney General to deceptive practices occurring within the state. This gives the AG the ability
to bring an action to protect all consumers and, as an incidental reward, gives the consumer
bringing the action additional leverage. Furthermore, any permanent injunction, judgment or
order of the court made as a result of an action of the Attorney General pursuant to KRS 367.190,
shall be prima facie evidence in an action brought by a consumer pursuant to the private cause of
action section of the Consumer Protection Act.
M. Privity of Contract
To maintain a private cause of action pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act there must
be privity of contract. As noted by the court in Skilcraft Sheetmetal, Inc. v. Kentucky
Machinery, Inc., Ky App 836 S.W.2d 907 (1991)
"From our reading this statute as a whole, we conclude a subsequent purchaser
may not maintain an action against a seller with whom he did not deal or who
made no warranty for the benefit ofthe subsequent purchaser. The language of the
statute plainly contemplates an action by a purchaser against his immediate
seller.."
(See also Anderson National Sec. Fire & Casualty Co., Ky App 870 S.W.2d 432 (l993)and
Winburn v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 933 F. Supp. 664 (E.n. Ky 1996»
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N. Statute of limitations for private actions
Pursuant to KRS 367.220(5), the statute oflimitations for bringing a private cause of
action pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act is within two years of the time the act or practice
was used or within one year after any action of the Attorney General has been terminated.
O. Attorney's Fees
KRS 367.220(3) states:
In any action brought by a person under this section,
the court may award, to the prevailing party, in addition to the
reliefprovided in this section, reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
(Emphasis added)
It is important to note that unlike some other states, Kentucky's provision for attorneys fees does
not apply only to consumers. The statute reads "prevailing party" and could mean that a business
defendant would be entitled to its attorneys fees if they prevailed.
Whether to grant attorney's fees and costs, and how much, is within the sound discretion of the
trial court. Alexander v S & M Motors, Inc., Ky. 28 S.W.3d 303 (2000)
III. SELECTED CASES DEFINING
"UNFAIR, FALSE, MISLEADING OR DECEPTIVE" (KRS 367.170)
The core of the Consumer Protection Act resides in KRS 367.170 which reads:
(1) Unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce are hereby declared unlawful.
(2) For the purposes ofthis section, unfair shall be construed to mean
unconscionable.
"Trade" and "commerce" means the advertising, offering for sale, or distribution of any
services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other article,
commodity, or thing ofvalue, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly
affecting the people of this Commonwealth. KRS 367.110(2)
The intent of the General Assembly when it enacted the Consumer Protection Act was to
provide a "strong and effective consumer protection program to protect the public interest and
the well-being ofboth the consumer public and the ethical sellers of goods and services". (KRS
367.120) To this end all departments, agencies, officers, and employees of the Commonwealth
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are required to fully cooperate with the Attorney General in carrying out the functions of the Act.
(KRS 367.160) It is the duty of the Commonwealth and county attorneys to lend to the Attorney
General such assistance as he or she may request in the commencement and prosecution ofcourt
actions pursuant to the act or they may institute such actions themselves with the prior approval
of the Attorney General. (KRS 376.300)
Cases
A. Constitutionality and Piercing the Corporate Veil
The first reported case under the Consumer Protection Act is arguably the most
important. In Dare to be Great v Commonwealth ex rei Hancock Ky., 511 S.W.2d 224 (1974)
the court faced the two issues ofwhether the Act was unconstitutionally vague and whether to
pierce the corporate veil.
Citing Federal Trade Com'm v Colgate-Palmolive Company, 380 U.S. 374, 85 S.Ct.
1035,13 L.Ed.2d 904 (1965) the court found that the words "false, misleading and deceptive
have meanings which are generally well understood by those who want to understand them."
(See also Commonwealth ex rei. Beshear v. ABAC Pest Control, Inc., Ky. App. 621 S.W.2d
705 (1981» The court also found that because the agents had common ties of employment and
selling schemes were intertwined, the entire corporate scheme were simply the "alter ego" of its
founder Glen W. Turner. As stated by the court:
Generally a corporation will be looked upon as a separate legal
entity but when the idea of separate legal entity is used to justify
wrong, protect fraud or defend crime the law will regard the
corporation as an association ofpersons.
(See also Lewis LP Gas, Inc. v: Lambert, Ky 113 S.W.3d 171(2002) for a discussion ofthe
elements ofthe alter ego doctrine.)
B. Unfair
An automobile manufacturer's warranty policy, as it related to one particular consumer
was considered unfair and unconscionable in Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, Ky App 575 S.W.2d
480 (1981).
C. Negative Option Billing Practice
In Kentucky ex reI. Gorman v. Comcast Cable 881 F.Supp. 285 (W.D.Ky 1995), the court
found that the use of a plan of"negative option billing" could be a violation of the state
Consumer Protection Act. The court also found that there was no Federal Preemption under the
federal 1992 Cable Act.
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D. Material non-disclosure
Failure to disclose a motor vehicles pre-sale history when selling it as new can constitute
a false, misleading or deceptive act under the Consumer Protection Act. Smith v. GMC, Ky. App
979 S.W.2d 127 (1997).
E. Federal Injunction to Enjoin State Enforcement of the Consumer Protection Act
The doctrines of abstention and comity precluded a federal court from interfering with the
state Attorney General's enforcement of the Consumer Protection Act. Hearing AidAssoc. V
Bullock, 413 F. Supp. 1032 (E.D. Ky 1976).
F. The purchase of insurance is a service under the Consumer Protection Act
The purchase of an insurance policy is a purchase of a "service" intended to be covered by
the Consumer Protection Act. Stevens v. Motorists Mut. Ins. Co., Ky., 759 S.W.2d 819 (1988)
False statements to the public, to shareholders, and to the Insurance Commissioner can bring an
insurance company within the purview of the Consumer Protection Act. Commonwealth ex reI.
Chandler v. Anthem Ins. Cos., Ky App, 8 S.W.3d 48 (1999)
G. Not every breach of contract is a violation of the Consumer Protection Act
Not every failure to perform a contract is sufficient to trigger application of the Kentucky
Consumer Protection Act. The statute requires some evidence of a unfair, false, misleading, or
deceptive act and does not apply to simple incompetent performance ofcontractual duties unless
some element of intentional or grossly negligent conduct is also present. Sparks v. RelMax
Allstar Realty, Inc., Ky App. 55 S.W.3d 343 (2000)
H. Mootness
Mootness exists in the issuance of an injunction pursuant to the Consumer Protection Act
only where events make it absolutely clear the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably
be expected to recur. Commonwealth ex rei. Stephens v. Isaacs, Ky App 577 S.W.2d 617
(1979)
I. Medical Claims
Mere medical malpractice is not a violation of the Consumer Protection Act. A
complaint that does not relate to the entrepreneurial, commercial, or business aspect ofthe
practice ofmedicine does not state a cause of action. Simmons v Stephenson, Ky. App. 84
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S.W.3d 926 (2002) Conversely, it would appear that just because medical malpractice has
occurred, there is no prohibition against alleging and proving that a physician or other medical
professional engaged in unfair or deceptive acts or practices as it relates to the entrepreneurial,
commercial, or business aspect of their practice.
IV. ANALYZING THE CASE
Consumer Protection cases usually involve complex and often difficult issues. A
thorough investigation and analyzation of the facts prior to filing a complaint in court is a
necessity. In analyzing a particular set of facts to determine whether they involve "false
misleading or deceptive" acts or practices, it is often helpful to keep in mind that deceptive
practices essentially involve a lie. A lie can be told by representing a patent untruth, or it can
done by leaving out essential information in the form of a material non-disclosure. In either case
a lie has been told. Many times practitioners look for the overt lie, but overlook the half truth or
the material non-disclosure. Likewise, those engaging in deceptive practices sometimes
mistakenly believe that they can get away with deception if they tell a half truth, but not the
whole truth.
A. Investigation and Discovery
Business tends to operate in patterns. If a particular practice works once and is successful,
chances are it will be used again.
B. Pattern
If a factual dispute develops in a consumer case, it is often useful to contact other
consumers to determine whether a pattern ofconduct can be shown. Defendants traditionally
resist an attempt to discover their customer list. An alternative to a lengthy discovery process is
to obtain complaint letters that might have been received by the Attorney General's Office or the
Better Business Bureau. The information in their files may serve a source of information from
other individuals who might have been victimized by the practice in question or provide much
needed documentation on the issue. Contacting other consumers can produce a wealth of
information in a consumer case.
C. Sales Presentation and Salespersons
Many organizations hold sales seminars and meetings to train their representatives on how
to sell the product or service. Many times the sales presentation is reduced to writing. In
addition, there are occasions when there are two or more presentations for the same product or
service. One may be for show, and the other(s) for actual use and training. During investigation
and discovery the practitioner should be careful to obtain all documents and recordings of sales
presentations and not just any sanitized version.
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Sales persons tend to commit their presentations to memory and make the same
presentation over and over. When examining a sales person, it is often helpful to ask them to
"mock out" their presentation as though the examiner is a potential buyer. In such instances the
sales person will likely either rattle offthe presentation and include any deceptive material, or
attempt to sanitize the presentation in an obvious way as he or she goes along. Useful evidence
can often be obtained in this way.
There is nothing that will "ice" a case for a consumer faster than to find a present or
former sales person who will explain how he or she was trained and how they used a deceptive
sales presentation. Invariably the defendant will complain that this is a disgruntled or rogue
employee. However; the truth coming from the "horse's mouth" so to speak, is very effective. In
discovery, the plaintiff should always ask for a list ofpresent and past sales persons if a deceptive
sales presentation was used. Always establish that the principal was either responsible for the
deceptive presentation or that the principal knew of its existence. The business will likely fight
to the death to keep from disclosing such information.
v. OTHER CONSUMER PROTECTION STATUTES
A. Buying Clubs (KRS 367.395)
The Buying Club or Vacation Clubs statute (KRS 367.395 et.seq.) is a statute for
practices that were problematic in 1982 , but which have become less problematic today. The
statute defines a "Buying club" in part as an organization which for a consideration provides or
purports to provide its members with the ability to purchase goods or services at discount prices.
An exception is an non-profit organization. The statute provides for cancellation ofmembership,
requirements for price comparisons and a bond requirement for such buying clubs.
B. Home Solicitation Sales (KRS 367.410)
What has been generally referred to as the "three day cooling offperiod" law is often
misunderstood. Ofprimary importance is the fact that it only applies when goods or services are
personally solicited at a residence of the buyer and the buyer's agreement to purchase is there
given. It does not include a sale made pursuant to prior negotiations between the parties at a
business establishment. The act provides for cancellation of a home solicitation sale until
midnight of the third business day after the day on which the buyer signs an agreement or offer to
purchase. It does not apply to goods or services which are provided without delay because of an
emergence and the seller makes a good faith beginning ofperformance or when the goods cannot
be returned to the seller in good condition, to sales of insurance or sales under $25.00. A home
solicitation notice is required, but if it complies with the FTC Act Home Solicitation Rule (Title
16, CFR, Chap. I, Subchapter D, Part 429) a separate notice is not required. (OAG 74-729) After
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cancellation the seller must tender to the buyer any payments made by him and the buyer must
tender any goods he received to the seller.
C. Telephone Solicitations
Telephone solicitations will be covered elsewhere in this Handbook and will not be
detailed here.
D. Recreation and Retirement Use Land Sales (KRS 367.470)
This statute was designed to address the problem of the sale of undeveloped land to be
used for recreation and retirement and which is never later developed. The statute requires a
statement of the buyer's rights, a performance bond by the seller, restrictions on the use of
maintenance fees, and an easement in common areas. Other consumer rights are also found in
the statute. Certain sub-dividers are exempted (15 U.S.c. secs. 1701-1720). A violation of
certain parts ofthe statute can be a Class C felony (KRS 367.990(15)).
E. Subscription Sales of Printed Material (KRS 367.510)
Magazine and book salesmen are often a plague on the consumer. Solicitors are required
by this statute to annually register with the county clerk of the county in which they are
solicitating. Such sales must be on a subscription basis and payable on installments or on a cash
basis or by contract or note and the delivery must be contingent on a future event such as a down
payment or one or more installments. School organizations are exempt. All orders or contracts
for such printed material are void and unenforceable at the option of the purchaser ifthe
solicitator is in violation ofthe statute. All magazines (not newspapers) mailed into Kentucky
shall have on their label the expiration date of the subscription.
The Supreme Court ofKentucky decided that the General Assembly can constitutionally
require nonresidents engaged in the business of soliciting orders, via interstate telephone for
magazines to register in each county in which they solicit. Budget Marketing, Inc. J':
Commonwealth, Ky. 587 S.W.2d 245 (1979)
E. Negative Option Plan (KRS 367.570)
Books and records (CD's) are often sold by means of a negative option plan. The plan
often requires the subscriber to send a card or notification to the company within a prescribed
time in order to prevent the company from sending and billing such subscriber for the
merchandise being sold. KRS 367.570 specifies the disclosures the seller must make to the
subscriber as well as the seller's duty thereunder. A violation ofthe act shall be considered an
unfair, false misleading or deceptive act or practice in violation ofthe Consumer Protection Act
(KRS 367.170).
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G. Consumer Credit Contracts (KRS 367.600)
This statute attempts to allow consumers to assert defenses for goods or services acquired
for personal, family, or household purposes, notwithstanding the Holder in Due Course Doctrine
found in the UCC (K.R.S. 355.3-302). The Kentucky law has an exception for contracts taken
which are in compliance with any trade regulation issued by the Federal Trade Commission or
any regulation issued by the Board of Governors ofthe Federal Reserve System or similar federal
agency.
H. Solicitation for Charitable and Civic Purposes (KRS 367.650)
What percentage ofmoney collected goes to the charity and what percentage goes to the
Professional Solicitor? This statute attempts to require an up front disclosure of this information
if the professional solicitor will receive more than 50% ofthe gross receipts of the funds solicited
as his or her compensation. KRS 367.667(3) Unfortunately, this portion ofthe statute was
declared unconstitutional in violation of the First Amendment in Kentucky State Police
Professional Association v. Chris Gorman, Attorney General, 870 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Ky
1994). However; this issue has been addressed in a later opinion by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Illinois v Telemarketing Associates, Inc., et al., 538 U.S.600; 123 S. Ct. 1829; 155 L. Ed. 2d
793 (2003) wherein the Court ruled that state Attorneys General may maintain fraud actions
when fundraisers make false or misleading representations designed to deceive donors about how
their donations will be used. The Illinois Attorney General's deceptive practice action was
allowed when it was alleged that the charitable solicitation was a facade and the amount of funds
paid over to the charity was merely incidental to the solicitors private pecuniary benefit. A
professional solicitor or his organization who receives more than 50% of the funds received as
his or her compensation might be liable pursuant to a Consumer Protection Act violation
depending upon the individual fact pattern.
The Charitable Solicitation Act contains other provisions designed to protect those who
make charitable contributions. These include a requirement that professional solicitors and
fundraising consultants register with the Attorney General (KRS 367.652), a requirement that
federal Form 990 be filed by a charitable organization prior to any solicitation (KRS 367.657)and
that a financial report of a solicitation campaign be filed with the Attorney General (KRS
367.658). It is an unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive act and practice in violation ofKRS
367.170 to lead anyone to believe that a solicitation is for a charitable organization without being
authorized in writing to do so. It is also a violation to utilize a name or symbol so closely related
or similar to that used by another charitable organization that its use would tend to confuse or
mislead a solicited person (KRS 367.667).
A large volume of information on professional solicitors and charitable organizations are
collected by the Attorney General each year. Help in obtaining this information can be had by
calling the Consumer Protection Division at (502) 696-5389.
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I. The Mobile Home Lemon Law (KRS 367.710)
The Mobile Home Lemon Law presumes that a mobile home is nonmerchantable if
within the first 12 months after delivery it has a defect which cost the owner at least 4 % ofthe
purchase price to repair and which requires repair or replacement on 3 separate occasions. After
a mobile home qualifies as nonmerchantable, the manufacturer shall at its option, return the price
paid by the seller or supply a new mobile home ofthe same model and year.
J. Business Opportunities (KRS 367.801)
One of the saddest forms of fraud and deception is what has been termed the "nest
egg" fraud. It is disheartening to see a person or couple lose their life savings on the promise of a
fly-by-night shark that they will get rich or obtain financial security as a result of a business
opportunity.
Persons engaging in the sale ofbusiness opportunities in the Commonwealth must
register with the Attorney General (KRS 367.805), furnish a bond, and furnish information
specified in the statute. Any representation regarding potential sale, income or profit from the
business opportunity must be based upon the actual earnings made by existing
consumer/investors. If examples of earnings claims are in excess ofthe average net earnings
realized by all of the investors, then there must be a complete disclosure of the average net
earnings actually realized by all of the investors. There is a 30 day cooling offperiod for
qualifying business opportunities.
Exemptions from the provisions of the act include when the offeror meets the FTC
definition ofa franchise and complies with 16 C.F.R. 436 et seq; offers a security pursuant to
KRS 292.313; offers an ongoing business for sale; or offers a not-for-profit sale of sales
demonstration equipment for $500.00 or less. (KRS 367.807) Violations ofparts of the Act can
be a Class C felony (KRS 367.990(13).
K. Pyramid Sales Act (KRS 367.830)
A pyramid distribution plan is any plan, program, device, scheme or other process by
which a participant gives consideration for the opportunity to receive compensation or things of
value in return for inducing other persons to become participants in the program. It is unlawful
in the Commonwealth for any person to establish, promote, operate, or participate in any pyramid
distribution plan. (KRS 367.832) Violation ofthe statute is a Class C felony.
(KRS 367.990(21)(a)
Although prosecuted under federal law, the practitioner is directed to United States
v. Gold Unlimited, Inc., 177 F.3d 472 (6 Cir. 1999). There the court analyzed the federal law as
it relates to pyramid sales. The company's conviction was upheld.
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L. Health Spas (Body Building) (KRS 367.900)
Pursuant to this statute, the term "Health spa" means a facility which purports to
improve the person's physical condition or appearance through participation in sports activities,
fitness training, exercise, or body building. It does not include nonprofit organizations.
Individuals or companies operating a Health Spa must file a registration with the
Attorney General and furnish a surety bond for compensation to any member who suffers loss of
money paid due to the insolvency of the health spa, the cessation of its operation or failure to
open for business within 90 days from the sale of the first contract. A purchaser shall be entitled
to cancel his or her contract within 3 business days following the purchase of the membership
contract. Other rights ofthe purchaser is specified in the statute which includes the right to cancel
for death, medical disability and in some instances, relocation.
M. Going out of Business Sale (KRS 365.410)
No one may hold a "Going out ofBusiness Sale" without first obtaining a license to
hold such a sale from the county clerk and posting a bond of$l,OOO.OO. The application for the
license must include a full and complete inventory which shall be posted at the front door and in
the sales room. No person conducting such a sale shall add any goods to the stock for inclusion
in the sale. The Attorney General may enforce the provisions of this statute by injunction and
civil penalty.
N. The Uniform Commercial Code (KRS Chapter 355)
The Uniform Commercial Code contains many provisions that may help, or in some
cases hurt the practitioner in a Consumer Protection case. Volumes ofmaterial have been written
on this subject. Listed below are selected provisions that may be ofhelp in a consumer case:
1. The unconscionable contract or clause provision (KRS 355.2-302;
KRS 355.2A-108).
2. The Holder in Due Course provision (K:R.S. 355.3-302; see also Subpart 9 of
the UCC).
3. Revocation ofAcceptance (KRS 355.2-608).
4. Implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose (KRS 355.2-315;
KRS 2A-213).
o. The Magnuson Moss Warranty Act (22 U.S.C. sec 2301-2312)
The Magnuson Moss Warranty Act (22 U.S.C. sec. 2301-2312) will be discussed in
greater detail in the context of automobiles in chapter 7 of this Handbook.
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VI. SELECTED CRIMINAL STATUTES
Certain criminal statutes may have a bearing on civil consumer protection actions. The
Commonwealth's Attorney, County Attorney or in some cases the Attorney General has state
jurisdiction to prosecute such cases. However; the practitioner should be aware of such statutes
since they might affect the outcome oftheir civil case. Many times a court will allow probation
in a criminal case on condition that the defendant makes full restitution.
A. Theft by deception (KRS 514.040)
Theft by deception is a Class A misdemeanor unless the value ofthe property, service, or
the amount of the check or sight order is three hundred dollars ($ 300) or more, in which case it
is a Class D felony.
B. False Advertising (KRS 517.030)
(1) A person is guilty of false advertising when, in connection with the promotion of the
sale ofor to increase the consumption ofproperty or services, he knowingly makes or causes to be
made a false or misleading statement in any advertisement addressed to the public or to a
substantial number ofpersons.
(2) False advertising is a Class A misdemeanor.
Bait Advertising (KRS 517.040)
(1) A person is guilty ofbait advertising when in any manner, including advertising or other
means ofcommunication, he offers to the public or a substantial number ofpersons property or
services as part ofa scheme or plan with the intent not to sell or provide the advertised property or services:
(a) At the price at which he offered them; or (b) In a quantity sufficient to meet the reasonably
expected public demand, unless the quantity is specifically stated in the advertisement; or (c) At
all.
(2) Bait advertising is a Class A misdemeanor.
(See also the Federal Trade Commission's "Guides Against Bait Advertising at 16 C.F.R. Part
238.)
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VII. SELECTED DEFENSES TO DECEPTIVE PRACTICE CLAIMS
A. Puffing
Although there are no known Kentucky cases on this subject at this time, mere puffing
during a sales presentation is generally a valid defense to a deceptive practice claim. Adjectives
such as "good", "better" or "best" may be considered puffing in certain cases and such terms may
not rise to the level of deception. To show that a claim is puffing, it may be necessary to show that
it is an exaggeration and harmless. A test for determining whether a representation is mere puffing
could be (a) whether the statement was specific; (b) the comparative knowledge ofthe buyer and
seller; (c) whether the representation pertained to a past, current, or future event or condition.
Humble Nat'l Bank v. DCV, Inc., Tex App., 933 S.W.2d 224(1997); (See sec. 4.2.10 of the 5th
Edition "Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices", National Consumer Law Center 2002;
See also Rodio v. Smith, N.J., 587A.2d 621(1991); "You're in good hands with Allstate" is
nothing more than puffery".; but see also Miller v. William Chevroiet/Geo, Inc., 326 Ri. App. 3d
642;762 N.E.2d 1(2001) "Unlike phrases such as "expert workmanship," or "magnificent" which
courts have found to be mere statements ofvalue Breckenridge v. Cambridge Homes, Inc., 246
Ri. App. 3d 810,823,616 N.E.2d 615, 623,186 Ill. Dec. 425 (1993)),. "executive driven" is
sufficiently susceptible of interpretation as a factual description ofa car's history to defy our
characterizing it as "puffing" as a matter oflaw.")
B. Mistake
A bona fide error might be a defense to a deceptive practice action. Such errors, if
accepted, should be limited to clerical errors or mistakes in computing numbers. A pattern or
practice utilizing mathematical errors; however, would not act as a defense. Likewise, a good faith
defense based upon an attorney's or other professional's advise would not normally be successful.
Similarly, the lack of knowledge on the part of a seller making a false statement would not
normally be a valid defense. (See sec. 4.2.6 of the 5th Edition "Unfair and Deceptive Acts and
Practices",Id)
C. Arbitration
The appearance of compulsory arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have become
increasingly prevalent. Such clauses may seek to foreclose a consumer's right to trial by jury. It
may also attempt to foreclose meaningful discovery. Likewise, the costs for the consumer to
arbitrate a claim may be staggering.
While overcoming arbitration clauses may be difficult, these difficulties are not
insurmountable. For in depth research on this subject, the practitioner is referred to the National
Consumer Law Center publication "Consumer Arbitration Agreements-Enforceability and
Other Topics" (2001).
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VIII. RESOURCES FOR THE PRACTITIONER
Throughout this overview, various references have been made to the Kentucky Attorney
General's Office and the National Consumer Law Center.
A. The Attorney General
The Assistant Attorneys General in the Consumer Protection Division are among the most
knowledgable in the nation. A telephone conference with one of these individuals may save
numerous hours ofresearch. The Attorney General's phone number is (502) 696-5300. The
Consumer Protection Division's direct line is 564-5389. Ask for an attorney in the Consumer
Protection Division that deals with your area of interest.
B. The National Consumer Law Center
The National Consumer Law Center is a non-profit organization located at 77 Summer
Street, 10th Floor, Boston, Massachusetts 02110. It can be reached by internet at
www.consumerlaw.org. The Center acts as a resource on consumer law and has many excellent
publications on consumer law issues. Anyone researching a consumer law issue should visit their
website.
C. Contributors to this Handbook
Finally, it would be a travesty not to mention the fine men and women who have
contributed to this CLE Handbook. These are the leading practitioners in this area of the law in
Kentucky.
Robert V. Bullock
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USURY & KENTUCKY CONSUMER CREDIT LAW
Consumer credit statutes and regulations generally do one or more of the following:
a) limit the rate of interest that can be charged on a loan. See e.g. the Usury Statute at
KRS 367.010 et seq.
b) limit the types of fees that can be included in the principal balance upon which interest
is charged. See e.g. The Retail Installment Contract Act at KRS 371.210 et. seq.
c) require disclosures of the true cost of credit. See e.g. The Truth In Lending Act at 15
U.S.c. 1601 et. seq. The Truth In Lending Act requires disclosure of the cost of credit as the
"Finance Charge" and cost on an annualized bases as the "Annual Percentage Rate".
The cost ofcredit includes more than just interest; it also may include document
preparation fees, loan origination fees; underwriting fees; brokers fee; funding fees, etc. that are
financed in the loan balance. Accordingly, the 'Finance Charge" will often exceed the interest
total and the Annual Percentage Rate will often exceed the interest rate.
USURY: KRS 367.010
Statutory Basis of Interest: The right to charge interest on a loan, debt, or other legal
obligation is a right created by statute. See, Coleman v. Reamer'8 Executor, 237 Ky. 603, 36
S.W.2d 22 (1931). Statutes may designate a charge as interest for purposes ofusury or as a
charge falling outside usury limits. See, e.g., KRS 368.100 ("deferred deposit" charges are
service fees); KRS 371.260 (charges on a retail installment contract are "time price differential").
Rate of Interest: the usury statute at KRS 367.010 sets the legal rate of interest at
8% per annum; allows the parties by written agreement, to set any interest rate for loans
exceeding $15,000.00, and for loans less than $15,000 set a maximum rate equal to the
lesser of 19% per annum, or 4% in excess of the discount rate on 90 day commercial paper
in effect at the Federal Reserve Bank in the Federal Reserve District where the transaction
is consummated.
Non-Applicability: The usury statute is not applicable where other, specific statutes have
been enacted. KRS 360.022.
Substance Over Form: Courts look beyond the formal language of a written obligation
to determine if charges are really interest. See, Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp 953 (E.D. Ky,
1997, quoting Hurt v. Crystal Ice & Cold Storage Co., 286 S.W.2d 1055, 1056-57 (Ky. 1926):
The cupidity oflenders, and the willingness ofborrowers to concede whatever may be demanded
or to promise whatever may be exacted in order to obtain temporary relief from financial
embarrassment, as would naturally be expected, have resulted in a great variety of devices to
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evade the usury laws; and to frustrate such evasions the courts have been compelled to look
beyond the form of a transaction to its substance, and they have laid it down as an inflexible rule
that the mere form is immaterial, but that it is the substance [*956] which must be considered.
See also, White v. Check Holders, Inc., Ky. 996 S.W.2d 496 (1999); Commonwealth ex rei.
Chandler v. Kentucky Title Loan, Inc., Ky.App., 16 S.W.2d 312 (1999).
Civil Penalty: KRS 360.020 states:
The taking, receiving, reserving, or charging a rate of interest greater than is allowed by KRS
360.010, when knowingly done, shall be deemed a forfeiture ofthe entire interest which the note,
bill, or other evidence of debt carries with it, or which has been agreed to be paid thereon. In case
the greater rate of interest has been paid, the person by whom it has been paid, or his legal
representatives, may recover, in an action in the nature of an action of debt, twice the amount of
the interest thus paid from the creditors taking or receiving the same: provided, that such action
is commenced within two (2) years from the time the usurious transaction occurred.
KRS 360.010 is worded virtually identically to the National Banking Act at 12 U.S.C
86. Courts construe statutes such as KRS 360.020 & 12 U.S.C. 86 to first require forfeiture
of all interest on the contract. As no interest is then owed, interest is not considered
received until the debtor has made payments totaling the principal. After sufficient
payments have been made to pay the principal, a payment is considered to be interest,
within the meaning of the statute, for which the debtor may recover twice the interest paid.
However, if a specific payment is designated by the parties as an interest payment, twice
the amount of such payment may be recovered, regardless of whether the principal has
been paid.
Conduct That May Result in Usury: Any systematic procedure that results in the
taking, receiving, reserving, or charging more interest than was agreed to in the contract could
result in usury. For example, unless permitted by the parties note, mortgage, or security
agreement or by applicable statute or regulation, the following practices are potentially
usurious: charging interest on a 365/360 daily basis l ; failing to timely apply payments to
principal reduction; failing to apply payments in the manner prescribed by the note and/or
mortgage; applying payments to the lender's or servicer's fees and costs of doing business,
rather than to principal reduction; assessing fees after default for reinstatement and or
forbearance of acceleration and collection.
State Statutes Regulating Interest or Fees in Specific Instances: A non-exhaustive list
ofKentucky statutes setting interest rates or defining charges as something other than "interest"
includes:
1 See American Timber & Trading Co. v First Nat. Bank (1973, CA9 Or) 511 F2d 980,
cert den (1975) 421 US 921, 43 LEd 2d 789,95 S Ct 1588.
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Loans in the nature of "deferred deposits" (holding a check before cashing). KRS
368.100;
General retail installment contract. KRS 371.210;
Retail installment contract for motor vehicles. KRS 190.110;
Financing for variable rate contracts for mobile homes. KRS 360.150;
Pawns. KRS 226.080;
Loans made by banks chartered by the Commonwealth ofKentucky. KRS 287.214,
287.215 (but have option ofproceeding under usury statute);
Credit cards/revolving credit cards by a Kentucky chartered bank or national bank located
in Kentucky. KRS 287.740, 287.750;
Small loan companies (loans of$15,000 or less). KRS 288.530, 288.533;
Savings and loan associations. KRS 289.451;
Title pledge agreements. KRS 368.260.
FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAW
The federal government has preempted states' usury laws in a number ways.
Preemptions of state laws pertaining to loans made by national banks are among the most
common.
National Bank Act: The National Bank Act sets interest rates for federally chartered
banks at the higher of (i) 1% above the discount rate on 90-day commercial paper as set by the
Federal Reserve Bank in the district where the bank is located or (ii) at the interest rate allowed
lenders in the state where the bank is located. 12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86; see also, 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001,
defining interest under the Act.
Most Favored Lender Doctrine: The National Bank Act's "most favored lender
doctrine" allows national banks to use the interest rate allowed lenders located in the state where
the bank is located. Under this doctrine, national banks may charge the highest rate of a
competing lender ofthe type ofloan the national bank is making. Therefore, a national bank
making a consumer loan inside Kentucky for under $15,000 could charge the rates allowed small
loan companies under KRS 288.530 and must comply with restrictions that are material to
interest rate determination such as maximum loan charges and service charges. See, Northway
Lanes v. Hackley Union Nat 'I. Bank and Trust, 464 F.2d 855 (6th Cir. 1972);
National Banks May Export Interest Rates: the most favored lender doctrine allows a
national bank to export its interest rate across state lines. Marquette National Bank of
Minneapolis v. First ofOmaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978). By Regulaton, the acc has
defined "interest" within the meaning ofthe National Bank Act to include any charge
compensating the bank for extending credit or for any default or breach by the borrower,
including among other things, late fees, over limit fees, membership fees, annual fees, NSF fees,
document preparation fees, and premiums or commissions earned on insurance sold to guarantee
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repayment.. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a). This means the national bank can export laws regarding the
foregoing fees, Id at (b). See also, Smiley v. eitibank (South Dakota), NA., 517 U.S. 735 (1996).
Federalization & Removal to Federal Court of Usury Claims against National
Banks: The Supreme Court in Ben. Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 539 u.s. 1 (2003) held that the
National Bank Act renders all usury claims against National Banks federal claims under the act
and subject to removal to federal court, even ifpleaded as state law claims.
O.C.C.'s Expansive and Controversial 2004 Preemption Regulations: In February,
2004 the Office of the Comptroller ofthe Currency (O.C.C.) adopted four expansive regulations
that purport to preempt state laws that "obstruct, impair or condition a national bank's ability to
fully exercise" its powers under the National Bank Act, including through subsidiaries. In
essence, the regulations hold that no state law applies to national banks unless the law has only
an "incidental affect on the business ofbanking". See 12 C.F.R. §§7.407(b), 7.408(d), 7.409(b),
34.4(a). The regulations, among other things, purport to preempt all state laws pertaining to rates
of interest, credit terms, escrow accounts, security for loans, loan to value ratios, etc. For an
extensive analysis ofOCC's 2004 preemption regulations, see National Consumer Law Center,
The Cost ofCredit (2d ed. 2000 & Supp 2004) at §3.4.6.2.
At the time of this writing, it is not known whether these regulations will withstand the
scrutiny of Congress and the courts. It is important to remember, however, that these regulations
pertain only to national banks; that most egregious mortgage loans and servicing abuses are
made by entities other than national bank; that usury claims can still be made against national
Banks pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §§ 85 and 86; and that usury claims based upon the charging of fees
and expenses not agreed to in the parties contract, in some instances, could be enhanced by
subject to O.C.c.'s broad definition of interest appearing at 12 C.F.R. § 7.4001(a).
Expansion of Most Favored Lender Doctrine to Federally Insured State Institutions:
The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDA) extends the
most favored lender doctrine to federally insured state institutions. Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat.
161 (1980) (codified throughout provisions of Title 12 ofthe U.S. Code dealing with specific
financial institutions). Greenwood Trust v Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818 (1 st Cir. 1992); Venture
Properties v. First Southern Bank, 79 F.3d 90 (8th Cir. 1996). These state financial institutions
may export a number of different fees if such fees are defined as "interest" in their home states
and even though not included in the numerical rate disclosed to and charged to borrowers. Id.
Under DIDA, states can reassert control over credit charges by affirmative action. See, DIDA,
Pub. L. No. 96-221, Title V §§ (501)(b), 525. With respect to express limitations on interest rate,
Kentucky is not one of the states that has reasserted control. Not surprisingly, a number of state
banks (and perhaps some national banks) have located in banking friendly states solely for the
reason of exporting high interest rates on credit cards to other states.
Other Federal Regulation: Other federal regulations may preempt state regulation of
interest rate and other charges for specific types of loans funded or guaranteed by the federal
government, especially residential mortgage loans. (e.g., Veterans Administration loans).
Among the most important is DIDA at 12 U.S.C. 1735f-7a, which for federally related lenders,
preempts
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The provisions ofthe constitution or the laws of any State expressly limiting the rate or amount
of interest, discount points, finance charges, or other charges, which may be charged, taken,
received, or reserved shall not apply to any loan, mortgage, credit sale, or advance which is
(A) secured by a first lien on residential real property, by a first lien on all stock allocated to
a dwelling unit in a residential cooperative housing corporation or by a first lien on a residential
manufactured home [but with respect to manufactured housing only if the creditor covered by
this part complies with the consumer protection regulations appearing at 12 c.P.R. § 590.4(b)]
12 U.S.C. 1735f-7a [emphasis supplied]
It is doubtful whether DIDA preempts Kentucky's usury statute with respect to mortgage
loans in excess of$15,000.00, because KRS 360.010 appears not to "expressly" limit the rate of
interest the parties may agree to, but merely requires that the lender abide by the rate it agreed to
in writing. As such it is a legitimate consumer protection provision. See e.g Grunbeck v. Dime
Sav. Bank ofNew York, 74 F3d 331 (1 st Cir. 1996), holding that statute precluding compound
interest is a legitimate consumer protection provision and not an express limitation on the rate of
interest and therefore is not preempted.
A summary of the various preemptive statutes, which appears in National Consumer
Law Center, The Cost of Credit (2d ed. 2000 & Supp 2004) at §3.4.6.2. can be found in the
Appendix to this Chapter.
KENTUCKY INSTALLMENT SALES ACTS: STATUTES PREVENTING INFLATION
OF THE PRINCIPAL BALANCE UPON WHICH INTEREST IS CHARGED
The Retail Installment Sales Contract Act at KRS 371.210 to 371.665 and The Motor
Vehicle Installment Sales Contract Act, KRS 190.090 to 190.990 both provide for forfeiture of
the finance charges for non-accidental violations of the statute. In Barnes v Community Trust
Bank 121 S.W. 3d 520,521-22 (Ky. App. 2003), the court noted that The Retail Installment
Sales Contract Act "is a consumer protection statute mandating the content of retail installment
sales contracts in the context of consumer goods." The court further stated that "[t]he Motor
Vehicle Retail Installment Sales Act contains similar consumer protections to the more general
Retail Installment Sales Act, but is specifically tailored to the sale ofmotor vehicles." The
statutes appear intended to prevent creditors from loan packing through the use of unauthorized
or unexpected "add-ons" after the cash price has been agreed upon and from inflating the
principal balance upon which interest is charged.
The Retail Installment Sales Contract Act does this by statutorily defining the
principal balance at KRS 371.210(13)as follows:
Principal balance" means the cash sale price of the goods or services which are the subject
matter of a retail installment contract plus the amounts, if any, included therein, if a separate
identified charge is made therefor and stated in the contract, for insurance and official fees, less
the amount of the buyer's down payment in money or goods or both.
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The act limits official fees to those prescribed by law for perfection of a lien. KRS
371.210(11). The act requires that the amount included for insurance fees include a disclosure of
the types of insurance and term ofcoverage. KRS.371.220(5)(d). The act defines time price
differential as
"the amount which is paid or payable for the privilege ofpurchasing goods or services to be paid for by
the buyer in installments over a period of time. It does not include the amount, if any, charged for
insurance premiums, delinquency charges, attorneys fees, court costs, or official fees."
KRS.371.210.(9).
Typical violations of the content limitations in the act would appear to include the
following if financed in the principal balance: charges for official fees in excess of those
actually paid to public officials; document preparation fees; loan origination fees; pre-paid
finance charges; insurance charges unaccompanied by disclosure ofthe type or term of the
insurance; and possibly insurance charges in excess of sums the seller paid to the insurance
company. It would appear difficult for creditors to contend that these fees are part of the cash
price for "services which are the subject matter of a retail installment contract" etc.
KRS 371.990 (3) states:
Any person who violates any provision ofKRS 371.210 to 371.330 except
as a result of an accidental or bona fide error shall be barred from the
recovery of any time price differential, or any delinquency or collection
charge under or in connection with the related retail installment contract or
retail charge agreement..."
The Motor Vehicle Retail Sales Installment Act contains similar definitions and
appears to function similarly to the Retail Installment Sales Contract Act. In addition, it places a
ceiling on finance charges, prescribed at KRS 190.110. The ceiling limits finance charges to
$11.00 per hundred for new vehicles, $13.00 per hundred to one and two year old vehicles, and
$15.00 pre hundred for vehicles more than two years old by model year. This ceiling allows
greater interest charges than it may initially appear because KRS 190.110(4) allows the finance
charge to be pre-computed by the add-on method.2 Installment contracts assigned to out of state
finance companies sometimes violate the ceilings.
Like the Retail Installment Sales Contract Act, the Motor Vehicle Retail Sales
Installment Act defines the principal balance as the cash sale price minus the down payment plus
insurance and other benefits and official fees. KRS 190.100(2). This content based definition of
the principal balance prevents evasion ofthe ceiling on finance charges by inflation ofthe
principal balance, upon which "[s]uch finance charge shall be computed." KRS.190.110(2).
2 The add-on method permits pre-computation of finance charges without accounting for
the payments that will be made. In other words, it does not account for the reduction of principal
via the monthly payments. To calculate allowable charges, multiply the interest rate by the
amount financed and multiply the result by the number of years of the contract.
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No reported cases explain the operation ofthe act. It would appear, however, that
charges for official fees in excess of those paid to public officials; document preparation fees,
particularly those charged for the preparation of credit related documents; and processing fees
paid to financing companies may run afoul ofthe act. KRS. 190.090 (3) provides that a willful
violation of any provision ofKRS 190.090 to 190.140 by any person shall bar his recovery of
any finance, delinquency or collection charge on the contract. The FTC Holder Notice required
in all retail installment contracts would render the holder liable for the seller's violations of acts
regulating installment sales contracts.
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PART 2
TRUTH IN LENDING RESCISSION
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TRUTH IN LENDING RESCISSION
August, 2004
I. Scope: Rescission of Non Purchase Money Mortgages on Principal Residence
Truth In Lending ("TILA") rescission can eliminate a non-purchase money mortgage on the
consumer's home, thwart foreclosure, and vastly reduce the sums the consumer owes. This
outline addresses TILA rescission as it applies to closed-end credit only.
II. Overview of Truth In Lending Rescission
A. TILA Rescission and Transactions to Which It Applies: 15 U.S.C. 1635 & Regulation Z
at 12 CFR 226.23, and Staff Commentary at 226.23
TILA's rescission provisions are found at 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1635; Reg. Z 226.23, applying to
closed end credit; Reg. Z. 225.15, applying to open end credit; and the Official Federal Reserve
Board Staff Commentary ("Commentary") to the foregoing sections of Reg Z. "Unless
demonstrably irrational, Federal Reserve Board staff opinions construing the Act or Regulation
should be dispositive...." Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565, (1980).
Potentially rescindable non-purchase money mortgage transactions include: (1) home equity
loans; (2) home improvement contracts and loans; (3) refinancing of residential mortgages by a
new creditor; (4) refinancing of residential mortgages by the same creditor, but only to the extent
ofnew credit.
Important Limitation: TILA rescission does not apply to residential mortgage transactions in
which the mortgage secures the funds advanced for the acquisition or construction of the
residence.
B. Basis of the Right of Rescission: Three Day Cooling Off Period Activated Only By
Accurate, Clear, and Conspicuous Disclosure Within Meaning of TILA
TILA provides a consumer three business days to assess the wisdom of any transaction in which
the collateral is the consumer's pre-existing ownership interest in her home. Reg. Z 226.23(b)
grants a consumer a right to rescind a transaction in which a non-purchase money security
interest is taken on his residence that remains until midnight of the third business day following
whichever occurs LAST:
(1) consummation of the contract;
(2) delivery ofthe right ofrescission forms required by TILA; or
(3) delivery of the material TILA disclosures in the clear, conspicuous, and
accurate manner required by TILA
If the creditor fails to furnish the material TILA disclosures or the notice of the consumer's right
to rescind in the manner prescribed by the Act, the right to rescind remains unexpired until the
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expiration of three years, or the sale or transfer of the consumer's ownership interest in the
property, whichever occurs first. Reg. Z Sec. 226.23(a)(3).
C. Exercising the Rescission in writing.
Any consumer whose right of rescission has not expired can cancel the transaction by notifying
the creditor in writing. Reg. Z Sec. 226.23(a)(2). If more than one consumer has a right of
rescission and rescinds, the rescission is effective as to all consumers. Id. at (a)(4). A rescission
is effective against the original creditor and assignees. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1641.
D. Effects of Rescission: Reverse of Common Law Rescission. Designed to place the
Consumer in Status Quo Ante, often at the Expense of the Creditor.
Reg Z. Sec 226.23 (d) Effects of rescission.
(1) When a consumer rescinds a transaction, the security interest giving rise to the right of rescission
becomes void and the consumer shall not be liable for any amount, including any finance charge.
(2) Within 20 calendar days after receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return any money or
property that has been given to anyone in connection with the transaction and shall take any action
necessary to reflect the termination of the security interest.
(3) If the creditor has delivered any money or property, the consumer may retain possession until the
creditor has met its obligation under paragraph (d)(2) of this section. When the creditor has complied with
that paragraph, the consumer shall tender the money or property to the creditor or, where the latter would
be impracticable or inequitable, tender its reasonable value. At the consumer's option, tender of property
may be made at the location of the property or at the consumer's residence. Tender of money must be made
at the creditor's designated place of business. If the creditor does not take possession of the money or
property within 20 calendar days after the consumer's tender, the consumer may keep it without further
obligation.
(4) The procedures outlined in paragraphs (d) (2) and (3) of this section may be modified by court order.
[Emphasis supplied. NOTE the omission ofparagraph (d)(l) from modification.]
Commentary 226.23(d)(1). Termination of security interest. Any security interest giving rise to the right
of rescission becomes void when the consumer exercises the right of rescission. The security interest is
automatically negated regardless of its status and whether or not it was recorded or perfected. Under section
226.23(d)(2), however, the creditor must take any action necessary to reflect the fact that the security
interest no longer exists.
In short, upon rescission, the mortgage is void, and the consumer is liable only for the original
loan proceeds ('real proceeds"), or for the property purchased, or, at the consumer's option, the
property's reasonable value. The consumer is not liable for any finance charge or other
incidental charges such as credit insurance charges, license, filing and official fees, title search
fees, and document preparation fees.
Statutory Damages: If the matter is litigated, the creditor may be liable for statutory damages of
twice the finance charge but not more than $2000 for the original disclosure violation that caused
the right of rescission to remain unexpired; additional statutory damages of $2000 for any failure
to comply with its rescission obligations; and the debtor's attorney fees. 15 U.S,c. 1640(a); 15
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U.S.C. 1635(g). Assignees are liable for statutory damages to the extent they can be determined
from the documents assigned. 15 U.S.C. 1641(a).
F. Property Vesting in Consumer Without Obligation and Other Remedies
Occasionally, the creditor could lose the right to recover the real proceeds. The rescission rules
of Regulation Z are meant to be implemented by the parties outside court. The creditor's tender
to the consumer of all amounts paid on the contract provides the consumer a portion of the funds
he will have to tender to the creditor. The voiding of the security interest frees equity in the
consumer's residence that can serve as collateral to enable the consumer to obtain any additional
funds he may need to complete his tender. If the creditor refuses to complete its obligations in
the rescission process, the process is thwarted since most consumers will not have the equity
necessary to secure the funds to complete their tender. Additionally, in accordance with the
steps specified by Reg. Z, the consumer's duty to tender never arises. Recognizing this, courts
have fashioned numerous remedies - including allowing the proceeds to vest in the consumer
without obligation - to enforce TILA rescission when a creditor fails to acknowledge the
rescission or tender. Examples
include:
Sosa v. Fite, 498 F.2d 114 (5th Cir. 1974): creditor ignored rescission and debtor's tender; must
return debtor's payments, pay $2000 statutory penalties, release mortgage, forfeit loan proceeds,
and pay debtor's attorney fees.
Gill v. Mid-Penn Consumer Discount Co., 671 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Pa. 1987): consumer's
tender obligation arises only if creditor releases security interest within 20 days. Held:
consumer awarded statutory penalties, attorney fees, excused from payment of outstanding
balance, mortgage void. See also, Family Financial Services v. Spencer 677 A2d 479 (Conn.
App.1996).
Shepherd v. Quality Siding and Window Factory, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 1295 (D. Del. 1990):
where no evidence creditor tried to cheat debtor, debtor awarded statutory penalties, attorney
fees, mortgage void, debtor must pay sums owed after rescission via monthly payments
without interest. See also Mayfield v. Vanguard Savings and Loan Assoc., 710 F. Supp. 143
(E.D. Pa., 1989).
But see, Buckles vs. Thorp Loan and Thrift Co., 189 B.R. 752, 764 (Bankr. Minn. 1995); and
similar cases holding that the court can condition the rescission and voiding of the mortga~e on
the consumer's tender. See Williams vs. Homestake Mortgage Co., 968 Fed. 2d 1137 (11 t Cir.
1992) for a discussion of a Court's, use of its equitable powers to "condition" voidance of the
security interest.
G. Using Bankruptcy After Rescission To Overcome Consumer Tender Problems
Reg. Z Sec. 226.23, on it's face, entitles the creditor only to an unsecured claim or judgment.
Some bankruptcy courts, recognizing this, have allowed rescission and held the creditor
unsecured. This means that in Chapter 7 bankruptcies, the creditor would take nothing. See In
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re Piercy, 18 B.R. 1004 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1982). In Chapter 13, the creditor would receive the
same percentage payment granted other unsecured creditors. See In re: Myers 175 B.R. 122
(Bank Bankr. D. Mass. 1994); In re Chancy, 33 B.R. 355 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1983). But see,
Buckles Supra at 189 B.R. 752 (Bankr. Minn. 1995); In re: Lynch. 170 B.R. (Bankr. D. M. H.
1994).
There is a split in the case law concerning whether a debtor can satisfy his rescission obligations
in Bankruptcy. For a good discussion of the case law, resulting in the conclusion that the
creditor is unsecured, but (surprisingly) should have a separately classified 100% claim see,
Williams v. Bank One 291 B.R. 636 (Bankr. B.D. Pa. 2003).1
III. Finding TILA Disclosure Violations To Obtain Statutory Damages And Extend the
Right Of Rescission, Reg. Z 226.4 & 226.23.
Truth In Lending rescission has potential to save the home of a consumer debtor threatened by
foreclosure arising from a home equity loan or home improvement loan or contract. To
accomplish this result, counsel must find a TILA disclosure violation sufficient to establish that
the right of rescission remains unexpired.
To find a disclosure violation that extends the rescission period, counsel must develop a working
knowledge of TILA at 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.; Regulation Z at 12 C.F.R. Part 226; and the
Commentary 12 C.F.R. Part 226, Supp. 1. Most important is Reg. Z 226.4 defining the finance
charge.
A. Overview of TILA
TILA is designed to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be
able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid uninformed use
ofcredit. 15 U.S.C. 1601.
In any TILA case, counsel should emphasize TILA is not merely a technical statute, but plays a
central role in assuring the efficient furnishing of consumer credit, which, central to our
economic well-being.2
1 It is surprising that the Court grants a creditor that violated an important consumer protection statute a
more favorable classification and treatment than the other unsecured creditors who violated no laws. Given that the
bankruptcy code provides for the elimination and stripping down of various security interests to the benefit of
unsecured creditors, bankruptcy judges, having to weigh the interests of all the creditors as well as the debtor, appear
generally less likely to deviate from Regulation Z's unambiguous directive that upon valid rescission the mortgage
is void, leaving the parties as unsecured creditors of one another.
2The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competition among the various
financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of consumer credit would be strengthened by the
informed use of credit. The informed use of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. 15
U.S.c. 1601(a).
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TILA applies to consumer credit transactions that are subject to a finance charge or payable by
written agreement in more than four installments and that are offered or extended by a creditor
who has extended such credit more than 25 times in the preceding or current calendar year.
The Act requires that consumer credit disclosures be (1) clear and conspicuous; (2) grouped
together; (3) segregated from other materials; (4)in a legible, written form that the consumer may
keep; and (5) reflect the parties legal obligations.
Note: TILA's"amount finanaced" discloses the amount of credit furnished, and "finance
charge" discloses the cost of credit, but the TILA disclosures are not necessarily part of the
contract. Usually, the Note or Promise to Pay is the contract. The principal of the Note or
Promise to Pay may exceed the TILA disclosed "amount financed" because the principal
contains lender financed costs of credit, such as points, loan fees, funding fees, origination fees
etc that are costs of credit that do not appear in the amountfinanced.
B. 15 U.S.C. 1632, Reg. Z 226.17. Accurate Disclosure is the Touchstone of the Act
TILA Act reflects a transition in congressional policy from a philosophy of "the buyer beware"
to one of "let the seller disclose." Morning v. Family Publications, Inc. 98 S. Ct. 1642, 1648.
Statutory Damages: TILA Section 1640 allows a consumer to recover any actual
damages, plus, for a specified list of violations, statutory damages of twice the finance
charge but not less than $100 nor more than $1,000. In closed end transactions secured by real
estate or by a dwelling, the statutory damages are not less than $200 nor more than $ 2000. No
showing of actual damage is necessary for a recovery of statutory damages. For disclosure
violations, only one statutory damage award may be granted per transaction.
For closed-end disclosures, statutory damages attach for failure to clearly, conspicuously, and
accurately disclose
THE AMOUNT FINANCED;
THE FINANCE CHARGE;
THE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE;
THE TOTAL OF PAYMENTS;
THE NUMBER, AMOUNT AND DUE DATES OF PAYMENTS; AND
THE SECURITY INTEREST IDENTIFIED BY TYPE.
C. Violations Extending Rescission Rights. 15 USC 1602(u)
For rescission purposes, the right to rescind may remain unexpired for failure to clearly,
conspicuously, and accurately disclose the following "material" disclosures:
THE AMOUNT FINANCED
THE FINANCE CHARGE ("COST OF CONSUMER CREDIT AS A DOLLAR AMOUNT")
THE ANNUAL PERCENTAGE RATE
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THE TOTAL OF PAYMENTS, AND
THE NUMBER, AMOUNTS, AND DUE DATES OF PAYMENTS.
THE HOME OWNERSHIP AND EQUITY PROTECTION ACT DISCLOSURE warning the consumer that
he could lose is his home. This disclosure is only required in certain high rate or high points and
fees loans. HOEPA disclosure is usually triggered by points and fees exceeding 8% of the loan
amount or an APR exceeding by 8 percentage points the rate on comparable treasury notes.. See
outline on HOEPA.
D. Finding Under-disclosed Finance Charges That Establish An Unexpired Right to
Rescind.
The usual cause of an unexpired right to rescind is a creditor's failure to allocate a charge to the
finance charge, more specifically the pre-paid finance charge, resulting in an under-disclosed
finance charge and annual percentage rate. Regulation Z at 12 C.F.R. 226.4 defines the finance
charge as the "cost of consumer credit as a dollar amount". It includes any charge imposed
directly or indirectly by the creditor as an incident to or a condition of the extension of credit."
Whenever an item appears in the amount financed which item should be part of the finance
charge, the amount financed is overstated and the finance charge and annual percentage rate are
under-stated resulting in material disclosure violations that could extend the rescission period.
Tolerances; TILA has tolerances that must be exceeded before a consumer has an unexpired
right to rescind under Section 1635. After the creditor has initiated a "judicial or non-judicial
foreclosure process on the primary dwelling of the obligor", an understatement of the finance
charge of $35 or more is necessary to extend the right to rescind. See, l5U.S.C. 1635(i).
Overstated finance charges are not grounds for rescission.
A consumer not foreclosed upon, has an unexpired right to rescind only if the finance charge is
under-stated by one-half of one percent of the credit extended, unless the loan is a refinancing of
a purchase money loan by any lender in which case the consumer has an unexpired right to
rescind only if the finance charge is understated by one percent of the credit extended. See, 15
U.S.c. 1605(f). In addition, it appears that for offensive rescission the understatement must be
by at least $200. See, 15 U.S.C. 1649. Since most cases are defensive in nature, and since most
understated finance charges are in excess of $35, these limitation will rarely come into play.
E. Rule of Thumb for Undisclosed Finance Charges
To determine whether the Pre-paid Finance Charge were properly disclosed, first determine the
lender's computation of the Pre-paid Finance Charge by subtracting the Amount Financed on the
TILA disclosure from the Principal on the Note. Then Compare the itemization of pre-paid
finance charges and/or Settlement Statement with Reg.Z, 226.4 and Commentary thereto to see if
their are items omitted from the pre-paid finance charge that the Regulation requires be included.
The following broad rule of thumb may be a helpful starting point:
Any sum not charged in a comparable cash transaction that is a condition or incident to entering
a credit transaction, or becomes profit on the furnishings of credit, or in a transaction secured by
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real property is a charge payable to a third party that is not reasonable or bona fide, IS a
FINANCE CHARGE.
Reg. Z Sec 226.4 refines this rule by defining certain charges as finance charges and listing
charges that may be excluded from the finance charge.
F. Examples of Finance Charges: Charges Imposed As Conditions to Extension of Credit.
Reg. Z Sec. 226.4(b)
Buyers points, loan origination fees, brokers fees, funding fees, underwriting fees, finders fees,
credit service charges, most settlement charges, premiums for private mortgage insurance, and
similar fees are finance charges because they are directly imposed as conditions to the extension
of credit. Reg. Z 226.4(b).
G. Excess Statutory and Lien Filing Fees Resulting In Under-disclosed Finance Charges.
Reg. Z Sec. 226.4{e)
Taxes and fees prescribed by law for determining the existence of, perfecting, or releasing
security interests may be excluded from the finance charge. Any charge for such fees in excess
of the fees or taxes prescribed by law and actually paid is an undisclosed finance charge that
results in an understated disclosure of the finance charge.
Similarly, fees in excess of actual license, title, and registration fees, if such excess fees are not
charged to cash customers, should be finance charges. See Williams
v. Bill Watson Ford, Inc., 423 F. Supp. 345 (E.D. La. 1976). Counsel should check with the
county clerk or taxing authorities to make certain such claimed fees were in accordance with the
law and actually paid.
H. Certain Fees in Mortgage Transactions that Become Finance Charges When they Are
Not Bona Fide And Reasonable. Reg. Z Sec. 226.4(c)(7).
In transactions secured by real property or residential mortgages, fees for title examinations,
abstract of title, title insurance, property survey and similar purposes; preparing deeds,
mortgages, and reconveyance settlement and similar documents; and fees for notaries, appraisers,
and credit reports; and certain escrow fees are not finance charges if the fees are bona fide and
reasonable. See Reg. Z 226.4(c)(7). Excessive or duplicate fees of the types mentioned above are
not uncommon and result in an understated finance charge and annual percentage rate and an
overstated amount financed. Fees of the types mentioned above that are charged as payable to
third parties, but are not actually paid, or which are paid for bogus services not actually
performed would also appear to be finance charges. Fees for preparation of Truth In Lending
disclosure documents are always finance charges. Commentary Sec. 226.4(a).
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I. Insurance Disclosure Violations Resulting In Under-disclosed Finance Charge. Reg. Z
Sec. 226.4(d)
Creditors may exclude from the finance charge premiums for property insurance or credit life,
accident, health, disability and loss of income insurance only if they are actually paid and satisfy
the disclosure requirements listed at Reg. Z 226.4(d).
Most of the insurance disclosures required by 226.4(d) are pre-printed on the disclosure
statement, but potential violations remain. For example with respect to:
• credit life, accident, health, or disability insurance, the creditor may fail to have the
consumer sign or initial a statement acknowledging the insurance is voluntary and
requesting the insurance, or omit term of the insurance when the term is less than the
term of the transaction.
• With respect to property insurance, creditors may fail to disclose the term the insurance
when the term is less than the term of the transaction, or fail to disclose that the consumer
can purchase the insurance from an insurer ofhis choice.
• Such omissions would preclude exclusion of the insurance charges from the finance
charge and result in an understated finance charge and annual percentage rate and
overstated amount financed.
• Private Mortgage Insurance if paid for by the consumer is always a finance charge and
must be disclosed in the Finance Charge and payment schedule.
Commentary 226.4(a)(3)(i).
J. Violation of Delay of Performance Rule: Reg. Z 226.23(c): Spiking
The creditor may disburse no money other than in escrow, perform no services, and deliver no
materials until the rescission period has expired. Violation of this rule is called "spiking".
Particularly in the home improvement context, premature performance (spiking) interferes with
the consumer's right to reflect for three days on the wisdom of the transaction and undermines
the three day rescission notice.. Accordingly, many courts have held that spiking results in an
unexpired right to rescind. See NCLC, Truth In Lending (4th ed. 1999) Sec. 6.8.4.2 and cases
cited thereunder.
K. Violations Pertaining to The Number of Disclosure Forms and Right to Rescind
Notices Furnished
Regardless of who is liable on the note, each consumer whose ownership interest is or will be
subject to the security interest in the residence has a right to rescind and has a right to receive
one copy of the TILA disclosures and two copies of the notice of the right to rescind. Reg. Z
226.23 (a)(l) and 226.23(b). Commentary 226.23(b)(1). In the typical home equity loan in
which the home is owned by a husband and wife, the couple should receive two Truth In
Lending Disclosure forms and four notices. Failure to provide the required number of
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disclosure forms and notices results in an unexpired right to rescind as to the consumer who did
not receive the disclosure or required number of rescission notices, and one consumer can
rescind for all. Reg Z 226.23(a)(4). See e.g.. Williams v. BankOne, NA. (In re Williams), 291
B.R. 636, 645 (Bankr.E.D.Pa. 2003); Stone v. Mehlberg, 728 F.Supp. 1341, 1353 (W.D.Mich.
1990).
Preserve Poof: Victims of high cost loans receive numerous documents, which they
often preserve untouched in envelope or folder furnished them at closing; it is essential to
preserve proof of the documents that client has received, by having a knowledgeable person
count them and prepare an affidavit stating the number of TILA disclosure statements and
Notices ofRight to Cancel among the documents.
L. Violations Resulting From Inaccuracies in the Notice of Right to Rescind. Reg. Z
226.23(b).
The right to rescind will remain unexpired if the creditor fails to provide information required at
Sec. 226.23(b) in the rescission form. The form should be carefully compared with that section.
Common errors are (1) use of outdated forms, (2) filling in the wrong date on which the right to
rescind would normally expire (usually as a result of forgetting about Sundays or holidays), (3)
omitting such date entirely, (4) supplementing the notice of the right to rescind with a separate
written, but inaccurate, explanation of that right, or an inaccurate oral explanation. See, e.g.
Jenkins v. Landmark Mortgage Corporation, 696 F.Supp. 1089 (W.D. Va.1988) (Closing
attorney orally misstated rescission rights rendering rescission notice "unclear" and resulting in
unexpired right to canceL).
Wrong Federal Reserve Forms: The Federal Reserve furnishes model forms that creditors can
use to notify consumers of their rescission rights. One form is used when the transaction is fully
rescindable; another is used for extensions of new credit by the original creditor, resulting in a
transaction that is partially rescindable. Furnishing the wrong form will result in an unexpired
right to rescind in a defensive rescission (See 15 U.S.C. l635(i)(1)(B), and most probably in an
offensive rescission. See 15 U.S.c. l635(h)
IV. Drafting the Rescission Letter After Finding The TILA Violations: To Specify the
Disclosure Violations or Not
A. Assess whether rescission is wise, keeping in mind the difficulties the client may face in
completing her part of the rescission and that rescission without right will breach the contract. In
most cases, the client already will be in default so the risk of placing the client in breach is a
minor consideration.
B. After determining that rescission is appropriate, counsel should give careful thought to the
drafting of the rescission letter.
It is sufficient to state only that the client cancels the contract.
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In may be preferable, nevertheless, to draft a detailed letter specifying the violations that
have resulted in the unexpired rescission right. This evidences good faith, may lead to faster
resolution, and may provide a stronger basis for a court's ordering that the property or funds vest
in the consumer without obligation ifthe creditor fails to fulfill its rescission obligations.
Counsel electing to specify violations, therefore, should be certain to specify that the list
ofviolations is not an exclusive list, and allege an under-disclosed finance charge generally, as at
least one court has denied rescission where the consumer specified the wrong violation in an
otherwise rescindable transaction.
V. Steps Following Creditor's Response
The creditor's response to the consumer's rescission will determine the next steps. If the creditor
honors rescission, releases the mortgage, and tenders the payments to the consumer or properly
credits the consumer's account, counsel may assist the consumer in obtaining a loan to pay the
consumer's obligation pursuant to the rescission. If no funds can be obtained, counsel may
consider discharging the consumer's tender obligation, or a portion thereof, over time via Chapter
13 of the Bankruptcy Code; seeking a court order modifying the second and third steps of the
rescission procedure by allowing the consumer to pay over time by regular monthly payments, or
tendering a judgment lien against the property for the amount owed post rescission. If, as is
likely, the creditor refuses to perform its part of the rescission, counsel can file an action,
including counterclaim to foreclosure, in federal or state court, or an adversary proceeding in
bankruptcy court seeking avoidance of the mortgage; vesting of money or in the consumer
without obligation; alternatively, seeking to limit any judgement against the consumer to an
unsecured judgment in the sum owed after rescission; recovery of statutory penalties; recovery of
costs and attorney fees.
VI. Satisfying Your Clients' Tender Obligation
A. Loan from a bank, credit union, rural development, family or friends (may need co-signor)
B. Is there no tender obligation because payments made plus statutory penalties wipe out the
obligation?
C. Structure your case to maximize the opportunity for vesting without obligation.
-To maximize chance of vesting, your rescission letter might clearly explain the bases for
your rescission, with citations from the statute and Reg Z. Option: client sends letter
simply stating "I cancel". You follow up immediately with letter explaining basis.
-Attempt to show that all times relevant, the creditor could have no reasonable doubts
that your rescission was valid.
-Attempt to show creditor bad faith or that the equities favor the debtor and that the
creditor's conduct has prejudiced the debtor's rescission rights: For example, furnishing
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adverse and/or inflated credit report after valid reSCISSIOn; following policy of
"stonewalling rescissions; failing to investigate your client's allegation; post rescission
harassing collection practices; basing the loan on inflated appraisals that render it
impossible for the consumer to borrow the funds to tender etc.
-Furnish creditor credible information that establishes your client has the ability to tender
the sums owed after rescission: i.e., with a loan commitment or notarized statement from
lender. Option: file notice of ability to tender in court record.
-When can't procure funds to tender:
(1) Seek to tender the sum owed post rescission via court ordered monthly payments without
interest.
(2) Tender via Chapter 13 Bankruptcy: You can litigate the entire case in the bankruptcy court
via adversary proceeding. REMEMBER, if you choose bankruptcy court as the forum, always
rescind prior to filing the bankruptcy case. This defeats any argument that the Trustee should
exercise the rescission and not your client.
(3) Discharge tender obligation in Ch 7. Remember, assured of keeping residence only when
debtor can exempt the equity created by the rescission.
(4) A valid rescission voids the mortgage automatically. Reg Z Sec 226.23(d)(1). Contend
that the most the creditor is entitled to is an unsecured judgement in the amount owed post
reSCISSIon.
(5) If desperate, tender a judgement, which can be secured by a judgement lien, in the amount
owed post rescission (but be sure to reserve your claims for damages that might offset the
judgement). Move for summary judgement for statutory damages, and, if granted, seek to offset
them against amount owed post rescission. (TILA does not permit unilateral offset of statutory
damages; must be awarded them first.)
6. Negotiate a loan modification with the creditor. In conjunction with negotiations have the
property appraised by a reputable appraiser. You'll find that a significant proportion of high cost
loans are based on grossly inflated appraisals. Roughly 80% of the accurately appraised value of
the property should set an outside limit on the "new principal" in a loan modification.
VII. Defeating Creditor's Pleas for "Conditional Rescission".
Some Courts, failing to note the obvious differences between a statutory TILA rescission and an
equitable common law rescission,"condition" the consumer's rescission on the tender of the
amounts owed post rescission. See e.g. Williams v. Homestake 968 F2d 1137 (11 th Cir. 1992).
Some of these courts have allowed the creditor to retain it's mortgage until the tender has been
satisfied, have placed deadlines on the tender, and ordered that the rescission be denied if the
tender is not timely made. See Buckles vs. Thorp Loan and Thrift Co., 189 B.R. 752, 764
(Bankr. Minn. 1995). One court, in a case that should be limited to its facts, upheld summary
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judgement against a debtor who offered no evidence of a plan or ability to satisfy his tender
obligation. See, Yomamoto v Bank ofNew Your 329 F3d 1167 (9th Cir.2003). Such decisions
often refer to the court's broad equitable powers applicable to equitable remedies such as
rescission as a basis for altering the structure laid out by Reg Z. Such decisions fail to recognize
that TILA rescission is a statutory consumer protection remedy that as written assures that the
consumer is returned to the status quo ante even if doing so renders it impossible to return the
creditor to the precise position it occupied before consummation. (For example, the creditor
never recovers creditor financed appraisals, broker's fees, and other closing costs). The
following might prove helpful in demonstrating that these decisions are a judicial "re-write" of
TILA rescission that conflicts with well-established principals of administrative law, statutory
construction, and, with respect to TILA, virtually unfettered deference to the regulations,
commentary, and opinions of the Federal Reserve Board.
1. Courts cannot resort to equity to re-write statutes and administrative regulations. The
Bankruptcy Court in In Re Reddington 90 B.R. 429, 431-32 (Bankr. Ill. 1988) rejected a plea for
an equitable modification of a Bankruptcy Rule and in summarizing the law on this point stated,
As the Ninth Circuit states in In re Shoreline Concrete Co. Inc., 831 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1987), "a
fundamental principle of equity jurisprudence is that 'equity follows the law.' Hedges v. Dixon
County, 150 U.S. 182, 192, 14 S. Ct. 71, 74, 37 L. Ed. 1044 (1893). Courts of equity are bound
to follow express statutory commands to the same extent as are courts oflaw. Hedges, 150 U.S.
at 192, 14 S. Ct. at 74; Badaracco v. Commissioner, 464 U.S. 386, 104 S. Ct. 756, 78 L. Ed. 2d
549 (1984) ('courts are not authorized to rewrite a statute because they might deem its effects
susceptible of improvement'); Heppner v. Alyeska Pipeline Servo Co., 665 F.2d 868,872 (9th Cir.
1981) (in absence of drafting error, courts are powerless to avoid effects of plain language of
statute)."
2. TILA grants the Federal Reserve Board ("the Board") broad authority to prescribe
regulations to carry out the purposes of the Act. The Boards' "regulations may contain such
classifications, differentiations, or other provisions, and may provide for such adjustments and
exceptions for any class of transactions, as in the judgment of the Board are necessary or proper
to effectuate the purposes of this subchapter, to prevent circumvention or evasion thereof, or to
facilitate compliance therewith." 15 U.S.C. Sec.1604
With respect to administrative regulations generally, "If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific
provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative regulations are given controlling weight
unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron U.S.A. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837,843,844 (1984)
3. "Unless demonstrably irrational, Federal Reserve Board staff opinions construing [TILA] or
Regulation should be dispositive...." Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565,
(1980). TILA reflects a transition in congressional policy from a philosophy of "the buyer
beware" to one of "let the seller disclose." Morning v. Family Publications, Inc. 98 S. Ct. 1642,
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1648 (1973). TILA is construed liberally to protect consumers. Adams v. Plaza Finance Co.
168 F3d 932 (7th Cir. 1999); Edwards v. Your Credit, Inc. 149 F3d 427 (5 th Cir. 1998).
4. The by virtue of both Reg Z and the Commentary has stated that upon rescission the
mortgage is void and automatically negated and that only the procedures following the negation
of the mortgage are modifiable by judicial action. See, Reg Z. Sec 226.23 (d) Effects of
rescission, quoted at page 2 supra, and Commentary 226.23(d)(I) , which states,
"The security interest is automatically negated regardless of its status and whether or not it was
recorded or perfected."
5. In light ofthe deference given the Board's regulations and commentary there is no such thing
as "conditional" voiding of the security interest dependent on the consumer's first making tender.
Had the Board intended that courts can condition the voiding of the security interest on the
consumer's tender the Board would not have limited the Court's modifications to paragraphs (2)
and (3) of Reg Z, Sec 226.23(d), while leaving paragraph (1), which states that the security
interest is void, immune from modification.
6. The Board's Regulations and Commentary are not demonstrably irrational, particularly in
light of the consumer protection nature of the statute. The statute at 15 U.S.c. Sec 1635 reads as
follows:
Return of money or property following rescission
When an obligor exercises his right to rescind under subsection (a) of this section, he is not liable
for any finance or other charge, and any security interest given by the obligor, including any such
interest arising by operation of law, becomes void upon such a rescission. Within 20 days after
receipt of a notice of rescission, the creditor shall return to the obligor any money or property
given as earnest money, downpayment, or otherwise, and shall take any action necessary or
appropriate to reflect the termination of any security interest created under the transaction. If the
creditor has delivered any property to the obligor, the obligor may retain possession of it. Upon
the performance of the creditor's obligations under this section, the obligor shall tender the
property to the creditor, except that if return of the property in kind would be impracticable or
inequitable, the obligor shall tender its reasonable value. Tender shall be made at the location of
the property or at the residence of the obligor, at the option of the obligor. If the creditor does
not take possession of the property within 20 days after tender by the obligor, ownership of the
property vests in the obligor without obligation on his part to pay for it. The procedures
prescribed by this subsection shall apply except when otherwise ordered by a court.
7. The foregoing language of 15 U.S.c. Sec 1635(b) establishes that the Board's
pronouncements that the security interest is "void" and "automatically negated" is not
"demonstrably irrational" as the statute itself states that upon rescission the security interest
"becomes void." Morever, Sec 1635(b) recognizes the "substance" vs "procedure" distinction
that permeates many areas of the law. Sec 1635(b) limits court modification of the rescission to
the "procedures" proscribed by the subsection as opposed to the "substantive" requirements that
the consumer" shall not liable for any finance or other charge, and any security interest given by
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the obligor, including any such interest arIsmg by operation of law, becomes void".
Accordingly, the Board's Commentary holding that the security interest is "automatically
negated" should be dispositive. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 565, (1980).
8. 15 U.S.C. Sec 1635(b), Reg Z Sec 226.23(d)(1); and the Commentary at Sec 226.23(d)(I)
unambiguously pronounce that upon rescission the security interest becomes void and is
"automatically" negated. Given such lack of ambiguity, Courts are precluded from looking
beyond he text to determine the meaning of the statute and regulations. Nevertheless, decisions
such as Williams v. Homestake 968 F2d 1137 (11 th Cir. 1992) that hold that courts may
condition the voiding of the security interest on the consumer's tender have quoted from the
legislative history::
"the courts, at any time during the rescission process, may impose equitable conditions to insure
that the consumer meets his obligations after the creditor has performed his obligations as
required by the act." S.Rep. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1980)
But, this quote omits the next sentence, which confirms Congress' faith in the Board to prescribe
the parties' specific obligations, and other relevant portions of the entire passage:
"Upon application by the consumer or the creditor, a court is authorized to modify this
section's procedures where appropriate. For example, a court might use this discretion in
a situation where a consumer in bankruptcy or wage earner proceedings is prohibited
from returning the property. The committee expects that the courts, at any time during the
recission process, may impose equitable conditions to insure that the consumer meets his
obligations after the creditor has performed his obligations as required under the act. The
committee further expects that the federal regulatory agencies will make clear to both
creditors and consumers their respective obligations under the act's recission
procedures." S.Rep. No. 368, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1980) [emphasis supplied]
The passage supports the substantive versus procedure distinction discussed above and limits the
court's role to modifying the procedures or process "after the creditor has performed his
obigations" as opposed to changing substantive rights, and confirms Congress' delegation to the
Board to clarify the parties obligations. Pursuant to that delegation, the Board unambiguously
stated that upon the consumer's rescission, the security interest is "automatically negated".
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VIII. Common TILA violations that have Occurred in Kentucky Transactions Known to
the Author and could result in unexpired right to rescind.
1. Lien filing fees more than $35 in excess ofactual fee.
2. $40.00 Courier fee imposed by creditor
3. Document preparation fee that included charges for preparing TILA disclosures.
4. Document preparation fee that included a "redraw fee' in case of an abortive closing requiring
that some documents be redrawn; but was no abortive closing.
5. Standard appraisal fee for" drive by" appraisal conducted by creditor.
6. Standard attorney title search fee, where identical title search performed in the previous
month and title search at issue limited to update.
7. Payment schedule on one of two TILA disclosure forms furnished to joint debtors illegible.
8. Inclusion of $75 prepaid finance charges in the amount financed.
9. Providing joint debtors with only one TILA disclosure form and two notices of right to
cancel.
10. Providing joint debtors with only one TILA disclosure form and four notices of right to
cancel.
11. Creditor, after debtor's reSCISSIOn, corrects error thereby opening up a new three day
rescission period, so debtor cancels within the three day period.
12. Creditor furnishes consumers copy of letter to home office to debtor, which letter explains
that creditor has explained to debtor their rescission rights and provides an explanation of those
rights; unfortunately, the explanation is incorrect, arguably rendering the correct notices of right
to rescind unclear.
13. Creditor overlooked cross collateralization, spreader clause.
14. Creditor omitted transaction date, and date upon which three day rescission period normally
would end.
15. Creditor omitted address to which rescission should be mailed.
16. Charging a brokers fee when no broker involved.
17. Charging a fee in excess of $150 for title insurance, disclosing the fee as paid to "public
officials", and disclosing that amounts paid to closing attorney include the title insurance.
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Apparent double charge could result in an understated finance charge. See e.g. Therrien v.
Resource Financial Group, Inc. 704 F. Supp. 322 (D.N.H.,1989)
18. Failing to disclose term ofcredit insurance on insurance disclosure where term less than loan
term.
19. Grossly inflated appraisal, designed solely to justify loan, not value property. Fee for bogus
appraisal may be finance charge, resulting in unexpired right to rescind, coverage because not
reasonable and bonafide. To be reasonable and bona fide and qualify for exclusion from the
finance charge an appraisal fee must be reasonable in amount and for a service that was actually
performed. See Bell v. Parkway Mortg., Inc. (In re Bell), 309 B.R. 139, 152 (Bankr. D. Pa.,
2004). Such a "service" should be an independent market value assessment in accordance with
industry standards, applicable ethics and licensing requirements.
20. Amounts for private mortgage insurance mis-stated in the payment schedule.
Addison Parker
Appalachian Research and Defense Fund ofKentucky
Post Office Box 567
Richmond, Kentucky 40476
(859) 624-1394
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HOME OWNERSHIP & EQUITY PROTECTION ACT
HOME OWNERSHIP & EQUITY PROTECTION ACT (HOEPA) Requirements for
certain mortgages at 15 U.S.C 1639 & Reg Z at 226.32 & 226.34 can result in an unexpired
right to rescind pursuant to the Truth In Lending Act,(TILA) at 15 U.S.C. 1635. Applies to non-
purchase money mortgages with high annual percentage rate and/or high points and fees. For
detailed discussion and analysis see, National Consumer Law Center, Truth In Lending, ch 9 (5th
ed. 2003) and annual supplements thereto.
A. HOEPA covers closed end loans otherwise subject to TILA rescission. HOEPA contains
additional disclosure requirements; designates prohibited loan terms, and specifies prohibited
acts and practices; provides enhanced statutory damages; and expands assignee liability.
B. Coverage is triggered by the following:
The APR Trigger: APR exceeding by more then 8 percentage points the yield on treasury
securities with comparable maturities at the time the loan was made. For treasury bond rates to
visit www//bog.frb.fed.us/releases/h15/data on the net. In the event the loan period falls midway
between two treasury bond maturity periods, select the lower rate. See, Reg Z, Commentary
26.32(a)(1 )(i)-4.
The Points and Fees Trigger: points and fees exceeding 8% of the "total loan amount" and
"payable at or before closing". The total loan amount is generally the "amount financed" but can
be less. Points and fees include
(1) all finance charges, except interest, including per diem interest, and time price
differential;
(2) all brokers commissions;
(3) all credit insurance premiums (but only for loans after 10/1/2002); (4) all
settlement charges that can be excluded from the finance charge under Reg Z, Sec.
226.4(c)(7) unless the charge is reasonable, the creditor receives no direct or indirect
compensation, and the charge is not paid to an affiliate of the creditor. Reg Z, Sec
226.32(b).
C. Activation by either trigger requires, in addition to all other TILA requirements, compliance
with the requirements of 15 USC 1639 and Reg Z 226.32, including
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS: three days prior to consummation the creditor must give
the consumer a disclosure containing statutorily mandated language appearing at 15 U.S.c.
1639(a) and Reg Z 226.32(c) in "conspicuous type size." The disclosure must warn the
consumer that "you could lose your home and any money you have put into it" and that signing
the loan application and receiving these disclosures creates no obligation to complete the
transaction; and disclose the APR; the periodic payment amount; the amount borrowed; for
variable rate loans, that the interest rate and the monthly payment could change, and the
maximum monthly payment; any balloon payment; and the amount of any financed credit
. .Insurance premIUms.
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The HOEPA disclosure is a material disclosures as defined at 15 U.S.C 1602(u). Accordingly,
failure to provide the HOEPA disclosures timely in the manner required by the Act results in an
unexpired right to rescind. Each consumer with an ownership interest in the dwelling must
receive a copy of the HOEPA disclosure. Reg Z, Commentary Sec.226.23(b).
If the APR or periodic payment amount is changed prior to closing, new HOEPA disclosures
must be timely furnished.
PROHIBITED LOAN PROVISIONS AND LIMITATIONS: Inclusion Results in
Unexpired Right to Rescind and Enhanced Damages: See, 15 U.S.C. 1639; Reg Z. 226.32;
15 U.S.c. 1640.
1. No Prepayment Penalties unless the loan satisfies the following five conditions:
a. Prepayment penalty must, br it's terms, not apply to a refinancing by the original
creditor or an affiliate thereof.
b. Loan can't result in monthly indebtedness exceeding half consumer's income.
c. Income and expenses must by verified.
d. Prepayment penalty must not apply after 5 years from consummation of the mortgage.
e. Prepayment Penalty must not otherwise be prohibited by law.
2. No increase in interest rates upon default.
3. No balloon payments for loans of less than 5 years.
4. No negative amortization.
5. No refunds or rebates calculated by method less favorable than actuarial method.
6. No more than two periodic payments financed in loan proceeds.
7. No due on demand clause.
l"[A] mortgage referred to in section 1602(aa) of this title may contain a prepayment penalty if ...the
penalty applies only to a prepayment made with amounts obtained by the consumer by means other than a
refInancing by the creditor under the mortgage, or an affiliate of that creditor;" 15 U.S.C 1639
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PROHIBITED ACTS AND PRACTICES that result in enhanced damages but not
unexpired right to rescind. Reg Z at 226.34.
1. No furnishing ofloan proceeds to a contractor unless (a) through instrument payable both to
consumer and contractor or (b) at consumer's election, pursuant to written escrow agreement
signed by consumer, contractor, and creditor before date ofpayment.
2. Must include Notice to Assignee that loan subject to HOEPA and that assignee could be liable
for all claims and defenses that borrower could assert against the original creditor.
3. No refinancing into a second HOEPA loan within a year by the creditor, assignee, or servicer
unless in consumer's best interest.
4. No extension ofcredit without regard to consumer's repayment ability where consumer can
show this is part ofpattern and practice.
Presumption that creditor lending without regard to repayment ability if creditor engages in
pattern and practice of failing to verify and document ability to repay.
5. No making open end loan to avoid HOEPA. Open end loan must have reasonable expectation
ofrepeated transactions.
CONSEQUENCES FOR VIOLATING HOEPA: RESCISSION, ENHANCED
DAMAGES; AND EXPANDED ASSIGNEE LIABILITY: Failure to provide the HOEPA
disclosure or a HOEPA loan containing "a provision prohibited by sec. 1639 ... shall be deemed
a failure to deliver the material disclosures ... for the purposes of section 1635". See, 15 U.S.C.
1639(j)and 15 U.S.C. 1602(u). This provides a consumer:
(A) an unexpired right to rescind; (but remember ifonly violation is prohibited act or
practice as described at Reg Z 226.34, then no rescission, only HOEPA enhanced
damages.)
(B) the statutory damages available in any rescission case, should the creditor fail to
timely comply with a valid rescission ( usually $2,000);
(C) attorney fees; and,
(D) unless the creditor can show that the compliance failure was not "material" within
the meaning of the common-law, enhanced damages equal to the "finance charges
and fees paid by the consumer". 15 U.S.C. 1640(a). Consumers should contend that
this includes an amount equal to all finance charges paid, at closing ("prepaid finance
charges"z) and as part of their monthly payments.
Z Reg Z recognizes prepaid finance charges as paid by the consumer. That's why they are call "prepaid".
"Prepaid finance charge" means any finance charge paid separately in cash or by check before or at consummation
ofa transaction, or withheld from the proceeds of the credit at any time. Reg Z 226.2(23).
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HOEPA enhanced damages can be viewed as double the rescission amount that must be
returned to the consumer: HOEPA is meant to discourage high cost loans.3 One way it
does so is by doubling the rescission amount that must be returned by the creditor. It
does so by first causing the creditor to lose the finance charges and fees via rescission and
then by requiring the creditor to pay to the consumer a sum equal to the finance charges
and fees paid by the consumer.
Multiple enhanced damages, a possibility: another way HOEPA discourage high cost
loans is making enhanced damages available for a failure to comply with "any
requirement" of Section 1639. 15 U.S.C Sec. 1640(a)(4). It, therefore, appears that
multiple violations result in multiple damage awards. By contrast, TILA's general
prohibition of multiple statutory damage awards applies only to "multiple failures to
disclose." 15 U.S.C Sec. 1640(g). Accordingly, a creditor failing to provide the HOEPA
notice and making a loan containing prohibited loan terms and/or aging in prohibited
practices could be liable for two or more enhanced damage awards.
(E.) EXPANDED ASSIGNEE LIABILITY
Assignees always subject to rescission. Sec. 1641(c).
Assignees subject to statutory damages and enhanced damages to extent violations are
apparent on face ofthe relevant documents. Sec 1641(a)
Unless assignee can prove by a preponderance of evidence that a reasonable person
would not have been able to determine that the instrument was high rate mortgage or high
points and fees mortgage as defined at sec. 1605(aa), assignee is subject to enhanced
damages, and damages based on any other claims, including TILA damages, that could
be asserted against the creditor to the extent of all remaining indebtedness plus all sums
the consumer has paid in connection with the transaction. Sec. 1641(d). This latter
provision functions similarly to the FTC Holder Rule. The Commentary clarifies that
assignee is liable for all claims that could be asserted against the creditor not just those
arising from TILA. Commentary 226.34(a)(2)-3.
Some creditors set the points and fees just below the 8%, threshold. A tactic in HOEPA
cases should be to move a charge into the points and fees so that the 8% threshold is
exceeded. This could result in both a disclosure violation and prohibited practice and
possible multiple enhanced damages, in addition to rescission and other rights available.
3The Joint Statement of the Conference Committee on HOEPA stated,_"[T]he Conferees believe that these
loan structures are potentially dangerous when misused and warrant a heightened degree ofconsumer protection in
order to ensure that borrowers are not victimized by abusive lending practices." H.Rep. No. 103-652, at 22 (August
2, 1994) (emphasis added).
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Common, clear-cut, potential, and arguable violations seen in Kentucky:
1. Failure to provide HOEPA disclosure three days in advance of closing.
2. Failure to provide separate HOEPA disclosure to each consumer with rescission rights.
3. Points and fees threshold exceeded after additional charges allocated to points and fees. Common
because many creditors bump up against 8% threshold by making 7.95% to 7.99% loans. Can occur
when official fee exceeds those actually paid to public officials; when third party fees not otherwise
finance charges become points and fees because they were paid to the creditor or affiliate; when courier
fees, flood determination fees, or settlement fees not included in finance charge when, under certain
circumstances, they have to be; or when document preparation fees not reasonable.
4. Failure to disclose varying payment levels on HOEPA disclosure.
5. Failure to disclose balloon payment on HOEPA disclosure.
6. Pre-payment penalty contains no limitation stating that penalty does not apply in event of refinancing
by creditor or affiliate. Very common. See, McIntosh v Irwin Union Bank & Trust, 215 F.R.D.
(D.S.Dist.C. Ma. 2003).
7. HOEPA disclosure warning consumer that could lose home etc. in same type size as other text on
disclosure and on other documents in apparent violation of Sec. 1639 requirement that this language be in
"conspicuous type size". See model form at Appendix H-16 to Reg Z.
8. Note with prepayment penalty results in monthly debt exceeding 50% of consumer's monthly income.
May result from improper or excessive "gross up" ofnon-taxable income.
9. Yield Spread Premium4, especially when combined with pre-payment penalty that is required to
assure lender under all circumstance recaptures it, may be a broker's commission payable by the
consumer at or before closing and therefore a point and fee triggering HOEPA coverage.5
10. Fee for bogus appraisal may be point and fee triggering HOEPA coverage because not reasonable and
bonafide. Many high cost loans are based upon appraisals that are grossly inflated to assure the loan
"goes through". To be reasonable and bona fide and qualify for exclusion from the finance charge an
appraisal fee must be reasonable in amount and for a service that was actually performed. Bell v. Parkway
Mortg., Inc. (In re Bell), 309 B.R. 139, 152 (Bankr. D. Pa., 2004). Such a "service" should be an
independent market value assessment in accordance with industry standards, applicable ethics and
licensing requirements, and designed to assure adequate collateral for the loan.
4 A yield spread premium is compensation paid by the lender to the mortgage broker for obtaining a loan in which
the borrower pays a greater rate of interest than the lender normally would charge. The lender recaptures the YSP from the
increased interest over the life of the loan and, in the event ofan early payoff, from the pre-payment penalty which is always
paired with a YSP.
5 Webster v. Centrix Home Equity Corp 300 B.R. 787 (Bankr. OK, 2003) holds the YSP is a point and fee within the
meaning ofHOEPA, but see, Mourer v. Equipment Corp. ofAmerica, 309 B.R. 502 (U.S. Dist, S.D. Mi. 2003). Neither case
analyzes the effect of the pre-payment penalty guaranteeing recapture of the YSP on the issue of whether the YSP is payable
by the consumer "at our before closing".
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PART 4
KENTUCKY HIGH COST LOAN ACT
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KENTUCKY HIGH COST LOAN ACT
For mortgage loans that exceed HOEPA's points and fees and APR triggers, KRS. 360.100 offers the
following additional protections:
1. Covers purchase and non-purchase money mortgages between $15,000 and $200,000
2. Prohibits flipping of subsidized mortgages
3. Limits prepayment penalties to 36 months, with the amount of penalty decreasing each year (1 st
year - 3%, 2nd year - 2%, 3rd year - 1%)
4. Prohibits balloon payments
5. Limits fees to modify, renew, extend or amend a high-cost loan - must be less than halfof fees
that would be charged to refinance
6. Expands on notice given to borrower prior to closing - recommends shopping for the best rate and
seeking counseling - and requires the lender to make available to the borrower a video, CD or
DVD explaining his or her rights under this law prior to closing
7. Requires lender to determine in each case that borrower has ability to repay loan based on income
and other expenses, not on borrower's equity in home
8. Prohibits any lender from charging points and fees if a high cost loan is refinanced within one year
into another high cost loan
9. Prohibits same lender from charging points and fees on refinancing into another high cost loan at
any time, except on new proceeds
10. Prohibits same lender who refinances into another high cost loan from financing any prepayment
fees or penalties and from financing points and fees in excess of 4% of total amount, excluding
third party real estate fees
11. Prohibits lender from financing single premium credit insurance
12. Prohibits mandatory arbitration clauses that are oppressive, unfair, unconscionable or that do not
comply with consumer standards of the American Arbitration Association
13. Limits late fees to 5% of amount past due or $10, and states that late fees may be charged only
once with respect to a late payment
14. Limits lender to a $10 fee for borrower to obtain written payoff
15. Requires lender to provide borrower with written notice of default and right to cure at least 30
days prior to initiating foreclosure
16. Prohibits lender from recommending or encouraging default when refinancing is anticipated
B - 39
17. Establishes that a violation of this Act is usury, but requires borrower to chose remedies between
usury (lender forfeits all interest and borrower may recover twice interest paid) or Consumer
Protection Act (actual damages plus attorney fees.)
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FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF STATE LAWS
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Comment:
Federal Preemption of State Laws Limiting Credit Charges / 2004 Supplement § 3.2.4
a. National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85 (interest rates), § 24 (general bank powers), § 24a (financial subsidiaries),
§ 371 (real estate-secured lending), § 484 (visitorial restrictions)(original act effective date: 1873); see Tiffany v.
National Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. 409 (1873) [reprinted at Appx. B.4, infra].
National bank may charge higher of state most favored lender rate or alternative federal ceiling. Pre-
emption of state laws affecting the business of lending permitted by regulation. Operating
subsidiaries are entitled to same preemption rights as their parent banks, according to regulation.
State Opt-out? No
Regulations:
Manual:
12 C.F .R. §§ 7.4000 (visitorial restrictions), 7.400 1 (definition of interest), 7.4002 (non-interest
fees) (replacing § 7.7310), § 7.4006 (applicability of state law to operating subsidiaries), 7.4008,
7.4009, 34.3, 34.4 (terms and conditions of loan and other related bank activities), 7.500 et seq.
(electronic activities).
§ 3.4S
b. DIDA § 501 (a) (first mortgage preemption), 12 U. S.C. § 173 5f-7a (effective date Apr. 1, 1980) [reprinted
at Appx. B.l, infra].
Comment: Preempts state usury ceilings on credit secured by first lien on residential real estate or mobile
home. Lender must be federally related or making over $1 million per year in residential mortgage
and mo-bile home loans or credit sales. Preemption only applies to mobile homes if creditor
complies with OTS consumer protection regulations.
State Opt-out? Yes. State opportunity to opt-out of interest preemption on first mortgage expired 4/1/83.
Opportunity to opt-out of provisions regulating points or pre-paid charges does not expire, and may
be done im-plicitly. Whole or partial opt-out jurisdictions include: CO, GA, HI, ID, lA, KS, ME,
MA, MN, NB, NV, NC, PR, SC, SD (Wisconsin repealed its § 501(a)(I) opt-out effective May 4,
1998).
Regulations: 12 C.F.R. § 590 (general OTS first mortgage preemption regulations); 12 C.F.R. § 590.4 (OTS
con-sumer protection regulations for mobile home loans or credit sales).
Manual: §§ 3.6.3S, 3.6.5.2S
c. DIDA §§ 521-523 (alternate ceiling), 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(g) (savings and loans), 1785(g) (credit unions),
1831d(a) (commercial banks) (effective Apr. I, 1980) [reprinted at Appx. B.2, infra].
Comment: Allows federally insured depositories to charge interest up to the federal alternative ceiling and,
by judicial interpretation, extends most favored lender status to these institutions.
State Opt-out? Yes, no expiration date on opportunity to opt-out. Jurisdictions remaining opted-out: lA, PR, WI
(Ne-braska opted out between 1982 and 1988; Massachusetts opted-out between 1981 and 1986;
Colorado dropped its opt-out in 1994; Maine dropped its opt-out in 1995; North Carolina dropped its
opt-out in 1995 as to loans, mortgages, credit sales, and advances made in the state after effective
date of July 1, 1995).
Regulations: 12 C.F.R. § 560.110 (replacing 12 C.F.R. § 571.22, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951, 50,965 (Sept. 30,1996)).
Manual: §§ 3.6.2S, 3.6.5.3S
d. FHA/VA preemption, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1709-la, 1735f-7, 1709(b)(5); 38 U.S.C. § 3728. State law preempted June
30,1976 and December 21, 1979. FHA authority to set interest ceiling revoked effective Nov. 30, 1983.
Comment: Preempts state interest ceilings on FHA or V A insured home loans.
State Opt-out? Yes. See 12 U.S.C. § l709-la(b) (effective June 30,1985) and 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7(b) (effective
Dec. 21, 1979). Adoption or amendment of applicable state usury law after effective date of federal
statute negates preemption associated under § 173 5f-7(b). Preemption extends to VA loans through
38 U.S.C. § 3728. Mere amendment or reenactment of usury law after effective date of preemption
may satisfy opt-out requirement.
Regulations: 24 C.F.R. §§ 200 et seq. (FHA); 38 C.F.R. § 36.4201 et seq. (VA).
Manual: § 3. 7S
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§ 3.3 The Cost of Credit: Regulation and Legal Challengess I 2004 Supplement
e. National Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1757 (effective date 1934) (1980 amendment substituted the 15%
annual ceiling for a 1% per month rate).
Comment: Regulates the types of loans which federally chartered credit unions may make. Sets maximum
interest rate at 15 % unless temporarily raised at the discretion of National Credit Union
Administration Board. The maximum was raised to 21% effective May 12,1980, and changed to 18%,
effective May 14, 1987,52 Fed. Reg. 8061 (Mar. 16, 1987). It has remained at 18% since that time. It
is scheduled to revert to 15% on March 8, 2005, unless otherwise provided by the NCUA Board. 12
C.F.R. § 701.21(c)(7)(ii).
State Opt-out? No.
Regulations:
Manual:
12 C.F.R. § 701.21.
§ 3.85
Comment:
f. Depository Institutions Act, Pub. L. No. 97-320 (Oct 15, 1982) (including Alternate Mortgage Transactions
Par-ity Act, codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-3805) (effective Oct. 15, 1982) [reprinted at Appx. B.3, infra].
Expanded authority of federally chartered lenders to issue variable rate mortgages and other creative
financing terms and to enforce due-on sale clauses. AMTP A (DIA Title VIII) grants state lenders,
which have received any state license(s) necessary to engage in home mortgage lending, the option of
following the appropriate federal lending regulations. This statute does not affect interest rate
ceilings.
State Opt-out? Yes. Option expired Oct. 18, 1985. Opt-out states: AZ, MA, ME, NY, SC, WI (New York's opt-out
does not apply to manufactured housing).
Regulations: 12 C.F.R. § 560 (federal savings and loans); 12 C.F.R. § 560.220 (state savings and loans, non-
de-pository "housing creditors"); 12 C.F.R. § 34.21(a) (national banks); 12 C.F.R. § 34.24 (state
com-mercial banks); 12 C.F.R. § 701.21 (credit unions).
Manual: § 3.9S
g. Home Owners' Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1461,1463,1464 (enactment date 1933).
Comment: Federal savings and loan associations and subsidiaries may charge higher of state most favored lender
rate or alternative federal ceiling. Broad preemption via regulation of other loan terms, conditions,
and related activites.
State Opt-out? No.
Regulations:
Manual:
12 C.F.R. §§ 560.1 et seq., 559.3(h), (n) (operating subsidiaries).
§ 3.5S
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Automobiles: Sales & Financing Issues
I. Troubleshooting Overview - Where to Look and What to Look for?
Very few clients ever come into the office announcing they have a usury problem or a
problem under the Truth in Lending Act. More likely, a consumer may be complaining about a
car that is falling apart or there is an impending repossession. Nevertheless, a consumer attorney
must review the complete transaction between the client, the dealer and the financial institution
in order to adequately represent the client.
A. Follow the Paper Trail
There may be a number of documents necessary to evaluate your client's case. While
some ofthe documents may tum out to be irrelevant, the attorney should initially review all of
them. Some of the documents listed below may not be readily available to the client depending
upon the stage ofthe transaction and practice of the dealership. For example, a buyer in the
middle of a "yo-yo"(see discussion below) sale may not have any documents:
• A document variously called a "Buyer's Order," "Purchase Order," "Retail
Contract," or similar names. This document usually contains the purchase price of
the auto, sales/use tax, filing fees, document fees, and trade-in allowance.
• Any rider or other separate document stating the sale or lease is conditional upon
financing.
• The financing document which may be either (1) a retail installment sales contract
(RISC) usually to be assigned to a financial institution but not always, (2) a note
and security agreement normally payable to a financial institution, or (3) a lease
which typically lists a financial institution as the lessor and the consumer as the
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lessee. These documents should contain the disclosures required under the Truth
in Lending Act.
• For used autos, any "Due Bill" or "We Owe" document promising work to be
done on the automobile.
• For used autos, the "Buyer's Guide" mandated by the Federal Trade Commission
to be affixed to the automobile.
• For new cars, the "sticker" listing the MSRP of the vehicle plus any dealer add-
ons.
• A copy of the title and registration.
• A copy ofthe Application for Certificate of TitlelRegistration (commonly referred
to as a "VTR"). The dealer may not have provided a copy of this to the buyer but
it should be available from the County Clerk.
• A copy of any service agreement or extended warranty that may have been
purchased together with any pamphlets or other documents related to the service
agreement or extended warranty.
• Any evidence of insurance that may have been purchased through the transaction
such as credit life and disability insurance or GAP insurance.
• Copies of service orders or repairs.
The attorney may also want the client to obtain a copy of the client's credit report after
determining which credit reporting agency the dealer uses.
The dealer will have additional documents directly related to the transaction with the
buyer/lessee set up in individual files. While there may be many other documents the dealer has
which are relevant, the individual file for each transaction (sometimes referred to as "the deal
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file") is a good starting point. The dealer may deny inspection by the consumer's attorney until
the case is in litigation and formal discovery initiated. It is highly recommended that the attorney
inspect the dealer's original file, rather than a copy, in order to better detect possible alterations.
The dealer's file should contain many of the documents requested from the client. In
addition the file may contain:
• Notes about the transaction which might show how the sales price and payment
terms were negotiated.
• The credit application.
• Notes about the financing aspect of the transaction which may include records of
calls made to financial institutions.
• Any "recap sheet" which would show the profit made on the transaction and
where it was made. Small dealerships may not have a recap sheet and some
dealers may simply store the information in a computer and not place it in the
physical file.
The attorney should be aware that many dealers make notes on the outside ofthe file and
not in documents inside the file.
B. Follow the Money Trail
The usual incentive for committing fraud is money. Therefore, it is useful to be able to
track the flow ofmoney and find out who is profiting from the transaction.
In the typical sale transaction, the may receive a trade-in, a down payment and.a retail
installment contract. The stated trade-in value mayor may not reflect the true value received by
the dealer. For example, the "N.A.D.A. Official Used Car Guide" lists trade-in values, loan
values, and retail values of automobiles. A dealer may only give the buyer credit for the trade-in
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value of the auto and may use a "black book" value which is tied closer to auction prices than the
N.A.D.A. guide. If the dealer does auction it or sell it to another dealer, then the trade-in or black
book value may be close to what is realized by the dealer. If the dealer keeps the trade-in and
resells it, the dealer will make a profit on the resale. This consumer is not given credit for this
profit and the dealer recap sheet previously mentioned will not show this profit.
On the other hand, the allowance for the trade-in may be higher than wholesale value in
order to make the down payment look larger than it really is for two reasons. First, it may
enhance financing by a bank or other financial institution because it shows as a larger down
payment. These institutions are familiar with this practice and may allow it to a limited degree
provided they are comfortable with the buyer's credit worthiness. The second reason a trade
allowance may be higher than wholesale is to make the buyer feel more comfortable with the
deal while increasing the true cost to the buyer in other ways.
Someone unfamiliar with automobile sales may simply assume dealers make their money
by selling cars and trucks at a higher price than what they paid. For many dealerships, however,
the real money is made elsewhere. It may be made by adding expensive accessory items to new
autos or by selling credit insurance. See, infra at ll(B)(6).
Once the transaction is completed, the credit contract is most often sold. The contract
may be sold "with recourse" or ''without recourse." If sold with recourse, the dealer bears the
ultimate risk of non-payment and will have to buy back the contract from the lender if the
consumer defaults. In these types of arrangements, a dealer reserve is often set up by the lender.
The lender holds back part of the price payable to the dealer to account for possible charge backs
where borrowers default and the dealer buys back the loans. If the loan is sold without recourse,
the lender bears the risk of default in all but a few instances (e.g., forged borrower's signature).
C-4
II. Step by Step - Looking for Problems at Every Stage
There are opportunities for unscrupulous dealers to take advantage ofconsumers at
practically every step oftheir relationship - advertising, sales negotiations, the closing, and even
after.
A. Advertising Scams
1. Bait and Switch
One ofthe oldest advertising scams is the ''bait and switch." The bait is an alluring
product advertised at an attractive price. The switch happens when the customer comes to the
place ofbusiness and is deliberately switched to another product. This can be done in several
different ways. Most commonly, the consumer is told the advertised product is sold out or is of
inferior quality. The consumer is then switched to a different, higher-priced product.
Different statutory and regulatory provisions prohibit bait and switch advertising. They
include:
• Criminal penalties for bait advertising if specific intent can be shown. KRS
517.040. These can be applied to any person, not just a dealer.
• The Federal Trade Commission's "Guides Against Bait Advertising," 16 C.F.R.
238.
• Motor Vehicle Commission regulations against bait advertising, 605 KAR 1:190,
which was promulgated under the Commission's authority to suspend, deny, or
revoke a dealer license for false or misleading advertising under KRS 190.040(1).
The Motor Vehicle Commission regulations on bait advertising may be particularly
helpful because they deal specifically with motor vehicles advertised by dealers. Section 2 ofthe
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regulation merely provides that "Licensees shall not use misleading or bait advertising." In turn,
"bait advertising" is defined as:
(4) "Bait advertising" means an alluring but insincere offer to sell or lease a
product, to obtain leads to persons interested in buying merchandise ofthe type
advertised and to switch consumers from the advertised product to another
product for a higher price or on a basis more advantageous to the dealer.
Advertising a new motor vehicle at a price which does not include all equipment
listed as standard equipment by the manufacturer without disclosing such fact, or
failing to disclose any such equipment for the purpose of advertising a low price
and "baiting" the customer into charges above the advertised price is prohibited.
No practice shall be pursued by the advertiser which will discourage the sale of
the advertised product with the intent and purpose of selling other merchandise
instead.
605 KAR 1:190 § 1(4). An "alluring but insincere offer" is arguably easier to prove than the
specific intent required by KRS 517.040. Likewise, the regulatory definition of"bait advertising"
prohibits, not just a price increase, but any switch to terms "more advantageous to the dealer."
The term "advertising" means "any oral, written or graphic statement which offers vehicles for
sale or lease or which indicates the availability of vehicles ..." and includes not only the
expected mass media advertisements but also signs, handbills, and even business cards. 605
KAR 1:190 1:190 § 1(1). This has possible implications in "yo-yo" or "spot delivery" abuses.
See, discussion infra at II(B)(8).
2. Other Laws
The Motor Vehicle Commission has promulgated regulations aimed at curbing
misleading advertising and includes a number of specific prohibitions in addition to the
prohibition against bait advertising. 605 KAR 1:190.
The Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, KRS 367.170, prevents any unfair, false, or
misleading act or practice in trade or commerce. Consumers have a private right of action under
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KRS 367.220 and can seek actual damages and equitable relief. KRS 367.220(1). This also opens
the possibility of attorney fees. KRS 367.220(3).
It is a misdemeanor for any person to knowingly make a false or misleading statement in
an advertisement addressed to the public or to a substantial number ofpeople. KRS 517.030.
This criminal statute may also be used as the basis of a civil claim.
Finally, a plaintiff can prove common law fraud if she can establish, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the advertisement consisted of (a ) material representation (b) which is
false (c) either known to be false or made recklessly (d) made to induce one to act (e) actual
reliance and (f) damages caused by the misrepresentation. See, United Parcel Service v. Rickert,
Ky., 996 S.W.2d 464,468 (1999). The plaintiff is entitled to the benefit of its bargain, not to just
money paid out by the plaintiff. Id. at p.470 ; see also, Dempsey v. Marshall, Ky., 344 S.W.2d
606,607 (1961).
B. Types of Unethical Practices
Once a prospective buyer enters a dealership, an unethical dealer may use a number of
methods to increase the cost to the buyer.
1. How Much Can You Mford?
One ofthe first things any dealer wants to know is how much the buyer is willing and
able to spend. The dealer may simply press the buyer for the monthly payment the buyer can
afford. In truth, many consumers do make buying decisions on the monthly payment. By getting
the consumer to reveal this information early in the process, however, a dealer will have a feel
for how much the consumer can pay in extras which can be a very high profit source. For both
new and used car sales, this may lead to expensive add-on items. For used cars, this may lead to
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an increase in the purchase price of the autos, especially at the buy here, pay here lots where an
asking price may not be put on the cars.
Some dealers may go further than simply pressuring the consumer for information on
their monthly budge and actually perform an unauthorized credit check. A credit check can only
be done for certain enumerated reasons such as in connection with a firm offer of credit or by
authorization ofthe consumer. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b)(3). Simply going for a test drive or asking
about prices and credit terms is not a sufficient reason to pull a credit report. See, Letter from
David Medine (FTC) to Karen Coffey, Texas Automobile Dealers Association (Feb. 11, 1998).
Obtaining this information gives the dealer an obvious advantage in negotiations with the buyer.
In addition to giving a dealer a negotiating advantage, the number ofcredit checks may lower a
consumer's credit score because multiple credit checks may be viewed as an indicator of credit
stress. A consumer may never find out about this practice, however, because they either
ultimately buy and finance an auto through the dealer or they simply never review their credit
report for credit inquiries.
2. Negotiating Tactics
Auto dealers may use a variety ofhighly questionable tactics in negotiating the sales price
on autos. One favorite tactic is to simply wear down a buyer by stalling. The buyer may get
handed from one salesman to the next, then to a "closer" or sales manager, and then finally to the
finance manager (known as "F&I" for finance and insurance). This process typically lasts a
couple ofhours but can last several hours. By this time, the buyer is so emotionally committed to
the sale that it is difficult to back away from the deal. Those with less than excellent credit may
be particularly vulnerable because of concerns about credit approval.
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During the sales process, many dealers use a method called the "four-square method" to
negotiate. Here, the dealer divides a sheet into four quadrants, like a cross. Each of these
quadrants will contain an item that the salesperson finds helpful in negotiations - price of auto to
be sold, monthly payment, down payment, and trade-in value. Skillful use ofthe four-square
method can be likened to the infamous shell game where the pea mysteriously disappears in plain
view. Even a wary consumer may find himself talking about monthly payments instead of the
purchase price. The purchase price on the final contract may be different than the one on the
four-square sheet.
These sales tactics are studied and deliberate. They are used to wear down a consumer's
resistance to a variety of questionable sales tactics.
3. Excessive Pricing
Although excessive pricing issues is not limited to used car sales, it is there that the
problem may be most clearly seen. Unsophisticated consumers or those with credit problems may
pay several thousand dollars more for an auto than it is worth. Later, they may try to cancel the
sale, erroneously believing there is a three day right of recision. When faced with this situation,
the consumer attorney should look carefully at potential discriminatory credit or sales practices.
See, infra at III(A). An attorney might be able to claim that excessive price alone is
unconscionable in violation ofthe Kentucky Consumer Protection Act (KRS 367.170) and the
Uniform Commercial Code (KRS 355.2-302 for sales and 355.2A-I08 for leases). However, this
may be a difficult argument to win absent additional facts. For example, one court has
determined that a price overcharge may be an unfair or deceptive practice where the dealer
misrepresented the sticker price and the wholesale value ofthe trade-in. Davis v. Wholesale
Motors, Inc., 949 P.2d 1026 (Haw. App. 1997).
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4. Pricing Misrepresentations
New cars are required to have a "Munroney Sticker" which, among other items, lists the
manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP) and delivery costs charged the dealer by the
manufacturer on passenger cars and station wagons. 15 U.S.c. § 1231-1232.
There is no direct private cause of action under this statute. Reiffv. Don Rosen
Cadillac-BMW, Inc., 501 F.Supp. 77 (E.D.Pa.1980). However, some courts have held it is an
unfair and deceptive practice under state law to hide the sticker in order to charge a higher price.
Suris v. Gilmore Liquidating, Inc., 651 So.2d 1282 (Fla. App. 1995) (misrepresenting "sticker"
price on demo while removing true sticker); Ciampi v. Ogden Chrysler Plymouth, Inc., 634
N.E.2d 448 (Ill. App. 19894) (car with 13,000 miles on it allegedly represented as "new" auto
and sticker price hidden); contra, Ambre v. Joe Madden Ford, 881 F.Supp. 1187 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
5. Packing
Many of the financial based add-ons discussed in the next section occur through a process
called "packing." The seller may intentionally inflate the monthly payment during the sales
negotiations in order to add items such as credit life insurance after the price has been finalized.
If they notice these charges at all, they may be mislead into believing they are not being charged
for the service. In some instances, the finance manager may actually obscure part of the
document while closing the deal. Where there is no room to increase the monthly payment and
include the options, the dealer may increase the term of the loan without the consumer noticing.
6. Add-ons
Add-ons can come in one of two flavors. Dealer add-ons like rust-proofing, fabric
protection (e.g., "Scotch Guard"), and pin-striping are often simply added to the sticker price
listed on the auto's window. They cost the dealer little but may be expensive for the buyer.
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Advertising prices without listing these add-ons may constitute bait advertising. See discussion
on bait and switch, supra. Outside the area ofbait advertising, it would be difficult to mount a
challenge against this practice.
Many buyers have become aware of the overpriced front end add-ons but are blissfully
unaware of the back end add-ons. Profit from the back-end items may often be gleaned from the
dealer recap sheet. Back end add-ons can take several forms:
• Credit life, health and disability insurance.
• GAP insurance.
• Extended warranties or service contracts.
• Documentation fees or similar fees.
A dealer may earn commissions of 30% to 50% on credit life and health insurance, GAP
insurance, and extended warranties or service contracts where the warrantor or administrator is a
third-party. In fact, many dealers make more money on these items than they do in selling their
cars and trucks. Unlike some states, the rate ofcommissions paid to dealers and others are not
disclosed when insurers file their rates with the Kentucky Department of Insurance.
a. Credit Life or Health Insurance
Dealers and lenders can require credit life or health insurance as a requirement for the
extension of credit but may have to include it as part of the finance charge under the Truth in
Lending Act. 15 U.S.c. § 1605(b). This has the effect of substantially raising the Annual
Percentage Rate (APR) on the loan and may dissuade a buyer from finalizing the deal. A dealer
or lender will not have to include it as part of the finance charge (it will be part ofthe amount
financed) if (a) the insurance coverage is not a factor in approving credit, (b) this is clearly
disclosed to the consumer, and (c) the consumer affirmatively agrees to it in writing after the cost
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is disclosed. Id. A dealer who nevertheless requires the consumer to take the insurance violates
the Truth in Lending Act. A dealer or lender which denies credit because the consumer does not
take the supposedly optional credit life insurance violates the Equal Credit Opportunity Act.
Bryson v. Bank ofNew York, 584 F.Supp. 1306, 1318 (S.D. N.Y. 1984).
b. GAP Insurance
GAP insurance became popular when auto leases became popular as a means of financing
automobile acquisitions. It is sometimes sold when autos are purchased. GAP insurance comes
into play when the consumer's automobile is "totaled" in an accident and the amount paid by the
auto insurance company (fair market value) is less than that needed to pay off the lease or loan.
Like other forms of insurance sold by dealers, the dealers earn commissions on GAP insurance.
Regulation Z was amended to treat GAP insurance (referred to as "debt cancellation fees" in
Regulation Z) the same as credit life and health insurance under the Truth in Lending Act. 12
C.F.R. § 226.4(b)(10) and 226.4(d)(3).
c. Extended Warranties/Service Contracts
Warranties are covered in another chapter in this treatise. However, it is important to
understand that the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act prohibits a seller or supplier from disclaiming
or modifying any implied warranty arising under state law if the seller or supplier makes any type
of written warranty or, within 90 days from the time of sale, enters into a service contract
covering the product. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a). A warrantor who offers a "limited" warranty may
limit the duration ofthe implied warranty to the same time period as the "limited" warranty
provided that the limitation is conscionable and clearly disclosed on the face of the warranty
statement. If a "full" warranty is extended, the duration of the implied warranties may not be
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modified. 15 U.S.c. § 2308(b). Any disclaimer or other limitation ofrights is ineffective. 15
U.S.c. § 2308(c).
d. Documentation Fees
Dealers routinely add documentation fees to supposedly cover the cost ofpreparing the
documents, transferring title, and recording the lien. The actual fees charged by the government
for filing and recording are normally separate from the documentation fee. In reality, many
dealers charge document fees which bear no relationship to the cost ofproviding this "service."
Section 11 of 605 KAR 1:190 may be of benefit where a dealer advertises a price in local media.
The price advertised must include "all charges which the customer must pay for the vehicle"
including such items as "additional dealer profit" and "additional dealer margin." Documentation
fees are not specifically mentioned in the regulation but, if mandatory, then should be listed in
part of the advertised price.
On the other hand, ifthe fees are optional then failing to disclose their optional nature by
pre-printing them on a sales document may be a deceptive act. See, Motzer Dodge Jeep Eagle,
Inc. v. Ohio Atty. Gen., 642 N.E.2d 20 (Ohio App. 1994); but see, Nigh v. Koons Buick Pontiac
GMC, Inc., 143 F.Supp.2d 535 (E.D. Va. 2001)(no misrepresentation where consumer believed
fee was mandatory government fee when it was actually only required by dealer).
7. Misrepresenting SaleslUse Tax
Some dealers may overcharge consumers the amount of sales or use tax. The easiest way
to detect this is by comparing the registration received when a car is titled or title is transferred
with either the purchase order (signed before the retail installment contract). The consumer may
not have a copy of the purchase order.
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This scam is perpetrated in different ways. In sales ofboth new and used vehicles, the
dealer may charge sales tax on the full amount ofthe sales price ofthe vehicle, without giving
credit for any trade-in. For used vehicles, the dealer may charge tax based upon an inflated sales
price ofthe vehicle but then remit tax based upon the book value ofthe vehicle. For new autos,
use tax is calculated at 90% ofMSRP but an unethical dealer may charge the consumer on the
full sales price.
8. Yo-Yo Sales
In order to close the sale, dealers like to deliver the newly purchased automobile to the
consumer on the spot, even when the lender has not given final approval for the loan. Typically,
the sale is made conditional upon receiving financing within a specified time period. Dealers call
these "spot deliveries" and there is not necessarily anything wrong with this practice. A dishonest
dealer, however, may use a spot delivery to increase the overall price to the consumer. This is
referred to as a "yo-yo sale" because the dealer plays the consumer like a yo-yo, first letting her
out of the dealership and then reeling her back.
A yo-yo sale typically happens when a dishonest dealer knows or has reason to know the
consumer will not receive credit at the rate specified in the retail installment contract. The
dishonest dealer will then call the consumer and inform her that financing on the agreed terms
cannot be approved but that financing may be approved on different terms, usually at a higher
interest rate. lithe consumer balks, the dealer may tell her that the trade-in has already been sold
(which mayor may not be true). The dealer may also demand immediate payment of high rental
fees found in the conditional portion ofthe contract. Faced with these pressures, a consumer may
find he has no choice but to accept the new financing arrangements.
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The consumer attorney is in a better position to help the consumer if the consumer has not
accepted the new contract. Ifthe trade-in has already been sold, then there are several possible
claims that can be brought including common law fraud, violation of the Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act (KRS 367.170, 367.220), and the tort ofconversion and trover.
In Hensley v. Paul Miller Ford, Ky., 508 S.W.2d 759 (1974) the Court determined that an
action for trover and conversion was appropriate under facts essentially similar to the modem yo-
yo sale. The Court described the facts as follows:
We find that within two hours after Hensley took to Mach I for a test run, and to
see ifhe could obtain a loan, Ford sold the Cyclone without legal title and with
the understanding that it would not be sold until Hensley completed the financing
arrangements. It is also noted that Ford was aware ofHensley's inability to obtain
a loan for the purchase of a car a few weeks before.
!d. at 762.
Damages for conversion and trover would be for the fair market value of the trade-in. See,
Batson v. Clark, Ky.App., 980 S.W.2d 566 (1998). As indicated in Hensley, punitive damages
are also available may also be available. Note, however, that the standard for granting punitive
damages is now governed by KRS 411.186.
A dealer's knowledge ofpotential credit problems of the buyer may be inferred if the
dealer targets consumers with credit problems. In other instances, knowledge of the dealer may
be established by carefully reviewing notes in the dealer's file and by reviewing the consumer's
credit history. The dealer should run a credit check and should have a good idea ofthe consumer
will qualify for certain financing. If the dealer fails to run a credit check, then an argument can be
made that the knowledge ofcredit problems should be imputed to the dealer because of its
recklessness.
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In a more recent case, a jury returned a verdict of $8,600 in actual damages (value of auto,
loss of use, inconvenience) and $50,000 in punitives. Piles and Warner v. Craig and Bishop,
Inc., d/b/a/ Sonny Bishop Cars, No. 03-CI-07221 (Jefferson Circ. Aug. 5,2004).
If the consumer has already signed a new contract, all is not necessarily lost. The tort of
fraud or deceit may still be available to the consumer as maya claim under the Consumer
Protection Act.
In those cases where there is not a conditional agreement based upon approval of
financing, then the dealer is normally the creditor and should finance the deal itself. This is
because the typical financing arrangement is a retail installment contract with the dealer as
assignor, even if the name of a bank is printed on a contract.
9. Laws to Consider
Possible application of the Truth in Lending Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act have
been discussed in context with particular problems. There may be other claims or defenses of a
more general nature which can be asserted.
The Uniform Commercial Code implies a duty of good faith in all contracts. KRS 355.1-
203. A court can grant relief from unconsionable terms ofa contract. KRS 355.2-302 (sales) and
355.2A-I08 (leases). A claim for rescission based on material misrepresentation or fraud can be
made without barring other remedies. KRS 355.2-721 and 355.2A-505.
The difficulty in seeking rescission for fraud is the responsibility most people have for
reading and being bound by their contracts. As the Court in Cline v. Allis-Chalmers Corporation,
Ky.App., 690 S.W.2d 764, 766 (1985) stated "negligence in failing to read the contract prevents
any reliance on oral representations at the time of his signing. Therefore, the lease or the
purchase order in the instant case may not be rescinded on the basis of fraud." There is an
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important but subtle difference, though, when a claim for the tort of fraud is brought by a party
who did not read the contract. A person has the duty to exercise ordinary care in reading their
contracts but the exercise of that ordinary care is a question of fact when the plaintiffwith one
factor being the extent the party is entitled to rely upon the one who procured his signature. Id. at
pp. 766-767 (plaintiffhad prior dealings with defendant).
The buyer may be able to revoke acceptance of the automobile under the Uniform
Commercial Code well after taking delivery. In Bell v. Louisville Motors, Inc., Ky.App., 573
S.W.2d 351 (1978), the Court held that the issue ofwhether acceptance had been revoked within
a reasonable time was an issue of fact. The buyer sued for recision and for violation ofthe
Consumer Protection Act where he claimed the seller had misrepresented the truck as new when
it was not. The buyer claimed he did not learn of facts supporting his claim until after he had
driven the truck 3,000 miles.
A disclaimer of implied warranties by the dealer does not prevent a buyer from revoking
acceptance. Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, Ky.App., 575 S.W.2d 480 (1978). Where the manufacturer
has a policy where it refuses to recognize this statutory remedy, it commits a violation ofthe
Consumer Protection Act. Id.
Revocation of acceptance usually requires a tender ofthe automobile back to the seller.
This may be difficult on the consumer who has to get to and from work. In Greene v. Waddell,
Ky.App., 657 S.W.2d 589 (1983), the Court held that the buyer who continues using the motor
vehicle could still bring an action for fraud and violation of the Consumer Protection Act
(odometer had 44,000 miles on it but engine had 80,000 miles on it)..
The Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, KRS 367.170, prevents any unfair, false, or
misleading act or practice in trade or commerce. Consumers have a private right of action under
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KRS 367.220 and can seek actual damages and equitable relief. KRS 367.220(1). This also opens
the possibility of attorney fees. KRS 367.220(3).
C. Failure to Disclose Damage or Repairs
Not all fraud and misrepresentations need to be made affirmatively. In certain
circumstances, the law recognizes a duty to inform - even in the sale of automobiles.
1. Damage to Vehicles
A dealer is expressly required by statute to disclose to a buyer damages done on new
automobiles in the following circumstances:
• The dealer must disclose damage done in transit where the damage exceeds six
percent of the vehicle's sticker price not including damage to glass, tire and
bumpers replaced by identical manufacturer's equipment. The dealer must then
certify to the consumer that the vehicle has been repaired to the manufacturer's
standards. The manufacturer, and not the dealer, is then liable for "any concealed
damage." KRS 190.0491(5).
• When damage exceeding $1,000 (formerly $300) occurs after delivery to the
dealer, the dealer must certify to the consumer that the vehicle has been repaired
to the manufacturer's standards. Liability for concealed damage remains with the
dealer and not the manufacturer. KRS 190.0491(5).
• An individual or licensed dealer is required to disclose in writing any damages
which exceed $1,000 (formerly $300) while the vehicle is in that person's
possession. KRS 186A.540.
The provisions ofKRS 186A.540 apply to non-dealers as well as dealers. Potter v. Bruce
Walters Ford Sales, Inc., Ky.App., 37 S.W.3d 210 (2000). The statute requires mechanical
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repairs which exceed the statutory limit be disclosed. Smith v. General Motors, Ky.App., 979
S.W.2d 127 (1998).
KRS 190.010(23) defines "fraud" as including "an intentional failure to disclose material
fact." The Court in Smith v. General Motors, Ky.App., 979 S.W.2d 127 (1998) used this statute
as one, independent basis for determining the dealer had a duty to disclose unsuccessful repair
attempts, leaving a "new" van which continued to stall. This, in turn, supported a claim for
common law fraud against the dealer. Using this rationale, a repair attempt that did not exceed
the $1,000 limits found in the above statutes might, nonetheless, still have to be disclosed if it
were a material fact.
The Court in Smith also held there was a duty to disclose "where one party to a contract
has superior knowledge and is relied upon to disclose same." Id. at 129. See also, Bryant v.
Troutman, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 918 (1956) (latent defect in real estate). Thus, the plaintiffhad a
claim for both the tort of fraud and for violation of the Consumer Protection Act. Most recently,
the Kentucky Supreme Court has recognized the tort ofnegligent misrepresentation where the
parties are in privity of contract. Presnell Canst. Managers, Inc. v. Eh Canst., LLC, Ky., 134
S.W.3d 575 (2004). The Court specifically adopted § 552 ofthe Restatement (Second) ofTorts.
!d. at 576.
2. Branded Titles
A motor vehicle may be damaged to the extent it cannot be repaired at a cost less than its
retail value. In that event, the owner is required to surrender the certificate of title to the
automobile. KRS 186A.295(1)(a). These are sometimes referred to as ''junk vehicles." KRS
186A.510(3). Chapter 186A contemplates that these vehicles will be taken out of service, never
to return. Junk vehicles, as defined by Kentucky law, should not be confused with motor vehicles
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which are branded as "salvage" in Kentucky. Nor should they be confused with out-of-state title
brands which may even include a 'junk" brand.
If a motor vehicle is sufficiently damaged in Kentucky, it receives a salvage title. It
receives the salvage title if it has been wrecked or damaged to the extent that the cost ofparts and
labor exceed 75% of the fair market value ofthe automobile as established by the NADA price
guide. KRS I86A.520(1). A motor vehicle which has been ''water damaged" in Kentucky must
also receive a salvage title. KRS 186A.530(4). The vehicle is considered to be water damaged if
it has been partially or completely submerged above the dashboard, regardless ofthe dollar
amount ofthe damage. KRS I86A.5 10(7). A hail-damaged vehicle, however, does not receive a
salvage title. See, KRS 186A.555.
Think ofthe salvage title as a temporary title. Once the vehicle has been repaired, the
owner can apply for a new title which is branded as a "rebuilt vehicle" on the face ofthe title.
KRS I86A.530(1 ), (2). Other states have titles brands which may contain different words such as
'junk" or "rebuildable." Those states may have different standards for branding titles. Kentucky
may issue a Kentucky salvage title (and later a branded title) on those vehicles if the applicant
submits at least two photographs ofthe vehicle showing the damage and also submits two
estimates verifying damage to the vehicle is less than 75% ofthe retail value of the auto. KRS
186A.530(5).
Before the statute was amended to allow for the continuation of a title brand on autos
from other states, Kentucky was known as a "title washing" state. A person could get a "clean"
title with no brand on it by simply having it titled in Kentucky. There are still a few states where
this can be done and a Kentucky consumer can still end up with a vehicle where the title has been
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washed from another state. Kentucky's statute has had the effect, however, of reducing the
number of such vehicles dumped in Kentucky.
A motor vehicle dealer must notify a buyer of a title brand in two ways. First, there must
be notice on a sticker ofthe automobile. KRS 186A.530(7)(a). Second, the dealer must obtain the
signature of the buyer on a notification form approved by the Transportation Cabinet. KRS
I86A.530(7)(a) and 186A.530(8). A non-dealer must also disclose a title brand on forms
prepared by the Cabinet. KRS 186A.530(7)(b); see also, Preferred Automotive Sales, Inc. v.
Sisson, Ky.App., 44 S.W.3d 818 (2001).
lfthe dealer fails to procure the buyer's signature on the notification form, the sale is
voidable at the option of the buyer. The option must be exercised within 45 days of issuance of
the title. KRS 186A.530(8). This is designed to give a reasonable amount oftime for a buyer to
receive the title and review it. The statute explicitly provides that the statute's provision does not
bar other remedies available to the buyer. Id.
One important limitation is that the notice provisions do not apply to motor vehicles more
than ten model years old. KRS 186A.530(9). That does not mean, however, that the title brand
comes off after ten years. A buyer might still be able to claim fraud or violation of the Consumer
Protection Act in the appropriate circumstances.
The notice requirements also do not apply to hail-damaged vehicles since they never
receive a salvage title. See, 186A.555. Instead, they receive a special brand. Id.
3. Duty to Disclose Previous Consumer Owner
KRS 190.080 was enacted to help a consumer determine the history of a used car before
buying it. The statute requires dealers to place a notice on the windshield of every used car
informing buyers of their right to seek the name and contact information of the previous
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consumer owner. KRS 190.080(3). The statute then makes it unlawful to refuse to furnish the
name and contact information of the previous consumer owner if requested by a prospective
buyer provided that information is known or available. KRS 190.080(2). Note that the statute
specifically refers to notice when there is a "used car" for sale, not a "motor vehicle" which
would include more types of automobiles. Violation of the statute can result in criminal penalties.
KRS 190.990(1).
This statute is most likely to be of assistance to the consumer buys a car with a defect or
problem that may have been discoverable by contacting the previous consumer owner. It might
be one fact in many upon which to base a claim of fraud or violation of the Consumer Protection
Act.
D. Disclosure Under the Truth in Lending Act
The Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.c. § 1601, et seq., was first passed in 1968 to enable
consumers to judge the true cost of credit and has been amended several times. In the context of
automobile financing, it covers both the traditional credit purchase and auto leases. Loans and
retail installment contracts are regulated by 12 C.F.R. 226, commonly referred to as Regulation
Z. That portion of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) dealing with consumer leases is known as the
Consumer Leasing Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1667 - 1667e, and is regulated under 12 C.F.R. 213,
commonly referred to as Regulation M. This discussion is merely a brief introduction
highlighting a few key provisions of the TILA.
1. Scope
For loans, the Act covers "creditors" which means anyone who either regularly extends
consumer credit or the person to whom the financial obligation is initially payable on the fact of
the obligation. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f). For traditional auto loans, "regularly extends credit" means
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more than 25 transactions per year. 12 C.F.R. 226.2(a)(17). There must be more than four
installments to come within the scope of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1602(f).
The Consumer Leasing Act covers "lessors" which includes those who both lease
personal property or arrange for such leases more than five times in a calendar year. 12 C.F.R.
213.2(h). The CLA applies to leases ofmore than four months in duration. 15 U.S.C. § 1667(1).
The most significant limitation in the scope ofthe TILA is that it is limited to credit
transactions where the amount financed is under $25,000. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(3). For consumer
leases, the "total contractual obligation" cannot exceed $25,000. 15 U.S.c. § 1667(1), 12 C.F.R.
213.2(e)(1). This term is not the same as the total of payments made on the lease and excludes
the residual value amount or purchase-option price and amounts collected by the lessor but paid
to others, such as taxes. Official Staff Commentary § 213.2(e)-3. Down payments or trade-ins
used to reduce the capitalized cost are considered part ofthe "total contractual obligation."
Eastwood v. General Electric Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 825 F.Supp. 306 (N.D. Ga. 1993);
Sanders v. Gold Key Lease, Inc., 906 F.Supp.197 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). For example, where a
consumer makes a $10,000 down payment in cash and trade-in and the regular lease payments
excluding the amount paid for taxes is $16,000 over the course ofthe lease, then total contractual
obligations would be $26,000 and would not be within the scope of the Consumer Leasing Act.
2. Required Disclosures in Credit Transactions and Regulation Z
Traditional automobile loans, whether structured as a retail installment contract or a note
payable to a bank, are considered "closed end" credit transactions requiring certain information
to be disclosed. Regulation Z requires a number of items to be disclosed with perhaps three of the
most critical being the amount financed, finance charge, total ofpayments, and Annual
Percentage Rate (APR). See, 12 C.F.R. 226.18.
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(a) Amount Financed
The "amount financed" must be disclosed and is calculated by:
(1) determining the principal amount or cash price (less any downpayment);
(2) adding any amounts financed by the creditor but which are not part of the finance
charge;
(3) subtracting any prepaid finance charges.
12 C.F.R. § 226.l8(b).
(b) Finance Charge
Often the most critical item to determine is the finance charge since this will effect both
the amount financed and APR. It includes "any charge payable directly or indirectly by the
consumer ... as an incident to or a condition ofthe extension of credit." 12 C.F.R. 226.4(a).
Therefore, any charge applicable to credit customers not applicable to cash customers would be a
finance charge unless specifically exempted under 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(c).. Regulation Z contains a
non-exclusive list of items which are included as part of the finance charge such as interest, time
price differential, debt cancellation fees (GAP insurance), and premiums for credit life and health
insurance written in connection with a credit transaction. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(b). These insurance
premiums, however, may be excluded from the finance charge if certain conditions are met.
Premiums for credit life, health, and accident insurance may be excluded only if:
• The insurance is optional and this fact is disclosed;
• The premium for the initial term is disclosed and, ifthe coverage term is less than
the term of the credit transaction, then this fact is disclosed; and
• The consumer makes an affirmative request in writing for the insurance after
receiving the disclosures.
C - 24
15 U.S.C. § 1605(b)(1); 12 C.F.R. 226.4(d)(1). GAP insurance is a type of debt cancellation fee
and is treated the same as credit life insurance for determination ofwhether the premium is a
finance charge or not. 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(d)(3); Official Staff Commentary § 226.4(b)(10); see
also, Sapia v. Regency Motors ofMetairie, Inc., 726 F3d 747 (5th Cir. 2002).
Auto dealers may receive substantial commissions from the sale ofcredit life and health
insurance. Where borrowers are verbally told that purchasing the insurance is not optional, then
the premiums should logically be included in the finance charge and there may also be a claim
for an unfair or deceptive act under the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act. A creditor may
violate the Equal Credit Opportunity Act when it lists insurance as being optional but then denies
the consumer credit. See, infra at III(A)(l)(c).
(c) Annual Percentage Rate
The Annual Percentage Rate must be disclosed using that particular term. 15 U.S.c. §
1638(a)(4). Tolerances for the disclosure ofthe APR may be as great as one-fourth percentage
point. 15 U.S.c. § 1607(c). Regulation Z contains a number ofmethods ofcalculating APR,
some ofwhich are quite complex. In some instances, there may be multiple methods of
determining the APR which are acceptable for determining the APR. For example, booklets
containing tables of finance charges may be obtained from the Federal Reserve Board or a
creditor may use software applying one of the approved formulas. One such software program
approved for banks by the Office ofthe Comptroller of the Currency can be downloaded for free
from the OCC's web site at www.occ.gov/aprwin.htm.
3. Remedies for Violations on Traditional Auto Loans
A consumer can recover actual damages resulting from a violation ofthe TILA. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1640. The consumer may recover statutory damages, with or without actual damages, ifthere is
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a failure to clearly, conspicuously, and accurately disclose amount financed, finance charge,
annual percentage rate, total ofpayments, payment amounts and schedule, and the security
interest identified. by type. Statutory damages include twice the finance charge but not less than
$100 and not more than $1,000 in the case of an individual action. There are also special damage
provisions for class actions.
While attorney fees may be awarded when the consumer properly rescinds a transaction
relating to a home, there is no right to attorney fees under TILA on typical automobile loans. See,
15 U.S.c. § 1640(c). For that reason, the attorney may want to plead that an inaccurate disclosure
is also a deceptive act in violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act which does allow
attorney fees at the discretion ofthe court. KRS 367.220.
4. Consumer Leasing Act Disclosures
Leasing became a widespread method ofconsumer financing of automobile use during
the 1990s. As certain problems surfaced, the Federal Reserve Board found it necessary to amend
Regulation M.1t did so effective October 1, 1996, though compliance was optional until January
1, 1998. 62 Fed Reg. 51006 (Sept. 30 1997) as corrected by 62 Fed. Reg. 53733 (Oct. 16, 1997).
These changes should be kept in mind when evaluating the precedential value of cases.
A lease is a consumer lease if the lessee is a natural person and the property is used for
personal, family, or household purposes and otherwise falls within the scope of the Consumer
Leasing Act. 15 U.S.c. § 1667(1). When liability at the end ofthe lease term is based on the
estimated value ofresidual value, there are special limitations on liability that do not apply to
non-consumer leases or leases outside the scope ofthe Act. There is a rebuttable presumption
that the estimated residual value (estimated at lease inception) is unreasonable where it exceeds
the actual residual value (at lease end) by more than three monthly payments. 15 U.S.C. § 1667b.
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Further, in such cases, a lessor cannot collect excess liability without bringing an action. The real
kicker is that "In all actions, the lessor shall pay the lessee's reasonable attorney's fees." Id. That
means the lessor pays attorney fees for the consumer whether it wins or loses. With higher prices
for automobiles, however, it is not that unusual for leases to fall outside this protection.
There are a number of items that need to be disclosed under Reg. M. 12 C.F.R. § 213.4.
The Federal Reserve Board has developed model forms so dealers and lessors have no excuse for
a form which does not make adequate disclosures Items to be disclosed in motor vehicle leases
include:
• A description of the property - typically year, make, model and VIN;
• Itemization of amounts to be paid at lease consumation or delivery;
• How amounts paid at lease consumation or delivery are be made (e.g., cash or
trade-in);
• Positive equity in trade-in. This is an area in which dealers sometimes slip. If
there is zero or negative equity, it can simply be disclosed as zero or left blank;
• Number, amounts, and due dates under the lease and the total amount of the
periodic payments;
• An itemization and total of "other charges" not included in the periodic payments
or disclosed elsewhere. For example, this would include a processing fee but not
taxes or other fees collected by the lessor for payment to third parties;
• Gross capitalized cost and agreed upon value of the vehicle. Prior to the
amendment ofReg. M, lessors were not required to disclose the capitalized cost to
consumers which sometimes resulted in payments based on a capitalized cost well
above sticker price. The agreed upon value can be thought of as the sticker price
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or negotiated value ofthe vehicle plus, at the lessor's option, fees for such items
as title and licensing. It does not include service contracts and insurance. The term
"gross capitalized cost" means the agreed upon value of the property together with
items paid over the term ofthe lease such as insurance, service contracts and
payoffs on existing loans or leases. 12 C.F.R. § 213.4(1). Dealers and
manufacturers sometimes hide the balance due on a lease covering the trade-in by
increasing the agreed upon value. This is a violation ofRegulation M.1t is part of
the gross capitalized cost but not the agreed upon value. The lease should contain
a statement notifying consumers oftheir right to a written itemization of these
items added to the agreed upon value. !d.;
• Capitalized cost reduction. This is the total of any rebates to the consumer, cash
payment, net trade-in and other non-cash credit;
• Adjusted capitalized cost. This is the gross capitalized cost less capitalized cost
reduction;
• Residual value. This is an estimate of the value of the vehicle at the end ofthe
lease term. Residual values mayor may not be available in accepted guide books;
• Depreciation attributed to the vehicle stated as a monthly figure;
• Rent charges as part of the monthly payment;
• Total ofbase periodic payments which includes depreciation and rent charges;
• Number of payments during the lease term;
• Base periodic payment which is the total ofbase periodic payments divided by the
number ofpayment periods in the lease. This is the amount of the monthly lease
payment before taxes and similar charges are added;
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• Total periodic payment which includes the basic periodic payment plus any other
monthly payments (e.g., taxes)
• Te method ofdetermining the amount of any penalty or charge for early
termination and default. This should be a formula which can be calculated from
the lease itself. See, Applebaum v. Nissan Motor Acceptance Corpt., 226 F.3d 214
(3rd Cir. 2001) (construing old Regulation M);
• Disclosures relating to maintenance and excess wear and tear;
• Purchase option price.
III. Credit Scams
A. Discriminatory Practices
1. Equal Credit Opportunity Act
Certain discriminatory credit practices are illegal. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA), 15 U.S.C. § 1691 et seq., is both the broadest and most narrow applicable statute. It is
broadest because of the wide class of persons it protects and is the most narrow because it deals
with solely with credit practices.
It prohibits discrimination bases upon sex, marital status, age, race, color, religion,
national origin, the exercise ofrights under the Consumer Credit Protection Act (15 U.S.c. §
1601 et seq.), and receipt of income from public assistance. 15 U.S.C. § 1691. It is not restricted
to the valuation of credit worthiness; it covers the complete credit transaction involving the
application process and collections. 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(m). It covers small business applicants as
well as traditional consumer applicants. See, 15 U.S.c. § 1691a(b) (definition of"applicant") and
15 U.S.c. § 1691a(f)(definition of"person").
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The Act covers "creditors" which is broadly defined as "any person who regularly
extends, renews, or continues credit; any person who regularly arranges for the extension,
renewal, or continuation of credit; or any assignee of an original creditor who participates in the
decision to extend, renew, or continue credit." 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(e). The typical car dealer who
has the dealership listed as the creditor in a retail installment contract and regularly arranges for
an extension ofcredit is a creditor under this section. Cannon v. Metro Ford, Inc., 242 F.Supp.2d
1322 (S.D.Fla.2002).
The Federal Reserve Board has defined credit transactions covered under the Act very
broadly:
Credit transaction means every aspect of an applicant's dealings with a creditor
regarding an application for credit or an existing extension of credit (including,
but not limited to, information requirements; investigation procedures; standards
ofcreditworthiness; terms ofcredit; furnishing of credit information; revocation,
alteration, or termination ofcredit; and collection procedures).
12 C.F.R. 202.2(m).
Leases have been held to be credit transactions with the scope of the ECOA. Brothers v.
First Leasing, 724 F.2d 789 (9th Cir. 1984); Ferguson v. Park City Mobile Homes, 1989 WL
111916 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
In addition to banning many forms ofdiscrimination, regulations under the Act actually
prohibits asking about sex, race, color, religion, or national origin except for some very narrow
circumstances. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(b). A creditor is also generally banned from inquiring about the
marital status of a person unless the person resides in a community property state or is relying
upon property located in such a state for repayment. 12 C.F.R. § 202.5(d)(1).
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a. Sex/Marital Status Discrimination
Creditors are banned from seeking the co-signature of a spouse on an unsecured extension
ofcredit if the applicant would otherwise qualify for credit. 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(2). If a security
interest is being granted, then "a creditor may require the signature of the applicant's spouse or
other person on any instrument necessary, or reasonably believed by the creditor to be necessary,
under applicable state law to make the property being offered as security available to satisfy the
debt in the event ofdefault. ..." 12 C.F.R. § 202.7(d)(4).
An interesting scenario presents itselfwhere one spouse applies for credit to purchase a
car but wants the auto in the couple's joint names. The creditor can require the non-applicant
spouse to sign a security agreement but not a document holding the non-applicant spouse
personally responsible for the debt. In home mortgages, it is common to have a separate note and
mortgage to create a security interest in the real estate. In automobile credit transactions,
however, there is typically only one document which provides for both personal liability and for a
security interest in the auto. This arguably violates the ban on requiring spouses to co-sign for
loans.
b. Racial Discrimination
Claims based on racial discrimination may be based upon overt discrimination, disparate
treatment, or disparate impact. The use of credit scores and yield spread premiums present twists
to these traditional analyses ofpossible discrimination.
The ban on asking about an applicant's race means the applicant's credit score is pivotal
in the decision to grant credit. Credit reporting agencies rate a person's credit on a number of
factors. The exact factors and how they are weighted are claimed to be proprietary. However,
certain factors certainly are used in determining a credit score: income, amount and nature of
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debt, debt to income ratio, past payment history, arrest or conviction record, whether an applicant
is a homeowner, length ofresidence at the current address, lawsuits and bankruptcies. In
addition, credit reporting agencies may have a separate credit score for use in evaluating
automobile purchases or leases because an person may be more likely to pay for an automobile
than an unsecured credit card.
The use ofcredit scores is generally laudable but there has been some debate about
whether there are inherently discriminatory factors used in determining these scores. For
example, does the use ofzip code data influence the credit score and result in a type of
"redlining" to discriminate against those who live in a minority neighborhood? In Cherry v.
Amoco Oil Company, 490 F.Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980), the Court ruled that the plaintiff (a
white female) could not prove a prima facie case ofdiscrimination because she could not show
that the applicants rejected from the zip code area were disproportionally minority (creditors are
generally banned from asking for race information). In addition, many ofthe low performing zip
codes were predominately white. Id. at 1031.
One African-American claimed a violation of the ECOA because his arrest record was
used to deny him credit. The plaintiff argued that African-Americans were more likely to be
arrested than whites because of discriminatory police departments which, in turn, had a disparate
impact on African-Americans. The court rejected this contention because there was no statistical
evidence to back up this contention. A.B. & S. Auto Service, Inc. v. South Shore Bank ofChicago,
962 F.Supp. 1056 (N.D. Ill. 1997).
The use of credit scores may, in fact, be helpful in establishing statistical evidence of
discrimination. At least three recent cases filed as class actions claim that defendant financial
institutions allow dealers to mark up loans above the actual approved rate (see discussion on
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yield spread premiums). (Thompson v. WFS Financial, Inc., Pakeman v. American Honda
Finance Company, and Herra v. Toyota Motor Credit Corporation, information retrieved from
plaintiffs' lawyer's web site at http://www.lieffcabraser.com/auto-Ioan-discrimination.htm on
August 4, 2004). The dealer mark-up then results in a higher cost ofcredit to minority auto
buyers compared to the cost ofcredit of whites with similar credit scores and income.
c. Discrimination Based on Exercise of Consumer Rights
The Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.c. § 1601 et seq., is the umbrella which
covers a number of federal consumer credit protection laws including the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, Truth in Lending Act, Fair Credit Reporting Act, Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act, and others. A creditor discriminating against one who exercises rights under any part of the
Consumer Credit Protection Act violates the ECOA. 15 U.S.c. § 1691(a)(3).
There is a violation of this provision where a creditor declines credit based upon the
refusal to purchase credit life where, as required by the Truth in Lending Act, the credit form
indicated such insurance was optional. Bryson v. Bank ofNew York, 584 F.Supp. 1306, 1318
(S.D. N.Y. 1984). In another instance, a finance company violated this provision when it required
a borrower to sign a release of a Truth in Lending claim on another transaction as a condition for
obtaining an emergency loan. Owens v. Magee Finance Service ofBogalusa, Inc., 476 F.Supp.
758, 764 (E.D. La. 1979).
d. Explanation of Adverse Action
An important procedural safeguard built into the ECOA is the requirement that a creditor
notifY an applicant in writing within 30 days of any adverse action taken on the application and
the reasons for the adverse action. 15 U.S.C. § 1691(d)(1) and (2). Regulation B further defines
the term "adverse action" as including "A refusal to grant credit in substantially the amount or on
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substantially the terms requested in an application unless the creditor makes a counteroffer (to
grant credit in a different amount or on other terms) ..." and the applicant accepts 12 C.F.R. §
202.2(c)(2)(v)(1).
e. Remedies
Remedies for individual actions brought under ECOA include equitable and injunctive
relief, actual damages, punitive damages not to exceed $10,000, and reasonable attorney fees. 15
U.S.c. § 1691e. Class actions may recover actual damages and punitive damages not to exceed
the lesser of$500,000 or 1% of the net worth of the defendant. Id. Actual damages may include
mental anguish, damage to credit reputation and out-of-pocket expenses. See, Fischl v. General
Motors Acceptance Corp., 708 F.2d 143 (5th Cir. 1983). A violation ofa substantive provision
and a violation for the failure to report the reasons for adverse action are separate violations
which may result in separate punitive damage awards. Ricci v. Key Bancshares ofMaine, Inc.,
662 F.Supp. 1132 (D. Me. 1987).
f. Statute of Limitations
There is a two year statute of limitations for bringing an ECOA action which starts to run
from the date of the violation. 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(f).
g. Other Protections Against Discrimination
There are a number ofother statutes which forbid discriminatory practices which might
potentially occur during the sale and financing of an automobile. A finding of a violation of42
U.S.C. § 1981, 1981a, or 1982 entitles the plaintiff to attorney fees. 42 U.S.c. § 1988(b). A
violation of sections 1981 or 1981a allows a court to include expert fees as part ofthe attorney
fees.
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All persons "shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security ofpersons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens...." 42
U.S.c. § 1981(a). The refusal to extend credit based on race is a violation of this statute. Bagley
v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 100 F.Supp.2d 879 (N.D.Il1.2000); Davis v. Strata Corp., 242
F.Supp.2d 643, (D.N.D.,2003). However, unlike the ECOA, this statute is not limited to credit
contracts. It applies to all contracts so that discriminatory pricing contracts would also be
covered.
Compensatory damages include future economic loss, emotional pain, and inconvenience.
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). Punitive damages may be assessed in proper circumstances with the
amount partially dependent upon the number ofpersons the defendant has employed. See, 42
U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).
Racial discrimination is also prohibited by 42 U.S.C. § 1982 which provides that "All
citizens ofthe United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed
by white citizens thereofto inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal
property." Section 1981 and 1982 are considered to be in pari materia and to be construed
together. Garrett v. Tandy Corp., 295 F.3d 94, 102 (1 5t Cir. 2002). There has to be a property
right involved and, in one case, a court held the credit practices of a material supplier did not
violate this statute because those practices did not effect the plaintiffs right to purchase or lease
property. Davis v. Strata Corp., 242 F.Supp.2d 643, (D.N.D. 2003).
h. State Law
Kentucky law prohibits certain discriminatory credit practices based on race, color,
religion, national origin or sex. KRS 344.400(1). Specifically, a person cannot used these factors
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to deny credit or increase fees or collateral required to secure credit based. Id. A plaintiffmay
recover actual damages and reasonable attorney fees. KRS 344.450. There does not appear to be
a statute which prohibits discrimination in the sales ofgoods or contracts generally.
B. Dealer Kickbacks on Financing - Yield Spread Premiums
Traditionally, an automobile dealer or other merchant who wanted a bank to finance a
credit sale by purchasing a retail installment contract often had to sell the contract at a lower
price than stated on the contract. The contracts were thus sold at a discounted rate to cover the
risk to the bank or other financial institution. Competition among lenders, however, as turned this
around. Financial institutions now often pay commissions or "dealer incentives" for the right to
buy the contracts. These are really just kickbacks.
Sometimes the dealer incentive is simply a straight fee for each loan purchased, often in
the range of $100 to $300. The more serious problem occurs when the financial institution
authorizes the dealer to charge interest at a rate greater than the minimum rate at which the
financial institution will approve. The lower rate is called the "buy rate." If the consumer agrees
to a higher rate than the buy rate, the difference in the buy rate and the final contract rate is called
the "yield-spread premium." In exchange for the higher interest rate sold to the consumer, the
dealer receives a larger kickback.
KRS 190.010(23) defines "fraud" as including "an intentional failure to disclose material
fact." The dealer's failure to disclose that it has added two to four percent onto the loan is surely
a material fact and the failure to disclose is surely intentional (or at least a question of fact).
Moreover, the Court in Smith v. General Motors, Ky.App., 979 S.W.2d 127 (1998), reaffirmed a
line of cases holding that one with superior knowledge in a contractual relationship may be under
a duty to disclose facts to the other part. See also, Presnell Canst. Managers, Inc. v. Eh Canst.,
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LLC, Ky., 134 S.W.3d 575 (2004)(recognizing the tort ofnegligent misrepresentation). In
Morton v. Bank ofthe Bluegrass, Ky.App., 18 S.W.3d 353,359 (1999), the Court held that a
bank officer "had a fiduciary duty to disclose 'material facts affecting the loan transaction' such
as eligibility for credit life insurance...."
Actions on this in other states have had mixed results. The Alabama Supreme Court has
determined there is not a duty to disclose the dealer kickback in a common law fraud claim.
Bramlett v. Adamson Ford, Inc., 717 So.2d 781 (Ala. 1997). One unreported case in Tennessee
has determined that the dealer misrepresented the rate charged by Ford Motor Credit. Adkinson v.
Harpeth Ford-Mercury, Inc., 1991 WL 17177 (Tenn.App. 1991); compare, Harvy v. Ford Motor
Credit Co., 1999 WL 486894 (Tenn.App. 1991)(Harpeth distinguished because consumer sued
FMC and not dealer). Case law is still evolving in this area.
In anticipation of litigation on this matter, some finance contracts now disclose that the
dealer may negotiate the interest rate but do not disclose the actual buy rate. Even in this
scenario, if a dealer affirmatively misrepresents the minimum ratethis is an affirmative
misrepresentation of fact which should be actionable under common law fraud and the Consumer
Protection Act.
C. Usury
Most automobile sales are in the form of a retail installment contract with finance fees
regulated by KRS 190.110. Rates are calculated using the add-on method of interest and are
based on the age of the motor vehicle:
• 11% for model years not earlier than the year of sale;
• 13% for model years 1 or 2 years earlier than the year of sale;
• 15% for all other model years.
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Id.
The add-on method of interest was first used as a simple way of calculating interest which
does not take into consideration installment payments made during the loan term. Using the
standard formula to determine interest payable (Principal x Rate x Time = futerest), the add-on
method simply calculates the futerest as ifonly one lump sum is payable at the end of the term.
Thus, the simple or actuarial interest rate will be higher when installment payments are made and
the actuarial rate will depend upon the length of the loan and the payment period (monthly,
weekly, etc.). This is one of the reasons the Truth in Lending Act was first passed. The Annual
Percentage Rate is used to show the true cost ofcredit which is essentially the actuarial rate of
interest plus other charges considered to be part of the finance charge.
Most retail installment contracts do not show the add-on method because KRS
190.110(4) allows the seller to compute the finance charge on a simple interest basis. Here are a
few examples of what the add-on rates would be when converted to their equivalent simple
interest rates:
Term Add-on Rate Simple futerest Rate
1 yr., monthly payments 11% 19.71%
1 yr., monthly payments 13% 23.2%
1 yr., monthly payments 15% 26.62%
The rates were determined by using a spreadsheet application which contained an
amortization template and using trial balances to determine the rates. Weekly payments, as is
common in "buy here pay here" lots, would result in higher equivalent simple interest rates.
If a bank or other financial institution directly lends money to a consumer using a note,
rather than retail installment contract, other interest rates might apply. The determination ofthe
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correct usury rate can be a complex analysis involving federal and state law and is beyond the
scope of this chapter.
IV. Odometer Fraud
One method of defrauding buyers is by rolling back the automobile's odometer or by
disconnecting it for a period of time. Although this type of fraud can be committed with any type
of automobile, it is more likely to occur in used automobiles which have been driven more miles
than the typical auto of that age. Rolling back the odometer on a two year old automobile from
50,000 miles to 20,000 miles can substantially add to the value ofthat vehicle.
A. Federal Law
The Motor Vehicle Information and Cost Savings Act (commonly referred to as the
Federal Odometer Act) was first passed in 1972 and subsequently amended and recodified at 49
U.S.C. § 32701 - 32711. The Act applies to all "persons" which includes corporate entities and
employees and agents of dealers such as a mechanic who physically rolls back an odometer.
The Act provides that a person may not:
• Disconnect, reset, or alter an odometer with intent to change the mileage recorded.
49 U.S.c. § 32703(2);
• Sell, advertise, install or use a device that causes an odometer to register an
incorrect amount. 49 V.S.c. § 32703(1);
• Operate a motor vehicle on a street or road with intent to defraud and knowing the
odometer is disconnected or not working. 49 V.S.c. § 32703(3); or
• Change the mileage on an odometer during a repair or, ifit cannot be repaired
without changing the mileage, the odometer must be reset to zero and a notice
attached to the left door frame ofthe vehicle. 49 U.S.C. § 32704(a);
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• Remove the notice attached to the door frame with intent to defraud. 49 U.S.C. §
32704(b).
1. Information to Be Disclosed
When transferring title, the transferor must disclose odometer readings at the time of the
transfer. 49 C.F.R. § 580.5(c)(1). The transferor must certify:
• To the best ofthe transferor's knowledge, the disclosure reflects the actual
mileage; or
• The mileage exceeds the mechanical odometer limits; or
• The odometer reading differs from the actual mileage and that the transferee
should not rely upon the mileage stated by the odometer.
49 C.F.R. § 580.5(e).
As discussed below, these disclosures may be made on an existing title in the case ofused
vehicles. Some unscrupulous dealers may simply warn the transferee that the actual mileage may
be different than the odometer in an attempt to insulate themselves from liability. However, at
least a couple of courts have ruled that the dealer can only make this certification if the dealer has
reason to know the actual mileage is different than that showing on the odometer. See, Nieto v.
Pence, 578 F.2d 640 (5th Cir.1978); see also, Denmon v. Nick's Auto Sales, 537 So.2d 796 (La.
App. 1989). In a series of interpretive letters, the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) has taken the position that a dealer who makes this certification
without reason to do so is in violation of49 C.F.R. § 580.4. See, e.g., Opinion Letter from Nat'l
Highway Traffic Safety Admin. to Frank E. McCarthy, Nat'l. Auto Dealers Ass'n.,
Clearinghouse No. 43,095U (Jan 14, 1987); Opinion Letter from Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety
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Admin. to Russell P. Laurens, Ga. Office of Consumer Affairs, Clearinghouse No. 43,0958S
(June 16, 1986).
2. Form of Disclosure
For new motor vehicles for which a new title has not been previously issued, the
odometer disclosure is made on a form separate from the title. 49 C.F.R. § 580.5(g). This
disclosure is not filed with the state so the dealer must retain a copy for five years. See, 49 C.F.R.
§ 580.8. Odometer disclosures do not have to be made on transfers of new motor vehicles
between the manufacturer and dealer or between dealers. Disclosure must be made before the
first sale to a person who actually intends to use the vehicle. 49 C.F.R. § 580.17(b).
Where a title already exists (i.e., a used vehicle), the federal law requires disclosure ofthe
odometer reading be made on the existing title to the motor vehicle. 49 C.F.R. § 580.5. The title
may be assigned several times among dealers before it sold to the end user. A new title is not
issued for each of these dealer assignments but the mileage disclosure must be made.
3. Retention of Records
Federal regulations require records related to odometer disclosure be retained for five
years. 49 C.F.R. § 580.08. This includes (i) dealers who are required to retain a copy of each
mileage statement they issue and receive, (ii) lessors ofmotor vehicles who receive an odometer
disclosure they receive from their lessees, and (iii) dealers who must retain a copy of their powers
of attorney which have been granted to them by their transferors. In each instance, the records
must be kept in a manner "that permits systematic retrieval." Id.
4. Remedies
A person may bring a civil action in federal or state court for violation of any part of the
Act (or regulations or orders) if the violation was done with intent to defraud. A person may
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recover the greater of either three times actual damages or $1,500 plus costs and reasonable
attorney fees. The action must be brought within 2 years ofviolation. 49 U.S.c. § 32710.
A person who knowingly and willfully violates the Act or regulation may be fined and
imprisoned up to 3 years. 49 U.S.C. § 32709(b). The Secretary of Transportation may impose a
civil penalty of up to $2,000 for each motor vehicle involved in a violation, not to exceed total
penalties of$100,000. 49 U.S.C. § 32709(a) and the United States Attorney General may seek
injunctive relief. 49 U.S.C. § 3209(c). The chieflaw enforcement officer of each State (typically,
the State Attorney General) may bring an action in state or federal court to enjoin violation ofthe
law and to seek those damages authorized by section 32710 on behalfof injured persons.
B. State Law
Kentucky law is substantially similar to the federal law on odometer fraud and is found at
KRS 190.260 through 190.320. One who violates the provisions of the law with intent to defraud
is liable to the transferee for the greater of three times actual damages or $1,500 plus attorney
fees. KRS 190.310(1). Venue is in the county where the purchaser resides. KRS 190.310(2).
Since no specific statute of limitations is imposed, the five year statute of limitations for an
action based on statute would be applicable. See, KRS 413.120(2).
V. The Federal Trade Commission-Used Car Rule
A. Source and Status
The FTC's used car rule was published November 19, 1984, in 49 F.R. 45725 and became
effective on May 9, 1985. 16 C.F.R. §455. The FTC published an extensive Commentary and
Analysis in the material immediately preceding the rule as published in the Federal Register. The
FTC reviewed it and made minor changes in December, 1995.
B. Scope and Coverage
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The rule covers all sellers ofmotor vehicles who sell or offer to sell a used motor vehicle
five times or more in any 12-month period. It is not limited to a motor vehicle dealer as defined
by state law. A used vehicle is one which has been driven more than the limited use necessary to
move or road test it prior to delivery to a consumer. Thus, the rule does apply to a typical new car
dealer's inventory of demonstrators, executive cars, etc. The rule covers sales to all buyers except
for used vehicle dealers.
Banks and financial institutions, lessors selling to lessees, and businesses selling to their
employees are exempted from the rule. The rule does not apply to motorcycles, agricultural
products, vehicles sold for scrap, or vehicles meeting certain size requirements (8,500 pounds
gross vehicle rating; 6,000 pounds curb weight; and less than 64 square feet of frontal area).
Compliance with the rule requires an understanding ofbasic warranty law and the effect
and implications of the Magnuson-Moss Consumer Product Warranty Act. The rule requires
special compliance procedures in the area ofwritten warranties, implied warranties and "service
contracts" as defined in Magnuson-Moss.
C. Substantive Provisions of the Rule
The rule essentially makes it unlawful to (i) misrepresent the mechanical condition of any
used motor vehicle, (ii) misrepresent the existence of or terms of a warranty, and (iii) fail to
disclose prior to sale certain substantive provisions of the warranty. It is this last provision which
has the most impact on used car sales and the attempt to enforce any indebtedness due because of
the sale.
All used car sellers must include two required sentences in their contract of sale. The
contract may be a separate contract or it could be the Retail Installment Contract which the
financer later buys. The required sentences are:
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The information you see on the window form for this vehicle is part of this
Contract. Information on the window form overrides any contrary provisions in
the contract of sale.
16 C.F.R. § 455.3(b). Even ifthe language is not contained in the contract, however, the
rule affirmatively incorporates the warranty disclosures made in the window form into the
contract and overrides any language in the contract. Id. However, a dealer may not make any
statements which alter or contradict the terms of the window form. 16 C.F.R. § 455.4.
A "Window Form" must be properly completed and properly displayed. Before the
revisions in January, 2001, the form had to be displayed on the side window of every used car
offered for sale and could not be removed. The rule now provides that the form be "prominently
and conspicuously in any location on a vehicle and in such a fashion that both sides are readily
readable." 16 C.F.R. § 455.2(a)(1). The amended rule also allows a dealer to remove the sticker
temporarily during any test drive but it must be reattached as soon as the test drive is finished.
The original of the window form must be given to the consumer at the time the sale is
consummated. The Rule specifies the exact size for the form and further mandates specific
wording. The Rule also requires the form to be printed in 100% black ink on white paper.
D. Spanish Language Sales
If a dealer conducts a sale in Spanish, the window form must be displayed in both English
and Spanish and specific language is mandated for information about implied warranties, if
applicable. 16 C.F.R. § 455.5.
E. Effect of Violation
While the Rule does not grant a specific cause of action or provide for recovery of
specific civil penalties, a violation of the Rule would likely constitute an unfair trade practice.
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VI. Repossession Issues
A. Right to Peacefully Repossess
A secured creditor has the right to repossess collateral covered by the security agreement
or may simply render the property unusable (but not damage it). KRS 355.9-609. The statute
makes it clear that the creditor can use non-judicial repossession only ifthere is no breach of
peace.
In First and Farmers Bank ofSomerset, Inc. v. Henderson, Ky.App., 763 S.W.2d 137
(1989), the Court held that creditor unlawfully converted property of the debtor when it
repossessed the property causing a threat ofa breach ofpeace, but no actual breach ofpeace. The
court said the strong verbal objection and the limited intervention of a sheriffs deputy was
sufficient proof that there was a threat of a breach to peace. In the same case, the Court noted that
there was nothing wrong in removing the boat from a garage which had its doors open. Id. at 39.
B. Disposition of the Collateral
If the debtor consents, the creditor has the option of retaining the repossessed auto in
satisfaction ofthe debt or selling the auto in certain circumstances. KRS 355.9-620(1). For
consumer goods, the debtor can only consent if the debtor does not possess the collateral. KRS
355.9-620(2). The creditor cannot accept the collateral in partial satisfaction in consumer
transactions. KRS 355.9-620(7). If the debtor has paid 60% of the cash price or principal amount
ofloan for consumer goods, the creditor must properly dispose (usually sell) of the collateral.
KRS 355.9-620(7). The disposition must typically take place within 90 days. KRS 355.9-620(6).
If the secured party elects or is required to sell the property, it may dispose of the
collateral in any commercially reasonable manner. KRS 355.9-610. The creditor must give
reasonable notice before disposition ofthe collateral. KRS 355.9-612. Requirements of the notice
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in consumer-goods transactions are set out in KRS 355.9-613. The secured party can recover
reasonable repossession costs, preparation and disposition costs, and reasonable attorney fees if
allowed in the contract. KRS 355.9-608(a) and 9-615(1)(a).
A commercially reasonable sale includes a public or private sale if such sale is
commercially reasonable. KRS 355.9-610. In the case of dealer only auctions, the sale may be
commercially reasonable but not be the type of sale at which the creditor can purchase back the
collateral. The creditor can buy back collateral at a public sale or at a private sale if the collateral
is the kind customarily sold on a recognized market to where tliere are widely distributed price
quotations. Auctions open only to dealers should not be considered to be public sales:
Although the term is not defined, as used in this Article, a "public disposition" is one at
which the price is determined after the public has had a meaningful opportunity for
competitive bidding. "Meaningful opportunity" is meant to imply that some form of
advertisement or public notice must precede the sale (or other disposition) and that the
public must have access to the sale (disposition).
Official Comment 7 to U.C.C. § 9-610. See also, Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Solway, 825 F.2d
1213 (7th Cir. 1987).
Likewise, used autos are not the type of goods that can be sold in a recognized market or
are the subject ofwidely distributed standard price quotations:
A "recognized market," as used in subsection (c) and Section 9-611 (d), is one in which
the items sold are fungible and prices are not subject to individual negotiation. For
example, the New York Stock Exchange is a recognized market. A market in which
prices are individually negotiated or the items are not fungible is not a recognized market,
even ifthe items are the subject of widely disseminated price guides or are disposed of
through dealer auctions.
Official Comment 7 to V.C.C. § 9-610.
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If the secured party or related party purchases nonetheless buys back the collateral, then
the surplus or deficiency is calculated using a sales amount the collateral would have brought in a
proper sale. KRS 355.9-615(6).
C. Remedies for Violation ofUCC
There are several potential remedies available under Article 9 including injunctive relief,
KRS 355.9-625(1) and damages for any loss incurred as a result ofviolation including loss for a
debtor's inability to obtain credit or increased costs of alternate financing. KRS 355.9-625(2). If,
however, the debtor utilized KRS 355.9-626 to reduce or eliminate a deficiency after
repossession, the debtor can only recover for loss of any surplus.
Perhaps the most potent arrow in a consumer's quiver is that found in KRS 355.9-
625(3)(b) which provides that, if the collateral is consumer goods, the debtor or co-signer may
recover a minimum of the amount of the credit service charge (interest) plus 10% of the cash
price or principal amount.
Where there is an action for deficiency or surplus relating to consumer transactions, the
VCC has adopted a very flexible rule and states the courts "may continue to apply established
procedures." KRS 355.9-626(2). Thus, a consumer's attorney is free to argue that a commercially
unreasonable sale completely bars any deficiency even though that remedy is no longer
specifically enumerated in the VCC.
D. Early Termination Penalties in Leases
Early tennination fees in leases must not be penal in nature. The Federal Consumer
Leasing Act allows penalties or early tennination fees "only at an amount which is reasonable in
the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the delinquency, default, or earl tennination"
but can take into consideration the difficulties in proving loss. 15 V.S.C. § 1667b(b).
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The failure to discount accelerated lease payments on default is an unlawful penalty and
not liquidated damages because it bears no relationship to anticipated harm. Moore v. Ford
Motor Credit Co., Ky.App., 778 S.W.2d 657 (1989); see also, KRS 355.2A-504.
E. Problems With the Insolvent Dealer
A problem sometimes arises where a dealer becomes insolvent before transferring title to
the consumer. A bank may be claiming a security interest in the recently purchased automobile or
another dealer may be refusing to transfer title on a used auto purchased by the consumer because
that dealer has not been paid by the insolvent dealer. The problem is exacerbated when the dealer
has already sold the trade-in.
Where another dealer or the manufacturer may be claiming an interest in the vehicle
purchased by the consumer, it appears that the interest ofthe consumer prevails under one of two
statutes. KRS 355.9-320(1) states in pertinent part that "a buyer in ordinary course ofbusiness,
other than a person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations, takes free
ofa security interest created by the buyer's seller, even ifthe security interest is perfected and the
buyer knows of its existence." A similar result is reached under KRS 355.2-403(2) which states
that "Any entrusting ofpossession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind gives
him power to transfer all rights ofthe entruster to a buyer in the ordinary course ofbusiness."
A problematic situation arises when a bank has a floor plan financing arrangement with
the dealer and claims a security interest in the auto purchased by the consumer. KRS 355-9-320
does not cover this situation because the bank is not the seller. In any event, KRS 355.9-303
provides that the issue ofperfection or non-perfection of security interests in goods covered by a
certificate oftitle (like motor vehicles) are covered by the certificate oftitle law. Unless the floor
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plan financier has recorded its lien on the certificate of title, then its security interest is
unperfected. See, KRS 186A.190(1).
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You probably get several calls a year from clients complaining of their automobile
purchases. Whether new or used, the purchase of a car is fraught with landmines for the
unsuspecting buyer. A little knowledge of sales law, common law fraud, and the consumer
protection laws will help you serve your clients well.
Here's the typical scenario. Your client purchases an automobile (new or used). After
owning it for a few weeks, maybe a few months, the automobile develops problems--structural,
electrical, mechanical. The computer system goes out. He/she takes it back to the auto dealer,
and he is more than willing to fix it under the new car's manufacturer's warranty or any service
contract. If it's used, often there is no written warranty or service contract, so the consumer has
to pay for the repairs.
During the "sales" phase, invariably the car salesman has "sold" your client on the car: a
"cream puff," "A-I excellent condition," driven by the proverbial "old lady back and forth to
church." After his purchase, the client might learn that the history of the car was not accurate. [t
may be the car was bought at an auto auction, or it has a salvage/rebuilt title, or it was a flood car
from a Florida hurricane. Sometimes the "executive program car" was really an Avis rental car.
And most times you learn these facts well after the date of purchase.
The element that makes these cases difficult for the consumer or his lawyer is the value of
the claim. The "damages" for the mechanical problems, or the salvage title or the
misrepresentations of prior history, are only a few thousand dollars. How can you seek redress in
an economically-reasoned manner? What laws protect you? Principally, there are five: sales
(DeC) laws, Kentucky's Lemon Law (KRS 367.840, et ~), the Federal Warranty Act
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(Magnuson-Moss Act - 15 U.S.C. 2301, et seq.), Kentucky's Consumer Protection Act (the
"KCPA"), and common law fraud.
Kentucky's Sales Law
There are usually two principal remedies under sales law--breach of warranty and
revocation of acceptance.
Express Warranties - Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and became part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty
that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise. KRS 355.2-3l3(1)(a).
Implied Warranty of Merchantability - A warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is
implied. Merchantability for automobiles is generally defined as "fit for the ordinary purposes
for which such goods are used." KRS 355.2-314(1) and (2)(c).
Implied warranties are almost always excluded by a simple though conspicuous "As [s"
disclaimer clause in the contract. (KRS 355.2-316)
Revocation of Acceptance - The buyer may revoke his acceptance of the vehicle if there
is a nonconformity that substantially impairs the value to him, ifhe accepted: (1) on the
reasonable assumption that the nonconformity would be cured and it has not been seasonably
cured, or (2) the nonconformity was unknown at the time of acceptance and reasonably difficult
to discover.
Note: the nonconformity, though sounding subjective, is an objective standard. Capitol
CadillacOldsv. Roberts, Ky., 813 S.W.2d287 (1991).
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There are a number of "traps" related to revocation that one must be aware of:
the buyer must be given notice of the revocation (preferably in writing).
revocation must be within a reasonable time (probably referring to some time
subsequent to the discovery of the nonconformity).
there must be no substantial change in the condition of the vehicle.
the seller must be given the opportunity to cure the defect, unless the defect is
reasonable "uncurable." (Example: car was previously totalled.)
the buyer must not exercise any ownership over the vehicle after he revokes
acceptance. KRS 355.2-602(2)(a); KRS 355.2-608(3).
The damage recoverable under express and implied warranties is generally the difference
in fair market value "as warranted" and "as received." This usually requires expert testimony.
The damage recoverable for revocation is the sales price.
Revocation, while securing a good result (i.e., he gets his money back), is risky. The
assessment of proper revocation is a matter oflaw, which means the judge can do anything.
Your client gives up the car, keys, title--and a year and a half later, in a pretrial, the judge may
say the car was not returned in the same condition, or he determines that revocation did not occur
within a reasonable time frame.
Quare: Who is going to take a case for a client whose damages might be $2,000.00 after
two years of litigation?
Kentucky's Lemon Law (KRS 367.840)
This provision is found under the Consumer Protection Statutes, KRS Chapter 367. It
applies only to new cars, KRS 367.840, and limits remedies for defects that appear within 12,000
miles or twelve (12) monthS following date of delivery to the buyer, whichever is earlier. It
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provides a remedy for any resident of Kentucky who buys a new car (i.e., not limited to consumer
use "primarily for household use" as defined in KRS 367.0 I0, the general consumer protection
statute).
Violation and Remedies Under Kentucky's Lemon Law
If a defect arises within the time frame set forth, and the manufacturer or the dealership is
unable to cure the defect after a reasonable number of attempts during the 12-monthl12,000 mile
period, then the manufacturer, at the option of the customer, must provide a full refund, or
provide a comparable replacement vehicle, KRS 367.842(1) and (2), less a reasonable offset for
use of the vehicle.
The reasonable opportunity to cure the defect is four or more attempts to fix the same
defect, or the same defect keeps the car out of service for a 'cumulative total of at least thirty (30)
days. KRS 367.842(3)(a) and (b). The additional advantage of recovery under the Lemon Law is
that attorneys' fees may be awarded to a prevailing plaintiff, at the court's discretion. KRS
367.842(9).
Sounds great? Not really. As a practical matter, the Kentucky Lemon Law statute is
worthless. This statute in practice provides no more protection than the written factory warranty,
except that it forces the manufacturer to enforce the written warranty under the threat of an
attorney fee award to the plaintiff. And most cars don't develop a nonconformity as defined
under the statute--a defect that fails to conform with an express warranty such that the defect
"substantially impairs the use, value, or safety of the motor vehicle," KRS 367.841(6)--within the
first twelve months ofownership. Almost~ does the typical consumer spend the time (nor
have the patience) to bring a vehicle in for repairs for the same defect four times or more, and
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rarely is a car out of service for a particular defect for over thirty days (remember the 12-month
limitation). If you took the car in three times, the manufacturer could keep the car for seven days
at a time, and still not hit the threshold).
In addition, the Lemon Law requires the consumer to participate in Alternative Dispute
Resolution (i.e., arbitration), as set out in KRS 367.860 or in 16 CFR Part 703. (Fayette County
is fortunate enough to have the Better Business Bureau's Auto Line, which provides the requisite
arbitration forum.) The decision of the arbitration panel is binding on the manufacturer, but not
binding on the consumer. And only then, after you've participated in arbitration, can you file a
lawsuit against the manufacturer.
Quare: How many clients will you see that have a substantial nonconforming defect in a
new motor vehicle within 12 months or 12,000 miles of purchase that hasn't been fixed in at
least four attempts (or is out of service for thirty days), have participated in arbitration, and still
have the desire (and financial wherewithal) to then file a lawsuit to seek redress? Not many--it's
a lot easier to sell the car.
The Magnuson-Moss Act (15 U.S.C. 2301, et seq.)
This statute is also known as the Federal Warranty Act. It applies to the sale of any
consumer goods, including automobiles, where a written warranty or service contract is provided.
It also expands the definition of "consumer goods" to include all items "normally used" for
personal or family use. 15 V.S.c. 2301(1). This allows a business lessee to invoke the Act.
Business Modeling Techniques, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 474 NY.S.2d 258 (1984).
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Violation and Remedies Under The Magnuson-Moss Act
This Act provides consumers the same protections as Kentucky's Lemon Law, and a great
deal more. It provides the same remedy, but it extends the window for asserting the claim. The
remedies, replacement or full refund at the option of the consumer, are available for any
noncurable defect for the entire period of the warranty or service contract. The typical
manufacturer's warranty is 3 years/36,000 miles, so a defect occurring at 25,000 miles is
covered. And there is no statutory provision for an offset for use of the vehicle. Defense counsel
will attempt to argue, with probably no success, that the dealer is entitled to a 34¢ per mile offset.
There is no statutory or decisional law that so permits. Ofcourse, defense can argue to the jury
that an offset is appropriate--equally as unsuccessful.
The Magnuson-Moss Act, like Kentucky's Lemon Law, also requires that the consumer
participate in arbitration before bringing a lawsuit. It also provides attorneys' fees to a prevailing
plaintiff, at the discretion of the court, but seems to presume recovery ofattorneys' fees by
stating that fees may be awarded, unless the court deems an award of fees inappropriate. 15
U.S.C. 231 O(d)(2). A Magnuson-Moss Act claim may be brought in any federal district court or
any state court of competent jurisdiction. 15 U.S.c. 2310(d)(l). In almost all cases, these claims
should be brought in state court (you need a hometown jury!).
There are two additional benefits of the Magnuson-Moss Act. First, it applies to any
written express warranties, including service contracts. If a consumer purchases a 5-year/75,000
mile service contract, the car is covered for any noncurable defects for the duration of the service
contract. The other huge advantage is that the warrantor cannot disclaim any implied warranties
during the coverage period. 15 U.S.C. 2308(a). In the case of automobiles, this principally
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applies to the implied warranty ofmerchantability and the implied warranty of use for a
particular purpose. See KRS 355.2-314 and KRS 355.2-315. In other words, aone buys a
service contract or has a written manufacturer's warranty, the "as is" disclaimer is invalid for the
duration of the contract or warranty.
As an example, your client buys a used car with a service contract. Car dealers will
always sell these service contracts because they're a sucker deal for consumers (like credit life
insurance). They're expensive and don't provide a lot of coverage. You've experienced this if
you've ever tried to enforce the provisions ofone of these service contracts. Of the several dozen
"service contract" cases rve looked at, almost every one involved the service contractor's
attempts to avoid "coverage" because the car was not "maintained properly." Some of these
nefarious companies demand that the consumer prove that he customarily changed the oil every
3,000 miles, or other ridiculous notions. Also, car dealers take a percentage, sometimes as high
as 50-70% ofthe premium, if they sell the service contract, which should tell you what you're
really receiving in terms of risklbenefit analysis.
Under Magnuson-Moss, if your client drives the car from the lot and one of the doors
falls off, that's not covered under the service contract, but it would probably be a breach of the
implied warranty ofmerchantability, i.e., is the vehicle as purchased reasonably fit for ordinary
driving? Probably not. So when a dealer sells a car "as is," along with a service contract, he
violates the Magnuson-Moss Act ab initio, the consumer can sue for, breach of implied
warranties, and recover his attorneys' fees as well under the Act. Now, that provides great
comfort for a purchaser of a used car. And the real beauty of this is that the car dealers have no
clue that they can't rely on "AS IS" disclaimers when they sell a service contract.
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As a rule of thumb, an attorney is almost always better served by utilizing the protections
found in the Magnuson-Moss Act. [fthere is any breach of warranty claim, assert a claim under
Magnuson-Moss, if applicable.
Consumer Protection Act (KRS 367.110, et seq.)
If your claim extends beyond a breach of warranty, you may be able to recover under
Kentucky's Consumer Protection Act ("the KCPA"), KRS 367.110, et~, which provides,
quite simply, that any act during the sale or lease of a consumer good which is "false, unfair,
misleading or deceptive" violates the Act. KRS 367.170«(1) "Unfair" is defined as
''unconscionable.'' KRS 367.170(2). Consumer goods are defined as those purchased or leased
"primarily for personal, family, or household purposes." KRS 367.220(1). One can recover
"actual damages or other equitable relief' as the court deems necessary and proper.
KRS 367.220(2). The Act is to be interpreted broadly in favor ofthe consumer. Commonwealth
v. Telcom Directories, Inc., Ky., 806 S.W.2d 638 (1991). This statute can be a very effective
tool if your client has been dealt with in a less than straightforward fashion by a car dealer.
Three principal advantages of the KCPA are the broad language encompassing consumer
fraud, the venue provision, and the attorney fee provision. First, under the KCPA, scienter is not
an issue; knowledge or intent to defraud are not requisite elements. Sparks v. Re/Max AUstar
Realty, Inc., Ky. App., 55 S.W.3d 343 (2000). Nor does the Act require actual deception of some
person in order to violate the Act. Telcom Directories v. Commonwealth, Ky. App., 833 S.W.2d
848 (1991). However, the Capitol OIds case requires proofof a "conscious and voluntary act or
omission." Second, the plaintiffmay bring this action in his county of residence, providing a
hometown advantage. However, one circuit judge held that the venue provision for a defendant
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»corporation (KRS 452.450) trumps the Consumer Protection venue provision ("shall" versus
"may"). Third, attorneys' fees may be awarded to a successful plaintiff, at the discretion of the
court. But the language of the statute may give you cause to pause. The fee provision states that
the "prevailing party" may recover its fees, so it is a double-edged sword. It requires some
confidence in one's case before asserting a claim under the CPA. Obviously, a competent
attorney should advise the client of this "risk ofloss." One should also be leery ofthe limitation
period for a CPA claim, which is two years after the commission of the violative act. KRS
367.220(5). There is also a seldom-used limitation of "one year after the state's Attorney
General has taken any action on its own." Id. The limitation for a Magnuson-Moss claim and a
Lemon Law claim are also two years.
Proof of Damages
An expert on difference in valuation is needed under Consumer Protection Act or breach
of warranty claims (to establish "actual damages"). Obviously, you can prove purchase price for
revocation and fraud through your client.
Attorneys' Fees
This is really what consumer law is about-the ability of the consumer to recover his
attorneys' fees. It provides an attorney with the incentive to take a particularly egregious case
forward to trial. It provides the real hammer to recalcitrant defendants who think they have
nothing to lose, and know they have more money than the consumer. Under the Federal
Warranty act, the fees are probably recoverable. Under Kentucky's consumer statutes, the court
may award fees.
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The seminal decision on attorneys' fees in a consumer case against car dealers is
Alexander (and Don Pisacano) v. S&M Motors d/b/a Lexus Store of Lexington, Ky., 28 S.W.3d
303 (2000). Therein, the Supreme Court of Kentucky essentially said: anything the circuit court
does with regard to attorneys' fees is discretionary (read the brilliant and cogent dissenting
opinion, on the way the law should be!).
Alexander v. Lexus: Salvage title Lexus sold. Verdict: $23,000 compensatories (price of
vehicle); $75,000 punitives. Attorney fee bill - $25,000; Fees awarded - "0." ("Plaintiff received
enough in punitives.")
Childers v. Ken Ray Motors: "One owner, A-I, Cream Puff." Verdict - $6,000
compensatories, $25,000 punitives. Attorney fee bill- $25,000; Fees awarded - "0." ("You got
enough in punitives.")
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court's decision, saying it's discretionary.
Other Cases: Chilton v. Bluegrass Chrysler (sold as "new" a car with previous paint
damage)
Anderson County (Judge Stewart)
Compensatories: $23,000 purchase price
Punitives - $175,000
Attorney fee bill- $42,000
Fees awarded - $42,000
Kocinski v. Freedom Dodge (sold a "program, executive lease" car, which
was really an AVIS rental car)
Fayette County (Judge Clark)
Compensatories: $6,000
Attorney fee bill: $42,000
Fees awarded - $39,000
Note: It only takes a few visionary judges, like Judges Clark and Stewart, to send a very strong
message that these dealers better deal fairly with the consumer public.
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Common Law Fraud
There remains one other viable means of recovery for a car transaction, and that is found
under Kentucky's common law fraud cases. These cases provide a recovery if one has been
intentionally defrauded. Common law fraud is generally the only means by which you can have a
jury instructed on punitive damages. A fraud claim requires: 1) a false statement made toa
consumer by a seller 2) with the intent that the consumer rely on the statement, 3) that the
consumer in fact relied on the statement, and 4) had the consumer known the truth ofthe
statement, he/she would not have executed the agreement, sale, or contract, and 5) the seller
knew the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard for whether the statement was true or
not true, and 6) the consumer was damaged as a result. See Wahba v. Don Corlett Motors, lic.,
Ky. App., 573 S.W.2d 357 (1979); Johnson v. Cormney, Ky. App., 596 S.W.2d 23 (1979).
Instructions
Some sample instructions are provided as an exhibit.
CONCLUSION
If you're like most attorneys, you probably receive a number of calls from clients who
have problems with car purchases. A little knowledge of Kentucky's sales law, Lemon Law,
Consumer Protection Act, the Federal Warranty Act (Magnuson-Moss Act), and common law
fraud will go a long way in helping your clients and determining possible remedies.
D-ll
t5
D·12
Exhibits:
KRS 367.840
KRS 367.841
KRS 367.842
KRS 367.843
KRS 367.845
KRS 367.846
KRS 355.2-314
KRS 355.2-608
Alexander (and Don Pisacano) v. S&M Motors d/b/a Lexus Store of Lexington, Ky., 28 S.W.3d
303 (2000)
Smith v. General Motors Corporation, Ky. App., 979 S.W.2d 127 (1998)
Sample Jury Instructions:
Chilton v. Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
Washington v. Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
D· 13
D - 14
\t\~tlavv.
KRS § 367.840
C
Baldwin's Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated Currentness
Title XXIX. Commerce and Trade
"ill Chapter 367. Consumer Protection (Refs & Annos)
"iii Defective New Cars
-+367.840 KRS 367.841 to 367.844 to be construed liberally; purposes
KRS 367.841 to 367.844 shall be liberally construed and applied to promote the underlying purposes of KRS
367.841 to 367.844, which purposes are:
(1) To protect consumers who buy or lease new motor vehicles that do not conform to applicable warranties by
holding manufacturers accountable for certain nonconformities;
(2) To limit the number of attempts and the amount of times that a manufacturer or its agents shall have to cure
such nonconformities; and
(3) To require manufacturers to provide, in as expeditious a manner as possible, a refund, not to exceed the
amount in KRS 367.842, or replacement vehicle that is acceptable to the aggrieved consumer when the
manufacturer or its agents fail to cure any nonconformity within the specified limits.
HISTORY: 1998 c 54, § I, eff. 7-15-98; 1986 c 387, § I, efr. 7-15-86
NOTES OF DECISIONS AND OPINIONS
Refund 1
1. Refund
New car purchaser was not bound by "decision" of manufacturer's consumer appeals board finding that her car had
been repaired where "decision" was not within scope of matter submitted to it for arbitration; customer had
demanded return of her money and did not submit to dispute resolution whether car could be or had been repaired.
Tackett v. Campbell Corp. (Ky.App. 1989) 781 S.W.2d 758. Arbitration~ 82(5)
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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KRS § 367.841
C
Baldwin's Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated Currentness
Title XXIX. Commerce and Trade
"iii Chapter 367. Consumer Protection (Refs & Annos)
"'t!I Defective New Cars
~367.841 Defmitions
(1) "Buyer" means any resident person who buys, contracts to buy, or leases a new motor vehicle in the
Commonwealth of Kentucky. In the case of the lease of a new motor vehicle, "buyer" shall mean the lessor,
lessee, or both.
(2) "Manufacturer" means any person or corporation, resident or nonresident, who manufactures or assembles new
motor vehicles, including new conversion van manufacturers, which are sold in the Commonwealth of Kentucky.
(3) "Motor vehicle" means every vehicle which is self-propelled, and which is intended primarily for use and
operation on the public highways and required to be registered or licensed in the Commonwealth prior to such
use or operation; however, "motor vehicle" shall not include:
(a) Any vehicle substantially altered after its initial sale from a dealer to an individual;
(b) Motor homes;
(c) Motorcycles;
(d) Mopeds;
(e) Farm tractors and other machines used in the production, harvesting, and care of farm products; or
(t) Vehicles which have more than two (2) axles.
(4) "New motor vehicle" means a motor vehicle which has been fmally and completely assembled and is in the
possession of a manufacturer, factory branch, distributor, wholesaler, or an authorized motor vehicle dealer
operating under a valid sales and service agreement, franchise, or contract for the sale of such vehicle granted by
the manufacturer, factory branch, distributor, or wholesaler which is, inlact, new and on which the original title
has never been issued.
(5) "Express warranty" or "warranty" means the written warranty, so labeled, of the manufacturer of a new
automobile, including any terms or conditions precedent to the enforcement ofobligations under the warranty.
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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KRS § 367.841
(6) "Nonconfonnity" means a failure to confonn with an express warranty in a manner which substantially impairs
the use, value, or safety of the motor vehicle.
(7) "Reasonable allowance for use" means the amount directly attributable to a consumer's use of the vehicle other
than those time periods when the vehicle is out ofservice due to the nonconfonnity.
HISTORY: 1998 c 96, § 1, c 54, § 2, eff. 7-15-98; 1986 c 387, § 2, eff 7-15-86
Legislative Research Commission Note (7-15-98): This section was amended by 1998 Ky. Acts chs. 54 and 96
which do not appear to be in conflict and have been codified together.
KRS § 367.841, KY ST § 367.841
Current through End of 2003 Reg. Sess.
Copyright © 1988-2004 by West, A Thomson business
END OF DOCUMENT
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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KRS § 367.842
C
Baldwin's Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated Currentness
Title XXIX. Commerce and Trade
"W Chapter 367. Consumer Protection (Refs & Annos)
"'iiI Defective New Cars
,...367.842 Options of buyer if manufacturer unable to repair nonconformity in new motor vehicle;
rights of lienholder; resolution of disputes; dealer not liable
(I) If, after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer or its agents are unable to repair the nonconformity
in the motor vehicle to the express warranty during the first twelve thousand (12,000) miles of operation or
during the first twelve (12) months following the date of delivery to the buyer, whichever is the earlier date, that
buyer shall report the nonconformity, in writing, to the manufacturer.
(2) If, within the period specified in subsection (I) of this section, the manufacturer or its agents, are unable to
repair or correct any nonconformity or defect that substantially impairs the use, value, or safety of the motor
vehicle, after a reasonable number of attempts, the manufacturer, at the option of the buyer, shall replace the
motor vehicle with a comparable motor vehicle, or accept return of the vehicle from the buyer and refund to the
buyer the full purchase price. The full purchase price shall include the amount paid for the motor vehicle,
finance charge, all sales tax, license fee, registration fee, and any similar governmental charges plus all collateral
charges, less a reasonable allowance for the buyer's use of the vehicle. Refunds shall be made to the buyer and
lienholder, if any, as their interests may appear on the records of ownership kept by the Department of Vehicle
Regulation. The provisions of this section shall not affect the interests of a lienholder, unless the lienholder
consents to the replacement of the lien with a corresponding lien on the automobile accepted by the consumer in
exchange for the automobile having a nonconformity, the lienholder shall be paid in full the amount due on the
lien, including [fiance charges and other charges, before an exchange of automobiles or a refund to the consumer
is made. It shall be an affirmative defense to any claim under this section that:
(a) The nonconformity, defect, or condition does not substantially impair the use, value, or safety of the motor
vehicle; or
(b) The nonconformity, defect, or condition is the result of abuse, neglect, or unauthorized modification or
alteration of the motor vehicle by the buyer.
(3) It shall be presumed that a reasonable number of attempts have been undertaken to conform a motor vehicle to
the applicable express warranty if, within the frrst twelve thousand (12,000) miles of operation or during the
period of, twelve (12) months following the date of original delivery of the motor vehicle to the buyer, whichever
is the earlier date:
(a) The same nonconformity, defect, or condition has been subject to repair four (4) or more times by the
manufacturer, but such nonconformity, defect, or condition continues to exist; or'
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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(b) The vehicle is out of selVice/use by reason of repair of the same nonconfonnity, defect, or condition for a
cumulative total of at least thirty (30) calendar days.
(4) Disputes ansrng under subsection (2) of this section concerning refund or replacement shall be resolved
through the dispute resolution system established under either K.RS 367.860 to 367.870, or 16 C.f.R. part 703.
Such remedy shall be pursued prior to seeking any judicial relief under K.RS 367.843.
(5) Nothing in this chapter may be construed as imposing any liability on a dealer or creating a cause of action by
a consumer against a dealer.
(6) Nothing in this section shall in any way limit the rights or remedies which are otherwise available to a buyer
under any other law.
(7) Any agreement entered into by a buyer for the purchase of a new motor vehicle which waives, limits, or
disclaims the rights set forth in this section shall be void as contrary to public policy.
(8) Any action brought pursuant to this section shall be commenced within two (2) years after the date of original
delivery of the new motor vehicle to the buyer.
(9) A court may award reasonable attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff.
HISTORY: 1986 c 387, § 3, eff. 7-15-86
CROSS REFERENCES
2002 Main Volume Cross References
Product liability risk retention groups, 304.45-0 1O et seq.
LAW REVIEW AND JOURNAL COMMENTARIES
2002 Pocket Part Law Review and Journal Commentaries
Kentucky's Lemon Law: Making Lemonade Out of a Statutory Lemon, Don Piscano. 65 Ky Bench & B 15 (May
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KRS § 367.843
C
Baldwin's Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated Currentness
Title xxrx. Commerce and Trade
~ Chapter 367. Consumer Protection (Refs & Annos)
"'S Defective New Cars
-+367.843 Action for relief by purchaser
Any person who purchases a motor vehicle and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real or
personal, as a result of a violation of KRS 367.842, may bring an action under the provisions of KRS 367.220 for
relief.
HlSTORY: 1986 c 387, § 4, eff. 7-15-86
KRS § 367.843, KY ST § 367.843
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KRS § 367.845
C
Baldwin's Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated Currentness
Title XXIX. Commerce and Trade
"iii Chapter 367. Consumer Protection (Refs & Annos)
"SI Defective New Cars
..367.845 Enforcement of provisions of KRS 367.842 to 367.844 by Attorney General
Noncompliance with the provIsions of KRS 367.842 to 367.844 by -a manufacturer shall be unlawful. The
Attorney General shall have authority to enforce KRS 367.842 to 367.844 in accordance with powers provided by
KRS 367.190 and 367.230, pertaining to acts declared unlawful by KRS 367.170. Any expenses accruing to the
Attorney General from the provisions of KRS 367.842 to 367.844 shall be assessed by his office upon the motor
vehicle manufacturer involved in any action cited in the provisions herein.
HISTORY: 1986 c 387, § 6, eff. 7-15-86
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KRS § 367.846
C
Baldwin's Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated Currentness
Title XXIX. Commerce and Trade
"iii Chapter 367. Consumer Protection (Refs & Annos)
"iii Defective New Cars
-+367.846 Application of KRS 367.840 to 367.845
KRS 367.840 to 367.845 shall apply to new motor vehicles purchased after July 15, 1986, and to motor vehicles
leased after July 15, 1998.
HISTORY: 1998 c 54, § 3, eff. 7-15-98; 1986 c 387, § 7, eff. 7-15-86
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KRS § 355.2-314
C
Baldwin's Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated Currentness
Title XXIX. Commerce and Trade
Chapter 355. Uniform Commercial Code (Refs & Annos)
"IiI Article 2. Sales (Refs & Annos)
"fj Part 3. General Obligation and Construction ofContract
...355.2-314 Implied warranty: merchantability; usage of trade
(I) Unless excluded or modified (KRS 355.2-316), a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a
contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind. Under this section the serving
for value of food or drink to be consumed either on the premises or elsewhere is a sale.
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description; and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used; and
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even kind, quality and quantity within each unit and
among all units involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or afflfffiations of fact made on the container or label if any.
(3) Unless excluded or modified (KRS 355.2-316) other implied warranties may arise from course of dealing or
usage of trade.
HISTORY: 1958 c 77, § 2-314, eff. 7-1-60
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c.J.S. Sales § 254 to 256.
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Damaged as a Result ofIts Own Defect, Note. 9 J L & Com 99 (1989).
Torts--Products Liability--Should Contract or Tort Provide the Cause of Action When a Plaintiff Seeks Recovery
Only For Damage to the Defective Product Itself--C & S Fuel, Inc v Clark Equipment Co, 552 FSupp 340 (ED Ky
1982), Note. to N Ky L Rev 489 (1983).
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l. In general
Blood containing hepatitis virus is unavoidably unsafe and there is no implied warranty that it is free of the virus.
McMichael v. American Red Cross (Ky. 1975) 532 S.W.2d 7.
One who accepts an order and supplies a cooling system is a merchant. Frantz, Inc. v. Blue Grass Hams, Inc. (Ky.
1974) 520 S.W.2d 313.
Unless expressly excluded by the contract of sale, there is in every sale an implied warranty that the article sold is
reasonably suited to the use for which it is intended. (Annotation from former KRS 361.150 and 361.160.) Frick
Co. v. Wiley (Ky. 1942) 290 Ky. 665, 162 S.W.2d 190.
Even if common-law action for breach of implied warranty existed in favor of building owner against manufacturer
of fireproofing containing asbestos, Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which had been adopted by time building
was constructed, was dispositive and thus provided proper statute of limitations for breach of warranty claims;
enactment of UCC in Kentucky was clear expression of legislative intent to occupy field of commercial
transactions. Farm Credit Bank of Louisville v. U.S. Mineral Products Co. (W.O.Ky. 1994) 864 F.Supp. 643.
Common Law €:= 12; Sales €:= 431
2. Creation by sale
Warranty provision concerning fitness and merchantability of goods apply to services where sale is one of goods
and the services are necessary to insure that those goods are merchantable and fit for the ordinary purpose. Riffe v.
Black (Ky.App. 1977) 548 S.W.2d 175. Sales €:= 272; Sales €:= 273(1)
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Claim against helicopter repairman under breach of warranty provisions of Uniform Commercial Code for personal
injuries sustained in helicopter crash would be dismissed since transaction between parties did not involve
transaction in goods but involved rendition of services in which sale of goods was incidental. T-Birds, Inc. v.
Thoroughbred Helicoptor Service, Inc. (E.D.Ky. 1982) 540 F.Supp. 548. Sales €= 246
3. Creation of merchantability
There is an implied warranty by the distributor that the appliance sold is merchantable and fit for use, and the
damages maybe the value of the appliance. Belcher v. Hamilton (Ky. 1971) 475 S.W.2d 483.
Where the language excluding implied warranties is not conspicuous, there is an implied warranty of fitness.
Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Utley (Ky. 1969) 439 S.W.2d 57.
Where contract under which contractors were to cover home with stucco paint provided that proposal, properly
accepted, should constitute the entire contract, that there were no verbal agreements, and that all verbal statements
were merged in the written agreement, the statutory implied warranty of fitness for special purpose, if any, arising
because of negotiations between homeowners and salesman was excluded by the provisions of the writing, and
therefore homeowners could not recover damages for breach of implied warranty of fitness. Amos v. Montgomery
(Ky. 1960) 339 S.W.2d 471. Contracts €= 205.35(4)
Under statute providing that where buyer makes known to seller particular purpose for which goods are required
and it appears that buyer relies on seller's skill or judgment, there is an implied warranty that goods shall be
"reasonably fit" for such purpose, the quoted words mean something more than barely usable. Halterman v.
Louisville Bridge & Iron Co. (Ky. 1955) 280 S.W.2d 175. Sales €= 279
The Court of Appeals takes judicial notice that word "Quonset" has specific connotation sufficient to involve
applicability of provision of Uniform Sales Act that there is no implied warranty of fitness of article sold under
patent or other trade name for any particular purpose to facts in action for breach of implied warranty that a
Quonset type building, purchased by plaintiff from defendant, was reasonably fit for plaintiffs intended use
thereof. Halterman v. Louisville Bridge & Iron Co. (Ky. 1953) 254 S.W.2d 493. Evidence €= 20(1)
Where an apparently worthless second-hand tractor was sold, jury should be given instructions on implied
warranty, there being no distinction made between new and second-hand goods as regards implied warranty under
this section. (Annotation from former KRS 361.150.) Moss v. Yount (Ky. 1944) 296 Ky. 415, 177 S.W.2d 372.
Where the seller knows that the purchaser is buying the goods to sell in his retail trade, there is an implied warranty
that the goods are of a merchantable quality. (Annotation from former KRS 361.150.) Porter v. Craddock
(W.D.Ky. 1949) 84 F.Supp. 704.
4. Defective design
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Genuine issue of fact as to whether new van's stalling at highway speeds was material defect rendering vehicle
unmerchantable precluded summary judgment for dealership and manufacturer in buyer's action for breach of
implied warranty of merchantability. Smith v. General Motors Corp. (Ky.App. 1998) 979 S.W.2d 127. Judgment
€= 181(29)
Defect may be proved by a sufficient quantum of circumstantial evidence for purposes of breach of implied
warranty of merchantability claim. Smith v. General Motors Corp. (Ky.App. 1998) 979 S.W.2d 127. Sales€=
441(3)
KRS 361.150 creates an implied warranty of fitness for use under which a retailer may be held liable for sale to
consumer of tainted food in sealed packages, even though retailer had no opportunity to examine contents.
(Annotation from former KRS 361.150.) Martin v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. (Ky. 1946) 301 Ky. 429, 192
S.W.2d 201.
Failure of automobile air bag to inflate at time of accident did not amount to breach of warranty by automobile
manufacturer, absent credible evidence that air bag should have deployed; testimony of plaintiffs expert was as
consistent with non-deployment of air bag as it was with deployment. McCoy v. General Motors Corp. (C.A.6
(Ky.) 1999) 179 F.3d 396. Evidence €= 571(6); Sales €= 441(3)
5. Fitness of purpose relative to seller
The purchaser of a front-end loader which caught fire and destroyed itself due to a manufacturing defect is
precluded from recovering from the manufacturer in a product liability tort action based on the doctrine of strict
liability because Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A, adopted by the Kentucky Supreme Court as the standard
for recovery in such cases, does not intend to place liability on the manufacturer where the damage is limited to
harm to the product itself, and under KRS 355.2-314 and 355.2-315, the purchaser is left with only his contractual
remedy. Falcon Coal Co. v. Clark Equipment Co. (Ky.App. 1990) 802 S.W.2d 947.
Where no contractual relation was shown between seller of boat, which exploded, and injured guest of buyer's son,
seller was not liable to the guest for injuries under theory of breach of implied warranty or representation.
Caplinger v. Werner (Ky. 1958) 311 S.W.2d 201. Sales €= 255; Shipping €= 27
6. Mitigation ofdamages
For express warranty purposes, a buyer may not rely blindly on a statement or affirmation that he knows is
incorrect and a buyer does not disregard any special knowledge he possesses or his accumulated experience with
the product in determining whether to enter the bargain. Overstreet v. Norden Laboratories, Inc. (CA.6 (Ky.)
1982) 669 F.2d 1286. Sales €= 262
7. Negligence
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Where there was no showing that milk bottle which collapsed and injured buyer's hand was sold and where there
was no showing that bottle had a specific defect which caused the accident, there was no breach of implied
warranty of fitness. Rowe v. Oscar Ewing Distributing Co. (Ky. 1962) 357 S.W.2d 882. Sales €= 284(1)
Where seller sold truck by written contract disclaiming implied warranties and sole respect in which buyer claimed
that truck was unsuitable for purpose for which intended to be used was that front wheels had a slight shimmy or
wobble which, after continued use by buyer without notice to seller of the defect, allegedly caused driver's loss of
control and an accident, there was no such breach of covenant or condition as would justify rescission on theory of
failure of consideration. L.R. Cooke Chevrolet Co. v. Culligan Soft Water Service of Lexington (Ky. 1955) 282
S.W.2d 349. Sales €= 115
Under Kentucky law, plaintiff has burden of establishing causation in claims of strict liability, as well as in claims
of negligence and breach of implied warranty. Morales v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (C.A.6 (Ky.) 1995) 71
F.3d 531. Products Liability €= 75.1; Sales €= 439
Evidence that building owner did not learn that building had been "contaminated" with asbestos fibers until time
well within limitations period precluded summary judgment against owner on Kentucky law claims against
manufacturer of fireproofing containing asbestos for strict liability, breach of postmanufacture/sale duty to warn
and negligence. Farm Credit Bank of Louisville v. U.S. Mineral Products Co. (W.D.Ky. 1994) 864 F.Supp. 643.
8. Pleadings
In action on statutory implied warranty in connection with sale of engine used in manufacturing ice, wherein buyer
alleged that it relied on seller's superior knowledge concerning capacity of engine and that engine would not
perform work properly, buyer was properly required to make petition more defmite and certain by setting forth
contract between parties, so as to show basis of charge of breach of warranty and enable court to determine
whether warranty was waived by the parties. Citizens Ice & Fuel Co. v. Fairbanks, Morse & Co. (Ky. 1943) 293
Ky. 64, 168 S.W.2d 586. Pleading €= 367(3)
Answer and counterclaim in action for balance due for firecrackers sold to defendant held to state cause of action
for breach of implied warranty of their quality and fitness for defendant's purpose. Balfour-Guthrie & Co. v. L.S.
Du Bois Son & Co. (Ky. 1932) 245 Ky. 640, 54 S.W.2d 13. Sales €= 435(1)
KRS § 355.2-314, KY ST § 355.2-314
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C
Baldwin's Kentucky Revised Statutes Annotated Currentness
Title XXIX. Commerce and Trade
Chapter 355. Unifonn Commercial Code (Refs & Annos)
"i!I Article 2. Sales (Refs & Annos)
"iii Part 6. Breach, Repudiation and Excuse
... 355.2-608 Revocation of acceptance in whole or in part
(I) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose nonconfonnity substantially impairs
its value to him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its nonconfonnity would be cured and it has not been seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such nonconfonnity if his acceptance was reasonably induced either by the difficulty of
discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have
discovered the ground for it and before any substantial change in condition of the goods which is not caused by
their own defects. It is not effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods involved as if he had rejected
them.
HISTORY: 1958 c 77, § 2-608, eff. 7-1-60
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Motor vehicle sales, failure of manufacturer to indemnify dealer, 190.0491
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38 ALR 5th 191, What Constitutes "Substantial lmpainnent" Entitling Buyer to Revoke His Acceptance of Goods
Under UCC § 2-608(1).
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Bardenwerper, 4 Kentucky Practice Series, Methods of Practice § 38.136, Acceptance and lts Consequences.
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Michael L Tsai. 137 U Pa L Rev 967 (January 1989).
Chernick v Fasig-Tipton: A Caveat to the Horse Trader, Note. 74 Ky L J 889 (1985-86).
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Remedies Under the New International Sales Convention: The Perspective From Article 2 of the U.e.e., Hany M.
Flechtner. 8 J L & Com 53 (1988).
Section 2-206 of the Uniform Commercial Code: How Much and What Kind of Use Maya Buyer Make of a Good
Before It Constitutes Acceptance?, Note. II J L & Com 81 (Fall 1991).
The Sale of Horses and Horse Interests: A Transactional Approach, Robert S. Miller. 78 Ky L J 517 (1989-90).
NOTES OF DECISIONS AND OPfNlONS
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Substantial impairment of value 4
l. In general
Under KRS 355.2-608, the remedy of revocation of acceptance may be predicated upon discovery of a latent defect
and must occur within a reasonable time after the purchaser discovered or should have discovered the grounds for
it; although the statute focuses on whether the nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the goods to the
purchaser, that test must be evaluated by objective standards. Capitol Cadillac Olds' Inc. v. Roberts (Ky. 1991)
813 S.W.2d 287.
Testimony of patient's physician did not conclusively establish that physician's alleged failure to disclose risks
involved in taking oral polio vaccine was consistent with standard of practice at time vaccine was administered, so
as to warrant summary judgment for physician, particularly in light of unsettled state of Kentucky informed consent
law. Snawder v. Cohen (W.D.Ky. 1990) 749 F.Supp. 1473. Federal Civil Procedure €= 2515
2. Buyer's rights and duties
A buyer's actions do not necessarily have to be detrimental to the seller's interest to preclude revocation, only
inconsistent with any intention to revoke, and since breeding a thoroughbred mare is an extremely delicate and
risky business involving decisions about which stallion to use, which veterinarian to employ, and when the
breeding should occur, a buyer's attempt to breed a mare after learning of defects in her is an act of dominion
precluding revocation of his acceptance of the mare. Chernick v. Casares (Ky.App. 1988) 759 S.W.2d 832.
A warranty limited to parts and labor did not fail in its essential purpose so as to allow the buyer to revoke
acceptance where the seller was not given a reasonable time to correct the defect and the buyer revoked his
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acceptance before determining whether the seller's latest attempt to correct the defect was effective. Cline v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp. (Ky.App. 1985) 690 S.W.2d 764.
A seller may limit the buyer's remedy to repair or replacement of defective parts unless the remedy fails of its
essential purpose. When a car dealer fails within a reasonable time to correct a defect which substantially impairs
the value of a new motor vehicle, the buyer is entitled to revoke his acceptance. Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes
(Ky.App. 1978) 575 S.W.2d480. Sales €== 120
Sale of truck occurred and title passed to buyer at time of delivery, in absence of exclusive agreement between
parties to the contrary, and when buyer accepted truck, and in absence of subsequent revocation of acceptance, he
became obligated to pay contract price, notwithstanding fact that buyer was unable to license truck because county
court clerk never received title documents from seller. Lexington Mack, Inc. v. Miller (Ky. 1977) 555 S.W.2d 249
. Sales €== 183; Sales €== 201(1)
3. Reasonable time after discovery
Ordinarily the question of whether a buyer has notified the seller of his intent to revoke his acceptance of goods
"within a reasonable time" is a fact issue to be submitted to the jury, but there are some situations in which a buyer
has delayed so excessively that his actions become untimely as a matter of law. Chernick v. Casares (Ky.App.
1988) 759 S.W.2d 832. Sales €== 130(3.5)
One of the purposes behind the "reasonable time" requirement of KRS 355.2- 608 is to limit prejudice to the seller
which results from natural deterioration of the goods over time, and thus the type of goods involved may be
dispositive of what constitutes a reasonable time in which to revoke acceptance, with perishable or seasonal goods
demanding prompter action; a thoroughbred brood mare has a limited useful life, and since its value depreciates
rapidly, three years between the purchase of a brood mare and an attempted revocation of her is clearly an
unreasonable time. Chernick v. Casares (Ky.App. 1988) 759 S.W.2d 832. Sales €== 126(1)
Although a buyer is entitled to rely on a seller's aSsurances, once put on notice he should not be allowed to wait
indefmitely for a defect to materialize before revoking acceptance, but has a duty to conduct his own inspection
within a reasonable time to discover defects and revoke acceptance before a substantial change in the condition of
the goods occurs; therefore, where the buyer of a thoroughbred brood mare is put on notice of the possibility of a
defect in the mare three months after he purchased her when she spontaneously aborts twin foals, he cannot revoke
his acceptance of her three years later. Chernick v. Casares (Ky.App. 1988) 759 S.W.2d 832.
In action by truck buyer against dealer seeking rescission of sales contract and damages for breach of express and
implied warranties, genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether revocation of acceptance of truck was made
within reasonable time, precluding summary judgment. Bell v. Louisville Motors, Inc. (Ky.App. 1978) 573
S.W.2d 351. Judgment €== 181(29)
The nature of the property pu~chased is a factor in determining whether the contract was rescinded within a
reasonable time. Chaplin v. Bessire & Co. (Ky. 1962) 361 S.W.2d 293.
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Purchaser who bought mare on January 15, 1974, who was informed on February 6 that the mare had aborted a
dead foal on that day, who was then informed that the mare, rather than having been barren in the previous year,
had slipped a foal in that year, and who, on February 11, 1974, wrote letters indicating that the sale should be null
and void to both seller of the horse and sales director for organization which conducted auction at which the horse
was purchased made revocation of sale within a reasonable time. Keck v. Wacker (E.D.Ky. 1976) 413 F.Supp.
1377. Sales €== 126(1)
4. Substantial impairment of value
The purchase of a new car is a major investment for most people, and in view of the millions ofdollars spent every
year by automobile vendors to persuade people to purchase their products and the great expectations created and
reinforced regarding the dependability and safety of the cars, it is not unreasonable to require the vendor to deliver
all or substantially all of that which has been promised; therefore, a material issue of fact exists whether a metallic
grinding noise which occurs when a new car is stopped on a steep incline substantially impairs the value of the car
to its purchaser, precluding summary judgment for the seller of the car in the buyer's action alleging a revocation of
acceptance of the car. Capitol Cadillac Olds, Inc. v. Roberts (Ky. 1991) 813 S.W.2d 287.
KRS § 355.2-608, KY ST § 355.2-608
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(Cite as: 28 S.W3d 303)
H
Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Jeffrey ALEXANDER Appellant,
v.
S & M MOTORS, INC., d/b/a the Lexus Store of
Lexington, Appellee.
Ken-Ray Motors, Appellant,
v.
Wanda Childers and Don A. Pisacano, Appellees.
Nos. 1998-SC-0896-DG, 1998-SC-0951-DG.
June 15,2000.
Rehearing Denied Oct. 26, 2000.
Purchaser filed suit against car dealership, alleging
that he was defrauded. The Circuit Court entered
judgment on jury verdict in favor of purchaser, but
denied purchaser's motion for attorney fees under
Kentucky Consumer Protection Act (KCPA).
Purchaser appealed. The Court of Appeals, No.
1998-SC-0896-DG, affitmed. In another case,
purchaser file suit against car dealership, alleging
fraudulent misrepresentation and violation of
KCPA. The Circuit Court entered judgment on jury
verdict in favor or purchaser, but denied purchaser
award of attorney fees incurred either in preparation
for trial or during course of trial. Purchaser
appealed. The Court of Appeals, No.
1998-SC-0951-DG, reversed and remanded for
reconsideration of issue of attorney fees and
litigation costs. After granting discretionary review,
the Supreme Court, Johnstone, J., held: (I) statutory
provision pertaining to award of attorney fees in
action brought under KCPA, authorized, but did not
mandate, an award of attorney fees and costs to
prevailing party; and (2) circuit court could deny
purchaser award ofattorney fees.
Affitmed in part and reversed in part.
Stumbo, J., concurred in part and dissented in part
by separate opinion, in which Graves and Keller,
JJ., joined.
West Headnotes
II) Consumer Protection £=42
92Hk42 Most Cited Cases
Statutory provision pertaining to award of attorney
fees in action brought under Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act (KCPA), authorized, but did not
mandate, an award of attorney fees and costs to
prevailing party; whether to award attorney fees was
a decision subject to the sound discretion of the trial
judge. KRS 367.220(3).
(2) Statutes £=227
361k227 Most Cited Cases
When considering the construction of statutes,
"may" is petmissive, and "shall" is mandatory.
KRS 446.010(20).
(3) Consumer Protection £=42
92Hk42 Most Cited Cases
When a trial court is considering whether to award
attorney fees and costs and/or how much to award
in action brought under Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act (KCPA), the trial court's decision
should be guided by the purpose and the intent of
providing an award of attorney fees and costs under
the act. KRS 367.220.
[41 Consumer Protection £=42
92Hk42 Most Cited Cases
Petmitting an additional recovery of attorney fees
and litigation costs to prevailing party in action
brought under Kentucky Consumer Protection Act
(KCPA) is intended to compensate the prevailing
party for the expense of bringing an action under
the statute and to provide attorneys with incentive
for representing litigants who assert claims which
serve an ultimate public purpose. KRS 367.220.
151 Consumer Protection £=42
92Hk42 Most Cited Cases
Trial court could deny purchaser award of attorney
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fees in action brought under Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act (KCPA), where amount of attorney
fees due as a result of representation was less than
punitive damage award, plaintiff was not made less
than whole by jury's verdict, denial of an award for
attorney fees did not prevent plaintiffs attorney
from making a reasonable return on his efforts, and
denial of attorney fees would not deter others
aggrieved by violations of the KCPA from bringing
suit in future or attorneys from representing them.
KRS 367.220.
(6) Consumer Protection C=42
92Hk42 Most Cited Cases
Trial court's polar star when considering a motion
for attorney fees under the Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act (KCPA) is keeping the courthouse
door open for those aggrieved by violations of the
act. KRS 367.220.
*304 Don A. Pisacano, Stites & Harbison,
Lexington, Counsel for Appellant, Jeffrey
Alexander.
Paul" Skip" Gaines, Stewart C. Burch, Frankfort,
Counsel for Appellee, S & M Motors.
Jimmy Dale Williams, Richmond, Counsel for
Appellant, Ken-Ray Motors.
Don A. Pisacano, Stites & Harbison, Lexington,
Counsel for Appellees, Wanda Childers and Don A.
Pisacano.
JOHNSTONE, Justice.
The issue presented in each of these cases involves
a question of first impression concerning the award
of attorney fees under the Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act (KCPA), KRS 367.220(3). We
granted discretionary review to resolve a split of
authority in the Kentucky Court of Appeals. We
hold that the award of attorney fees under the
statute is discretionary with the trial court.
We begin with a brief discussion of the pertinent
facts ofeach case.
ALEXANDER V. S & M MOTORS, INC.
On November 29, 1993, Jeffery Alexander
purchased a vehicle from S & M Motors, which
represented that the vehicle had not been damaged,
that it only had one prior owner, and that it was a
"Certified Lexus Pre-Owned Car." Approximately
one year later, Alexander discovered that the
vehicle had sustained heavy damage prior to the
date of purchase. Alexander subsequently filed suit
against S & M alleging that he was defrauded. In
the suit, he sought recovery of his purchase price
and punitive damages. The matter proceeded to
trial, and a unanimous jury awarded Alexander
$6,000 in compensatory damages and $75,000 in
punitive damages. However, the trial court denied
Alexander's motion for attorney fees under the
KCPA, and Alexander appealed this ruling. The
Court of Appeals afIumed the trial court.
KEN-RA Y MOTORS V. CHILDERS
Wanda Childers purchased a used vehicle from
Ken-Ray Motors in May, 1994. Childers began
having problems with the vehicle within the first
hour of purchase. She continued to have problems
with the vehicle and ultimately filed a claim against
Ken-Ray in November, 1994. In the complaint she
alleged, inter alia. fraudulent misrepresentation and
violation of the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act
(KCPA), KRS 367.010 et seq. A jury trial was
held concerning these two issues on January 27,
1997. The trial resulted in a unanimous jury
verdict which awarded Childers $6,748.89 in
compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive
damages. The award of damages was based on the
jury's fmding that Ken-Ray committed fraud upon
Childers, violated the KCPA, and acted with fraud,
malice or oppression.
Ken-Ray filed a number of post-judgment motions
and Childers filed a motion for attorney fees
pursuant to KRS 367.220(3). Childers
subsequently filed further motions for additional
attorney fees as would be generated from the
post-judgment proceedings. The trial court denied
all of Ken-Ray's post-judgment motions, and
eventually entered an order awarding Childers: (I)
the costs necessary *305 to prepare and bring her
cause of action to trial; (2) $128.60 in
post-judgment costs; (3) nothing for attorney fees
generated in preparation for trial or incurred during
trial; and (4) $600 in post-judgment attorney fees.
The trial court further ordered that Childers not be
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awarded "any other (additional) costs or attorney
fees, as movant has failed to persuade the Court that
the additional fees and expenses claimed were
necessary." Childers appealed from the portions of
this order denying her any award of attorney fees
incurred either in preparation for trial or during the
course of the trial. The Court of Appeals reversed
and remanded to the trial court for reconsideration
of the issue ofattorney fees and litigation costs.
DISCUSSION
[1] The issue presented in both Alexander and
Childers is whether the trial court abused its
discretion in denying attorney fees and costs under
KRS 367.220(3), which provides:
In any action brought by a person under this
section, the court may award. to the prevailing
party, in addition to the relief provided in this
section, reasonable attorney's fees and costs.
(Emphasis added).
[2] Not only have Kentucky courts long construed
"may" to be a permissive word, rather than a
mandatory word, but our legislature has given
guidance in this regard. When considering the
construction of statutes, KRS 446.010(20) provides
that "may" is permissive, and "shall" is mandatory.
Chief Justice Lambert recently noted in White v.
Check Holders, Inc., Ky., 996 S.W.2d 496, 497
(1999):
This Court's duty in construing statutes is to
ascertain and give effect to the intent of the
General Assembly. Beckham v. Board oj
Education, Ky., 873 S.W.2d 575, 577 (1994).
When the words of a statute "are clear and
unambiguous and express the legislative intent,
there is no room for construction or interpretation
and the statute must be given its effect as
written." McCracken County Fiscal Court v.
Graves, Ky., 885 S.W.2d 307,309 (1994).
We, therefore, read the statute to authorize, but not
mandate, an award of attorney fees and costs in an
action brought under the Kentucky Consumer
Protection Act. Of course, whether to award such is
a decision subject to the sound discretion of the trial
judge.
[3][4] When a trial court is considering whether to
award attorney fees and costs and/or how much to
award, the trial court's decision should be guided by
the purpose and the intent of providing an award of
attorney fees and costs under the act. As Judge
Knox, writing for the appellate panel in Childers,
ably explained:
Permitting an additional recovery of attorney fees
and litigation costs is intended to compensate the
prevailing party for the expense of bringing an
action under the statute. A further aim is to
provide attorneys with incentive for representing
litigants who assert claims which serve an
ultimate public purpose (Le., a deterrent to
conduct resulting in unfair trade practices which
perpetrate fraud and deception upon the public).
In many, if not most, consumer protection cases,
the monetary value [of the underlying claim] is
typically low. Should the court focus strictly on
the dollar value of the ultimate award when
considering attorney fees and costs, the intended
remedial goal of the statute would be thwarted, if
not entirely defeated. Simply put, if, in these
cases, attorney fees and costs do not provide a
reasonable return, it will be economically
impossible for attorneys to represent likely
litigants. Thus, practically speaking, the door to
the courthouse will be closed to all potential
parties excepting those with either a strong
probability of substantial damages, or those with
sufficient economic resources to personally afford
fmancing the expense of litigation. *306 Such a
situation would indeed be ironic, since it is
precisely those with ordinary consumer
complaints, who cannot afford to pay attorney
fees, for whom these remedial acts are designed.
Childers v. Ken-Ray Motors, Ky.App., 1998 WL
381342, 97-CA-1496-MR, July 10,1998.
[5][6] Thus, a trial court's polar star when
considering a motion for attorney fees under the
KCPA is keeping the courthouse door open for
those aggrieved by violations of the act. In both
cases at bar, neither trial courts' ruling concerning
attorney fees penalized either plaintiff for bringing a
claim under the act. Nor does either ruling
establish a precedent which closes the courthouse
for future plaintiffs or makes the door more difficult
to open.
The jury awarded Childers $6,748.89 in
compensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive
damages. The compensatory damages represented
the maximum amount that could be awarded under
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the instructions. Childers' attorney submitted an
affidavit in support of Childers' motion for attorney
fees. According to the affidavit, the amount of
attorney fees due as a result of the representation of
Childers was $24,965.23 based on a rate of $120 an
hour, which, consequently, was just a few dollars
less than the punitive damage award. The punitive
damage award prevented Childers' favorable
judgment from being turned into a Pyrrhic victory.
That is, even after factoring in attorney fees and
litigation costs, Childers was not made less than
whole by the jury's verdict. Further, the denial of
an award for attorney fees in this case did not
prevent Childers' attorney from making a reasonable
return on his efforts. Finally, we do not believe
that the denial of attorney fees in Childers' case will
deter others aggrieved by violations of the KCPA
from bringing suit in the future or attorneys from
representing them.
The jury awarded Alexander $6,000 in
compensatory damages and $75,000 in punitive
damages. Alexander's counsel sought $26,594.50
in attorney fees, which the trial court found to be
reasonable. The argument that the trial court
abused its discretion in denying attorney fees and
costs to Alexander is less compelling under the
relevant facts of his case than under the relevant
facts of Childers' case.
For the reasons set forth above, we hereby affirm
the Court of Appeals in Alexander v. S & M Motors,
Inc. (l998-SC-0896-DG) and reverse the Court of
Appeals in Ken-Ray Motors v. Childers
(l998-SC-0951-DG).
LAMBERT, c.J.; COOPER and
WINTERSHEIMER, H., concur.
STUMBO, 1., concurs in part and dissents in part
by separate opinion, in which GRAYES and
KELLER, H., join.
STUMBO, Justice, Concurring in Part and
Dissenting in Part.
Although I agree with the legal reasoning of the
maJonty opmlOn, I disagree with the result it
reaches and therefore must dissent in part. I agree
with that much of the majority's analysis which
interprets the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act,
KRS 367.220(3) as authorizing, but not requiring,
the award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in
a suit brought pursuant to the Act. However, I
believe the trial courts in both cases herein failed to
thoroughly consider all relevant factors when
considering the plaintiffs' requests for attorney fees,
and, consequently, their denial of attorney fees was
an abuse of discretion. I believe Judge Knox's
opinion for the Court of Appeals in the Childers
case articulately and thoroughly sets forth the
factors a trial court should consider when
considering a request for attorney fees under the
KCPA:
(T]he intent of (KRS 367.220(3) ] is analogous to
KRS 344.450 which provides for the allowance
of attorney fees and costs arising from a
successful prosecution for a violation of the
Kentucky Civil Rights Act, KRS 344.010 et seq.
In this regard, *307Meyers v. Chapman Printing
Co., Inc., Ky., 840 S.W.2d 814 (1992) remains
the seminal case regarding the calculation of
reasonable attorney fees as permitted by KRS
344.450.
(In Meyers. the Kentucky Supreme Court stated]
that "the court should not undertake to adopt
some arbitrary proportionate relationship between
the amount of attorney fees awarded and the
amount of damages awarded." Meyers, 840
S.W.2d at 825-26. We believe identical
reasoning is applicable under the KCPA.
With respect to civil rights grievances, the
accepted method of calculating attorney fees is
that set forth in Hensley v. Eckerhart. 461 U.S.
424, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983), as
adopted by the Meyers Court. The Hensley/
Meyers analysis provides that attorney fees
should be ascertained by multiplying counsel's
reasonable hours by a reasonable hourly rate to
produce a "lodestar" figure. This lodestar figure
may then be adjusted to account for any special
factors particular to the individual litigation.
Meyers, 840 S.W.2d at 826.
Special factors the court will want to consider in
making any adjustment to the lodestar figure
include: (I) amount and character of. services
rendered; (2) labor, time and trouble involved;
(3) nature and importance of the litigation in
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which the services were rendered; (4)
responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money
or value of the property affected by the
controversy, or involved in the employment; (6)
skill and professional character and standing of
the attorneys; and, (8) the results secured. Boden
v. Boden. Ky., 268 S.W.2d 632, 633 (1954)
(citing Axton v. Vance, 207 Ky. 580, 269 S.W.
534 (1925». These factors have long been
regarded as applicable through the decisional law
of Kentucky. Commonwealth v. Lavit, Ky., 882
S.W.2d 678, 680 (1994) (calculation of fees for
private attorney who acted as public defender);
Daniels v. May, Ky., 467 S.W.2d 372, 374 (1971)
(attorney fees allowed for services rendered in
civil litigation extending over four years);
Itschner v. Itschner, Ky., 455 S.W.2d 54, 56
(1970) (award of attorney fees in dissolution
action); Stubblefield v. Stubblefield, Ky., 327
S.W.2d 24, 26 (1959) (same); Brown v. Fulton,
Hubbard & Hubbard, Ky.App., 817 S.W.2d 899,
901 (1991) (attorney fee charged for defending
client against criminal charges); Citizens Fidelity
Bank & Trust Co. v. Harvin, Ky.App., 550
S.W.2d 569, 570 (1977) (award of attorney fee
for sale of real estate that was subject of action
for specific performance).
In my opinion, considering all the proper factors
set forth by Judge Knox, and given the services
rendered by both plaintiff attorneys and the results
realized from said services, the trial courts below
should reconsider their refusal to award attorney
fees. The trial courts' failure to allow any fee for
time spent actually litigating the case and all hourly
services leading up thereto is inconsistent with the
finding (implicit in Alexander, explicit in Childers )
that the jury's award of both compensatory and
punitive damages was supported by the evidence
and not the result of passion or prejudice, and that
the amount of the compensatory and punitive
damages were not excessive. Thus, in my view, the
trial courts below either abused their discretion or
failed to use it at all. I therefore would remand
both cases to the trial courts for reconsideration of
the plaintiffs' request for attorney fees in view of all
the relevant factors set forth above.
GRAVES and KELLER, JJ., join.
28 S.W.3d 303
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Court of Appeals of Kentucky.
Buddy James SMITH, APPtfllant,
v.
GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, and
Royal Oaks Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc., Appellees.
No.1997-CA-002295-MR.
Oct 16, 1998.
Buyer of "new" van that stalled at highway speeds
sued dealership and manufacturer for fraud, breach
of warranty, and violation of Consumer Protection
Act. The McCracken Circuit Court, James R.
Daniels, J., granted summary judgment for
defendants. Buyer appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Miller, J., held that: (I) dealership had statutory and
common law duty to disclose to buyer material
pre-sale defects and repairs; (2) genuine issue of
fact existed as to whether pre-sale repairs to radiator
and servicing for engine performance problems
totalling $323.33 constituted material repairs and
defects precluded summary judgment for dealership
on fraud claim; (3) genuine issue of fact as to
whether sale of van as "new" without disclosure of
pre-sale history was a false, misleading, or
deceptive act precluded summary judgment for
defendants on Consumer Protection Act claim; and
(4) genuine issue of fact as to whether van's stalling
was material defect rendering vehicle
unmerchantable precluded summary judgment on
breach of implied warranty of merchantability
claim.
Reversed and remanded.
West Headnotes
(1) Judgment C=181(2)
228kI81(2) Most Cited Cases
Summary judgment is proper only when there exists
no material issue of fact and movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.
[2[ Fraud C=16
184kl6 Most Cited Cases
To establish an actionable case of fraud based upon
suppression of a fact, plaintiff must demonstrate (I)
that defendant had a duty to disclose a material fact,
(2) that defendant failed to disclose same, (3) that
defendant's failure to disclose the material fact
induced him to act, and (4) that he suffered actual
damages therefrom.
(3) Fraud C=17
184kl7 Most Cited Cases
Duty to disclose may anse from a fiduciary
relationship, from a partial disclosure of
information, or from particular circumstances such
as where one party to a contract has superior
knowledge and is relied upon to disclose same.
(4) Consumer Protection C=9
92Hk9 Most Cited Cases
[4[ Fraud C=17
184kl7 Most Cited Cases
New vehicle dealership, which had made over $300
of pre-sale repairs to "new" van, had statutory and
common law duty to disclose to buyer material
pre-sale defects and repairs. KRS I 86A.540,
190.071(1)(e); KRS 190.010(23) (1995).
(5) Judgment C=181(29)
228kI81(29) Most Cited Cases
Genuine issue of fact existed as to whether new
vehicle dealership's pre-sale repairs to "new" van's
radiator and servicing' for engine performance
problems totalling $323.33 constituted material
repairs and defects, thereby precluding summary
judgment for dealership in buyer's fraud action
based on failure to disclose van's pre-sale history
brought after van stalled at highway speeds. KRS
186A.540, 190.071(1)(e); KRS 190.010(23) (1995)
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[6[ Consumer Protection £:=9
92Hk9 Most Cited Cases
New motor vehicle dealers have statutory duty to
disclose material facts to customers while in the
course ofconducting business. KRS 190.071(1)(e).
[7[ Consumer Protection £:=9
92Hk9 Most Cited Cases
Licensed dealer's duty under Damaged Motor
Vehicles Act to disclose repairs exceeding $300
includes any motor vehicle repairs over $300, be
they mechanical, body, or otherwise. KRS
186A.540.
[81 Judgment £:=181(29)
228kI81(29) Most Cited Cases
Genuine issue of fact existed as to whether sale of
van as "new" without disclosure of van's pre-sale
repairs and defects constituted false, misleading, or
deceptive act, thereby precluding summary
judgment for new vehicle dealership and
manufacturer in buyer's action for violation of
Consumer Protection Act KRS 367.170.
[91 Judgment £:=181(29)
228kI81(29) Most Cited Cases
Genuine issue of fact as to whether new van's
stalling at highway speeds was material defect
rendering vehicle unmerchantable precluded
summary judgment for dealership and manufacturer
in buyer's action for breach of implied warranty
of merchantability. KRS 355.2-314(1).
(10) Sales £:=441(3)
343k44 1(3) Most Cited Cases
Defect may be proved by a sufficient quantum of
circumstantial evidence for purposes of breach of
implied warranty of merchantability claim. KRS
355.2- 314(1).
*128 Thomas L. Osborne, C. Thomas Miller,
Paducah, for Appellant
Donald Craig York, Louisville, for Appellee/GM.
John C. Whitfield, Madisonville, for
Appellee/Royal Oaks Chevrolet.
Before HUDDLESTON, KNOPF, and MlLLER,
JJ.
OPINION
MILLER, Judge.
Buddy James Smith brings this appeal from a
summary judgment (Ky. R. Civ.Proc.(CR) 56) of
the McCracken Circuit Court entered April 24,
1997. We reverse and remand.
On or about December 15, 1994, Buddy James
Smith (Smith) purchased a new GMC van from
co-appellee, Royal Oaks Chevrolet-Cadillac, Inc.
(Royal Oaks), in Paducah, Kentucky. His
employer paid for the vehicle as a retirement gift.
During the first 4,800 miles, the van "stalled" three
times on interstate roads while traveling at highway
speed. In June, 1995, Smith took the van to Royal
Oaks complaining of the stalling incidents. Royal
Oaks examined the vehicle and was unable to frnd a
defect. Smith was advised to keep driving the van.
About one month later, he complained to
co-appellee, General *129 Motors Corporation
(General Motors). He requested both Royal Oaks
and General Motors to sign statements that the
vehicle was safe for use. Each declined. Being
unsatisfied with these responses, Smith returned the
van to Royal Oaks.
On November 7, 1995, Smith filed suit against
Royal Oaks and General Motors, alleging breach of
warranty under the sales provision of our Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC)(codified in Ky.Rev.Stat. (
KRS) 355.2-101--355.2-725) and violation of our
Consumer Protection Act (codified in KRS 367.110
- 367.360). In the course of discovery, Smith
learned that Royal Oaks had made pre-sale repairs
to the van. In March 1994, some nine months
before Smith acquired the van, repairs were made to
the radiator. At the time, the odometer reading was
eight miles. In August of the same year, the van
was serviced for engine performance problems,
which included "[dying] at highway speeds." [FN1]
At this time, the odometer reading was forty-five
miles. These repairs totaled $323.33. Royal Oaks
did not advise Smith of the vehicle's service history
prior to his taking possession of same. Upon
learning said history, Smith amended his complaint
to allege fraud. On April 24, 1997, the McCracken
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Circuit Court entered summary judgment dismissing
Smith's complaint in its entirety. This appeal
followed.
FN 1. During discovery, it was learned that
other General Motor's vans had
experienced stalling problems.
Certain facts are not in dispute. The van was sold
as a new vehicle by Royal Oaks, GM's franchised
dealer. As such, it was accompanied by the
General Motors' new vehicle warranty and,
likewise, afforded aU protection of the law relative
to the sale of new vehicles.
FRAUD CLAIMAGAINST ROYAL OAKS
Smith contends that the circuit court committed
reversible error by entering summary judgment
upon his claim of fraud. We agree. On this claim,
we are of the opinion that Smith established
sufficient facts to preclude summary judgment as to
Royal Oaks' failure to disclose the van's pre-sale
history. [FN2]
FN2. At oral argument, Smith informed the
Court that the fraud claim would be
directed only against Royal Oaks.
[1][2] Summary judgment is proper only when
there exists no material issue of fact and movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Steelvest,
Inc. v. Scansteel Service Center, Inc., Ky., 807
S.W.2d 476 (1991). To establish an actionable
case of fraud based upon suppression of a fact,
Smith must demonstrate (l) that Royal Oaks had a
duty to disclose a material fact, (2) that Royal Oaks
failed to disclose same, (3) that Royal Oaks' failure
to disclose the material fact induced him to act, and
(4) that he suffered actual damages therefrom. See
Faulkner Drilling Company, Inc. v. Gross,
Ky.App., 943 S.W.2d 634 (1997), and Wahba v.
Don Corlett Motors, Inc., Ky.App., 573 S.W.2d
357 (l978). Royal Oaks asserts, however, there
existed no duty upon it to disclose the pre-sale
history of the van.
[3][4][5] It is, of course, well established that mere
silence is not fraudulent absent a duty to disclose.
Hall v. Carter, Ky_, 324 S. W.2d 4 LO (1959). A
duty to disclose may arise from a fiduciary
relationship, from a partial disclosure of
information, or from particular circumstances such
as where one party to a contract has superior
knowledge and is relied upon to disclose same.
See Bryant v. Troutman, Ky., 287 S.W.2d 918
(l956); Dennis v. Thomson. 240 Ky. 727, 43
S.W.2d l8 (193 l); and Faulkner, 943 S.W.2d at
634. Considering Royal Oaks' superior knowledge
and Smith's reliance thereupon, we are of the
opinion there arose, as a matter of law, a duty upon
Royal Oaks to disclose material defects and
repairs known to it. We believe issues of fact
exist as to whether the van's pre-sale history of
repairs and defects would be considered material to
a reasonable person. See Faulkner, 943 S.W.2d at
634. We therefore conclude that material issues of
fact exist as to Smith's common law fraud claim,
thus precluding summary judgment.
[6] We additionally think statutory provisions exist
that imposed upon Royal Oaks a duty to disclose
the van's pre-sale history. One such statute is KRS
190.071(l)(e), set *130 forth in KRS Chapter 190,
"Motor Vehicle Sales." KRS 190.071( l)(e) reads
as follows:
(I) It shall be a violation of this section for any
new motor vehicle dealer:
(e) To use false or fraudulent representations
in connection with the operation of the new
motor vehicle dealership. (Emphasis added.)
"Fraud," in the above context, is defmed m KRS
190.010(23) as
"a misrepresentation in any manner, whether
intentionally false or due to gross negligence, of a
material fact; a promise or representation not
made in good faith; or an intentional failure to
disclose material fact." (Emphases added.)
Considering this defmition of fraud, we believe
KRS 190.07l(I)(e) imposes an affmnative duty
upon new motor vehicle dealers to disclose material
facts to customers while in the course of conducting
business. We further believe that failure to so
inform the customers may constitute fraud. We are
buttressed in our interpretation of same by KRS
190.015 wherein the Legislature declared its public
policy underlying Chapter 190:
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190.015. Public policy declared.
The Legislature frnds and declares that the
distribution and sale of vehicles within this state
vitally affects the general economy of the state
and the public interest and the public welfare, and
that in order to promote the public interest and
public welfare, ... it is necessary to regulate and
license vehicle manufacturers, distributors ...
distributor representatives, and to regulate and
license dealers of vehicles doing business in this
state, in order to prevent frauds, impositions,
and other abuses upon its citizens.... (Emphasis
added.)
Upon the forgoing, we are of the opinion that KRS
190.07I(l)(e) imposed upon Royal Oaks a duty to
disclose· such material pre-sale repairs and defects
known to it and that issues of fact exist as to
whether the van's pre-sale repairs and defects were
material. See Faulkner, 943 S.W.2d at 634.
[7] We are also persuaded by Smith's argument that
KRS 186A.540 imposed an affirmative duty upon
Royal Oaks to disclose repairs exceeding $300.00.
That statute is found in the "Damaged Motor
Vehicles" Act (KRS 186A.500-550) and states as
follows:
An individual or a dealer required to be licensed
pursuant to KRS Chapter 190 shall disclose all
damages to a motor vehicle which result in
repairs or repair estimates that exceed three
hundred dollars ($300) and that occur while the
motor vehicle is in his possession and prior to
delivery to a purchaser. Disclosure shall be in
writing and shall require the purchaser's signature
acknowledging the disclosure of damages:
(Emphasis added.)
Royal Oaks urges this Court to adopt a narrow
interpretation of the above statute so that it includes
only "body" damage to motor vehicles. We decline
to do so. We believe said statute should be broadly
interpreted to include any motor vehicle repairs
over $300.00, be they mechanical, body, or
otherwise. We view such broad interpretation as
mandated by the legislative purpose of the
"Damaged Motor Vehicles" Act:
186A.500. Legislative fmding.
The General Assembly fmds that purchasers
when buying vehicles are entitled to know if the
vehicle has sustained prior severe damage....
(Emphasis added.)
As the van's cumulative repair work exceeded
$300.00, we think KRS 186A.540 imposed a duty
upon Royal Oaks to disclose the repairs.
In sum, we are persuaded there existed both a
common law and statutory basis for imposition of a
duty upon Royal Oaks to disclose material pre-sale
repairs and defects of the van and that issues of fact
exist to preclude summary judgment thereupon.
CONSUMER PROTECTION CLAIM AGAINST
ROYAL OAKS AND GENERAL MOTORS
[8] Upon the aforementioned grounds, we likewise
perceive that Smith should not have suffered
summary judgment upon his claim that failure to
disclose the van's pre-sale history constituted a
false, misleading and/or deceptive trade practice
under the Consumer Protection Act KRS 367.170.
Cf *131 Ford Motor Company v. Mayes, Ky.App.,
575 S.W.2d 480 (1978)(holding that Ford Motor
Company's failure to repair or replace a defective
vehicle constituted an unfair trade practice under
the Consumer Protection Act). We believe this
claim should proceed against both Royal Oaks and
General Motors. We note that "false", "misleading",
and "deceptive" are defmed in terms generally
understood and perceived by the public. Cf Dare
To Be Great, Inc. v. Commonwealth, Ky., 511
S.W.2d 224 (1974). Certainly, a fact-finder might
reasonably conclude that the sale of the van as
"new" without disclosure of its pre-sale history
constituted a false, misleading or deceptive act
Thus, we believe summary judgment upon this issue
was improper.
BREACH OF WARRANTY CLAIM AGAINST
ROYAL OAKS AND GENERAL MOTORS
We now tum to the consideration of Smith's breach
of warranty claim against Royal Oaks and General
Motors. KRS 355.2-314(1), a provision of our
UCC, implies a warranty of merchantability in all
contracts of sale. If goods are defective, they may,
of course, be rejected. KRS 355.2-602. If a defect
is not discovered until after acceptance, however, a
revocation of the acceptance may be effected, and
the buyer may have "the same rights and duties with
regard to the goods ... as if he had rejected them."
KRS 355.2- 608(3). In the case at hand, Smith
accepted the van, together with all the rights
afforded him under the UCC. When he experienced
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works
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stalling at highway speeds, he gave appellees
prompt and ample opportunity to correct same.
KRS 355.2-608. They gave him no assurance, but
suggested that he continue utilizing the vehicle
under what he perceived to be extraordinary risk.
Unsatisfied with the proffered remedy, Smith
revoked his acceptance by delivering the van to the
dealer. See Mayes, 575 S.W.2d at 480.
[9] The appellees, as did the circuit court, believe it
incumbent upon Smith to prove by direct evidence a
specific defect. In their briefs and at oral
argument, the appellees relied upon Briner v.
General Motors Corporation, Ky., 461 S.W.2d 99
(1971), for this proposition. In Briner, the
appellant was injured in an automobile accident.
She instituted an action against the manufacturer of
the automobile, General Motors Corporation, and
the dealer/seller, Universal. The bases of the
action were "manufacturer's liability and negligent
repair." [d. at 100. Essentially, the appellant
claimed that a defect existed in the steering system
of the vehicle causing her to veer across the
centerline and strike another automobile and that
such defect was the proximate cause of the
accident. It is crucial to note that the appellant in
Briner had the burden of proving not only the
existence of a defect but, more importantly, that
such defect caused the accident. Indeed, the Briner
Court pointed out that "[t]here was no direct proof
of the existence of a defective mechanical condition
existing at the time of the accident which could
have caused it." (Emphasis added.) [d. at 10 l.
The Court recognized that such "causal
relationship" may be proved by circumstantial
evidence but thereafter invoked the well-founded
rule of law that such relationship may not be proved
by an inference which is itself based upon an
inference. The following IS the Court's
ratiocination:
To justify a froding of liability on Universal's part
would require a jury first to infer a breakdown in
the steering mechanism attributable to a defect.
Secondly, it would be required to further infer
that, had Universal made different inspections
and tests it would have discovered and corrected
the condition which ultimately caused plaintiff's
car to veer to the left. This is piling inference
upon inference, which leads to speculation....
[10] ...
As said in Le Sage v. Pitts, 311 Ky. 155, 223
S.W.2d 347,352 (1949):
"An inference may be drawn from a clearly
established fact, but, if the conclusion is drawn
upon a fact dependent for proof of its existence
upon a prior inference, the evidentiary fact is too
remote to support the conclusion."
[d. at 10 1-102. The Briner Court simply held that
inference of a "causal relationship" was
impermissible as it was based upon inference of a
defective condition. Such are *132 not the
circumstances in the case at hand. As no accident
occurred, Smith need not prove a "causal
relationship." The reasoning of Briner is inapposite
to the case at hand. Smith invokes but a single
inference in his attempt to prove a defective
condition. We view such as clearly permissible.
We think it only necessary for Smith to prove that
the van stalled. Such is evidence of a defective
condition. A defect may be proved by a sufficient
quantum of circumstantial evidence. Indeed, it has
been observed that "[ilt matters not that the
evidence be circumstantial for as Thoreau put it
'Some circumstantial evidence is very strong, as
when you find a trout in the milk.' " Embs v.
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of Lexington,
Kentucky, Inc., Ky., 528 S.W.2d 703, 706 (l975).
Considering the van's uncontroverted prior history
of stalling, the witnessing of said stalling by several
others besides Smith, and the documented stalling
of other General Motors' vans, we liken the weight
of circumstantial evidence herein to that of the
proverbial "trout in the milk."
In sum, we are convinced that the record presents a
material issue of fact as to whether the van's stalling
was a material defect rendering the vehicle
unmerchantable. Under the doctrine announced in
Stee/vest. 807 S.W.2d at 476, we are therefore of
the opinion that the summary judgment upon the
breach ofwarranty claim was inappropriate.
Conclusion
We think summary judgment was improperly
granted on Smith's claims of fraud, violation of the
Consumer' Protection Act, and breach of warranty.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
McCracken Circuit Court is reversed, and this cause
is remanded for proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
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INSTRUCTION NO.1
Immediately upon retiring to the jury room, you should elect one of your number as
Foreperson.
Nine or more of your number must agree in order to answer any of the questions or make
any ofthe determinations required by these Instructions. The nine or more who agree upon one,
however, need not be the same jurors who agree upon another.
If all twelve ofyou agree on the answer to all ofthe questions and determinations to
which you are required to respond, the foreperson alone can sign for you.
Each answer or response on which the verdict is not unanimous must be signed by the
nine or more of you who agree.
(Please proceed to Instruction No.2)
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INSTRUCTION NO.2
Revocation of Acceptance
It was Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inco's duty to sell Jim and Jane Chilton a "new" car
or car that was free of any non-conformity, if:
(a) the non-conformity was not readily discoverable by the Chiltons at the time they
bought the car, and
(b) the Chiltons notified Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. of the defect within a
reasonable time after they discovered or should have discovered the defect.
"Non-conformity" means a defect which substantially impairs the value of the car to the
purchasers, Jim and Jane Chilton.
Question No. 2-1
Do you believe from the evidence that Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. breached this
duty owed to the Chiltons?
Yes
---
FOREPERSON, IF UNANIMOUS
No
---
D - 56
JURORS WHO AGREE,
IF NOT UNANIMOUS
(Please proceed to Instruction No.3)
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INSTRUCTION NO.3
Under the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, it is unlawful for Blue Grass Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. to engage in any unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive act or practice in
conducting its business.
Question No. 3-1
Do you believe from the evidence that Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. in its sale of
the car to the Chiltons violated the Consumer Protection Act as described above?
Yes
---
FOREPERSON, IF UNANIMOUS
No
---
JURORS WHO AGREE,
IF NOT UNANIMOUS
(please proceed to Instruction No.4)
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INSTRUCTION NO.4
Fraudulent Misrepresentation
You will find for Jim and Jane Chilton against Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. on the
issue of fraudulent misrepresentation if you are satisfied by clear and convincing evidence as
follows:
that before Jim and Jane Chilton purchased the car from Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., its employees, or representatives
communicated to the Chiltons that they were buying a new car;
that Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., its employees or representatives, intended for the
Chiltons to rely on the truth ofthe statement in subsection (1) above in deciding
to buy the car;
that the Chiltons did, in fact, rely on the statement in subsection (1) above as being true in
deciding to buy the car;
that, in fact, the car was not new;
that when Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.'s employees or representatives made such
statement, they either knew the statement was not true, or acted in reckless
disregard for whether It was true or not, or concealed the truth as to the condition
of the car;
AND
that had Jim and Jane Chilton known the truth about the statement in paragraph (I), they would
not have purchased the car.
Otherwise, you will find for Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
Question No. 4-1
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Do you find from the evidence that Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. made a fraudulent
misrepresentation as described above in the sale ofthe car to Jim and Jane Chilton?
Yes
---
FOREPERSON, IF UNANIMOUS
No
---
JURORS WHO AGREE,
IF NOT UNANIMOUS
(Please proceed to Instruction No.5)
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INSTRUCTION NO.5
Omission ofa Material Fact/Concealment of the Truth
You will find for Jim and Jane Chilton against Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. if you
are satisfied from the evidence as follows:
(1) that before Jim and Jane Chilton purchased the car, Blue Grass Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. and its employees failed to tell them:
that the car had previous body damage;
OR
the car had been repainted or repaired; OR
the car had damage to the front end and front driver's side door.
(2) that such information would have been material in the Chiltons' decision to
purchase the car, and that had one or more of these facts been disclosed to the
Chiltons, they would not have bought the car;
(3) that Jim and Jane Chilton could not, through reasonable inspection, discover the
omitted facts stated in paragraph (1);
AND
(4) that Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. knew that the car had been previously
damaged OR repaired OR repainted, OR acted in reckless disregard for whether
or not the car had such defects.
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Question No. 5-1
Do you believe from the evidence presented that Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
failed to disclose a material fact as described in paragraph (1) of this Instruction in the sale of the
car to Jim and Jane Chilton?
Yes
---
FOREPERSON, IF UNANIMOUS
No
---
JURORS WHO AGREE,
. IF NOT UNANIMOUS
(Please proceed to Instruction No.6)
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INSTRUCTION NO.6
If you answered "No" to Question Nos. 2-1, 3-1, 4-1, and
5-1, you have found in favor of Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. and may return to the
courtroom.
If you answered "Yes" to one or more ofQuestions 2-1, 3-1, 4-1, and 5-1, please proceed
to the next instruction.
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INSTRUCTION NO.7
If you answered "Yes" to Question Nos. 2-1, 3-1,4-1, or
5-1, you will award Jim and Jane Chilton a sum ofmoney that will fairly and reasonably
compensate them for such financial loss or losses as you are satisfied from the evidence that they
incurred as a direct result of the misrepresentations, violations, omissions, or breaches of Blue
Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.:
1.
2.
3.
Purchase price of the car,
including tax, license, and
processing fee,
not to exceed $17,914.03.
Interest payments on their loan for
the car, not to exceed $514.00.
Loss ofuse of this motor vehicle
since April 1996 to present,
not to exceed $5,880.00.
(Please Proceed to Instruction No.8)
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$-----
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INSTRUCTION NO.8
If you are further satisfied from the evidence that Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
acted toward Jim and Jane Chilton with fraud, oppression, or malice, or other conduct
demonstrating a reckless disregard toward the lives, safety or property of the Chiltons, you may
at your discretion award punitive damages against Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. in
addition to the damages awarded under Instruction 7.
"Punitive damages" means damages other than compensatory damages and nominal damages
awarded against a person or company to punish and to discourage that person or company, and
other persons or companies, from similar conduct in the future.
"Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment ofmaterial fact
known to Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. and made with the intention ofcausing injury to
Jim and Jane Chilton.
"Oppression" means conduct that was specifically intended by Blue Grass Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. to subject Jim and Jane Chilton to cruel and unjust hardship; and
"Malice" means (a) conduct that was specifically intended by Blue Grass Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc. to cause tangible or intangible injury to Jim and Jane Chilton, OR (b) conduct
that was carried out by Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. with a flagrant indifference to Jim
and Jane Chiltons' rights with subjective awareness that such conduct would result in harm.
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Question No. 8-1
Do you believe from the evidence that Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. cOrr1mitted
fraud or acted with oppression or malice?
Yes
---
FOREPERSON, IF UNANIMOUS
No _
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JURORS WHO AGREE,
IF NOT UNANIMOUS
Question No. 8-2
Do you believe from the evidence that Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. acted toward
Jim and Jane Chilton with reckless disregard for the lives, safety, and property of the Chiltons?
Yes
---
FOREPERSON, IF UNANIMOUS
No
---
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JURORS WHO AGREE,
IF NOT UNANIMOUS
If you award punitive damages, in detennining the amount thereof you should consider
one or more of the following factors:
the likelihood at the time ofsuch misconduct by Blue Grass Chrysler-PlYmouth, Inc. that
serious harm would arise from it;
the degree ofBlue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.'s awareness of that likelihood;
the profitability ofthe misconduct to Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.;
the duration of the misconduct and any concealment of it by Blue Grass Chrysler-
Plymouth, Inc.;
AND
the actions by Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. to remedy the misconduct once it
became known to it.
If you award punitive damages, you will state the amount separately from the sum or
sums awarded under Instruction No.9.
Does the jury award punitive damages against Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.?
Yes
---
If your answer is "Yes," what amount
of punitive damages do you award
Jim and Jane Chilton?
No
---
$----------'---
JURORS WHO AGREE,
FOREPERSON, IF UNANIMOUS
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IF NOT UNANIMOUS
(You mayretum to the Courtroom.)
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INSTRUCTION NO.1
(a) Immediately upon retiring to the jury room, you should
elect one of your number as Foreperson.
(b) Nine or more of your number must agree in order to
answer ~ny of the questions or make any of the determinations
required by these Instructions. The nine or more who agree upon
one, however, need not be the same jurors who agree upon another.
(c) If all twelve of you agree on the answer to all of the
questions and determinations to which you are required to
respond, the foreperson alone can sign for you.
(d) Each answer or response on which the verdict is not
unanimous must be signed by the nine or more of you who agree.
(Please proceed to Instruction No.2)
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INSTRUCTION NO.2
The Court has already determined and instructed you that
Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth has breached both an express
warranty and an implied warranty in the sale of a 1993 Pontiac
Sunbird to plaintiff, Chris Washington. You shall now decide from
the evidence what sum of money will fairly compensate Chris
Washington for each of the following elements:
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
Price of the contract
Damage to his personal credit
Damage suffered from the loss of
use of the motor vehicle for 16 months
Damage for his loss of employment
opportunities
'Damage to his reputation in the
business community
Damage for his mental and emotional
distress and anguish
$------
$------
$------
$------
$-----
$------
FOREPERSON, IF UNANIMOUS
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JURORS WHO AGREE,
IF NOT UNANIMOUS
(Please Proceed to Instruction No.3)
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INSTRUCTION NO.3
Under the Kentucky Revised Statute 367, known as the
Consumer Protection Act, it is unlawful for any business to
engage in unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive acts or
practices.
Question No. 3-1
Do you believe from the evidence that Blue Grass Chrysler-
Plymouth in its sale of the 1993 Pontiac Sunbird and the Extended
Service Warranty to Chris Washington violated any portion of the
Consumer Protection Act as cited above?
YES _
FOREPERSON , IF UNANIMOUS
NO _
JURORS WHO AGREE,
IF NOT UNANIMOUS
(Please proceed to Instruction No.4)
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INSTRUCTION NO.4
"Fraud" means an inte.ntional misrepresentation, deceit,
omission of a material fact, or concealment of a material fact
known to the Defendant and made with the knowledge that the
misrepresentation, deceit, omission or concealment would be
relied upon by the Plaintiff to his detriment and would in all
probability cause injury to the Plaintiff.
QUESTION NO,· 4-1
Do you believe from the evidence that Blue Grass Chrysler-
Plymouth in its sale of the 1993 Pontiac Sunbird and Extended
Service Warranty to Chris Washington cQmmitted fraud?
Yes No
FOREPERSON, IF UNANIMOUS JURORS WHO AGREE,
IF NOT UNANIMOUS
(If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 4-1, please proceed to
Instruction No,S, If you answered "No" to Question No, 4-1, you
may return to the Courtroom.)
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INSTRUCTION NO.5
If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 4-1 or if you are
further satisfied from the evidence that the Defendant, Blue
Grass Chrysler-Plymouth acted toward Chris washington with
oppression or malice, you may at your discretion award punitive
damages against Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth in addition to the
damages awarded under Instruction 2.
As used in this Instruction: "Oppression" means conduct
that was specifically intended by Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth to
subject Chris Washington to cruel and unjust hardship; and
"Malice" means (a) conduct that was specifically intended by
Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth to cause tangible or intangible
injury to Chris Washington, OR (b) conduct that was carried out
by Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth with both a flagrant indifference
to Chris Washington's rights AND a subjective awareness that such
conduct would result in harm.
If you award punitive damages, in determining the amount
thereof you should consider the following factors:
(a) the likelihood at the time of such misconduct by Blue
Grass Chrysler-Plymouth that serious harm would arise
from it;
(b) the degree of Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth's awareness
of that likelihood;
(c) the profitability of the misconduct to Blue Grass
Ghrysler-Plymouth;
(d) the duration of the misconduct (and any concealment of
it) by Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth;
AND
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(e) the actions by Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth to remedy
the misconduct once it became known to it.
If you award punitive damages, you will state the amount
separately from the sum or sums awarded under Instruction 2.
Punitive Damages
FOREPERSON, IF UNANIMOUS
(You may return to the Courtroom.)
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JURORS WHO AGREE,
.. IF NOT UNANIMOUS
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INSTRUCTION NO.1
1 . Immediately upon retiring to the jury room, you should
elect one of your number as Foreperson.
2. Nine or more of your number must agree in order to
answer any of the questions or make any of the determinations
required by these Instructions. The nine or more who agree upon
one, however, need not be the same jurors who agree upon another.
3. If all twelve of you agree on the answer to all of the
questions and determinations to which you are required to
respond, the foreperson alone can sign for you.
4. Each answer or response on which the verdict is not
unanimous must be signed by the nine or more of you who agree.
(Please proceed to Instruction No.2)
D-~
INSTRUCTION NO.2
The Court has already determined and instructed you that
Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth has breached both an express
warranty and an implied warranty in the sale of a 1993 Pontiac
Sunbird to ,Plaintiff, Chris Washington. You shall now decide from
the evidence what sum of money will fairly compensate Chris
Washington as follows:
The difference in the value of the car
as warranted at the time of sale
minus (-)
The actual value of the car at the time
of sale
Actual damage
Add to actual damage the amount required
to restore the vehicle to its actual
value at the time of engine failure
Total actual damages, not to exceed
$-------
FOREPERSON, IF UNANIMOUS
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$------
$------
$------
$------
JURORS WHO AGREE,
IF NOT UNANIMOUS
(Please Proceed to Instruction No.3)
D-~
INSTRUCTION NO . .24 .
It was Blue Grass Chrysler's duty to sell Chris Washington a
car that was free of any non-conformity, if such non-conformity
was not readily discoverable by Chris Washington at the time he
bought the car.
"Non-conformity" means a failure to conform with an express
or implied warranty which substantial
"Non-conformity" means a defect which substantially impairs
the value of the car to the purchaser, Chris Washington.
Do you believe from the evidence that Blue Grass Chrysler
breached this duty owed to Chris Washington?
Yes
(Please proceed to
(" l\- U.A.c;.~: ----.} )
.--
No
Instruction No.4)
J"v.«CIfI, ~ fA. <) A-),"'
r:-r- ;/\J~ 7 <JV\ ."""';:~
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INSTRUCTION NO.4
Under the Kentucky Revised Statute 367, known as the
Question No. 4-1
practices in conducting its business.
Consumer Protection Act l it is unlawful for any business to
the
JURORS WHO AGREE,
IF NOT UNANIMOUS
NoYes
Do you believe from the evidence that Blue Grass Chrysler-
FOREPERSON, IF UNANIMOUS
Plymouth in its sale of the 1993 Pontiac Sunbird and the Extended
Consumer Protection Act as described above?
Service Warranty to Chris Washington violated
engage in unfair l false, misleading, or deceptive acts or
(Please proceed to Instruction No.5)
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INSTRUCTION NO.5
"Fraud" means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit,
omission of a material fact, or concealment of a material fact
known to the Defendant and made with the knowledge that the
misrepresentation, deceit, omission or concealment would be
relied upon by the Plaintiff to his detriment and would in all
probability cause injury to the Plaintiff.
INSTRUCTION NO. SA
You will find for Chris Washington against Blue Grass
Chrysler-Plymouth on the issue of fraudulent misrepresentation if
you are satisfied from the evidence as follows:
(1) that before Chris Washington purchased the car from
Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, that Blue Grass Chrysler-
Plymouth's employees told him:
(a) the car was not previously salvaged and rebuilt
OR
(b) the car was previously owned by a woman who could
not afford the payments
OR
(c) the service contract he purchased from Blue Grass
Chrysler-Plymouth would cover repairs to the car
he purchased.
(2) that Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth and its employees
intended for Chris Washington to rely on the truth of
one or more of the statements in (1) above in deciding
to buy the car;
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(3) that Chris Washington did, in fact, rely on one or more
of the statements in subsection (1) above as being true
and otherwise would not have purchased the car;
(4) that, in fact, one, two, or all three of those
statements in subsection (1) were not true;
AND
(5) that having purchased the car, Chris Washington
suffered financial loss or losses that he would not
have suffered if the statement or statements made to
him by Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth and its employees
had been true.
otherwise, you will find for Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth.
QUESTION 5-1
Do you find from the evidence that Blue Grass Chrysler J ~~~J\
~ j-e~( .... :l,.'
Plymouth committed a fraudulent misrepresentation/in the sale of
the 1993 Plymouth Sunbird or Extended Servic Warranty to Chris
Washington? yes _
C . ( - \ ...J;"C<<At:'-"\.)
) .h,-t i(J(-I-- I ~ - , ",-~v-
-
-
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INSTRUCTION NO. 5B
You will find for Chris Washington against Blue Grass
Chrysler-Plymouth, if you are satisfied from the evidence as
follows:
(1) that before Chris Washington purchased the car from
Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth, that Blue Grass Chrysler-
Plymouth and its employees failed to tell him:
(a) the car was previously salvaged and rebuilt;
OR
(b) the car was formerly an Avis Rent-A-Car;
OR
(c) the service contract he purchased from Blue Grass
Chrysler-Plymouth was worthless.
(2) that such statements were material in Chris
Washington's decision to purchase his car, and that he,
in fact, would not have purchased the car had the above
facts been disclosed to him;
(3) that Chris Washington could not, through reasonable
inspection, discover the omitted facts stated in
paragraph (1);
(4) that Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth and its employees had
knowledge of the facts set forth in paragraph (1);
AND
(6) that Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth intentionally
withheld or failed to disclose these facts from Chris
Washington.
D-~
Question No. 5-2
Based on the foregoing, do you believe from the evidence
presented that Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth committed a
G) d(\(,,:.,rJ w~,:)v\.
fraudulent~omission in the sale of the 1993 Plymouth Sunbird or
Extended Service Warranty to Chris Washington?
Yes
('[J <.J.A~... ~ ---. )
------------
D - 88
No
J \..A ...-~... \ vlA.? lI.\ y ((
,f'" rJ~\ u"'~~~
-
-------
-
-
-
----
-
INSTRUCTION NO.6
If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 3, 4, 5-1, or 5-2
you will award him a sum of money that will fairly and reasonably
compensate him for such financial loss or losses as you are
satisfied from the evidence that he incurred as a direct result
of the misrepresentations or omissions made'to him by Blue Grass
Chrysler-Plymouth.
1 . Purchase price of the contract, not $
to exceed $11,078.00.
2. Expenses for loan transaction, not $
to exceed $86.10.
7 ~eed $,
4. Insurance payments for six months, $
not to exceed $
5. Loss of use of a motor vehicle since $
April 1994 to present (seventeen
months) .
6. Inconvenience and mental anguish,
to include damage to credit, stress
of legal proceedings, and loss of
employment.
(Please Proceed to Instruction No.7)
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INSTRUCTION NO.7
If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 5-1 or 5-2 or if you
are further satisfied from the evidence that the Defendant[ Blue
Grass Chrysler-Plymouth acted toward Chris Washington with
oppression or malice, you may at your discretion award punitive
damages against Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth in addition to the
damages awarded under Instruction 2.
As used' in this Instruction: "Oppression" means conduct
that was specifically intended by Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth to
subject Chris Washington to cruel and unjust hardship; and
"Malice" means (a) conduct that was specifically intended by
Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth to cause tangible or intangible
injury to Chris Washington, OR (b) conduct that was carried out
by Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth with both a flagrant indifference
to Chris Washington's rights AND a subjective awareness that such
conduct would result in harm.
"Puni ti ve damages" means damages other than compensatory
damages and nominal damages awarded against a person or company
to punish and to discourage that person or company and others
from simliar conduct in the future.
If you award punitive damages, in determining the amount
thereof you should consider the following factors:
(1) the likelihood at the time of such misconduct by Blue
Grass Chrysler-Plymouth that serious harm would arise
from it;
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(2) the degree of Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth's awareness
of that likelihood;
(3) the profitability of the misconduct to Blue Grass
Chrysler-Plymouth;
(4) the duration of the misconduct (and any concealment of
it) by Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouthi
AND
(5) the actions by Blue Grass Chrysler-Plymouth to remedy
the misconduct once it became known to it.
If you award punitive damages, you will state the amount
separately from the sum or sums awarded under Instruction 2 or 6.
Does the jury award punitive damages under Instruction No. ~ ?
, I
Yes
If your answer is "Yes," what amount of
award Chris Washington?
FOREPERSON, IF UNANIMOUS
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No
punitive damages do you
$------1l ----
JURORS WHO AGREE,
IF NOT UNANIMOUS
(You may return to the Courtroom.)
D-~
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I. 1991 TELEPHONE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT ("TCPA")
47 U.S.C. § 227
Sec. 227. - Restrictions on use of telephone equipment
(a) Definitions
As used in this section -
(1)
The term "automatic telephone dialing system" means equipment which
has the ca pacity -
(A)
to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a
random or sequential number generator; and
(8)
to dial such numbers.
(2)
The term "telephone facsimile machine" means equipment which has the
capacity
(A)
to transcribe text or images, or both, from paper into an electronic
signal and to transmit that signal over a regular telephone line, or
(8)
to transcribe text or images (or both) from an electronic signal
received over a regular telephone line onto paper.
(3)
The term "telephone solicitation" means the initiation of a telephone call
or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or
investment in, property, goods, or services, which is transmitted to any
person, but such term does not include a call or message
(A)
to any person with that person's prior express invitation or
permission,
(8)
to any person with whom the caller has an established business
relationship, or
(C)
by a tax exempt nonprofit organization.
(4)
The term "unsolicited advertisement" means any material advertising
the commercial availability or quality of any property, goods, or services
which is transmitted to any person without that person's prior express
invitation or permission.
(b) Restrictions on use of automated telephone equipment
(1) Prohibitions
It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States -
(A)
to make any call (other than a call made for emergency purposes
or made with the prior express consent of the called party) using
any automatic telephone dialing system or an artificial or
prerecorded voice -
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(i)
to any emergency telephone line (including any "911" line and
any emergency line of a hospital, medical physician or service
office, health care facility, poison control center, or fire
protection or law enforcement agency);
(ii)
to the telephone line of any guest room or patient room of a
hospital, health care facility, elderly home, or similar
establishment; or
(iii)
to any telephone number assigned to a paging service, cellular
telephone service, specialized mobile radio service, or other
radio common carrier service, or any service for which the
called party is charged for the call;
(8)
to initiate any telephone call to any residential telephone line using
an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the
prior express consent of the called party, unless the call is initiated
for emergency purposes or is exempted by rule or order by the
Commission under paragraph (2)(6);
(e)
to use any telephone facsimile machine, computer, or other device
to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile
machine; or
(D)
to use an automatic telephone dialing system in such a way that
two or more telephone lines of a multi-line business are engaged
simultaneously.
(2) Regulations; exemptions and other provisions
The Commission shall prescribe regulations to implement the
requirements of this subsection. In implementing the requirements of
this subsection, the Commission -
(A)
shall consider prescribing regulations to allow businesses to avoid
receiving calls made using an artificial or prerecorded voice to
which they have not given their prior express consent;
(8)
may, by rule or order, exempt from the requirements of paragraph
(1)(6) of this subsection, subject to such conditions as the
Commission may prescribe -
(i)
calls that are not made for a commercial purpose; and
(ii)
such classes or categories of calls made for commercial
purposes as the Commission determines -
(I)
will not adversely affect the privacy rights that this
section is intended to protect; and
(II)
do not include the transmission of any unsolicited
advertisement; and
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(C)
may, by rule or order, exempt from the requirements of paragraph
(l)(A)(iii) of this subsection calls to a telephone number assigned
to a cellular telephone service that are not charged to the called
party, subject to such conditions as the Commission may prescribe
as necessary in the interest of the privacy rights this section is
intended to protect.
(3) Private right of action
A person or entity may, if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of
court of a State, bring in an appropriate court of that State -
(A)
an action based on a violation of this subsection or the regulations
prescribed under this subsection to enjoin such violation,
(8)
an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation,
or to receive $500 in damages for each such violation, whichever
is greater, or
(C)
both such actions.
If the court finds that the defendant willfully or knowingly violated this
subsection or the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the court
may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an amount
equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under
subparagraph (6) of this paragraph.
(e) Protection of subscriber privacy rights
(1) Rulemaking proceeding required
Within 120 days after December 20, 1991, the Commission shall initiate
a rulemaking proceeding concerning the need to protect residential
telephone subscribers' privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone
solicitations to which they object. The proceeding shall -
(A)
compare and evaluate alternative methods and procedures
(including the use of electronic databases, telephone network
technologies, special directory markings, industry-based or
company-specific "do not call" systems, and any other
alternatives, indiVidually or in combination) for their effectiveness
in protecting such privacy rights, and in terms of their cost and
other advantages and disadvantages;
(8)
evaluate the categories of public and private entities that would
have the capacity to establish and administer such methods and
procedures;
(C)
consider whether different methods and procedures may apply for
local telephone solicitations, such as local telephone solicitations of
small businesses or holders of second class mail permits;
(D)
consider whether there is a need for additional Commission
authority to further restrict telephone solicitations, including those
calls exempted under subsection (a)(3) of this section, and, if such
a finding is made and supported by the record, propose specific
restrictions to the Congress; and
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(E)
develop proposed regulations to implement the methods and
procedures that the Commission determines are most effective
and efficient to accomplish the purposes of this section.
(2) Regulations
Not later than 9 months after December 20, 1991, the Commission shall
conclude the rulemaking proceeding initiated under paragraph (1) and
shall prescribe regulations to implement methods and procedures for
protecting the privacy rights described in such paragraph in an efficient,
effective, and economic manner and without the imposition of any
additional charge to telephone subscribers.
(3) Use of database permitted
The regulations required by paragraph (2) may require the
establishment and operation of a single national database to compile a
list of telephone numbers of residential subscribers who object to
receiving telephone solicitations, and to make that compiled list and
parts thereof available for purchase. If the Commission determines to
require such a database, such regulations shall -
(A)
specify a method by which the Commission will select an entity to
administer such database;
(8)
require each common carrier providing telephone exchange
service, in accordance with regulations prescribed by the
Commission, to inform subscribers for telephone exchange service
of the opportunity to provide notification, in accordance with
regulations established under this paragraph, that such subscriber
objects to receiving telephone solicitations;
(e)
specify the methods by which each telephone subscriber shall be
informed, by the common carrier that provides local exchange
service to that subscriber, of
(i)
the subscriber's right to give or revoke a notification of an
objection under subparagraph (A), and
(ii)
the methods by which such right may be exercised by the
subscriber;
(D)
specify the methods by which such objections shall be collected
and added to the database;
(E)
prohibit any residential subscriber from being charged for giving or
revoking such notification or for being included in a database
compiled under this section;
(F)
prohibit any person from making or transmitting a telephone
solicitation to the telephone number of any subscriber included in
such database;
(G)
specify
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(i)
the methods by which any person desiring to make or transmit
telephone solicitations will obtain access to the database, by
area code or local exchange prefix, as required to avoid calling
the telephone numbers of subscribers included in such
database; and
(ii)
the costs to be recovered from such persons;
(H)
specify the methods for recovering, from persons accessing such
database, the costs involved in identifying, collecting, updating,
disseminating, and selling, and other activities relating to, the
operations of the database that are incurred by the entities
carrying out those activities;
(I)
specify the frequency with which such database will be updated
and specify the method by which such updating will take effect for
purposes of compliance with the regulations prescribed under this
subsection;
(l)
be designed to enable States to use the database mechanism
selected by the Commission for purposes of administering or
enforcing State law;
(K)
prohibit the use of such database for any purpose other than
compliance with the requirements of this section and any such
State law and specify methods for protection of the privacy rights
of persons whose numbers are included in such database; and
(l)
require each common carrier providing services to any person for
the purpose of making telephone solicitations to notify such person
of the requirements of this section and the regulations thereunder.
(4) Considerations required for use of database method
If the Commission determines to require the database mechanism
described in paragraph (3), the Commission shall -
(A)
in developing procedures for gaining access to the database,
consider the different needs of telemarketers conducting business
on a national, regional, State, or local level;
(B)
develop a fee schedule or price structure for recouping the cost of
such database that recognizes such differences and -
(i)
reflect the relative costs of providing a national, regional, State,
or local list of phone numbers of subscribers who object to
receiving telephone solicitations;
(ii)
reflect the relative costs of providing such lists on paper or
electronic media; and
(iii)
not place an unreasonable financial burden on small
businesses; and
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(C)
consider
(i)
whether the needs of telemarketers operating on a local basis
could be met through special markings of area white pages
directories, and
(ii)
if such directories are needed as an adjunct to database lists
prepared by area code and local exchange prefix.
(S) Private right of action
A person who has received more than one telephone call within any 12-
month period by or on behalf of the same entity in violation of the
regulations prescribed under this subsection may, if otherwise permitted
by the laws or rules of court of a State bring in an appropriate court of
that State -
(A)
an action based on a violation of the regulations prescribed under
this subsection to enjoin such violation,
(8)
an action to recover for actual monetary loss from such a violation,
or to receive up to $500 in damages for each such violation,
whichever is greater, or
(C)
both such actions.
It shall be an affirmative defense in any action brought under this
paragraph that the defendant has established and implemented, with
due care, reasonable practices and procedures to effectively prevent
telephone solicitations in violation of the regulations prescribed under
this subsection. If the court finds that the defendant willfully or
knowingly violated the regulations prescribed under this subsection, the
court may, in its discretion, increase the amount of the award to an
amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount available under
subparagraph (6) of this paragraph.
(6) Relation to subsection (b)
The provisions of this subsection shall not be construed to permit a
communication prohibited by subsection (b) of this section.
(d) Technical and procedural standards
(1) Prohibition
It shall be unlawful for any person within the United States -
(A)
to initiate any communication using a telephone facsimile machine,
or to make any telephone call using any automatic telephone
dialing system, that does not comply with the technical and
procedural standards prescribed under this subsection, or to use
any telephone facsimile machine or automatic telephone dialing
system in a manner that does not comply with such standards; or
(8)
to use a computer or other electronic device to send any message
via a telephone facsimile machine unless such person dearly
marks, in a margin at the top or bottom of each transmitted page
of the message or on the first page of the transmission, the date
and time it is sent and an identification of the business, other
entity, or individual sending the message and the telephone
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number of the sending machine or of such business, other entity,
or individual.
(2) Telephone facsimile machines
The Commission shall revise the regulations setting technical and
procedural standards for telephone facsimile machines to require that
any such machine which is manufactured after one year after December
20, 1991, clearly marks, in a margin at the top or bottom of each
transmitted page or on the first page of each transmission, the date and
time sent, an identification of the business, other entity, or individual
sending the message, and the telephone number of the sending machine
or of such business, other entity, or individual.
(3) Artificial or prerecorded voice systems
The Commission shall prescribe technical and procedural standards for
systems that are used to transmit any artificial or prerecorded voice
message via telephone. Such standards shall require that -
(A)
all artificial or prerecorded telephone messages
(i)
shall, at the beginning of the message, state clearly the identity
of the business, individual, or other entity initiating the call,
and
(ii)
shall, during or after the message, state clearly the telephone
number or address of such business, other entity, or individual;
and
(8)
any such system will automatically release the called party's line
within 5 seconds of the time notification is transmitted to the
system that the called party has hung up, to allow the called
party's line to be used to make or receive other calls.
(e) Effect on State law
(1) State law not preempted
Except for the standards prescribed under subsection (d) of this section
and subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, nothing in this section or
in the regulations prescribed under this section shall preempt any State
law that imposes more restrictive intrastate requirements or regulations
on, or which prohibits -
(A)
(8)
(e)
(D)
the use of telephone facsimile machines or other electronic devices
to send unsolicited advertisements;
the use of automatic telephone dialing systems;
the use of artificial or prerecorded voice messages; or
the making of telephone solicitations.
(2) State use of databases
If, pursuant to subsection (c)(3) of this section, the Commission requires
the establishment of a single national database of telephone numbers of
subscribers who object to receiving telephone solicitations, a State or
local authority may not, in its regulation of telephone solicitations,
require the use of any database, list, or listing system that does not
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include the part of such single national database that relates to such
State.
(f) Actions by States
(1) Authority of States
Whenever the attorney general of a State, or an official or agency
designated by a State, has reason to believe that any person has
engaged or is engaging in a pattern or practice of telephone calls or
other transmissions to residents of that State in violation of this section
or the regulations prescribed under this section, the State may bring a
civil action on behalf of its residents to enjoin such calls, an action to
recover for actual monetary loss or receive $500 in damages for each
violation, or both such actions. If the court finds the defendant Willfully
or knowingly violated such regulations, the court may, in its discretion,
increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than
3 times the amount available under the preceding sentence.
(2) Exclusive jurisdiction of Federal courts
The district courts of the United States, the United States courts of any
territory, and the District Court of the United States for the District of
Columbia shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all civil actions brought
under this subsection. Upon proper application, such courts shall also
have jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, or orders affording like
relief, commanding the defendant to comply with the provisions of this
section or regulations prescribed under this section, including the
requirement that the defendant take such action as is necessary to
remove the danger of such violation. Upon a proper showing, a
permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted
without bond.
(3) Rights of Commission
The State shall serve prior written notice of any such civil action upon
the Commission and provide the Commission with a copy of its
complaint, except in any case where such prior notice is not feasible, in
which case the State shall serve such notice immediately upon instituting
such action. The Commission shall have the right
(A)
to intervene in the action,
(8)
upon so intervening, to be heard on all matters arising therein,
and
(e)
to file petitions for appeal.
(4) Venue; service of process
Any civil action brought under this subsection in a district court of the
United States may be brought in the district wherein the defendant is
found or is an inhabitant or transacts business or wherein the violation
occurred or is occurring, and process in such cases may be served in any
district in which the defendant is an inhabitant or where the defendant
may be fou nd.
(5) Investigatory powers
For purposes of bringing any civil action under this subsection, nothing in
this section shall prevent the attorney general of a State, or an official or
agency designated by a State, from exercising the powers conferred on
the attorney general or such official by the laws of such State to conduct
investigations or to administer oaths or affirmations or to compel the
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attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary and other
evidence.
(6) Effect on State court proceedings
Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit an
authorized State official from proceeding in State court on the basis of
an alleged violation of any general civil or criminal statute of such State.
(7) Limitation
Whenever the Commission has instituted a civil action for violation of
regulations prescribed under this section, no State may, during the
pendency of such action instituted by the Commission, subsequently
institute a civil action against any defendant named in the Commission's
complaint for any violation as alleged in the Commission's complaint.
(8) "Attorney general" defined
As used in this subsection, the term "attorney general" means the chief
legal officer of a State
E-9
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the carrier provides materially false or
incomplete information in its FCC
Form 499-A or otherwise fails to com-
ply with paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of
this section.
(f) Imposition of fine. After notice and
opportunity to respond, the Commis-
sion may impose a fine on a carrier
that is subject to the registration re-
quirement pursuant to paragraph (a) of
this section if that carrier fails to sub-
mit an FCC Form 499-A in accordance
with paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this
section.
(g) Changes in information. A carrier
must notifY the Commission of any
changes to the information provided
pursuant to paragraph (b) of this sec-
tion within no more than one week of
the change. Carriers may satisfy this
requirement by filing the relevant por-
tion of FCC Form 499-A in accordance
with the Instructions to such form.
(h) Duty to confirm registration ofother
carriers. The Commission shall make
available to the public a comprehen-
sive listing of registrants and the infor-
mation that they have provided pursu-
ant to paragraph (b) of this section. A
telecommunications carrier providing
telecommunications service for resale
shall have an affirmative duty to ascer-
tain whether a potential carrier-cus-
tomer (i.e., reseller) that is subject to
the registration requirement pursuant
to paragraph (a) of this section has
filed an FCC Form 499-A with the Com-
mission prior to offering service to
that carrier-customer. After notice and
opportunity to respond, the Commis-
sion may impose a fine on a carrier for
failure to confirm the registration sta-
tus of a potential carrier-customer be-
fore providing that carrier-customer
with service.
[66 FR 12894, Mar. 1, 2001]
Subpart L-Restrictions on Tele-
marketing and Telephone So-
licitation
§ 64.1200 Delivery restrictions.
(a) No person or entity may:
(1) Initiate any telephone call (other
than a call made for emergency pur-
poses or made with the prior express
consent of the called party) using an
§64.1200
automatic telephone dialing system or
an artificial or prerecorded voice,
(i) To any emergency telephone line,
including any 911 line and any emer-
gency line of a hospital, medical physi-
cian or service office, health care facil-
ity, poison control center, or fire pro-
tection or law enforcement agency;
(ii) To the telephone line of any guest
room or patient room of a hospital,
health care facility, elderly home, or
similar establishment; or
(iii) To any telephone number as-
signed to a paging service, cellular
telephone service, specialized mobile
radio service, or other radio common
carrier service, or any service for
which the called party is charged for
the call.
(2) Initiate any telephone call to any
residential line using an artificial or
prerecorded voice to deliver a message
without the prior express consent of
the called party, unless the call,
(i) Is made for emergency purposes,
(ii) Is not made for a commercial pur-
pose,
(iii) Is made for a commercial pur-
pose but does not include or introduce
an unsolicited advertisement or con-
stitute a telephone solicitation,
(iv) Is made to any person with whom
the caller has an established business
relationship at the time the call is
made, or
(v) Is made by or on behalf of a tax-
exempt nonprofit organization.
(3) Use a telephone facsimile ma-
chine, computer, or other device to
send an unsolicited advertisement to a
telephone facsimile machine,
(i) For purposes of paragraph (a) (3) of
this section, a facsimile advertisement
is not "unsolicited" if the recipient has
granted the sender prior express invita-
tion or permission to deliver the adver-
tisement, as evidenced by a signed,
written statement that includes the
facsimile number to which any adver-
tisements may be sent and clearly indi-
cates the recipient's consent to receive
such facsimile advertisements from the
sender.
(ii) A facsimile broadcaster will be
liable for violations of paragraph (a)(3)
of this section if it demonstrates a high
degree of involvement in, or actual no-
tice of, the unlawful activity and fails
297
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to take steps to prevent such facsimile
transmissions.
(4) Use an automatic telephone dial-
ing system in such a way that two or
more telephone lines of a multi-line
business are engaged simultaneously.
(5) Disconnect an unanswered tele-
marketing call prior to at least 15 sec-
onds or four (4) rings.
(6) Abandon more than three percent
of all telemarketing calls that are an-
swered live by a person, measured over
a 30-day period. A call is "abandoned"
if it is not connected to a live sales rep-
resentative within two (2) seconds of
the called person's completed greeting.
Whenever a sales representative is not
available to speak with the person an-
swering the call, that person must re-
ceive, within two (2) seconds after the
called person's completed greeting, a
prerecorded identification message
that states only the name and tele-
phone number of the business, entity,
or individual on whose behalf the call
was placed, and that the call was for
"telemarketing purposes." The tele-
phone number so provided must permit
any individual to make a do-not-call
request during regular business hours
for the duration of the telemarketing
campaign. The telephone number may
not be a 900 number or any other num-
ber for which charges exceed local or
long distance transmission charges.
The seller or telemarketer must main-
tain records establishing compliance
with paragraph (a) (6) of this section.
(i) A call for telemarketing purposes
that delivers an artificial or
prerecorded voice message to a residen-
tial telephone line that is assigned to a
person who either has granted prior ex-
press consent for the call to be made or
has an established business relation-
ship with the caller shall not be consid-
ered an abandoned call if the message
begins within two (2) seconds of the
called person's completed greeting.
(ii) Calls made by or on behalf of tax-
exempt nonprofit organizations are not
covered by paragraph (a) (6) of this sec-
tion.
(7) Use any technology to dial any
telephone number for the purpose of
determining whether the line is a· fac-
simile or voice line.
(b) All artificial or prerecorded tele-
phone messages shall:
47 CFR Ch. I (llH-Q3 Edition)
(1) At the beginning of the message,
state clearly the identity of the busi-
ness, individual, or other entity that is
responsible for initiating the call. If a
business is responsible for initiating
the call, the name under which the en-
tity is registered to conduct business
with the State Corporation Commis-
sion (or comparable regulatory author-
ity) must be stated, and
(2) During or after the message, state
clearly the telephone number (other
than that of the autodialer or
prerecorded message player that placed
the call) of such business, other entity,
or individual. The telephone number
provided may not be a 900 number or
any other number for which charges
exceed local or long distance trans-
mission charges. For telemarketing
messages to residential telephone sub-
scribers, such telephone number must
permit any individual to make a do-
not-call request during regular busi-
ness hours for the duration of the tele-
marketing campaign.
(c) No person or entity shall initiate
any telephone solicitation, as defined
in paragraph (f) (9) of this section, to:
(1) Any residential telephone sub-
scriber before the hour of 8 a.m. or
after 9 p.m. (local time at the called
party's location), or
(2) A residential telephone subscriber
who has registered his or her telephone
number on the national do-not-call reg-
istry of persons who do not wish to re-
ceive telephone solicitations that is
maintained by the federal government.
Such do-not-call registrations must be
honored for a period of 5 years. Any
person or entity making telephone so-
licitations (or on whose behalf tele-
phone solicitations are made) will not
be liable for violating this requirement
if:
(i) It can demonstrate that the viola-
tion is the result of error and that as
part of its routine business practice, it
meets the following standards:
(A) Written procedures. It has estab-
lished and implemented written proce-
dures to comply with the national do-
not-call rules;
(B) Training of personnel. It has
trained its personnel, and any entity
assisting in its compliance, in proce-
dures established pursuant to the na-
tional do-not-call rules;
1
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(C) Recording. It has maintained and
recorded a list of telephone numbers
that the seller may not contact;
(D) Accessing the national do-not-call
database. It uses a process to prevent
telephone solicitations to any tele-
phone number on any list established
pursuant to the do-not-call rules, em-
ploying a version of the national do-
not-call registry obtained from the ad-
ministrator of the registry no more
than three months prior to the date
any call is made, and maintains
records documenting this process; and
(E) Purchasing the national do-not-call
database. It uses a process to ensure
that it does not sell, rent, lease, pur-
chase or use the national do-not-call
database, or any part thereof, for any
purpose except compliance with this
section and any such state or federal
law to prevent telephone solicitations
to telephone numbers registered on the
national database. It purchases access
to the relevant do-not-call data from
the administrator of the national data-
base and does not participate in any ar-
rangement to share the cost of access-
ing the national database, including
any arrangement with telemarketers
who may not divide the costs to access
the national database among various
client sellers; or
(ii) It has obtained the subscriber's
prior express invitation or permission.
Such permission must be evidenced by
a signed, written agreement between
the consumer and seller which states
that the consumer agrees to be con-
tacted by this seller and includes the
telephone number to which the calls
may be placed; or
(iii) The telemarketer making the
call has a personal relationship with
the recipient of the call.
(d) No person or entity shall initiate
any call for telemarketing purposes to
a residential telephone subscriber un-
less such person or entity has insti-
tuted procedures for maintaining a list
of persons who request not to receive
telemarketing calls made by or on be-
half of that person or entity. The pro-
cedures instituted must meet the fol-
lowing minimum standards:
(1) Written policy. Persons or entities
making calls for telemarketing pur-
poses must have a written policy,
§64.1200
available upon demand, for maintain-
ing a do-not-call list.
(2) Training of personnel engaged in
telemarketing. Personnel engaged in any
aspect of telemarketing must be in-
formed and trained in the existence
and use of the do-not-call list.
(3) Recording, disclosure of do-not-call
requests. If a person or entity making a
call for telemarketing purposes (or on
whose behalf such a call is made) re-
ceives a request from a residential tele-
phone subscriber not to receive calls
from that person or entity, the person
or entity must record the request and
place the subscriber's name, if pro-
vided, and telephone number on the do-
not-call list at the time the request is
made. Persons or entities making calls
for telemarketing purposes (or on
whose behalf such calls are made) must
honor a residential subscriber's do-not-
call request within a reasonable time
from the date such request is made.
This period may not exceed thirty days
from the date of such request. If such
requests are recorded or maintained by
a party other than the person or entity
on whose behalf the telemarketing call
is made, the person or entity on whose
behalf the telemarketing call is made
will be liable for any failures to honor
the do-not-call request. A person or en-
tity making a call for telemarketing
purposes must obtain a consumer's
prior express permission to share or
forward the consumer's request not to
be called to a party other than the per-
son or entity on whose behalf a tele-
marketing call is made or an affiliated
entity.
(4) Identification of seJ]ers and tele-
marketers. A person or entity making a
call for telemarketing purposes must
provide the called party with the name
of the individual caller, the name of
the person or entity on whose behalf
the call is being made, and a telephone
number or address at which the person
or entity may be contacted. The tele-
phone number provided may not be a
900 number or any other number for
which charges exceed local or long dis-
tance transmission charges.
(5) Affiliated persons or entities. In the
absence of a specific request by the
subscriber to the contrary, a residen-
tial subscriber's do-not-call request
shall apply to the particular business
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entity making the call (or on whose be-
half a call is made), and will not apply
to affiliated entities unless the con-
sumer reasonably would expect them
to be included given the identification
of the caller and the product being ad-
vertised.
(6) Maintenance of do-not-call lists. A
person or entity making calls for tele-
marketing purposes must maintain a
record of a caller's request not to re-
ceive further telemarketing calls. A
do-not-call request must be honored for
5 years from the time the request is
made.
(1) Tax-exempt nonprofit organiza-
tions are not required to comply with
64.1200(d).
(e) The rules set forth in paragraph
(c) and (d) of this section are applicable
to any person or entity making tele-
phone solicitations or telemarketing
calls to wireless telephone numbers to
the extent described in the Commis-
sion's Report and Order, CG Docket No.
02-218, FCC 03-153, "Rules and Regula-
tions Implementing the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act of 1991."
(t) As used in this section:
(l) The terms automatic telephone dial-
ing system and autodialer mean equip-
ment which has the capacity to store
or produce telephone numbers to be
called using a random or sequential
number generator and to dial such
numbers.
(2) The term emergency purposes
means calls made necessary in any sit-
uation affecting the health and safety
of consumers.
(3) The term established business rela-
tionship means a prior or existing rela-
tionship formed by a voluntary two-
way communication between a person
or entity and a residential subscriber
with or without an exchange of consid-
eration, on the basis of the subscriber's
purchase or transaction with the enti-
ty within the eighteen (18) months im-
mediately preceding the date of the
telephone call or on the basis of the
subscriber's inquiry or application re-
garding products or services· offered by
the entity within the three months im-
mediately preceding the date of the
call, which relationship has not been
previously terminated by either party.
(i) The subscriber's seller-specific do-
not-call request, as set forth in para-
47 CFR Ch. I 00-1-03 Edition)
graph (d) (3) of this section, terminates
an established business relationship for
purposes of telemarketing and tele-
phone solicitation even if the sub-
scriber continues to do business with
the seller.
(ii) The subscriber's established busi-
ness relationship with a particular
business entity does not extend to af-
filiated entities unless the subscriber
would reasonably expect them to be in-
cluded given the nature and type of
goods or services offered by the affil-
iate and the identity of the affiliate.
(4) The term facsimile broadcaster
means a person or entity that trans-
mits messages to telephone facsimile
machines on behalf of another person
or entity for a fee.
(5) The term seller means the person
or entity on whose behalf a telephone
call or message is initiated for the pur-
pose of encouraging the purchase or
rental of, or investment in, property,
goods, or services, which is transmitted
to any person.
(6) The term telemarketer means the
person or entity that initiates a tele-
phone call or message for the purpose
of encouraging the purchase or rental
of, or investment in, property, goods,
or services, which is transmitted to
any person.
(1) The term telemarketing means the
initiation of a telephone call or mes-
sage for the purpose of encouraging the
purchase or rental of, or investment in,
property, goods, or services, which is
transmitted to any person.
(8) The term telephone facsimile ma-
chine means equipment which has the
capacity to transcribe text or images,
or both, from paper into an electronic
signal and to transmit that signal over
a regular telephone line, or to tran-
scribe text or images (or both) from an
electronic signal received over a reg-
ular telephone line onto paper.
(9) The term telephone solicitation
means the initiation of a telephone call
or message for the purpose of encour-
aging the purchase or rental of, or in-
vestment in, property, goods, or serv-
ices, which is transmitted to any per-
son, but such term does not include a
call or message:
(i) To any person with that person's
prior express invitation or permission;
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(ii) To any person with whom the
caller has an established business rela-
tionship; or
(iii) By or on behalf of a tax-exempt
nonprofit organization.
(10) The term unsolicited advertisement
means any material advertising the
commercial availability or quality of
any property, goods, or services which
is transmitted to any person without
that person's prior express invitation
or permission.
(11) The term personal relationship
means any family member, friend, or
acquaintance of the telemarketer mak-
ing the call.
(g) Beginning January I, 2004, com-
mon carriers shall:
(1) When providing local exchange
service, provide an annual notice, via
an insert in the subscriber's bill, of the
right to give or revoke a notification of
an objection to receiving telephone so-
licitations pursuant to the national do-
not-call database maintained by the
federal government and the methods by
which such rights may be exercised by
the subscriber. The notice must be
clear and conspicuous and include, at a
minimum, the Internet address and
toll-free number that residential tele-
phone subscribers may use to register
on the national database.
(2) When providing service to any
person or entity for the purpose of
making telephone solicitations, make
a one-time notification to such person
or entity of the national do-not-call re-
quirements, including, at a minimum,
citation to 47 CFR 64.1200 and 16 CFR
310. Failure to receive such notification
will not serve as a defense to any per-
son or entity making telephone solici-
tations from violations of this section.
(h) The administrator of the national
do-not-call registry that is maintained
by the federal government shall make
the telephone numbers in the database
available to the States so that a State
may use the telephone numbers that
relate to such State as part of any
database, list or listing system main-
tained by such State for the regulation
of telephone solicitations.
[68 FR 44177, July 25,2003]
EFFECTIVE DATE NOTE: At 68 FR 44177, July
25, 2003, §64.1200 was revised. Paragraph
(a)(3)(i) will become effective Jan. 1, 2005.
§64.1201
§ 64.1201 Restrictions on billing name
and address disclosure.
(a) As used in this section:
(1) The term billing name and address
means the name and address provided
to a local exchange company by each of
its local exchange customers to which
the local exchange company directs
bills for its services.
(2) The term "telecommunications
service provider" means interexchange
carriers, operator service providers, en-
hanced service providers, and any other
provider of interstate telecommuni-
cations services.
(3) The term authorized billing agent
means a third party hired by a tele-
communications service provider to
perform billing and collection services
for the telecommunications service
provider.
(4) The term bulk basis means billing
name and address information for all
the local exchange service subscribers
of a local exchange carrier.
(5) The term LECjoint use card means
a calling card bearing an account num-
ber assigned by a local exchange car-
rier, used for the services of the local
exchange carrier and a designated
interexchange carrier, and validated by
access to data maintained by the local
exchange carrier.
(b) No local exchange carrier pro-
viding billing name and address shall
disclose billing name and address infor-
mation to any party other than a tele-
communications service provider or an
authorized billing and collection agent
of a telecommunications service pro-
vider.
(c) (1) No telecommunications service
provider or authorized billing and col-
lection agent of a telecommunications
service provider shall use billing name
and address information for any pur-
pose other than the follOWing:
(i) Billing customers for using tele-
communications services of that serv-
ice provider and collecting amounts
due:
(ii) Any purpose associated with the
"equal access" requirement of United
States v. AT&T 552 F.Supp. 131 (D.D.C.
1982); and
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caused to pass through a proper on-
hook transition in order to minimize
the likelihood of damage to individuals
with normal hearing.
(g) These incorporations by reference
of paragraph 4.1.2 (including table 4.4)
of American National Standards Insti-
tute (ANSI) Standard ANSI/EIA-470-A-
1987 and paragraph 4.3.2 of ANSI/EIA!
TIA-579-1991 were approved by the Di-
rector of the Federal Register in ac-
cordance with 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR
part 51. Copies of these publications
may be purchased from the American
National Standards Institute (ANSI),
Sales Department, 11 West 42nd Street.
13th Floor, New York. NY 10036. (212)
642-4900. Copies also may be inspected
during normal business hours at the
following locations: Consumer and
Governmental Affairs Bureau. Ref-
erence Information Center. Federal
Communications Commission. 445 12th
Street. SW, Washington. DC 20554; and
Office of the Federal Register. 800 N.
Capitol Street. NW., Suite 700, Wash-
ington. DC.
[61 FR 42187, Aug. 14. 1996, as amended at 64
FR 60726, Nov. 8. 1999: 67 FR 13229, Mar. 21.
20021
§ 68.318 Additional limitations.
(a) General. Registered terminal
equipment for connection to those
services discussed below must incor-
porate the specified features.
(b) Registered terminal equipment with
automatic dialing capability. (1) Auto-
matic dialing to any individual number
is limited to two successive attempts.
Automatic dialing equipment which
employ means for detecting both busy
and reorder signals shall be permitted
an additional 13 attempts if a busy or
reorder signal is encountered on each
attempt. The dialer shall be unable to
re-attempt a call to the same number
for at least 60 minutes following either
the second or fifteenth successive at-
tempt, whichever applies. unless the di-
aler is reactivated by either manual or
external means. This rule does not
apply to manually activated dialers
that dial a number once following each
activation.
NOTE TO PARAGRAPH (b)(I): Emergency
alarm dialers and dialers under external
computer control are exempt from these re-
quirements.
47 CFR Ch. I (10-1-03 Edition)
(2) If means are employed for detect-
ing both busy and reorder signals. the
automatic dialing equipment shall re-
turn to its on-hook state within 15 sec-
onds after detection of a busy or reor-
der signal.
(3) If the called party does not an-
swer, the automatic dialer shall return
to the on-hook state within 60 seconds
of completion of dialing.
(4) If the called party answers. and
the calling equipment does not detect a
compatible terminal equipment at the
called end. then the automatic dialing
equipment shall be limited to one addi-
tional call which is answered. The
automatic dialing equipment shall
comply with paragraphs (b)(I). (b)(2).
and (b)(3) of this section for additional
call attempts that are not answered.
(5) Sequential dialers shall dial only
once to any individual number before
proceeding to dial another number.
(6) Network addressing signals shall
be transmitted no earlier than:
(i) 70 ms after receipt of dial tone at
the network demarcation point; or
(Ii) 600 ms after automatically going
off-hook (for single line equipment
that does not use dial tone detectors);
or
(iii) 70 ms after receipt of CO ground
start at the network demarcation
point.
(c) Line seizure by automatic telephone
dialing systems. Automatic telephone
dialing systems which deliver a re-
corded message to the called party
must release the called party's tele-
phone line within 5 seconds of the time
notification is transmitted to the sys-
tem that the called party has hung up.
to allow the called party's line to be
used to make or receive other calls.
(d) Telephone facsimile machines; Iden-
tification of the sender of the message. It
shall be unlawful for any person within
the United States to use a computer or
other electronic device to send any
message via a telephone facsimile ma-
chine unless such person clearly
marks. in a margin at the top or bot-
tom of each transmitted page of the
message or on the first page of the
transmission. the date and time it is
sent and an identification of the busi-
ness. other entity. or individual send-
ing the message and the telephone
number of the sending machine or of
380
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such business, other entity, or indi-
vidual. If a facsimile broadcaster dem-
onstrates a high degree of involvement
in the sender's facsimile messages,
such as supplying the numbers to
which a message is sent, that broad-
caster's name, under which it is reg-
istered to conduct business with the
State Corporation Commission (or
comparable regulatory authority),
must be identified on the facsimile,
along with the sender's name. Tele-
phone facsimile machines manufac-
tured on and after December 20, 1992,
must clearly mark such identifying in-
formation on each transmitted page.
(e) Requirement that registered equip-
ment allow access to common carriers.
Any equipment or software manufac-
tured or imported on or after April 17,
1992, and installed by any aggregator
shall be technologically capable of pro-
viding consumers with access to inter-
state providers of operator services
through the use of equal access codes.
The terms used in this paragraph shall
have meanings defined in § 64.708 of this
chapter (47 CFR 64.708).
[62 FR 61691, Nov. 19, 1997, as amended at 68
FR 44179, July 25,2003]
§ 68.320 Supplier's Declaration of Con-
formity.
(a) Supplier's Declaration of Con-
formity is a procedure where the re-
sponsible party, as defined in §68.3,
makes measurements or takes other
necessary steps to ensure that the ter-
minal equipment complies with the ap-
propriate technical standards.
(b) The Supplier's Declaration of
Conformity attaches to all items subse-
quently marketed by the responsible
party which are identical, within the
variation that can be expected to arise
as a result of quantity production tech-
niques, to the sample tested and found
acceptable by the responsible party.
(c) The Supplier's Declaration of
Conformity signifies that the respon-
sible party has determined that the
equipment has been shown to comply
with the applicable technical criteria if
no unauthorized change is made in the
equipment and if the equipment is
properly maintained and operated.
(d) The responsible party, if different
from the manufacturer, may upon re-
ceiving a written statement from the
§68.322
manufacturer that the equipment com-
plies with the appropriate technical
criteria, rely on the manufacturer or
independent testing agency to deter-
mine compliance. Any records that the
Administrative Council for Terminal
Attachments requires the responsible
party to maintain shall be in the
English language and shall be made
available to the Commission upon a re-
quest.
(e) No person shall use or make ref-
erence to a Supplier's Declaration of
Conformity in a deceptive or mis-
leading manner or to convey the im-
pression that such a Supplier's Dec-
laration of Conformity reflects more
than a determination by the respon-
sible party that the device or product
has been shown to be capable of com-
plying with the applicable technical
criteria published by the Administra-
tive Council of Terminal Attachments.
[66 FR 7585, Jan. 24, 2001]
§ 68.321 Location of responsible party.
The responsible party for a Supplier's
Declaration of Conformity must des-
ignate an agent for service of process
that is physically located within the
United States.
[67 FR 57182, Sept. 9, 2002]
§ 68.322 Changes in name, address,
ownership or control of responsible
party.
(a) The responsible party for a Sup-
plier's Declaration of Conformity may
license or otherwise authorize a second
party to manufacture the equipment
covered by the Supplier's Declaration
of Conformity provided that the re-
sponsible party shall continue to be re-
sponsible to the Commission for ensur-
ing that the equipment produced pur-
suant to such an agreement remains
compliant with the appropriate stand-
ards.
(b) In the case of transactions affect-
ing the responsible party of a Sup-
plier's Declaration of Conformity, such
as a transfer of control or sale to an-
other company, mergers, or transfer of
manufacturing rights, the successor
entity shall become the responsible
party.
[66 FR 7586, Jan. 24, 2001]
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III. 1994 TELEMARKETING CONSUMER FRAUD AND ABUSE
PREVENTION ACT ("TELEMARKETING ACT")
15 U.S.C. §§ 6101 et seq.
Sec. 6101. - Findings
The Congress makes the following findings:
(1)
Telemarketing differs from other sales activities in that it can be carried
out by sellers across State lines without direct contact with the
consumer. Telemarketers also can be very mobile, easily moving from
State to State.
(2)
Interstate telemarketing fraud has become a problem of such magnitude
that the resources of the Federal Trade Commission are not sufficient to
ensure adequate consumer protection from such fraud.
(3)
Consumers and others are estimated to lose $40 billion a year in
telemarketing fraud.
(4)
Consumers are victimized by other forms of telemarketing deception and
abuse.
(5)
Consequently, Congress should enact legislation that will offer
consumers necessary protection from telemarketing deception and abuse
Sec. 6102. - Telemarketing rules
(a) In general
(1)
The Commission shall prescribe rules prohibiting deceptive telemarketing
acts or practices and other abusive telemarketing acts or practices.
(2)
The Commission shall include in such rules respecting deceptive
telemarketing acts or practices a definition of deceptive telemarketing
acts or practices which shall include fraudulent charitable solicitations,
and which may include acts or practices of entities or individuals that
assist or facilitate deceptive telemarketing, including credit card
laundering.
(3)
The Commission shall include in such rules respecting other abusive
telemarketing acts or practices -
(A)
a requirement that telemarketers may not undertake a pattern of
unsolicited telephone calls which the reasonable consumer would
consider coercive or abusive of such consumer's right to privacy,
(8)
restrictions on the hours of the day and night when unsolicited
telephone calls can be made to consumers,
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(e)
a requirement that any person engaged in telemarketing for the
sale of goods or services shall promptly and clearly disclose to the
person receiving the call that the purpose of the call is to sell
goods or services and make such other disclosures as the
Commission deems appropriate, including the nature and price of
the goods and services; and
(D)
a requirement that any person engaged in telemarketing for the
solicitation of charitable contributions, donations, or gifts of money
or any other thing of value, shall promptly and clearly disclose to
the person receiving the call that the purpose of the call is to solicit
charitable contributions, donations, or gifts, and make such other
disclosures as the Commission considers appropriate, including the
name and mailing address of the charitable organization on behalf
of which the solicitation is made.
In prescribing the rules described in this paragraph, the Commission shall also
consider recordkeeping requirements.
(b) Rulemaking
The Commission shall prescribe the rules under subsection (a) of this section
within 365 days after August 16, 1994. Such rules shall be prescribed in
accordance with section 553 of title 5.
(c) Enforcement
Any violation of any rule prescribed under subsection (a) of this section shall
be treated as a violation of a rule under section 57a of this title regarding
unfair or deceptive acts or practices.
(d) Securities and Exchange Commission rules
(1) Promulgation
(A) In general
Except as provided in subparagraph (6), not later than 6 months
after the effective date of rules promulgated by the Federal Trade
Commission under subsection (a) of this section, the Securities
and Exchange Commission shall promulgate, or require any
national securities exchange or registered securities association to
promulgate, rules substantially similar to such rules to prohibit
deceptive and other abusive telemarketing acts or practices by
persons described in paragraph (2).
(8) Exception
The Securities and Exchange Commission is not required to
promulgate a rule under subparagraph (A) if it determines that -
(i)
Federal securities laws or rules adopted by the Securities
and Exchange Commission thereunder provide protection
from deceptive and other abusive telemarketing by persons
described in paragraph (2) substantially similar to that
provided by rules promulgated by the Federal Trade
Commission under subsection (a) of this section; or
(ii)
such a rule promulgated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission is not necessary or appropriate in the public
interest, or for the protection of investors, or would be
inconsistent with the maintenance of fair and orderly
markets.
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If the Securities and Exchange Commission determines that an
exception described in clause (i) or (ii) applies, the Securities and
Exchange Commission shall publish in the Federal Register its
determination with the reasons for it.
(2) Application
(A) In general
The rules promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission
under paragraph (l)(A) shall apply to a broker, dealer, transfer
agent, municipal securities dealer, municipal securities broker,
government securities broker, government securities dealer,
investment adviser or investment company, or any individual
associated with a broker, dealer, transfer agent, municipal
securities dealer, municipal securities broker, government
securities broker, government securities dealer, investment
adviser or investment company. The rules promulgated by the
Federal Trade Commission under subsection (a) of this section
shall not apply to persons described in the preceding sentence.
(8) Definitions
For purposes of subparagraph (A) -
(i)
the terms "broker", "dealer", "transfer agent", "municipal
securities dealer", "municipal securities broker",
"government securities broker", and "government securities
dealer" have the meanings given such terms by paragraphs
(4), (5), (25), (30), (31), (43), and (44) of section 78c(a) of
this title;
(ii)
the term "investment adviser" has the meaning given such
term by section 80b-2(a)(11) of this title; and
(iii)
the term "investment company" has the meaning given such
term by section 80a-3(a) of this title.
(e) Commodity Futures Trading Commission rules
(1) Application
The rules promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission under
subsection (a) of this section shall not apply to persons described in
section 9b(1) of title 7.
(2) Omitted
Sec. 6103. - Actions by States
(a) In general
Whenever an attorney general of any State has reason to believe that the
interests of the residents of that State have been or are being threatened or
adversely affected because any person has engaged or is engaging in a pattern
or practice of telemarketing which violates any rule of the Commission under
section 6102 of this title, the State, as parens patriae, may bring a civil action
on behalf of its residents in an appropriate district court of the United States to
enjoin such telemarketing, to enforce compliance with such rule of the
Commission, to obtain damages, restitution, or other compensation on behalf
of residents of such State, or to obtain such further and other relief as the
court may deem appropriate.
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(b) Notice
The State shall serve prior written notice of any civil action under subsection
(a) or (f)(2) of this section upon the Commission and provide the Commission
with a copy of its complaint, except that if it is not feasible for the State to
provide such prior notice, the State shall serve such notice immediately upon
instituting such action. Upon receiving a notice respecting a civil action, the
Commission shall have the right
(1)
to intervene in such action,
(2)
(3)
upon so intervening, to be heard on all matters arising therein, and
to file petitions for appeal.
(c) Construction
For purposes of bringing any civil action under subsection (a) of this section,
nothing in this chapter shall prevent an attorney general from exercising the
powers conferred on the attorney general by the laws of such State to conduct
investigations or to administer oaths or affirmations or to compel the
attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary and other evidence.
(d) Actions by Commission
Whenever a civil action has been instituted by or on behalf of the Commission
for violation of any rule prescribed under section 6102 of this title, no State
may, during the pendency of such action instituted by or on behalf of the
Commission, institute a civil action under subsection (a) or (f)(2) of this
section against any defendant named in the complaint in such action for
violation of any rule as alleged in such complaint.
(e) Venue; service of process
Any civil action brought under subsection (a) of this section in a district court
of the United States may be brought in the district in which the defendant is
found, is an inhabitant, or transacts business or wherever venue is proper
under section 1391 of title 28. Process in such an action may be served in any
district in which the defendant is an inhabitant or in which the defendant may
be found.
(f) Actions by other State officials
(1)
Nothing contained in this section shall prohibit an authorized State
official from proceeding in State court on the basis of an alleged violation
of any civil or criminal statute of such State.
(2)
In addition to actions brought by an attorney general of a State under
subsection (a) of this section, such an action may be brought by officers
of such State who are authorized by the State to bring actions in such
State on behalf of its residents
Sec. 6104. - Actions by private persons
(a) In general
Any person adversely affected by any pattern or practice of telemarketing
which violates any rule ofthe Commission under section 6102 of this title, or
an authorized person acting on such person's behalf, may, within 3 years after
discovery of the violation, bring a civil action in an appropriate district court of
the United States against a person who has engaged or is engaging in such
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pattern or practice of telemarketing if the amount in controversy exceeds the
sum or value of $50,000 in actual damages for each person adversely affected
by such telemarketing. Such an action may be brought to enjoin such
telemarketing, to enforce compliance with any rule of the Commission under
section 6102 of this title, to obtain damages, or to obtain such further and
other relief as the court may deem appropriate.
(b) Notice
The plaintiff shall serve prior written notice of the action upon the Commission
and prOVide the Commission with a copy of its complaint, except in any case
where such prior notice is not feasible, in which case the person shall serve
such notice immediately upon instituting such action. The Commission shall
have the right
(A)
to intervene in the action,
(B)
upon so intervening, to be heard on all matters arising therein,
and
(C)
to file petitions for appeal.
(e) Action by Commission
Whenever a civil action has been instituted by or on behalf of the Commission
for violation of any rule prescribed under section 6102 of this title, no person
may, during the pendency of such action instituted by or on behalf of the
Commission, institute a civil action against any defendant named in the
complaint in such action for violation of any rule as alleged in such complaint.
(d) Cost and fees
The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought under subsection (a)
of this section, may award costs of suit and reasonable fees for attorneys and
expert witnesses to the prevailing party.
(e) Construction
Nothing in this section shall restrict any right which any person may have
under any statute or common law.
(f) Venue; service of process
Any civil action brought under subsection (a) of this section in a district court
of the United States may be brought in the district in which the defendant is
found, is an inhabitant, or transacts business or wherever venue is proper
under section 1391 of title 28. Process in such an action may be served in any
district in which the defendant is an inhabitant or in which the defendant may
be found
Sec. 6105. - Administration and applicability of chapter
(a) In general
Except as otherwise provided in sections 6102(d), 6102(e), 6103, and 6104 of
this title, this chapter shall be enforced by the Commission under the Federal
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 41 et seq.). Consequently, no activity which
is outside the jurisdiction of that Act shall be affected by this chapter.
(b) Actions by Commission
The Commission shall prevent any person from violating a rule of the
Commission under section 6102 of this title in the same manner, by the same
means, and with the same jurisdiction, powers, and duties as though all
applicable terms and provisions of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15
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U.S.C. 41 et seq.) were incorporated into and made a part of this chapter. Any
person who violates such rule shall be subject to the penalties and entitled to
the privileges and immunities provided in the Federal Trade Commission Act in
the same manner, by the same means, and with the same jurisdiction, power,
and duties as though all applicable terms and provisions of the Federal Trade
Commission Act were incorporated into and made a part of this chapter.
(e) Effect on other laws
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to limit the authority of
the Commission under any other provision of law
Sec. 6106. - Definitions
For purposes of this chapter:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
The term "attorney general" means the chief legal officer of a State.
The term "Commission" means the Federal Trade Commission.
The term "State" means any State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, and any territory
or possession of the United States.
The term "telemarketing" means a plan, program, or campaign which is
conducted to induce purchases of goods or services, or a charitable
contribution, donation, or gift of money or any other thing of value, by
use of one or more telephones and which involves more than one
interstate telephone call. The term does not include the solicitation of
sales through the mailing of a catalog which -
(A)
(8)
(C)
(D)
contains a written description, or illustration of the goods or
services offered for sale,
includes the business address of the seller,
includes multiple pages of written material or illustrations, and
has been issued not less frequently than once a year,
where the person making the solicitation does not solicit customers by
telephone but only receives calls initiated by customers in response to
the catalog and during those calls takes orders only without further
solicitation
Sec. 6107. - Enforcement of orders
(a) General authority
Subject to subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the Federal Trade
Commission may bring a criminal contempt action for violations of orders of
the Commission obtained in cases brought under section 53(b) of this title.
(b) Appointment
An action authorized by subsection (a) of this section may be brought by the
Federal Trade Commission only after, and pursuant to, the appointment by the
E - 24
Attorney General of an attorney employed by the Commission, as a special
assistant United States Attorney.
(e) Request for appointment
(1) Appointment upon request or motion
A special assistant United States Attorney may be appointed under
subsection (b) of this section upon the request of the Federal Trade
Commission or the court which has entered the order for which contempt
is sought or upon the Attorney General's own motion.
(2) Timing
The Attorney General shall act upon any request made under paragraph
(1) within 45 days of the receipt of the request.
(d) Termination of authority
The authority of the Federal Trade Commission to bring a criminal contempt
action under subsection (a) of this section expires 2 years after the date of the
first promulgation of rules under section 6102 of this title. The expiration of
such authority shall have no effect on an action brought before the expiration
date
Sec. 6108. - Review
Upon the expiration of 5 years following the date of the first promulgation of
rules under section 6102 of this title, the Commission shall review the
implementation of this chapter and its effect on deceptive telemarketing acts
or practices and report the results of the review to the Congress
E - 25
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Additional Information
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE)
For more information about AFVs, contact DOE's National
Alternative Fuels Hotline, 1-800-423-1 DOE, and ask for its
free brochure.
NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION
(NHTSA)
For more information about vehicle safety, contact NHTSA's
Auto Safety Hotline, 1-800-424-9393.
The Information on :1115 lilbel15 reQuired by the Federal Trade Commission. 16 CFR Part 309
Figure 8
PART 31D-TELEMARKETING SALES
RULE
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310.1 Scope of regulations in this part.
310.2 Definitions.
310.3 Deceptive telemarketing acts or prac-
tices.
310.4 Abusive telemarketing acts or prac-
tices.
310.5 Recordkeeping requirements.
310.6 Exemptions.
310.7 Actions by states and private persons.
310.8 Fee for access to "do-not-call" reg-
istry.
310.9 Severability.
AUTHORITY: 15 U.S.C. 6101-6108.
SOURCE: 68 FR 4669, Jan. 29, 2003, unless
otherwise noted.
§ 310.1 Scope of regulations in this
part.
This part implements the Tele-
marketing and Consumer Fraud and
Abuse Prevention Act, 15 U.S.C, 6101-
6108, as amended,
§ 310.2 Definitions.
(a) Acquirer means a business organi-
zation, financial institution, or an
agent of a business organization or fi-
nancial institution that has authority
from an organization that operates or
licenses a credit card system to author-
ize merchants to accept, transmit, or
process payment by credit card
through the credit card system for
money, goods or services, or anything
else of value.
(b) Attorney General means the chief
legal officer of a state.
(c) Billing information means any data
that enables any person to access a
customer's or donor's account, such as
a credit card, checking, savings, share
or similar account, utility bill, mort-
gage loan account, or debit card.
\
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(d) Caller identification service means a
service that allows a telephone sub-
scriber to have the telephone number,
and, where available, name of the call-
ing party transmitted contempora-
neously with the telephone call, and
displayed on a device in or connected
to the subscriber's telephone.
(e) Cardholder means a person to
whom a credit card is issued or who is
authorized to use a credit card on be-
half of or in addition to the person to
whom the credit card is issued.
(f) Charitable contribution means any
donation or gift of money or any other
thing of value.
(g) Commission means the Federal
Trade Commission.
(h) Credit means the right granted by
a creditor to a debtor to defer payment
of debt or to incur debt and defer its
payment.
(i) Credit card means any card, plate,
coupon book, or other credit device ex-
isting for the purpose of obtaining
money, property, labor, or services on
credit.
(j) Credit card sales draft means any
record or evidence of a credit card
transaction.
(k) Credit card system means any
method or procedure used to process
credit card transactions involving cred-
it cards issued or licensed by the oper-
ator of that system.
(1) Customer means any person who is
or may be required to pay for goods or
services offered through tele-
marketing.
(m) Donor means any person solicited
to make a charitable contribution.
(n) Established business relationship
means a relationship between a seller
and a consumer based on:
(1) the consumer's purchase, rental,
or lease of the seller's goods or services
or a financial transaction between the
consumer and seller, within the eight-
een (18) months immediately preceding
the date of a telemarketing call; or
(2) the consumer's inquiry or applica-
tion regarding a product or service of-
fered by the seller, within the three (3)
months immediately preceding the
date of a telemarketing call.
(0) Free-to-pay conversion means, in
an offer or agreement to sell or provide
any goods or services, a provision
under which a customer receives a
§310.2
product or service for free for an initial
period and will incur an obligation to
pay for the product or service if he or
she does not take affirmative action to
cancel before the end of that period.
(p) Investment opportunity means any-
thing, tangible or intangible, that is of-
fered, offered for sale, sold, or traded
based wholly or in part on representa-
tions, either express or implied, about
past, present, or future income, profit,
or appreciation.
(q) Material means likely to affect a
person's choice of, or conduct regard-
ing, goods or services or a charitable
contribution.
(r) Merchant means a person who is
authorized under a written contract
with an acquirer to honor or accept
credit cards, or to transmit or process
for payment credit card payments, for
the purchase of goods or services or a
charitable contribution.
(s) Merchant agreement means a writ-
ten contract between a merchant and
an acquirer to honor or accept credit
cards, or to transmit or process for
payment credit card payments, for the
purchase of goods or services or a char-
itable contribution.
(t) Negative option feature means, in
an offer or agreement to sell or provide
any goods or services, a provision
under which the customer's silence or
failure to take an affirmative action to
reject goods or services or to cancel the
agreement is interpreted by the seller
as acceptance of the offer.
(u) Outbound telephone call means a
telephone call initiated by a tele-
marketer to induce the purchase of
goods or services or to solicit a chari-
table contribution.
(v) Person means any individual,
group, unincorporated association, lim-
ited or general partnership, corpora-
tion, or other business entity.
(w) Preacquired account information
means any information that enables a
seller or telemarketer to cause a
charge to be placed against a cus-
tomer's or donor's account without ob-
taining the account number directly
from the customer or donor during the
telemarketing transaction pursuant to
which the account will be charged.
(x) Prize means anything offered, or
purportedly offered, and given, or pur-
portedly given, to a person by chance.
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For purposes of this definition, chance
exists if a person is guaranteed to re-
ceive an item and, at the time of the
offer or purported offer, the tele-
marketer does not identify the specific
item that the person will receive.
(y) Prize promotion means:
(1) A sweepstakes or other game of
chance; or
(2) An oral or written express or im-
plied representation that a person has
won, has been selected to receive, or
may be eligible to receive a prize or
purported prize.
(z) Seller means any person who, in
connection with a telemarketing trans-
action, provides, offers to provide, or
arranges for others to provide goods or
services to the customer in exchange
for consideration.
(aa) State means any state of the
United States, the District of Colum-
bia, Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana
Islands, and any territory or possession
of the United States.
(bb) Telemarketer means any person
who, in connection with telemarketing,
initiates or receives telephone calls to
or from a customer or donor.
(cc) Telemarketing means a plan, pro-
gram, or campaign which is conducted
to induce the purchase of goods or serv-
ices or a charitable contribution, by
use of one or more telephones and
which involves more than one inter-
state telephone call. The term does not
include the solicitation of sales
through the mailing of a catalog
which: contains a written description
or illustration of the goods or services
offered for sale; includes the business
address of the seller; includes multiple
pages of written material or illustra-
tions; and has been issued not less fre-
quently than once a year, when the
person making the solicitation does
not solicit customers by telephone but
only receives calls initiated by cus-
tomers in response to the catalog and
during those calls takes orders only
without further solicitation. For pur-
poses of the previous sentence, the
term "further solicitation" does not
include providing the customer with
information about, or attempting to
sell, any other item included in the
same catalog which prompted the cus-
tomer's call or in a substantially simi-
lar catalog.
16 CFR Ch. I (1-1-04 Edition)
(dd) UpselJing means soliciting the
purchase of goods or services following
an initial transaction during a single
telephone call. The upsell is a separate
telemarketing transaction, not a con-
tinuation of the initial transaction. An
"external upsell" is a solicitation
made by or on behalf of a seller dif-
ferent from the seller in the initial
transaction, regardless of whether the
initial transaction and the subsequent
solicitation are made by the same tele-
marketer. An "internal upsell" is a so-
licitation made by or on behalf of the
same seller as in the initial trans-
action, regardless of whether the ini-
tial transaction and subsequent solici-
tation are made by the same tele-
marketer.
§ 310.3 Deceptive telemarketing acts or
practices.
(a) Prohibited deceptive telemarketing
acts or practices. It is a deceptive tele-
marketing act or practice and a viola-
tion of this Rule for any seller or tele-
marketer to engage in the following
conduct:
(1) Before a customer pays 1 for goods
or services offered, failing to disclose
truthfully, in a clear and conspicuous
manner, the following material infor-
mation:
(i) The total costs to purchase, re-
ceive, or use, and the quantity of, any
goods or services that are the subject
of the sales offer; 2
(ii) All material restrictions, limita-
tions, or conditions to purchase, re-
ceive, or use the goods or services that
are the subject of the sales offer;
(iii) If the seller has a policy of not
making refunds, cancellations, ex-
changes, or repurchases, a statement
informing the customer that this is the
1 When a seller or telemarketer uses, or di-
rects a customer to use, a courier to trans-
port payment, the seller or telemarketer
must make the disclosures required by
§31O.3(a)(J) before sending a courier to pick
up payment or authorization for payment, or
directing a customer to have a courier pick
up payment or authorization for payment.
2For offers of consumer credit products
subject to the Truth in Lending Act, 15
U.S.C. 1601 et seq.. and Regulation Z, 12 CFR
226, compliance with the disclosure require-
ments under the Truth in Lending Act and
Regulation Z shall constitute compliance
with §31O.3(a)(I)(i) of this Rule.
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seller's policy; or, if the seller or tele-
marketer makes a representation
about a refund, cancellation, exchange,
or repurchase policy, a statement of all
material terms and conditions of such
policy;
(iv) In any prize promotion, the odds
of being able to receive the prize, and,
if the odds are not calculable in ad-
vance, the factors used in calculating
the odds; that no purchase or payment
is required to win a prize or to partici-
pate in a prize promotion and that any
purchase or payment will not increase
the person's chances of winning; and
the no-purchase/no-payment method of
participating in the prize promotion
with either instructions on how to par-
ticipate or an address or local or toll-
free telephone number to which cus-
tomers may write or call for informa-
tion on how to participate;
(v) All material costs or conditions
to receive or redeem a prize that is the
subject of the prize promotion;
(vi) In the sale of any goods or serv-
ices represented to protect, insure, or
otherwise limit a customer's liability
in the event of unauthorized use of the
customer's credit card, the limits on a
cardholder's liability for unauthorized
use of a credit card pursuant to 15
U.S.C. 1643; and
(vii) If the offer includes a negative
option feature, all material terms and
conditions of the negative option fea-
ture, including, but not limited to, the
fact that the customer's account will
be charged unless the customer takes
an affirmative action to avoid the
charge(s), the date(s) the charge(s) will
be submitted for payment, and the spe-
cific steps the customer must take to
avoid the charge(s).
(2) Misrepresenting, directly or by
implication, in the sale of goods or
services any of the folloWing material
information:
(i) The total costs to purchase, re-
ceive, or use, and the quantity of, any
goods or services that are the subject
of a sales offer;
(ii) Any material restriction, limita-
tion, or condition to purchase, receive,
or use goods or services that are the
subject of a sales offer;
(iii) Any material aspect of the per-
formance, efficacy, nature, or central
§310.3
characteristics of goods or services
that are the subject of a sales offer;
(iv) Any material aspect of the na-
ture or terms of the seller's refund,
cancellation, exchange, or repurchase
policies;
(v) Any material aspect of a prize
promotion including, but not limited
to, the odds of being able to receive a
prize, the nature or value of a prize, or
that a purchase or payment is required
to win a prize or to participate in a
prize promotion;
(vi) Any material aspect of an invest-
ment opportunity including, but not
limited to, risk, liquidity, earnings po-
tential, or profitability;
(vii) A seller's or telemarketer's af-
filiation with, or endorsement or spon-
sorship by, any person or government
entity;
(viii) That any customer needs of-
fered goods or services to provide pro-
tections a customer already has pursu-
ant to 15 U.S.C. 1643; or
(ix) Any material aspect of a nega-
tive option feature including, but not
limited to, the fact that the customer's
account will be charged unless the cus-
tomer takes an affirmative action to
avoid the charge(s), the date(s) the
charge(s) will be submitted for pay-
ment, and the specific steps the cus-
tomer must take to avoid the
charge(s).
(3) Causing billing information to be
submitted for payment, or collecting or
attempting to collect payment for
goods or services or a charitable con-
tribution, directly or indirectly, with-
out the customer's or donor's express
verifiable authorization, except when
the method of payment used is a credit
card subject to protections of the
Truth in Lending Act and Regulation
Z,3 or a debit card subject to the pro-
tections of the Electronic Fund Trans-
fer Act and Regulation E.4 Such au-
thorization shall be deemed verifiable
if any of the following means is em-
ployed:
'Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601 et
seq., and Regulation Z, 12 CFR part 226.
'Electronic Fund Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C.
1693 et seq., and Regulation E, 12 CFR part
205.
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(i) Express written authorization by
the customer or donor, which includes
the customer's or donor's signature; 5
(ii) Express oral authorization which
is audio-recorded and made available
upon request to the customer or donor,
and the customer's or donor's bank or
other billing entity, and which evi-
dences clearly both the customer's or
donor's authorization of payment for
the goods or services or charitable con-
tribution that are the subject of the
telemarketing transaction and the cus-
tomer's or donor's receipt of all of the
following information:
(A) The number of debits, charges, or
payments (if more than one);
(B) The date(s) the debit(s),
charge(s), or payment(s) will be sub-
mitted for payment;
(C) The amount(s) of the debit(s),
charge(s), or payment(s);
(D) The customer's or donor's name;
(E) The customer's or donor's billing
information, identified with sufficient
specificity such that the customer or
donor understands what account will
be used to collect payment for the
goods or services or charitable con-
tribution that are the subject of the
telemarketing transaction;
(F) A telephone number for customer
or donor inquiry that is answered dur-
ing normal business hours; and
(G) The date of the customer's or do-
nor's oral authorization; or
(iii) Written confirmation of the
transaction, identified in a clear and
conspicuous manner as such on the
outside of the envelope, sent to the
customer or donor via first class mail
prior to the submission for payment of
the customer's or donor's billing infor-
mation, and that includes all of the in-
formation contained in
§§310.3(a)(3)(ii)(A)-(G) and a clear and
conspicuous statement of the proce-
dures by which the customer or donor
can obtain a refund from the seller or
telemarketer or charitable organiza-
tion in the event the confirmation is
inaccurate; provided, however, that this
means of authorization shall not be
5 For purposes of this Rule, the term "sig-
nature" shall include an electronic or digital
form of signature, to the extent that such
form of signature is recognized as a valid sig-
nature under applicable federal law or state
contract law.
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deemed verifiable in instances in which
goods or services are offered in a trans-
action involving a free-to-pay conver-
sion .and preacquired account informa-
tion.
(4) Making a false or misleading
statement to induce any person to pay
for goods or services or to induce a
charitable contribution.
(b) Assisting and facilitating. It is a de-
ceptive telemarketing act or practice
and a violation of this Rule for a per-
son to provide substantial assistance or
support to any seller or telemarketer
when that person knows or consciously
avoids knowing that the seller or tele-
marketer is engaged in any act or prac-
tice that violates §§310.3(a), (c) or (d),
or §310.4 of this Rule.
(c) Credit card laundering. Except as
expressly permitted by the applicable
credit card system, it is a deceptive
telemarketing act or practice and a
violation of this Rule for:
(1) A merchant to present to or de-
posit into, or cause another to present
to or deposit into, the credit card sys-
tem for payment, a credit card sales
draft generated by a telemarketing
transaction that is not the result of a
telemarketing credit card transaction
between the cardholder and the mer-
chant;
(2) Any person to employ, solicit, or
otherwise cause a merchant, or an em-
ployee, representative, or agent of the
merchant, to present to or deposit into
the credit card system for payment, a
credit card sales draft generated by a
telemarketing transaction that is not
the result of a telemarketing credit
card transaction between the card-
holder and the merchant; or
(3) Any person to obtain access to the
credit card system through the use of a
business relationship or an affiliation
with a merchant, when such access is
not authorized by the merchant agree-
ment or the applicable credit card sys-
tem.
(d) Prohibited deceptive acts or prac-
tices in the solicitation of charitable con-
tributions. It is a fraudulent charitable
solicitation, a deceptive telemarketing
act or practice, and a violation of this
Rule for any telemarketer soliciting
charitable contributions to misrepre-
sent, directly or by implication, any of
the following material information:
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(1) The nature, purpose, or mission of
any entity on behalf of which a chari-
table contribution is being requested;
(2) That any charitable contribution
is tax deductible in whole or in part;
(3) The purpose for which any chari-
table contribution will be used;
(4) The percentage or amount of any
charitable contribution that will go to
a charitable organization or to any
particular charitable program;
(5) Any material aspect of a prize
promotion including, but not limited
to: the odds of being able to receive a
prize; the nature or value of a prize; or
that a charitable contribution is re-
quired to win a prize or to participate
in a prize promotion; or
(6) A charitable organization's or
telemarketer's affiliation with, or en-
dorsement or sponsorship by, any per-
son or government entity.
§ 310.4 Abusive telemarketing acts or
practices.
(a) Abusive conduct generally. It is an
abusive telemarketing act or practice
and a violation of this Rule for any
seller or telemarketer to engage in the
following conduct:
(1) Threats, intimidation, or the use
of profane or obscene language;
(2) Requesting or receiving payment
of any fee or consideration for goods or
services represented to remove deroga-
tory information from, or improve, a
person's credit history, credit record,
or credit rating until:
(i) The time frame in which the seller
has represented all of the goods or
services will be provided to that person
has expired; and
(ii) The seller has provided the person
with documentation in the form of a
consumer report from a consumer re-
porting agency demonstrating that the
promised results have been achieved,
such report having been issued more
than six months after the results were
achieved. Nothing in this Rule should
be construed to affect the requirement
in the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C. 1681, that a consumer report
may only be obtained for a specified
permissible purpose;
(3) Requesting or receiving payment
of any fee or consideration from a per-
son for goods or services represented to
recover or otherwise assist in the re-
§310.4
turn of money or any other item of
value paid for by, or promised to, that
person in a previous telemarketing
transaction, until seven (7) business
days after such money or other item is
delivered to that person. This provision
shall not apply to goods or services
provided to a person by a licensed at-
torney;
(4) Requesting or receiving payment
of any fee or consideration in advance
of obtaining a loan or other extension
of credit when the seller or tele-
marketer has guaranteed or rep-
resented a high likelihood of success in
obtaining or arranging a loan or other
extension of credit for a person;
(5) Disclosing or receiving, for con-
sideration, unencrypted consumer ac-
count numbers for use in tele-
marketing; provided, however, that this
paragraph shall not apply to the disclo-
sure or receipt of a customer's or do-
nor's billing information to process a
payment for goods or services or a
charitable contribution pursuant to a
transaction;
(6) Causing billing information to be
submitted for payment, directly or in-
directly, without the express informed
consent of the customer or donor. In
any telemarketing transaction, the
seller or telemarketer must obtain the
express informed consent of the cus-
tomer or donor to be charged for the
goods or services or charitable con-
tribution and to be charged using the
identified account. In any tele-
marketing transaction involving
preacquired account information, the
requirements in paragraphs (a)(6)(i)
through (ii) of this section must be met
to evidence express informed consent.
(i) In any telemarketing transaction
involving preacquired account informa-
tion and a free-to-pay conversion fea-
ture, the seller or telemarketer must:
(A) obtain from the customer, at a
minimum, the last four (4) digits of the
account number to be charged;
(B) obtain from the customer his or
her express agreement to be charged
for the goods or services and to be
charged using the account number pur-
suant to paragraph (a) (6) (i) (A) of this
section; and,
(C) make and maintain an audio re-
cording of the entire telemarketing
transaction.
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(ii) In any other telemarketing trans-
action involving preacquired account
information not described in paragraph
(a) (6) (i) of this section, the seller or
telemarketer must:
(A) at a minimum, identify the ac-
count to be charged with sufficient
specificity for the customer or donor to
understand what account will be
charged; and
(B) obtain from the customer or
donor his or her express agreement to
be charged for the goods or services
and to be charged using the account
number identified pursuant to para-
graph (a) (6) (ii) (A) of this section; or
(7) Failing to transmit or cause to be
transmitted the telephone number,
and, when made available by the tele-
marketer's carrier, the name of the
telemarketer, to any caller identifica-
tion service in use by a recipient of a
telemarketing call; provided that it
shall not be a violation to substitute
(for the name and phone number used
in, or billed for, making the call) the
name of the seller or charitable organi-
zation on behalf of which a tele-
marketing call is placed, and the sell-
er's or charitable organization's cus-
tomer or donor service telephone num-
ber, which is answered during regular
business hours.
(b) Pattern of calls. (1) It is an abusive
telemarketing act or practice and a
violation of this Rule for a tele-
marketer to engage in, or for a seller
to cause a telemarketer to engage in,
the following conduct:
(i) Causing any telephone to ring, or
engaging any person in telephone con-
versation, repeatedly or continuously
with intent to annoy, abuse, or harass
any person at the called number;
(ii) Denying or interfering in any
way, directly or indirectly, with a per-
son's right to be placed on any registry
of names and/or telephone numbers of
persons who do not wish to receive out-
bound telephone calls established to
comply with §310.4(b) (I) (iii);
(iii) Initiating any outbound tele-
phone call to a person when:
(A) that person previously has stated
that he or she does not wish to receive
an outbound telephone call made by or
on behalf of the seller whose goods or
services are being offered or made on
behalf of the charitable organization
16 CFR Ch. I (1-1-04 Edition)
for which a charitable contribution is
being solicited; or
(B) that person's telephone number is
on the "do-not-call" registry, main-
tained by the Commission, of persons
who do not wish to receive outbound
telephone calls to induce the purchase
of goods or services unless the seller
(1) has obtained the express agree-
ment, in writing, of such person to
place calls to that person. Such written
agreement shall clearly evidence such
person's authorization that calls made
by or on behalf of a specific party may
be placed to that person, and shall in-
clude the telephone number to which
the calls may be placed and the signa-
ture 6 of that person; or
(iJ) has an established business rela-
tionship with such person, and that
person has not stated that he or she
does not wish to receive outbound tele-
phone calls under paragraph
(b)(I)(iii)(A) of this section; or
(iv) Abandoning any outbound tele-
phone call. An outbound telephone call
is "abandoned" under this section if a
person answers it and the telemarketer
does not connect the call to a sales rep-
resentative within two (2) seconds of
the person's completed greeting.
(2) It is an abusive telemarketing act
or practice and a violation of this Rule
for any person to sell, rent, lease, pur-
chase, or use any list established to
comply with §310.4(b)(l)(iii)(A), or
maintained by the Commission pursu-
ant to §310.4(b)(I)(iii)(B), for any pur-
pose except compliance with the provi-
sions of this Rule or otherwise to pre-
vent telephone calls to telephone num-
bers on such lists.
(3) A seller or telemarketer will not
be liable for violating §310.4(b)(l)(ii)
and (iii) if it can demonstrate that, as
part of the seller's or telemarketer's
routine business practice:
(i) It has established and imple-
mented written procedures to comply
with §31O.4(b)(l)(ii) and (iii);
(ii) It has trained its personnel. and
any entity assisting in its compliance,
6For purposes of this Rule, the term "sig-
nature" shall include an electronic or digital
form of signature, to the extent that such
form of signature is recognized as a valid sig-
nature under applicable federal law or state
contract law.
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in the procedures established pursuant
to §310.4(b) (3) (i);
(iii) The seller, or a telemarketer or
another person acting on behalf of the
seller or charitable organization, has
maintained and recorded a list of tele-
phone numbers the seller or charitable
organization may not contact, in com-
pliance with §31O.4(b)(I)(iii)(A);
(iv) The seller or a telemarketer uses
a process to prevent telemarketing to
any telephone number on any list es-
tablished pursuant to §§ 310.4(b)(3)(iii)
or 310.4 (b)(I)(iii)(B), employing a
version of the "do-not-call" registry
obtained from the Commission no more
than three (3) months prior to the date
any call is made, and maintains
records documenting this process;
(v) The seller or a telemarketer or
another person acting on behalf of the
seller or charitable organization, mon-
itors and enforces compliance with the
procedures established pursuant to
§310.4(b)(3)(i); and
(vi) Any subsequent call otherwise
violating §310.4(b)(I)(ii) or (iii) is the
result of error.
(4) A seller or telemarketer will not
be liable for violating 310.4(b) (I) (iv) if:
(i) the seller or telemarketer employs
technology that ensures abandonment
of no more than three (3) percent of all
calls answered by a person, measured
per day per calling campaign;
(ii) the seller or telemarketer, for
each telemarketing call placed, allows
the telephone to ring for at least fif-
teen (I5) seconds or four (4) rings before
disconnecting an unanswered call;
(iii) whenever a sales representative
is not available to speak with the per-
son answering the call within two (2)
seconds after the person's completed
greeting, the seller or telemarketer
promptly plays a recorded message
that states the name and telephone
number of the seller on whose behalf
the call was placed 7; and
(iv) the seller or telemarketer, in ac-
cordance with §31O.5(b)-(d), retains
records establishing compliance with
§310.4(b) (4) (i)-(iii).
7This provision does not affect any seller's
or telemarketer's obligation to comply with
relevant state and federal laws, including
but not limited to the TCPA, 47 U.S.C. 227,
and 47 CFR part 64.1200.
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(c) Calling time restrictions. Without
the prior consent of a person, it is an
abusive telemarketing act or practice
and a violation of this Rule for a tele-
marketer to engage in outbound tele-
phone calls to a person's residence at
any time other than between 8:00 a.m.
and 9:00 p.m. local time at the called
person's location.
(d) Required oral disclosures in the sale
ofgoods or services. It is an abusive tele-
marketing act or practice and a viola-
tion of this Rule for a telemarketer in
an outbound telephone call or internal
or external upsell to induce the pur-
chase of goods or services to fail to dis-
close truthfully, promptly, and in a
clear and conspicuous manner to the
person receiving the call, the following
information:
(I) The identity of the seller;
(2) That the purpose of the call is to
sell goods or services;
(3) The nature of the goods or serv-
ices; and
(4) That no purchase or payment is
necessary to be able to win a prize or
participate in a prize promotion if a
prize promotion is offered and that any
purchase or payment will not increase
the person's chances of winning. This
disclosure must be made before or in
conjunction with the description of the
prize to the person called. If requested
by that person, the telemarketer must
disclose the no-purchase/no-payment
entry method for the prize promotion;
provided, however, that, in any internal
upsell for the sale of goods or services,
the seller or telemarketer must pro-
vide the disclosures listed in this sec-
tion only to the extent that the infor-
mation in the upsell differs from the
disclosures prOVided in the initial tele-
marketing transaction.
(e) ReqUired oral disclosures in chari-
table solicitations. It is an abusive tele-
marketing act or practice and a viola-
tion of this Rule for a telemarketer, in
an outbound telephone call to induce a
charitable contribution, to fail to dis-
close truthfully, promptly, and in a
clear and conspicuous manner to the
person receiving the call, the following
information:
(I) The identity of the charitable or-
ganization on behalf of which the re-
quest is being made; and
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(2) That the purpose of the call is to
solicit a charitable contribution.
§ 310.5 Recordkeeping requirements.
(a) Any seller or telemarketer shall
keep, for a period of 24 months from
the date the record is produced, the fol-
lowing records relating to its tele-
marketing activities:
(1) All substantially different adver-
tising, brochures, telemarketing
scripts, and promotional materials;
(2) The name and last known address
of each prize recipient and the prize
awarded for prizes that are rep-
resented, directly or by implication, to
have a value of $25.00 or more;
(3) The name and last known address
of each customer, the goods or services
purchased, the date such goods or serv-
ices were shipped or provided, and the
amount paid by the customer for the
goods or services; 8
(4) The name, any fictitious name
used, the last known home address and
telephone number, and the job title(s)
for all current and former employees
directly involved in telephone sales or
solicitations; provided, however, that if
the seller or telemarketer permits fic-
titious names to be used by employees,
each fictitious name must be traceable
to only one specific employee; and
(5) All verifiable authorizations or
records of express informed consent or
express agreement required to be pro-
vided or received under this Rule.
(b) A seller or telemarketer may
keep the records required by §3IO.5(a)
in any form, and in the same manner,
format, or place as they keep such
records in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. Failure to keep all records re-
quired by §31O.5(a) shall be a violation
of this Rule.
(c) The seller and the telemarketer
calling on behalf of the seller may, by
written agreement, allocate responsi-
bility between themselves for the rec-
ordkeeping required by this Section.
When a seller and telemarketer have
entered into such an agreement, the
"For offers of consumer credit products
subject to the Truth in Lending Act, IS
U.S.C. 1601 et seq., and Regulation Z, 12 CFR
226, compliance with the recordkeeping re-
quirements under the Truth in Lending Act,
and Regulation Z, shall constitute compli-
ance with § 31O.5(a) (3) of this Rule.
16 CFR Ch. I (1-1-04 Edition)
terms of that agreement shall govern,
and the seller or telemarketer, as the
case may be, need not keep records
that duplicate those of the other. If the
agreement is unclear as to who must
maintain any required record(s), or if
no such agreement exists, the seller
shall be responsible for complying with
§§3l0.5(a)(l)-(3) and (5); the tele-
marketer shall be responsible for com-
plying with §3l0.5(a)(4).
(d) In the event of any dissolution or
termination of the seller's or tele-
marketer's business, the principal of
that seller or telemarketer shall main-
tain all records as required under this
Section. In the event of any sale, as-
signment, or other change in ownership
of the seller's or telemarketer's busi-
ness, the successor business shall main-
tain all records required under this
Section.
§ 310.6 Exemptions.
(a) Solicitations to induce charitable
contributions via outbound telephone
calls are not covered by
§310.4(b)(l)(iii)(B) of this Rule.
(b) The following acts or practices
are exempt from this Rule:
(1) The sale of pay-per-call services
subject to the Commission's Rule enti-
tled "Trade Regulation Rule Pursuant
to the Telephone Disclosure and Dis-
pute Resolution Act of 1992," 16 CFR
Part 308, provided, however, that this
exemption does not apply to the re-
quirements of §§3I0.4(a)(I), (a)(7), (b),
and (c);
(2) The sale of franchises subject to
the Commission's Rule entitled "Dis-
closure Requirements and Prohibitions
Concerning Franchising and Business
Opportunity Ventures," ("Franchise
Rule") 16 CFR Part 436, provided, how-
ever, that this exemption does not
apply to the requirements of
§§310.4(a)(l) , (a)(7) , (b), and (c);
(3) Telephone calls in which the sale
of goods or services or charitable solic-
itation is not completed, and payment
or authorization of payment is not re-
quired, until after a face-to-face sales
or donation presentation by the seller
or charitable organization, provided,
however, that this exemption does not
apply to the requirements of
§§3I0.4(a)(I), (a)(7) , (b), and (c);
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(4) Telephone calls initiated by a cus-
tomer or donor that are not the result
of any solicitation by a seller, chari-
table organization, or telemarketer.
provided. however, that this exemption
does not apply to any instances of
upselling included in such telephone
calls;
(5) Telephone calls initiated by a cus-
tomer or donor in response to an adver-
tisement through any medium, other
than direct mail solicitation. provided.
however. that this exemption does not
apply to calls initiated by a customer
or donor in response to an advertise-
ment relating to investment opportuni-
ties. business opportunities other than
business arrangements covered by the
Franchise Rule. or advertisements in-
volving goods or services described in
§§310.3(a)(l)(vi) or 31O.4(a)(2)-(4); or to
any instances of upselling included in
such telephone calls;
(6) Telephone calls initiated by a cus-
tomer or donor in response to a direct
mail solicitation. including solicita-
tions via the U.S. Postal Service. fac-
simile transmission. electronic mail,
and other similar methods of delivery
in which a solicitation is directed to
specific address(es) or person(s). that
clearly. conspicuously, and truthfully
discloses all material information list-
ed in §310.3(a)(l) of this Rule. for any
goods or services offered in the direct
mail solicitation. and that contains no
material misrepresentation regarding
any item contained in §310.3(d) of this
Rule for any requested charitable con-
tribution; provided. however. that this
exemption does not apply to calls initi-
ated by a customer in response to a di-
rect mail solicitation relating to prize
promotions. investment opportunities.
business opportunities other than busi-
ness arrangements covered by the
Franchise Rule. or goods or services de-
scribed in §§ 310.3(a)(l)(vi) or 310.4(a)(2)-
(4); or to any instances of upselling in-
cluded in such telephone calls; and
(7) Telephone calls between a tele-
marketer and any business. except
calls to induce the retail sale of non-
durable office or cleaning supplies; pro-
vided. however. that §310.4(b)(l)(iii)(B)
and §310.5 of this Rule shall not apply
to sellers or telemarketers of non-
durable office or cleaning supplies.
§310.8
§ 310.7 Actions by states and private
persons.
(a) Any attorney general or other of-
ficer of a state authorized by the state
to bring an action under the Tele-
marketing and Consumer Fraud and
Abuse Prevention Act. and any private
person who brings an action under that
Act. shall serve written notice of its
action on the Commission, if feasible.
prior to its initiating an action under
this Rule. The notice shall be sent to
the Office of the Director. Bureau of
Consumer Protection. Federal Trade
Commission. Washington. D.C. 20580.
and shall include a copy of the state's
or private person's complaint and any
other pleadings to be filed with the
court. If prior notice is not feasible.
the state or private person shall serve
the Commission with the required no-
tice immediately upon instituting its
action.
(b) Nothing contained in this Section
shall prohibit any attorney general or
other authorized state official from
proceeding in state court on the basis
of an alleged violation of any civil or
criminal statute of such state.
§ 310.8 Fee for access to the National
Do Not Call Registry.
(a) It is a violation of this Rule for
any seller to initiate, or cause any
telemarketer to initiate. an outbound
telephone call to any person whose
telephone number is within a given
area code unless such seller, either di-
rectly or through another person, first
has paid the annual fee. reqUired by
§31O.8(c). for access to telephone num-
bers within that area code that are in-
cluded in the National Do Not Call
Registry maintained by the Commis-
sion under §310.4(b)(l)(iii)(B) ; provided.
however. that such payment is not nec-
essary if the seller initiates. or causes
a telemarketer to initiate. calls solely
to persons pursuant to
§§ 310.4(b)(l)(iii)(B)(1) or (i1). and the
seller does not access the National Do
Not Call Registry for any other pur-
pose.
(b) It is a violation of this Rule for
any telemarketer. on behalf of any sell-
er. to initiate an outbound telephone
call to any person whose telephone
number is within a given area code un-
less that seller. either directly or
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through another person. first has paid
the annual fee, required by §31O.8(c).
for access to the telephone numbers
within that area code that are included
in the National Do Not Call Registry;
provided, however, that such payment
is not necessary if the seller initiates.
or causes a telemarketer to initiate.
calls solely to persons pursuant to
§§ 310.4(b)(l)(iii)(B) (l) or (iI). and the
seller does not access the National Do
Not Call Registry for any other pur-
pose.
(c) The annual fee, which must be
paid by any person prior to obtaining
access to the National Do Not Call
Registry. is $25 per area code of data
accessed. up to a maximum of $7.375;
provided. however. that there shall be
no charge for the first five area codes
of data accessed by any person. and
provided further. that there shall be no
charge to any person engaging in or
causing others to engage in outbound
telephone calls to consumers and who
is accessing the National Do Not Call
Registry without being required under
this Rule, 47 CFR 64.1200. or any other
federal law. Any person accessing the
National Do Not Call Registry may not
participate in any arrangement to
share the cost of accessing the reg-
istry. including any arrangement with
any telemarketer or service provider to
divide the costs to access the registry
among various clients of that tele-
marketer or service provider.
(d) After a person. either directly or
through another person, pays the fees
set forth in §310.8(c), the person will be
provided a unique account number
which will allow that person to access
the registry data for the selected area
codes at any time for twelve months
following the first day of the month in
which the person paid the fee ("the an-
nual period"). To obtain access to addi-
tional area codes of data during the
first six months of the annual period,
the person must first pay $25 for each
additional area code of data not ini-
tially selected. To obtain access to ad-
ditional area codes of data during the
second six months of the annual period,
the person must first pay $15 for each
additional area code of data not ini-
tially selected. The payment of the ad-
ditional fee will permit the person to
16 CFR Ch. I (1-1-04 Edition)
access the additional area codes of data
for the remainder of the annual period.
(e) Access to the National Do Not
Call Registry is limited to tele-
marketers, sellers, others engaged in or
causing others to engage in telephone
calls to consumers, service providers
acting on behalf of such persons, and
any government agency that has law
enforcement authority. Prior to access-
ing the National Do Not Call Registry,
a person must provide the identifying
information required by the operator of
the registry to collect the fee, and
must certify. under penalty of law,
that the person is accessing the reg-
istry solely to comply with the provi-
sions of this Rule or to otherwise pre-
vent telephone calls to telephone num-
bers on the registry. If the person is ac-
cessing the registry on behalf of sell-
ers, that person also must identify
each of the sellers on whose behalf it is
accessing the registry, must provide
each seller's unique account number
for access to the national registry, and
must certify, under penalty of law,
that the sellers will be using the infor-
mation gathered from the registry
solely to comply with the provisions of
this Rule or otherwise to prevent tele-
phone calls to telephone numbers on
the registry.
[68 FR 45144, July 31, 2003]
§ 310.9 Severability.
The provisions of this Rule are sepa-
rate and severable from one another. If
any provision is stayed or determined
to be invalid, it is the Commission's in-
tention that the remaining provisions
shall continue in effect.
PART 311-TEST PROCEDURES AND
LABELING STANDARDS FOR RE-
CYCLED OIL
Sec.
311.1 Definitions.
311.2 Stayed or invalid parts.
311.3 Preemption.
311.4 Testing.
311.5 Labeling.
311.6 Prohibited acts.
AUTHORITY: 42 U.S.C. 6363(d).
SOURCE: 60 FR 55421, Oct. 31, 1995, unless
otherwise noted.
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v. KENTUCKY TELEMARKETING ACT
367.46951 Definitions for KRS 367.46951 to 367.46999.
As used in KRS 367.46951 to 367.46999 and 367.990, unless the context otherwise
requires:
(1) "Telephone solicitation" means:
(a) A live or recorded communication sent by a telephone or message sent by a
facsimile machine to a residential, mobile, or telephone paging device
telephone number, including a call made by an automatic dialing or recorded
message device, for the purpose of:
1. Soliciting a sale of consumer goods or services, offering an investment,
business, or employment opportunity, or offering a consumer loan to the
person called;
2. Obtaining information that will or may be used for the solicitation of a
sale of consumer goods or services, the offering of an investment,
business, or employment opportunity, or the offering of a consumer loan
to the person called;
3. Offering the person called a prize, gift, or anything else of value, if
payment of money or other consideration is required in order to receive
the prize or gift, including the purchase of other merchandise or services
or the payment of any processing fees, delivery charges, shipping and
handling fees, or other fees or charges; or
4. Offering the person called a prize, gift, or other incentive to attend a
sales presentation for consumer goods or services, an investment or
business opportunity, or a consumer loan; or
(b) A live or recorded communication sent by telephone, facsimile machine, mobile
telephone, or telephone paging device in response to inquiries generated by
unrequested notifications sent by the merchant to persons who have not
previously purchased goods or services from the merchant or telemarketer or
who have not previously requested credit from the merchant, to a prospective
purchaser if the merchant or telemarketer represents or implies to the recipient
of the notification that any of the following applies:
1. That the recipient has in any manner been specially selected to receive
the notification or the offer contained in the notification;
2. That the recipient will receive a prize or gift if the recipient calls the
merchant or telemarketer; or
3. That if the recipient buys one (1) or more items from the merchant or
telemarketer, the recipient will also receive additional or other items of
the same or a different type at no additional cost or for less than the
regular price of the items;
(2) "Telephone solicitation" does not mean the following:
(a) A telephone call made in response to an express request of a person called,
unless the request was made during a prior telephone solicitation;
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(b) A telephone call made to the debtor or a party to the contract in connection
with the payment or performance of an existing debt or contract, the payment
or performance ofwhich has not been completed at the time of the call;
(c) A telephone call to any person with whom the telemarketer or merchant has a
prior or existing business relationship, including but not limited to the
solicitation of contracts for the maintenance or repair of items previously
purchased from the person making the solicitation or on whose behalf the
solicitation is made;
(d) A telephone call made by the following:
1. A merchant or telemarketer located in Kentucky to a location outside of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky;
2. A telephone call made by one (1) merchant to another;
(3) "Consumer goods or services" means goods, services, or interests in real property
used by natural persons primarily for personal, family, or household purposes;
(4) "Consumer loan" means any extension of credit, including credit cards and other
forms of revolving credit, to a natural person primarily for the purposes of
purchasing consumer goods or services or for paying existing personal, family, or
household debts;
(5) "Consumer" means a natural person who receives a telephone solicitation;
(6) "Legal name of the merchant" means the real name of the merchant, as defined in
KRS 365.015(1), or the assumed name of the merchant for which all proper
certificates have been filed pursuant to KRS 365.015;
(7) "Merchant" means the individual or business entity offering the consumer goods or
services, an investment, business, or employment opportunity, or a consumer loan;
(8) "Caller" or "sales person" means the individual making the call or operating the
automatic dialing or recorded message device and causing the call to be made;
(9) "Division" means the Consumer Protection Division of the Office of the Attorney
General;
(10) "Automated calling equipment" means any device or combination of devices used to
select or dial telephone numbers and to deliver recorded messages to those numbers
without the use of a live operator;
(11) "Telemarketer" means any person who under contract with a merchant or in
connection with a telephone solicitation initiates or receives telephone calls to or
from a consumer of goods and services. A telemarketer includes but is not limited to
any such person that is an owner, operator, officer, director, or partner to the
management activities ofa business;
(12) "Publicly traded corporation" means an issuer or subsidiary of an issuer that has a
class of securities which is:
(a) Subject to Section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.c. sec.
781) and which is registered or exempt from registration under paragraph (A),
(B), (C), (E), (F), (G), or (H) of subsection (g)(2) of that section;
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(b) Listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the American Stock Exchange, or
the NASDAQ National Market System; or
(c) A reported security within the meaning of subparagraph (4) of Regulation
Section 240.11Aa3-1.(a) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. A
subsidiary of an issuer that qualifies for exemption under this paragraph shall
not itself be exempt unless at least sixty percent (60%) of the voting power of
its shares is owned by the qualifYing issuer;
(13) "Telemarketing company" means a company whose primary business is to engage in
telephone solicitation; and
(14) "Zero call" list means a list containing the telephone numbers of the individuals that
indicate their preference not to receive telephone solicitations.
Effective: July 15,2002
History: Amended 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 21, sec. I, effective July IS, 2002. -- Amended
1998 Ky. Acts ch.426, sec. 573, effective July IS, 1998; and ch.581, sec. I,
effective July IS, 1998. -- Created 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 302, sec. I, effective July IS,
1994; and ch. 463, sec. I, effective July IS, 1994.
Legislative Research Commission (7/15/94). This statute was created by 1994 Ky.
Acts chs. 302 and 463, which are substantively identical and have been codified
together. Minor variations have been resolved by giving precedence to Acts ch. 463
which was enacted last.
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367.46953 Requirements for making telephone solicitation.
A caller making a telephone solicitation shall:
(1) Immediately upon making contact by telephone with the consumer, state his actual
name, the merchant's legal name, a telephone number or address at which the
merchant may be contacted, and the town or city and state where the caller is
physically located;
(2) Within the first thirty (30) seconds of the call, identify the goods, services, interest in
real estate, investment or business opportunity, or type of credit being offered and
inquire whether the consumer is interested in listening to a sales presentation; and
(3) Immediately discontinue the solicitation if the consumer responds in the negative.
, Effective: July 15, 1994
History: Created 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 302, sec. 2, effective July 15, 1994; and ch. 463,
sec. 2, effective July 15, 1994.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/15/94). This statute was created by 1994
Ky. Acts chs. 302 and 463, which are substantively identical and have been codified
together. Minor variations have been resolved by giving precedence to Acts ch. 463
which was enacted last.
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367.46955 Prohibited telephone solicitation acts and practices.
It is a prohibited telephone solicitation act or practice and a violation of KRS 367.46951
to 367.46999 for any person making a telephone solicitation to engage in the following
conduct:
(1) Advertising or representing that registration as a telemarketer equals an endorsement
or approval by any government or governmental agency;
(2) Requesting a fee in advance to remove derogatory information from or improve a
person's credit history or credit record;
(3) Requesting or receiving a payment in advance from a person to recover or otherwise
aid in the return of money or any other item lost by the consumer in a prior
telephone solicitation transaction;
(4) Requesting or receiving payment of any fee or consideration in advance of obtaining
a loan or other extension of credit when the telemarketing company has guaranteed
or represented a high likelihood of success in obtaining or arranging a loan or other
extension ofcredit for a person;
(5) Obtaining or submitting for payment a check, draft, or other form of negotiable
paper drawn on a person's checking, savings, or bond or other account without the
consumer's express written authorization, or charging a credit card account or
making electronic transfer of funds except in conformity with KRS 367.46963;
(6) Procuring the services of any professional delivery, courier, or other pickup service
to obtain immediate receipt or possession of a consumer's payment, unless the goods
are delivered with the opportunity to inspect before any payment is collected;
(7) Assisting, supporting, or providing substantial assistance to any telemarketer when
the telemarketing company knew or should have known that the telemarketer was
engaged in any act or practice prohibited under this section;
(8) Making a telephone solicitation to anyone under eighteen (18) years of age. When
making a telephone solicitation the telemarketer shall inquire as to whether the
person is eighteen (18) years of age or older and the answer shall be presumed to be
correct;
(9) Utilizing any method to block or otherwise circumvent the use of a caller
identification service when placing an unsolicited telephone solicitation call;
(10) Directing or permitting employees to use a fictitious name or not to use their name
while making a telephone solicitation;
(11) Threatening, intimidating, or using profane or obscene language;
(12) Causing the telephone to ring more than thirty (30) seconds in an intended telephone
solicitation;
(13) Engaging any person repeatedly or continuously with behavior a reasonable person
would deem to be annoying, abusive, or harassing;
(14) Initiating a telephone solicitation call to a person, when that person has stated
previously that he or she does not wish to receive solicitation calls from that seller;
(15) (a) Making or causing to be made an unsolicited telephone solicitation call if the
residential number for that telephone appears in the current publication of the
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zero call list maintained by the Office of the Attorney General, Division of
Consumer Protection. Any holder of a residential telephone number may notify
the division and be placed on a zero call list indicating the wish not to receive
unsolicited telephone solicitation calls by notification to the division. The
telephone numbers of persons requesting to be on the zero call list shall remain
on the list until the person rescinds his or her name from the list.
(b) The zero call list shall be updated, published, and distributed on a quarterly
basis in electronic and hard copy and may be made available in other formats at
the discretion of the division. After the publication of the list each quarter each
telemarketing company, telemarketer, and merchant shall be deemed to be on
notice not to solicit any person whose telephone number appears on the list.
The list shall be made available to requesters either on a statewide or county by
county basis;
(16) Making telephone solicitations to a person's residence at any time other than
between 10 a.m. - 9 p.m. local time, at the called person's location;
(17) Selling or making available for economic gain any information revealed during a
telephone solicitation without the express written consent of the consumer;
(18) Making a telephone solicitation to any residential telephone using an artificial or
prerecorded voice to deliver a message, unless the call is initiated for emergency
purposes by schools regulated by the Kentucky Department of Education or the call
is made with the prior express consent of the called party; or
(19) Engaging in any unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive practice or act as part of a
telephone solicitation.
Effective: July 15,2002
History: Amended 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 21, sec. 2, effective July 15, 2002. -- Created
1998 Ky. Acts ch. 581, sec. 3, effective July 15, 1998.
Legislative Research Commission Note (07/1512002). Under the authority of KRS
7.136, the Reviser of Statutes has corrected a clearly erroneous statutory reference
in subsection (5) of this section as enacted in 2002 Ky. Acts ch.21, sec. 2, by
changing "KRS 367.46953" to "KRS 367.46963."
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367.46957 Contract or agreement voidable by consumer if resulting from
nonconforming telephone solicitation.
A contract or agreement made as a result of a telephone solicitation violating KRS
367.46951 to 367.46999 is voidable by the consumer for any reason at any time and shall
not be enforced against the consumer.
Effective: July 15, 1994
History: Created 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 302, sec. 3, effective July 15, 1994; and ch. 463,
sec. 3, effective July 15, 1994.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/15/94). This statute was created by 1994
Ky. Acts chs. 302 and 463, which are substantively identical and have been codified
together. Minor variations have been resolved by giving precedence to Acts ch. 463
which was enacted last.
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367.46961 Cancellation of contract not reduced to writing -- Exception.
(1) Unless the contract is reduced to writing in compliance with subsection (4) of this
section, a consumer may cancel a contract made as a result of a telephone
solicitation and obtain a full refund of all money paid, by returning the goods, if any,
undamaged and unused, or canceling services within the later of:
(a) Fourteen (14) calendar days following receipt of the goods; or
(b) Fourteen (14) calendar days following receipt of two (2) copies of a written
notice of cancellation rights containing the following language in no less than
ten (10) point, bold-faced type:
NOTICE OF CANCELLATION RIGHTS
BECAUSE YOU AGREED TO BUY THESE GOODS (or services or
other appropriate description) AS A RESULT OF AN UNSOLICITED
TELEPHONE CALL, KENTUCKY LAW GIVES YOU FOURTEEN
(14) DAYS TO CANCEL YOUR AGREEMENT WITH US. IF YOU
WANT TO CANCEL, YOU MUST SIGN YOUR NAME BELOW
AND RETURN A COPY OF THIS NOTICE, TOGETHER WITH
ANY GOODS YOU HAVE RECEIVED, SO THEY ARE
POSTMARKED NO LATER THAN MIDNIGHT OF THE
FOURTEENTH DAY FOLLOWING THE DATE YOU RECEIVED
THE GOODS OR AGREED TO THE SERVICES, OR THE
FOURTEENTH DAY FOLLOWING THE DATE YOU RECEIVED
THIS NOTICE, WHICHEVER IS LATER. THE NOTICE AND
GOODS MUST BE ADDRESSED AS FOLLOWS:
(Name and address ofMerchant)
I want to cancel my agreement to purchase.
(Signature)
(Name of Consumer - Printed)
(Address of Consumer - Printed)
(Address - City, State, Zip)
(Date)
(2) The consumer shall be deemed to have complied with subsection (1) of this section if
the cancellation notice and goods, if any, are returned to the merchant and are
postmarked by midnight of the fourteenth day.
(3) The merchant shall process the refund due any consumer within thirty (30) days of
receiving the merchandise returned by the consumer or the written cancellation
provided in subsection (1) of this section.
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(4) The cancellation period provided in subsection (1) of this section shall not apply to a
written contract signed by the consumer that:
(a) Complies with all applicable federal and state laws and regulations:
(b) Contains a description of the goods, services, investment or business
opportunity, extension of credit, or interest in realty matching the description
used in the telephone solicitation;
(c) Contains the name, address, and telephone number of the merchant, the total
price of the contract, including any finance or interest charges, and a detailed
description of the goods, services, credit, or interest in realty being offered;
(d) Contains all oral or written representations made to the consumer in
connection with the transaction; and
(e) Sets out in at least ten (10) point, bold-face type, immediately preceding the
signature, the following statement:
YOU ARE NOT OBLIGATED TO PAY ANY
MONEY UNLESS YOU SIGN THIS CONTRACT
AND RETURN IT TO THE MERCHANT.
Effective: July 15, 1994
History: Created 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 302, sec. 4, effective July 15, 1994; and ch. 463,
sec. 4, effective July 15, 1994.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/15/94). This statute was created by 1994
Ky. Acts chs. 302 and 463, which are substantively identical and have been codified
together. Minor variations have been resolved by giving precedence to Acts ch. 463
which was enacted last.
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367.46963 Requirements to be met before accepting payment from or charging
consumer.
No caller or merchant making or causing to be made a telephone solicitation shall request
or accept payment from a consumer or make or submit any charge to the consumer's
credit or bank account until either:
(1) The merchant receives from the consumer a signed copy of a written contract
complying with KRS 367.46961(4); or
(2) The cancellation period provided in KRS 367.46961(1) has expired, and the
consumer has not exercised his right to cancel.
Effective: July 15, 1994
History: Created 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 302, sec. 5, effective July 15, 1994; and ch. 463,
sec. 5, effective July 15, 1994.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/15/94). This statute was created by 1994
Ky. Acts chs. 302 and 463, which are substantively identical and have been codified
together. Minor variations have been resolved by giving precedence to Acts ch. 463
which was enacted last.
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367.46967 Violation as unfair or deceptive trade practice -- Powers of Attorney
General.
(1) A violation by a telemarketing company, telemarketer, caller, or merchant of KRS
367.46951 to 367.46999 shall constitute an unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive act
or practice in the conduct of trade or commerce in violation ofKRS 367.170.
(2) All of the remedies, powers, and duties provided for the Attorney General by KRS
367.190 to 367.300 and the penalties provided in KRS 367.990, relating to acts and
practices violating KRS 367.170 shall apply with equal force and effect to acts and
practices declared unlawful by KRS 367.46951 to 367.46999.
(3) Nothing in KRS 367.46951 to 367.46999 shall be construed to limit or restrict the
exercise of powers or the performance of the duties of the Attorney General
authorized under any other provision oflaw.
Effective: July 15, 2002
History: Amended 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 21, sec. 7, effective July IS, 2002. -- Created
1994 Ky. Acts ch. 302, sec. 6, effective July 15, 1994; and ch. 463, sec. 6, effective
July IS, 1994.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/15/94). This statute was created by 1994
Ky. Acts chs. 302 and 463, which are substantively identical and have been codified
together. Minor variations have been resolved by giving precedence to Acts ch. 463
which was enacted last.
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367.46971 Registration of telemarketing companies doing business in this state --
Filing fee -- Renewal -- Addendum -- Written confirmation of receipt of filing -
- Posting of registration statement.
(1) At least ten (10) days prior to doing business in this state, a telemarketing company
shall file with the division the information described below and pay a filing fee of
three hundred dollars ($300). A telemarketing company shall be deemed to do
business in this state if the telemarketing company solicits prospective purchasers
from locations in this state or solicits prospective purchasers who are located in this
state. The information required by this section shall be submitted on a form provided
by the Attorney General and shall be verified by a declaration signed by each
principal of the telemarketing company, under penalty of peIjury. The declaration
shall specify the date and location of signing. Information submitted pursuant to
KRS 367.46951 to 367.46999 shall be clearly identified and appended to the filing.
(2) Registration of a telemarketing company shall be valid for one (1) year from the
effective date thereof and may be renewed annually by making the filing required by
this section and paying a filing fee of fifty dollars ($50).
(3) If, prior to expiration of a telemarketing company's annual registration, there is a
material change in the information required by KRS 367.46951 to 367.46999, the
telemarketing company shall, within ten (10) days, file an addendum updating the
information with the division. However, changes in salespersons soliciting on behalf
of a telemarketing company shall be updated by filing addenda, if necessary, in
quarterly intervals computed from the effective date of registration. The addendum
shall include the required information for all salespersons currently soliciting or
having solicited on behalf of the telemarketing company at any time during the
period between the filing of the registration, or the last addendum, and the current
addendum, and shall include information on salespersons no longer soliciting for the
telemarketing company as of the date of the filing of the current addendum.
(4) Upon receiving the filing and the filing fee pursuant to this section, the division shall
send the telemarketing company a written confirmation of receipt of the filing. If the
telemarketing company has more than one (1) business location, the written
confirmation shall be sent to the telemarketing company's principal business location
as identified in the telemarketing company's filing in sufficient numbers so that the
telemarketing company can meet the requirements of this subsection. Within ten (10)
days of receipt of the confirmation, the telemarketing company shall post in a
conspicuous place at each of the telemarketing company's business locations within
this state a copy of the entire registration statement which has been filed with the
division. Until confirmation of receipt of filing is received and posted, the
telemarketing company shall post in a conspicuous place at each of the telemarketing
company's business locations within this state a copy of the first page of the
registration form sent to the department. The telemarketing company shall also post
in close proximity to either the confirmation of receipt of filing or the first page of
the submitted registration form the name of the individual in charge of each location
from which the telemarketing company does business in this state.
Effective: July 15, 2002
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History: Amended 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 21, sec. 3, effective July 15, 2002. -- Created
1994 Ky. Acts ch. 302, sec. 7, effective July 15, 1994; and ch. 463, sec. 7, effective
July 15, 1994.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/15/94). This statute was created by 1994
Ky. Acts chs. 302 and 463, which are substantively identical and have been codified
together. Minor variations have been resolved by giving precedence to Acts ch. 463
which was enacted last.
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367.46973 Contents of filing.
Each filing pursuant to KRS 367.46971 shall contain the following information:
(1) The name or names of the merchant, including the name under which the merchant is
doing or intends to do business, if different from the name of the merchant, and the
name of any parent or affiliated organization that will engage in business transactions
with purchasers relating to sales solicited by the merchant, or that accepts
responsibility for statements made by, or acts of, the merchant relating to sales
solicited by the merchant;
(2) The merchant's business form and place of organization and, if the merchant is a
corporation, a copy of its articles of incorporation and bylaws and amendments to
those, or, if a partnership, a copy of the partnership agreement, or if operating under
a fictitious business name, the location where the fictitious name has been registered,
along with a copy of the registration documents. The same information shall be
included for any parent or affiliated organization disclosed pursuant to subsection (1)
of this section;
(3) The complete street address of all locations designating the principal location from
which the merchant will be conducting business. If the principal business location of
the merchant is not in this state, then the merchant shall also designate which of its
locations within this state is its main location;
(4) A listing of all telephone numbers to be used by the merchant and the address where
each telephone using each of these telephone numbers is located;
(5) The name of and the office held by the merchant's officers, directors, trustees,
general and limited partners, sole proprietor, and owners and the names of persons
having management responsibilities in the merchant's business activities;
(6) The principal residence, the date ofbirth, and the driver's license number and state of
issuance of each person named pursuant to subsection (5) of this section;
(7) The name and principal residence of each person the merchant leaves in charge at
each location in which the merchant does business in this state, and the business
location at which each of these persons is in charge;
(8) A statement, meeting the requirements of this subsection, as to both the merchant,
whether a corporation, partnership, firm, association, joint venture, or any other type
of business entity and as to any person identified pursuant to subsection (5) or (7) of
this section who:
(a) Has been convicted of a felony or a misdemeanor involving a violation of this
article, or fraud, theft, embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, or
misappropriation of property. For purposes of this paragraph, a plea of nolo
contendere shall be considered a conviction;
(b) Has had entered against him a final judgment or order in a civil or
administrative action, including a stipulated judgment or order, if the complaint
or petition in the civil or administrative action alleged acts constituting a
violation of KRS 367.46951 to 367.46999, fraud, theft, embezzlement,
fraudulent conversion, or misappropriation of property, the use of untrue or
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misleading representations in an attempt to sell or dispose of real or personal
property, or the use ofunfair, unlawful, or deceptive business practices;
(c) Is subject to an injunction or restrictive court order relating to business activity
as the result of an action brought by a federal, state, or local public agency or
unit of that agency, including, but not limited to, an action affecting any
vocational license; or
(d) Has during the previous seven (7) tax years filed in bankruptcy, been adjudged
a bankrupt, been reorganized due to insolvency, or been a principal, director,
officer, trustee, general or limited partner, or had management responsibilities
of any other corporation, partnership, joint venture, or business entity that has
so filed or was so adjudicated or reorganized, during or within one (1) year
after the period that the person held that position.
The statement required by paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) of this subsection shall
identify the merchant or person, the court or administrative agency rendering the
conviction, judgment, or order, the docket number of the matter, the date of the
conviction, judgment, or order, and the name of the governmental agency, if any,
that brought the action resulting in the conviction, judgment, or order. For purposes
of paragraph (d) of this section, the statement required shall include the name and
location of the merchant or person filing in bankruptcy, adjudged a bankrupt, or
reorganized due to insolvency, and shall include the date thereof, the court which
exercised jurisdiction, and the docket number of the matter;
(9) A list of the names, driver's license numbers and states of issuance, principal
residence addresses, and telephone numbers of salespersons who solicit on behalf of
the merchant, and any names the salesperson uses while soliciting;
(10) A description of the items the merchant is offering for sale and a copy of all sales
scripts the merchant requires salespersons to use when soliciting prospective
purchasers. If no sales script is required to be used, a statement to that effect shall be
included;
(11) A copy of all sales information and literature including, but not limited to, scripts,
outlines, instructions, and information regarding how to conduct telephonic sales,
sample introductions, sample closings, product information, and contest or premium-
award information provided by the merchant to salespersons or of which the
merchant informs salespersons, and a copy of all written materials the merchant
sends to any prospective or actual purchaser;
(12) (a) If the merchant represents or implies, or directs salespersons to represent or
imply, to purchasers that the purchaser will receive certain specific items,
including a certificate of any type which the purchaser must redeem to obtain
the item described in the certificate, or one (1) or more items among
designated items, whether the items are denominated as gifts, premiums,
bonuses, prizes, or otherwise, the filing shall include the following:
1. A list of the items offered;
2. The actual value or worth of each item described to prospective
purchasers and the basis for the valuation; and
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3. The price paid by the merchant to its supplier for each of these items and
the name, address, and telephone number of each item's supplier;
(b) If the purchaser is to receive fewer than all of the items described by the
merchant, the filing shall include the following:
1. The manner in which the merchant decides which item each prospective
purchaser is to receive;
2. The odds a single prospective purchaser has of receiving each described
item;
3. The name and address of each recipient who has, during the preceding
twelve (12) months, or if the merchant has not been in business that long,
during the period the merchant has been in business, received the item
having the greatest value and the item with the smallest odds of being
received; and
4. All rules, regulations, terms, and conditions a prospective purchaser must
meet in order to receive the item; and
(13) If the merchant is offering an investment, business, or employment opportunity, the
filing shall include the following:
(a) The number of consumers or investors who have participated to date;
(b) The actual experience of the consumers or investors as measured by standards
used in the sales presentations; and
(c) If the opportunity is so recent that no actual performance experience exists,
that fact shall be disclosed in all sales presentations, and no other
representation ofperformance shall be made in sales presentations.
Effective: July 15, 1994
History: Created 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 302, sec. 8, effective July 15, 1994; and ch. 463,
sec. 8, effective July 15, 1994.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/15/94). This statute was created by 1994
Ky. Acts chs. 302 and 463, which are substantively identical and have been codified
together. Minor variations have been resolved by giving precedence to Acts ch. 463
which was enacted last.
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367.46977 Disclosure requirements for sale presentations.
(1) If the merchant or telemarketer represents or implies that the consumer will receive a
prize, award, or similar item of value from a number of such prizes or awards, all
sales presentations shall include the actual number of individuals who have received
the item having the greatest value, a description of the item, the market value of the
item, the number of prizes to be awarded, the conditions to receive the item, the
odds of winning, the statement that no purchase is necessary to win the prize or to
participate in the promotion, and the actual number of individuals who have received
the item with the least value within the preceding twelve (12) months or since the
merchant or telemarketer has been in business ifless than twelve (12) months.
(2) If the merchant or telemarketer is offering real estate, an investment, business, or
employment opportunity, the sales presentation shall include the following:
(a) The number of consumers or investors who have participated to date;
(b) The actual experience of the consumers or investors as measured by the
standards used in the sales presentations; and
(c) The price of the real estate or investment;
(d) The location of the real estate or investment;
(e) Regarding an investment or business opportunity, the reasonable likelihood of
success and a notice of the risk; and
(f) If the opportunity is so recent that no actual performance experience exists,
that fact shall be disclosed in all sales presentations, and no other
representation ofperformance shall be made in sales presentations.
(3) If the sales presentation includes representations of prices below those usually
charged for items, the sales presentation shall include the name of the manufacturer,
importer, or supplier of such items and the locations within the merchant's or
telemarketer's calling state or this state at which the items are offered at usual prices.
If the item has never been sold in the merchant's or telemarketer's calling state or this
state no representation of usual selling price shall be made.
(4) If presenting information on merchandise or service, the total cost of the goods or
services that are the subject of the call shall be given.
(5) If any restrictions, limitations, or conditions for the purchase or investment exist,
these shall be disclosed during the telephone sales presentation.
(6) Terms for refunds, cancellation, exchange, or repurchase of the subject of the sales
presentation shall be disclosed during the telephone sales presentation.
Effective: July 15, 1998
History: Amended 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 581, sec. 2, effective July IS, 1998. -- Created
1994 Ky. Acts ch. 302, sec. 9, effective July IS, 1994; and ch. 463, sec. 9, effective
July IS, 1994.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/15/94). This statute was created by 1994
Ky. Acts chs. 302 and 463, which are substantively identical and have been codified
together. Minor variations have been resolved by giving precedence to Acts ch. 463
which was enacted last.
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367.46981 Bond required for telemarketing companies -- Notification to Attorney
General of promotion offering premium.
(1) Every telemarketing company shall maintain a bond issued by a surety company
admitted to do business in this state. The bond shall be in the amount of fifty
thousand dollars ($50,000) in favor of the Attorney General for the benefit of any
person suffering injury or loss by reason of any violation of KRS 367.46951 to
367.46999 to be paid under the terms of any order of a court of competent
jurisdiction obtained by the Attorney General, as a result of any violation of KRS
367.46951 to 367.46999. A copy of the bond shall be filed with the division.
(2) At least ten (10) days prior to the inception of any promotion offering a premium
with an actual market value or advertised value of five hundred dollars ($500) or
more, the telemarketing company shall notify the Attorney General in writing of the
details of the promotion, describing the premium and its current market value, the
value at which it is advertised or held out to the customer, the date the premium
shall be awarded, and the conditions under which the award shall be made. The
telemarketing company shall maintain an additional bond for the greater of the
current total market value or the advertised value of the premiums held out or
advertised to be available to a purchaser or recipient. A copy of the bond shall be
filed with the division. The bond, or a portion of it necessary to cover the cost of the
award, shall be forfeited if the premium is not awarded to a bona fide customer
within thirty (30) days of the date disclosed as the time of award or the time
otherwise required by law. The proceeds of the bond shall be paid to any person
suffering injury or loss by reason of any violation of KRS 367.46951 to 367.46999
or shall be paid pursuant to the terms of any order of a court of competent
jurisdiction obtained by the Attorney General, Commonwealth's attorney, or county
attorney as a result of any violation ofKRS 367.46951 to 367.46999. The bond shall
be maintained until the telemarketing company files with the Attorney General proof
that the premium was awarded.
Effective: July 15, 2002
History: Amended 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 21, sec. 4, effective July 15, 2002. -- Created
1994 Ky. Acts ch.302, sec. 10, effective July 15, 1994; and ch.463, sec. 10,
effective July 15, 1994.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/15/94). This statute was created by 1994
Ky. Acts chs. 302 and 463, which are substantively identical and have been codified
together. Minor variations have been resolved by giving precedence to Acts ch. 463
which was enacted last.
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367.46983 Authority for administrative regulations.
The Attorney General may promulgate administrative regulations necessary for the proper
administration and enforcement ofKRS 367.46951 to 367.46999.
Effective: July 15, 1994
History: Created 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 302, sec. II, effective July 15, 1994; and ch.463,
sec. 11, effective July 15, 1994.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/15/94). This statute was created by 1994
Ky. Acts chs. 302 and 463, which are substantively identical and have been codified
together. Minor variations have been resolved by giving precedence to Acts ch. 463
which was enacted last.
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367.46987 Person using electronic equipment for solicitation deemed to have
accepted Kentucky law.
Any merchant, caller, or other person who uses electronic equipment within this
Commonwealth for purposes of telephone solicitation shall, as a condition of that use, be
deemed to have accepted the provisions of KRS 367.46951 to 367.46999 and of KRS
Chapter 526.
Effective: July 15, 1994
History: Created 1994 Ky. Acts ch. 302, sec. 12, effective July 15, 1994; and ch. 463,
sec. 12, effective July 15, 1994.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/15/94). This statute was created by 1994
Ky. Acts chs. 302 and 463, which are substantively identical and have been codified
together. Minor variations have been resolved by giving precedence to Acts ch. 463
which was enacted last.
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367.46993 Telemarketer prohibited from contacting credit card issuer to obtain
account number -- Issuer prohibited from providing account number.
(1) A telemarketer shall not contact a credit card issuer, in writing or by telephone,
facsimile, computer, or by any other means, for the purpose of obtaining a
consumer's credit card account number.
(2) A credit card issuer shall not provide a consumer's credit card account number to a
telemarketer.
Effective: July 15, 2002
History: Created 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 18, sec. 1, effective July 15,2002.
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367.46994 Zero call list -- Registration -- Administrative regulations -- Availability
of information on list -- Consumer education pamphlet.
(1) Any person may apply to the Office of the Attorney General, Division of Consumer
Protection, to have his or her residential telephone number listed on the zero call list.
The Office of the Attorney General shall provide automated telephone dial-in
registration and shall collect only the home phone number from the applicant deemed
to be required to administer the zero call list. The Office of the Attorney General
shall promulgate administrative regulations to:
(a) Provide for automatic telephone number referral from the incumbent local
exchange carrier or the competitive local exchange carrier to the Office of the
Attorney General for the purpose of updating the zero call list to reflect an
applicant's change of address or an applicant's termination of telephone service;
and
(b) Develop, modify, or administer the zero call list in such a way as to permit
interface with any national registry established by the Federal Trade
Commission or the Federal Communications Commission for the purpose of
including in Kentucky's zero call list that part of the national database that
relates to the Commonwealth or release to the national registry applicants on
the zero call list that indicate a preference to be listed on a national registry.
(2) The Attorney General shall place the residential telephone number provided by the
applicant on the list. The Attorney General may update the information on the list as
provided in subsection (1) of this section, but shall not remove the information
unless requested to do so in writing by the applicant, or upon receiving notice that
the given telephone number is no longer held in the name of the applicant.
(3) Persons whose telephone numbers appear on the zero call list shall not receive
telephone solicitations except in accordance with the provisions of KRS 367.46951
to 367.46999.
(4) Any person that applies to the Office of the Attorney General to be placed on the
zero call list shall be informed about how to add his or her name or telephone
number to company-specific and industry-wide no solicitation call lists, including
those lists provided by the Direct Marketing Association (DMA) and the Telephone
Preference Service (TPS).
(5) Information contained in a database established for the purpose of administering the
zero call list shall be used only for the purpose of implementing the zero call
program in conformance with KRS 367.46951 to 367.46999.
(6) The zero call list shall be available at no cost to any merchant or telemarketing
company that is required to consult the list. In addition to the formats described in
KRS 367.46955(15), the list shall be made available in a format for electronic
download from the Internet Web page of the Office of the Attorney General. The
Attorney General shall make the electronic list available in a format that is searchable
by area code and by local exchange. The electronic format shall be arranged with the
last four digits of the telephone numbers in ascending order. The electronic list shall
also be searchable by individual number and shall be downloadable in at least five (5)
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of the most common commercially available data management program formats.
Hard copies of the zero call list shall be arranged by area code and local exchange
with the last four digits in ascending order. The Office of the Attorney General shall
develop procedures to assure that:
(a) The merchant or telemarketing company requesting the list shall maintain the
confidentiality of the information on the list; and
(b) The merchant or telemarketing company shall use the list only for the purpose
of preventing telephone solicitation calls to persons whose telephone numbers
appear on the list.
(7) The Kentucky Public Service Commission shall produce a consumer education
pamphlet that:
(a) Describes the changes made in the year 2002 to Kentucky's telemarketing laws
including the creation of the zero call list;
(b) Describes the consumer's rights and responsibilities regarding the receipt of
telephone solicitation;
(c) Explains how consumers can apply to be placed on the zero call list and on any
federal do not call registry established by the Federal Communications
Commission or the Federal Trade Commission;
(d) Explains how to apply to be placed on company-specific and industrywide no
solicitation calls list, including those lists provided by the Direct Marketing
Association (DMA) and the Telephone Preference Service (TPS); and
(e) Describes how a consumer can file a complaint if the consumer receives calls
after being placed on the zero call list.
(8) At least once a year, the Public Service Commission shall require that the pamphlet
be included in the billing inserts of the telephone companies under the Public Service
Commission's jurisdiction.
Effective: July 15,2002
History: Created 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 21, sec. 5, effective July 15,2002.
E - 61
367.46995 Claims alleging calls made to persons on zero call list -- Defenses.
(1) Any claim or action alleging the making of a call to a person on the zero call list in
violation ofKRS 367.46955 shall be in writing and verified by the claimant.
(2) In any action or claim alleging the making of a call to a person on the zero call list, it
shall be a defense that the defendant obtains the current zero call list in a timely
manner and makes reasonable efforts to avoid calling persons whose telephone
numbers appear on the list.
(3) It shall be a defense in any action or proceeding brought under KRS 367.46951 to
367.46999 that the defendant has established and implemented, with due care,
reasonable practices and procedures to prevent telephone solicitations in violation of
KRS 367.46951 to 367.46999.
Effective: July 15, 2002
History: Created 2002 Ky. Acts ch. 21, sec. 6, effective July 15, 2002.
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367.46999 Penalty for violation -- Concurrent enforcement powers of Attorney
General.
Any person, including, but not limited to, a merchant, a telemarketer, a salesperson, agent
or representative of the merchant, or an independent contractor, who knowingly violates
any provision ofKRS 367.46951 to 367.46999 or engages in any act, practice, or course
of business which operates or would operate as fraud or deceit upon any person in
connection with a sale shall be guilty of a Class D felony, except that any person who
violates KRS 367.46955(7) to (16) shall be guilty of a Class B misdemeanor for the first
offense and a Class A misdemeanor for any subsequent offense. The Office of the
Attorney General shall have concurrent enforcement powers as to such felonies and
misdemeanors.
Effective: July 15, 1998
History: Amended 1998 Ky. Acts ch. 581, sec. 4, effective July 15, 1998. -- Created
1994 Ky. Acts ch.302, sec. 14, effective July 15, 1994; and ch.463, sec. 14,
effective July 15, 1994.
Legislative Research Commission Note (7/15/94). This statute was created by 1994
Ky. Acts chs. 302 and 463, which are substantively identical and have been codified
together. Minor variations have been resolved by giving precedence to Acts ch. 463
which was enacted last.
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VI. KENTUCKY TELEMARKETING REGULATIONS
40 KAR 2:070. Procedure for registration of telemarketing companies.
RELATES TO: KRS 367.46971, 367.46973, 367.46981
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 15.180,367.46983
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS 367.46983 authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate
administrative regulations required to enforce KRS 367.46951 to 367.46999 governing the sales ofgoods and services to
Kentucky consumers by use oftelephone solicitations. This administrative regulation establishes procedures for the
registration of telemarketing companies governed by the provisions ofKRS 367.46951 to 367.46999.
Section 1. Registration. (1 )(a) Registration, or a renewal ofregistration, for telephone solicitation pursuant to KRS 367.46971
shall be made on the "Commonwealth ofKentucky Telemarketing Company Registration Statement". Each telemarketing
company shall register by:
1. Completing the information required by the "Commonwealth of Kentucky Telemarketing Company Registration
Statement"; and
2. Paying fees required by KRS 367.46971.
(b) At the time of filing the "Commonwealth of Kentucky Telemarketing Company Registration Statement", a telemarketing
company shall file:
1. "Commonwealth of Kentucky, Office of the Attorney General, Telemarketing Company Consent for Service "; and
2. One (1) of the following bond forms:
a. "Commonwealth of Kentucky, Office of the Attorney General, Bond for Telemarketing Company"; or
b. "Commonwealth ofKentucky, Office of the Attorney General, Telemarketing Company Premium Surety Bond".
(2) A registration may be withdrawn prior to approval by submitting a written request that the application be withdrawn.
(3) If, upon receipt, the division determines that the materials filed by the telemarketing company do not contain all
information required by KRS 367.46971, 367.46973 and 367.46981 or this administrative regulation, the division shall notify
the telemarketing company in writing, specifying the information that was not completed in the registration statement or bond
form. The registration shall not be completed until an amended filing is received by the division that contains all information
required by KRS 367.46971, 367.46973 and 367.46981 or this administrative regulation. Upon receipt of the completed
registration materials, the division shall provide a written confirmation of receipt of the completed filing.
Section 2. (1) A change in the information specified in this subsection shall be considered a material change that a
telemarketing company shall file in an addendum to the original or annual registration:
(a) A change relating to information in an original or annual filing required by KRS 367.46971(3) or 367.46973(11), (12),
and (13);
(b) An addition or deletion of factual matter that differs from the factual matter contained in a telemarketing company's
original filing; or
(c) An association with an officer, director, trustee, general or limited partner, sole proprietor, owner, or person having
management responsibility in an applicant's business, or other person specified by KRS 367.46973(5) and (7), who, after a
telemarketing company's original filing:
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1. Has committed an act or offense specified by KRS 367.46973(8)(a);
2. Is subject to a fmaljudgment or order specified by KRS 367.46973(8)(b) and (c);
3. Has filed in bankruptcy or been adjudged as bankrupt as specified by KRS 367.46973(8)(d).
(2) Information filed pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall contain the information required by 367.46973(8).
(3)(a) A change in information required pursuant to this section shall be filed on "Commonwealth ofKentucky
Telemarketing Company Registration Statement".
(b) Information required pursuant to this section shall be filed with the division.
Section 3. Incorporation by Reference. (1) The following material is incorporated by reference:
(a) "Commonwealth ofKentucky Telemarketing Company Registration Statement", Form Ts-l, 2002;
(b) "Commonwealth ofKentucky, Office of the Attorney General, Telemarketing Company, Consent For Service, Form Ts-2,
2002;
(c) "Commonwealth ofKentucky, Office of the Attorney General, Bond for Telemarketing Company", Form Ts-4, 2002; and
(d) "Commonwealth of Kentucky, Office of the Attorney General, Telemarketing Company Premium Surety Bond", Form
Ts-5,2002.
(2) This material may be inspected, copied, or obtained, subject to applicable copyright law, at the Office of the Attorney
General, 1024 Capital Center Drive, Frankfort Kentucky 40601, Monday through Friday, 8 a.rn.. to 4:30 p.rn.. (21 Ky.R. 688;
Am. 1283; eff. 10-12-94; 25 Ky.R. 1098; 1581; eff. 1-19-99; 29 Ky.R. 1298; 2075; eff2-16-03.)
40 KAR 2:050. Hearing procedures.
RELATES TO: KRS 367.461, 367.463, 367.465, 367.467, 367.469
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 15.180,367.150(4),367.469
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: This administrative regulation establishes the procedures for conducting
a hearing by the Office of the Attorney General to revoke a permit to use automated dialing equipment in the Commonwealth
of Kentucky.
Section 1. Hearings related to denials ofapplications or revocations ofpermits shall be governed by the provisions of this
administrative regulation.
Section 2. Denial and revocation actions shall be heard by:
(I) An Assistant Attorney General; or
(2) A hearing examiner employed by the Department ofLaw as a hearing officer.
Section 3. An applicant or permittee shall have the right to:
(1) Be present;
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(2) Be heard at the hearing;
(3) Be represented by legal counsel;
(4) Present evidence;
(5) Cross-examine witnesses presented by the attorney prosecuting the matter before the hearing officer; and
(6) Make both opening and closing statements.
Section 4. Prehearing Disclosure of Evidence. (1) A permittee shall have the right to:
(a) Inspect the investigative file relating to a revocation acti~n;
(b) Represent himself, or be represented by counsel; and
(c) Inspect tangible evidence in the possession of the hearing officer or the department.
(2) An appointment for examination ofa file or other evidence shall be made:
(a) Upon reasonable notice;
(b) During and for regular office hours; and
(c) For a time convenient to all parties.
(3) At least ten (10) days prior to the scheduled hearing date, the permittee shall furnish to the Office of the Attorney General:
(a) Copies of documents he intends to introduce; and
(b) Produce for inspection tangible evidence within his possession or control that he intends to introduce.
(4) Upon timely written notice, he shall produce such other information requested by the hearing officer.
(5)(a) At least ten (10) days prior to the scheduled hearing date the permittee shall file with the hearing officer a written
response to the specific allegations contained in the notice of charges.
(b) The hearing officer may for good cause permit the late filing ofa response.
(6)(a) After disclosure has been completed each party shall remain under an obligation to disclose any new or additional
items of evidence which may come to its attention. Such additional disclosure shall take place as soon as practicable.
(b) Failure to disclose may result in the exclusion of the new evidence or testimony from the hearing.
Section 5. Order ofProceeding. (1) The hearing officer shall call the meeting to order and shall identify the parties to the
action and the persons present. The hearing officer shall rule upon any objections or motions. Opening statements shall be
made, with the attorney prosecuting the allegations of the complaint proceeding first. Either side may waive opening
statement.
(2) The taking ofproof shall commence with the calling of witnesses on behalf of the attorney prosecuting the matter before
the hearing officer. Witnesses shall be examined first by the attorney prosecuting the allegations of the complaint, then by the
permittee or that person's attorney, and finally by the hearing officer. Rebuttal examination of witnesses shall proceed in the
same order. Documents or other items may be introduced into evidence as appropriate.
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(3) Upon conclusion of the case for the attorney prosecuting the matter before the hearing officer, the permittee shall call its
witnesses. Witnesses shall be examined fIrst by the permittee or that person's attorney, then by the attorney prosecuting the
allegations of the complaint, and fInally by the hearing officer. Rebuttal examination of those witnesses shall proceed in the
same order. Documents or other evidence may be introduced as appropriate.
(4) The hearing officer shall be responsible for enforcing the general rules ofconduct and decorum and expediting the
hearing by keeping the testimony and exhibits relevant to the complaint.
Section 6. Evidence. (1) Formal rules ofevidence shall not apply.
(2) A hearing officer shall exclude evidence that is:
(a) Irrelevant;
(b) Immaterial;
(c) Unduly repetitious; or
(d) Excludable on:
1. Constitutional or statutory grounds; or
2. The basis ofevidentiary privilege recognized in the courts of the Commonwealth.
(3) Testimony or other evidence shall be admitted ifit is:
(a) Based on facts; and
(b) Commonly relied upon by reasonably prudent persons.
(4)(a) Evidence shall not be excluded solely because it is hearsay.
(b) Hearsay evidence, including affidavits, may be admitted for the purpose of supplementing relevant evidence.
(5) A hearing officer may admit party or witness testimony taken by deposition if:
(a) A party or witness is unable to attend through no fault of his own; and
(b) The opposing party has had a full opportunity to cross-examine the party or witness.
(6) Evidence may be received in written form if it will:
(a) Expedite the hearing; and
(b) Not substantially prejudice the interests ofa party.
(7)(a) A copy or an excerpt ofdocumentary evidence may be received.
(b) Upon request, a party shall be permitted to compare the copy or excerpt with the original.
(8) Official notice shall be taken of:
(a) A fact that would be judicially noticed in the courts of the Commonwealth;
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(b) The record ofother proceedings before the Office of the Attorney General;
(c) Technical or scientific matters within the specialized knowledge of the Office of the Attorney General;
(d) Pursuant to the provisions ofKRS Chapter 13A, codes or standards that have been adopted by:
1. An agency ofthe United States, the Commonwealth, or another state; or
2. A nationally recognized organization or association.
(9) Tangible items may be received into evidence the hearing officer is satisfied that the item is:
(a) What it is represented to be; and
(b) In substantially the same condition as it was at the time of the events under consideration.
Section 7. (1) Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing officer shall render a decision in writing with copies to all
parties.
(2)(a) The decision of the hearing officer shall be reviewed by the Attorney General.
(b) The Attorney General shall:
1. Approve the decision; or
2. Modify the decision; or
3. Remand to the hearing officer for further action. (19 Ky.R. 535; Am. 1064; eff. 11-9-92.)
40 KAR 2:070. Procedure for registration of telemarketing companies.
RELATES TO: KRS 367.46971, 367.46973, 367.46981
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 15.180,367.46983
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS 367.46983 authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate
administrative regulations required to enforce KRS 367.46951 to 367.46999 governing the sales ofgoods and services to
Kentucky consumers by use of telephone solicitations. This administrative regulation establishes procedures for the
registration of telemarketing companies governed by the provisions ofKRS 367.46951 to 367.46999.
Section 1. Registration. (1)(a) Registration, or a renewal ofregistration, for telephone solicitation pursuant to KRS 367.46971
shall be made on the "Commonwealth ofKentucky Telemarketing Company Registration Statement". Each telemarketing
company shall register by:
1. Completing the information required by the "Commonwealth ofKentucky Telemarketing Company Registration
Statement"; and
2. Paying fees required by KRS 367.46971.
(b) At the time of filing the "Commonwealth ofKentucky Telemarketing Company Registration Statement", a telemarketing
company shall file:
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1. "Commonwealth ofKentucky, Office of the Attorney General, Telemarketing Company Consent for Service "; and
2. One (1) of the following bond forms:
a. "Commonwealth ofKentucky, Office of the Attorney General, Bond for Telemarketing Company"; or
b. "Commonwealth ofKentucky, Office of the Attorney General, Telemarketing Company Premium Surety Bond".
(2) A registration may be withdrawn prior to approval by submitting a written request that the application be withdrawn.
(3) If, upon receipt, the division determines that the materials filed by the telemarketing company do not contain all
information required by KRS 367.46971, 367.46973 and 367.46981 or this administrative regulation, the division shall notify
the telemarketing company in writing, specifying the information that was not completed in the registration statement or bond
form. The registration shall not be completed until an amended filing is received by the division that contains all information
required by KRS 367.46971, 367.46973 and 367.46981 or this administrative regulation. Upon receipt of the completed
registration materials, the division shall provide a written confirmation of receipt of the completed filing.
Section 2. (1) A change in the information specified in this subsection shall be considered a material change that a
telemarketing company shall file in an addendum to the original or annual registration:
(a) A change relating to information in an original or annual filing required by KRS 367.46971(3) or 367.46973(11), (12),
and (13);
(b) An addition or deletion of factual matter that differs from the factual matter contained in a telemarketing company's
original filing; or
(c) An association with an officer, director, trustee, general or limited partner, sole proprietor, owner, or person having
management responsibility in an applicant's business, or other person specified by KRS 367.46973(5) and (7), who, after a
telemarketing company's original filing:
1. Has committed an act or offense specified by KRS 367.46973(8)(a);
2. Is subject to a fmaljudgment or order specified by KRS 367.46973(8)(b) and (c);
3. Has filed in bankruptcy or been adjudged as bankrupt as specified by KRS 367.46973(8)(d).
(2) Information filed pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall contain the information required by 367.46973(8).
(3)(a) A change in information required pursuant to this section shall be filed on "Commonwealth ofKentucky
Telemarketing Company Registration Statement".
(b) Information required pursuant to this section shall be filed with the division.
Section 3. Incorporation by Reference. (1) The following material is incorporated by reference:
(a) "Commonwealth of Kentucky Telemarketing Company Registration Statement", Form Ts-l, 2002;
(b) "Commonwealth ofKentucky, Office of the Attorney General, Telemarketing Company, Consent For Service, Form Ts-2,
2002;
(c) "Commonwealth of Kentucky, Office of the Attorney General, Bond for Telemarketing Company", Form Ts-4, 2002; and
(d) "Commonwealth ofKentucky, Office of the Attorney General, Telemarketing Company Premium Surety Bond", Form
Ts-5,2002.
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(2) This material may be inspected, copied, or obtained, subject to applicable copyright law, at the Office of the Attorney
General, 1024 Capital Center Drive, Frankfort Kentucky 40601, Monday through Friday, 8 a.rn. to 4:30 p.rn. (21 Ky.R. 688;
Am. 1283; eft: 10-12-94; 25 Ky.R. 1098; 1581; eft: 1-19-99; 29 Ky.R. 1298; 2075; eff2-16-03.)
40 KAR 2:075. Commonwealth of Kentucky Zero Call List.
RELATES TO: KRS 367.150, 367.170, 367.46951(14), 367.46955(15), 367.46971, 367.46973, 367.46981
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 15.180,367.46983
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS 367.46983 authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate
administrative regulations required to enforce KRS 367.46951 to 367.46999 governing the sales ofgoods and services to
Kentucky consumers by use of telephone solicitations. KRS 367.46955(15) establishes the right of consumers to be placed on
the "Commonwealth ofKentucky Zero Call List". This administrative regulation establishes requirements relating to the
"Commonwealth ofKentucky Zero Call List".
Section 1. Placement on the "Commonwealth ofKentucky Zero Call List". In accordance with KRS 367.46955(15)(a), a
person who wishes to be placed on the "Commonwealth of Kentucky Zero Call List" shall enroll on the Zero Call List by:
(1) Notifying the division either orally or in writing that the person wishes to be placed on the Zero Call List and providing
the person's residential telephone number;
(2) Calling an automated telephone dial-in registration number established by the division and providing the person's
residential telephone number; or
(3) Accessing the division's website at www.kycallO.com and entering the person's residential telephone number.
Section 2. Publication. (1) Quarterly publication schedule. The Zero Call List shall be published according to the following
schedule:
(a) The fIrst quarter shall be effective January 15-AprilI4, and it shall be published on December 15;
(b) The second quarter shall be effective April15-July 14, and it shall be published on March 15;
(c) The third quarter shall be effective July 15-0ctober 14, and it shall be published on June 15; and
(d) The fourth quarter shall be effective October 15-January 14, and it shall be published on September 15.
(2) The Zero Call List shall be:
(a) Available in accordance with Section 4 of this administrative regulation;
(b) Published on the Internet at web site address www.kycallO.com; and
(c) Available in electronic and hard copy. A request for an electronic or hard copy of the Zero Call List shall require a
minimum of fIve (5) business days notice to the division.
E -71
Section 3. Deadline for Telephone Numbers' Inclusion in Next Quarterly Publication ofZero Call List. The telephone
numbers ofproperly completed requests for registration on the Zero Call List shall become part of the Zero Call List in the
calendar quarter following the deadline for receipt ofregistration requests according to the following schedule:
Receipt Deadline
November 15th
February 15th
May 15th
August 15th
Calendar Quarter
January 15 - April 14
April 15 - July 14
July 15 - October 14
October 15 - January 14
Section 4. Application for "Commonwealth ofKentucky Zero Call List". (1) A telemarketing company or merchant subject to
the provisions ofKRS 367.46951 to 367.46999 shall apply for a copy of the "Commonwealth ofKentucky Zero Call List" on
an "Application for Telemarketing 'Zero Call' List".
(2) A telemarketing company or merchant shall provide the following information:
(a) The quarter or year for which a list is requested;
(b) Whether the request is for Internet access to the list, electronic copy or hard copy;
(c) The name and title of the person requesting the information; and
(d) The name, telephone number, and complete address of the merchant or telemarketing company.
(3) Before a telemarketing company or merchant may obtain a copy of the Zero Call List, it shall sign a written
confidentiality agreement prepared by the Office of the Attorney General that:
(a) Prohibits disclosure of information contained on the Zero Call List;
(b) Restricts use of the Zero Call List exclusively for the purpose of compliance with KRS 367.46951-367.46999; and
(c) Prohibits the transfer of the copy of the Zero Call List to any person or entity who has not completed and signed a written
"Application for Telemarketing "Zero Call" List", form TS-8, and filed it with the division.
(4) Each "Application for Telemarketing "Zero Call" List shall expire on June 14 ofeach year. Each telemarketing company
and merchant conducting telephone solicitations to Kentucky residential telephone numbers shall be required to complete a
new "Application for Telemarketing "Zero Call" List which shall include an update of the information requested on the form,
if applicable. The division shall issue a new user name and password each year for each applicant.
Section 5. Incorporation by Reference. (1) "Application for Telemarketing 'Zero Call' List", Form Ts-8, November, 2002, is
incorporated by reference.
(2) This material may be inspected, copied, or obtained, subject to applicable copyright law, at the Office of the Attorney
General, 1024 Capital Center Drive, Frankfort Kentucky 40601, Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.rn. (25 Ky.R. 1263;
Am. 1582; eff. 1-19-99; 29 Ky.R. 489; 1284; 1518; eff. 12-18-02.)
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40 KAR 2:076. Complaint procedure for telephone solicitations.
RELATES TO: KRS 367.170, 367.46955, 367.46971, 367.46973, 367.46981, 367.46995
STATUTORY AUTHORlTY: KRS 15.180,367.46983
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS 367.46983 authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate
administrative regulations required to enforce KRS 367.46951 to 367.46999 governing the sales ofgoods and services to
Kentucky consumers by use of telephone solicitations. KRS 367.46951(2)(c) excludes from the definition of "telephone
solicitation" a telephone call to a person who has a prior or existing business relationship with the telemarketer or merchant.
KRS 367.46955 establishes prohibited telephone solicitation acts or practices. KRS 367.46995 requires that a claim or action
alleging a violation ofKRS 367.46955 be in writing and verified by the claimant. This administrative regulation establishes
the procedure for filing a complaint (prior to a claim or action) and lists the factors used to determine if a prior or existing
business relationship exists.
Section 1. A complaint relating to a violation ofKRS 367.46955 shall be filed with the division in the following manner:
(1) An oral complaint made either by telephone or in person giving a statement of facts;
(2) A written complaint giving a statement of the facts;
(3) A written complaint filed on "Telemarketing Complaint Form"; or
(4) A complaint filed electronically using the Internet Telemarketing Complaint Form on the Kentucky Attorney General's
web site.
Section 2. Incorporation by Reference. (1) The following material is incorporated by reference:
(a) "Telemarketing Complaint Form", Form TS-9, November 2002; and
(b) "Internet Telemarketing Complaint Form", TS-10, November 2002.
(2) This material may be inspected, copied, or obtained, subject to applicable copyright law, at the Office of the Attorney
General, 1024 Capital Center Drive, Frankfort Kentucky 40601, Monday through Friday, 8 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. (25 Ky.R. 1265;
Am. 1584; eff. 1-19-99; 29 Ky.R. 492; 1286; 1520; eff. 12-18-02.)
40 KAR 2:077. Update of zero call list.
RELATES TO: KRS 367.46955, 367.46994(1)(a)
STATUTORY AUTHORlTY: KRS 15.180,367.46983, 367.46994(1)(a)
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS 367.46994(1)(a) provides that the Attorney General shall
promulgate administrative regulations to provide for automatic telephone number referral from the incumbent local exchange
carrier or the competitive local exchange carrier to the Office of the Attorney General for the purpose ofupdating the zero
call list to reflect an applicant's change ofaddress or an applicant's termination of telephone service. This administrative
regulation establishes the requirements for updating the zero call list by local exchange carriers and competitive local
exchange carriers.
Section 1. Deadlines for Receipt ofUpdate Information. (1) The zero call list shall be updated by each local exchange carrier
or competitive local exchange carrier providing telephone service to Kentucky consumers.
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(2) On November 15th, February 15th, May 15th and August 15th of each year, each local exchange carrier or competitive
local exchange carrier shall forward to the Office of the Attorney General the update information described in Section 3 of
this administrative regulation.
Section 2. Protocol for Transfer of Update Information. (1) Each local exchange carrier or competitive local exchange carrier
shall be issued a user name and password to transfer the update information.
(2) At the time of the issuance of the password, the Attorney General's Office shall provide technical instructions regarding
the data transfer.
(3) A local exchange carrier or competitive local exchange carrier shall transfer this information using File Transfer Protocol
to a secure file server specified by the Attorney General's Office.
Section 3. Information Update Options. A local exchange carrier or competitive local exchange carrier shall fumish the
update information to the Attorney General's office by:
(1) Forwarding an electronic file containing the names and telephone numbers of their customers that are on the zero call list;
or
(2) Forwarding an electronic file containing the names and telephone numbers ofall of their customers. (29 Ky.R. 1424; Am.
2076; eff. 2-16-03.)
40 KAR 2:078. Interface with federal database.
RELATES TO: KRS 367.46955, 367.46994(1)(b)
STATUTORY AUTHORITY: KRS 15.180,367.46983, 367.46994(1)(b)
NECESSITY, FUNCTION, AND CONFORMITY: KRS 367.46994(1)(b) provides that the Attorney General shall
promulgate administrative regulations to develop, modify or administer the zero call list in such a way as to permit interface
with any national registry established by the Federal Trade Commission or the Federal Communications Commission for the
purpose of including in Kentucky's zero call list that part of the national database that relates to the Commonwealth or
release to the national registry applicants on the zero call list that indicate a preference to be listed on a national registry. This
administrative regulation establishes the requirements for interfacing with the federal database.
Section 1. The Attorney General shall:
(1) Include in Kentucky's Zero Call List that part of the National Do Not Call Registry that relates to the Commonwealth, as
provided by the administrator of the National Do Not Call Registry; and
(2) On a quarterly basis electronically transfer to the administrator of the National Do Not Call Registry the residential
telephone number ofall applicants On the zero call list that indicate a preference to be listed on the National Do Not Call
Registry. (29 Ky.R. 1425; Am. 2657; eff. 5-15-03.)
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VII. MAINSTREAM MARKETING SERVICES, INC. V. F.T.C.
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Before SEYMOUR, EBEL and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
The four cases consolidated in this appeal involve challenges to the national do-not-call registry, which
allows individuals to register their phone numbers on a national "do-not-calllist" and prohibits most commercial
telemarketers from calling the numbers on that list. The primary issue in this case is whether the First Amendment
prevents the government from establishing an opt-in telemarketing regulation that provides a mechanism for
consumers to restrict commercial sales calls but does not provide a similar mechanism to limit charitable or political
calls. 1 We hold that the do-not-call registry is a valid commercial speech regulation because it directly advances the
government's important interests in safeguarding personal privacy and reducing the danger of telemarketing abuse
without burdening an excessive amount of speech. In other words, there is a reasonable fit between the do-not-call
regulations and the government's reasons for enacting them.
As we discuss below in greater detail, four key aspects of the do-not-call registry convince us that it is
consistent with First Amendment requirements. First, the list restricts only core commercial speech - i.e.,
commercial sales calls.2 Second, the do-not-call registry targets speech that invades the privacy of the home, a
personal sanctuary that enjoys a unique status in our constitutional jurisprudence. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474,484 (1988). Third, the do-not-call registry is an opt-in program that puts the choice of whether or not to restrict
commercial calls entirely in the hands of consumers. Fourth, the do-not-call registry materially furthers the
government's interests in combating the danger of abusive telemarketing and preventing the invasion of consumer
privacy, blocking a significant number of the calls that cause these problems. Under these circumstances, we
conclude that the requirements of the First Amendment are satisfied.
A number of additional features of the national do-not-call registry, although not dispositive, further
demonstrate that the list is consistent with the First Amendment rights ofcommercial speakers. The challenged
1 The telemarketers also marshal attacks on the fees they must pay to access the national do-not-call registry and to the regulations' exception for
commercial callers who have an established business relationship with the consumer. We address those alternative arguments in parts IV(A) and
IV(B) below. Finally, in part IV(C), we discuss the FTC's statutory authority to enact its national do-not-call regulations.
2 We express no opinion as to whether the do-not-call registry would be constitutional if it applied to political and charitable callers.
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regulations do not hinder any business' ability to contact consumers by other means, such as through direct mailings
or other forms of advertising. Moreover, they give consumers a number ofdifferent options to avoid calls they do
not want to receive. Namely, consumers who wish to restrict some but not all commercial sales calls can do so by
using company-specific do-not-calllists or by granting some businesses express permission to call.3 In addition, the
government chose to offer consumers broader options to restrict commercial sales calls than charitable and political
calls after finding that commercial calls were more intrusive and posed a greater danger of consumer abuse. The
government also had evidence that the less restrictive company-specific do-not-calllist did not solve the problems
caused by commercial telemarketing, but it had no comparable evidence with respect to charitable and political
fundraising.
The national do-not-call registry offers consumers a tool with which they can protect their homes against
intrusions that Congress has determined to be particularly invasive. Just as a consumer can avoid door-to-door
peddlers by placing a "No Solicitation" sign in his or her front yard, the do-not-call registry lets consumers avoid
unwanted sales pitches that invade the home via telephone, if they choose to do so. We are convinced that the First
Amendment does not prevent the government from giving consumers this option.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2003, two federal agencies - the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) - promulgated rules that together created the national do-not-call registry. See 16 C.F.R. §
31O.4(b)(1)(iii)(B) (FTC rule); 47 C.F.R. § 64. 1200(c)(2) (FCC rule).4 The national do-not-call registry is a list
containing the personal telephone numbers of telephone subscribers who have voluntarily indicated that they do not
wish to receive unsolicited calls from commercial telemarketers.5 Commercial telemarketers are generally
prohibited from calling phone numbers that have been placed on the do-not-call registry, and they must pay an
annual fee to access the numbers on the registry so that they can delete those numbers from their telephone
solicitation lists. So far, consumers have registered more than 50 million phone numbers on the national do-not-call
registry.
The national do-not-call registry's restrictions apply only to telemarketing calls made by or on behalfof
sellers ofgoods or services, and not to charitable or political fundraising calls. 16 C.F.R. §§ 3l0.4(b)(1)(iii)(B),
3l0.6(a); 47 C.F.R. §§ 64. 1200(c)(2), 64. 1200(f)(9).6 Additionally, a seller may call consumers who have signed up
for the national registry if it has an established business relationship with the consumer or if the consumer has given
that seller express written permission to call. 16 C.F.R. § 31O.4(b)(1 )(iii)(B)(i-ii); 47 C.F.R. § 64.l200(f)(9)(i-ii).7
3 The company-specific do-not-call regulations require that a company must respect a consumer's request not to receive calls from or on behalf
of that particular business. See 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(I)(iii)(A); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(d)(3).
4 Congress has directed the FCC to coordinate its efforts with the FTC in order to maximize consistency between the agencies' do-not-call
regulations. Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 108-10, I 17 Stat. 557 (2003). Although the FTC and FCC rules are consistent in
most respects, there are some situations in which a telernarketer could be subject to do-not-call restrictions under one agency's rule but exempt
under the other's. See Federal Trade Commission, Report to Congress Pursuant to the Do Not Call Implementation Act on Regulatory
Coordination in Federal Telemarketing Laws (2003); Federal Communications Commission, Report on Regulatory Coordination (2003). In the
interest of simplicity, and because any inconsistencies between the two rules do not affect our constitutional analysis, we generally refer to both
agencies' do-not-call provisions as a single regulatory measure (the do-not-call registry). When we mean to discuss the FTC rule or the FCC rule
in particular, we do so explicitly.
5 Consumers can register their personal phone numbers for the do-not-calllist either by phone or online.
6 There has been some confusion throughout this litigation with respect to how to define the term ''telemarketing.'' Compare Telemarketing and
Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-297,108 Stat. 1545 at §§ 7 (1994) ("Telemarketing Act") (defining
''telemarketing'' as calls "conducted to induce purchases of goods or services") with Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc. v. FTC, 283 F.Supp. 2d 1151,
1154 (D. Colo. 2003) (describing ''telemarketing'' as the practice of "soliciting sales and donations" conducted by businesses, charities, political
organizations, and others). Unless otherwise indicated, we use the term ''telemarketing'' to refer to commercial sales calls made to induce
purchases of goods or services (not charitable or political fundraising) consistent with Congress' definition in the Telemarketing Act.
7 The "established business relationship" exception allows businesses to call customers with whom they have conducted a financial transaction or
to whom they have sold, rented, or leased goods or services within 18 months of the telephone call. 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(3); Telemarketing
Sales Rule, Statement of Basis and Purpose, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580,4591 (Jan. 29, 2003). Additionally, sellers can call consumers on the national
do-not-call registry within three months after the consumer makes an inquiry or application. 47 C.F.R § 64.1200(f)(3). A seller who has an
established business relationship with a consumer is still bound to comply with the company-specific rules if the consumer requests not to be
called. Id. at § 64.1200(f)(3)(i).
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Telemarketers generally have three months from the date on which a consumer signs up for the registry to remove
the consumer's phone number from their call lists. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(3)(iv); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(c)(2)(i)(D).
Consumer registrations remain valid for five years, and phone numbers that are disconnected or reassigned will be
periodically removed from the registry. 47 C.F.R § 1200(c)(2); Telemarketing Sales Rule, Statement of Basis and
Purpose, 68 Fed. Reg. 4580, 4640 (Jan. 29,2003).
The national do-not-call registry is the product of a regulatory effort dating back to 1991 aimed at
protecting the privacy rights ofconsumers and curbing the risk oftelemarketing abuse. See generally FTC v.
Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850,857-58 (10th Cir. 2003). In the Telephone Consumer Protection Act
of 1991 (''TCPA'') - under which the FCC enacted its do-not-call rules - Congress found that for many consumers
telemarketing sales calls constitute an intrusive invasion ofprivacy. See Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 at § 2
(1991). Moreover, the TCPA's legislative history cited statistical data indicating that "most unwanted telephone
solicitations are commercial in nature" and that "unwanted commercial calls are a far bigger problem than
unsolicited <;alls from political or charitable organizations." H.R. Rep. No. 102-317 at 16 (1991). The TCPA
therefore authorized the FCC to establish a national database ofconsumers who object to receiving ''telephone
solicitations," which the act defined as commercial sales calls. Pub. L. No. 102-243, 105 Stat. 2394 at § 3.8
Furthermore, in the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act of 1994
("Telemarketing Act") - under which the FTC enacted its do-not-call rules - Congress found that consumers lose an
estimated $40 billion each year due to telemarketing fraud. See Pub. L. No. 103-297, 108 Stat. 1545 at § 2 (1994).
Therefore, Congress authorized the FTC to prohibit sales calls that a reasonable consumer would consider coercive
or abusive ofhis or her right to privacy. Id. at § 3.
The FCC and FTC initially sought to accomplish the goals of the TCPA and the Telemarketing Act by
adopting company-specific do-not-call lists, requiring sellers to maintain lists ofconsumers who have requested not
to be called by that particular solicitor, and requiring telemarketers to honor those requests. See Rules and
Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 8752 at
~ 23-24 (Sept. 17, 1992); Telemarketing Sales Rule, Statement ofBasis and Purpose, 60 Fed. Reg. 43842, 43854-55
(Aug. 23, 1995). Yet in enacting the national do-not-call registry, the agencies concluded that the company-specific
lists had failed to achieve Congress' objectives. See Telemarketing Sales Rule, Statement of Basis and Purpose, 68
Fed Reg. 4580, 4629, 4631 (Jan. 29, 2003); Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act (TCPA) of 1991,68 Fed. Reg. 44144, 44144-45 (July 25,2003). Among other shortfalls, the
agencies explained that the large number ofpossible telephone solicitors made it burdensome for consumers to
assert their rights under the company-specific rules, and that commercial telemarketers often ignored consumers'
requests not to be called. 68 Fed. Reg. at 4629. Accordingly, the agencies decided to keep the company-specific
rules as an option available to consumers, but to supplement them with the national do-not-call registry. Id.; 68 Fed.
Reg. at 44144.
In this appeal we have consolidated four cases challenging various aspects of the national do-not-call
registry.9 Cases Nos. 03-1429, 03-6258 and 03-9571 involve First Amendment attacks on the do-not-call list and its
registry fees. We address these issues in parts III and IV(A) respectively. Case No. 03-9594 involves a challenge to
the FCC rule's established business relationship exception on administrative law grounds. We address this issue in
part IV(B). Finally, in part IV(C), we address the alternative argument that the FTC lacked statutory authority to
enact its do-not-call regulations, an argument that the district court relied upon in case No. 03-6258. We conclude
that all of the te1emarketers' challenges lack merit and we uphold the do-not-call list in its entirety.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
8 The TCPA defines a "telephone solicitation" as a ''telephone call or message for the purpose of encouraging the purchase or rental of, or
investment in, property, goods, or services," excluding, inter alia, calls from tax exempt nonprofit organizations. Pub. L. No.1 03-297, 108 Stat.
1545 at § 3.
9 Case No. 03-1429 reaches us on appeal from the District of Colorado, which held that the FTC's do-not-call rules were unconstitutional on
First Amendment grounds. In that case, the district court enjoined the FTC from implementing the do-not-call registry. We stayed that
injunction, pending our review on the merits, in FTC v. Mainstream Mktg. Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850 (lOth Cir. 2003). Case No. 03-6258 reaches
us on appeal from the Western District of Oklahoma, which held that the FTC lacked the statutory authority to enact its do-not-call rules. In that
case, the court also approved certain unrelated aspects of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and the portions of its decision addressing those issues
are not before us on appeal. In cases No. 03-9571 and No. 03-9594, we review the FCC order directly pursuant to 47 U.S.C. § 402(a) and 28
U.S.c. § 2342.
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The constitutionality of the national do-not-call registry and its fees under the First Amendment are
questions oflaw we review de novo. See Phelan v. Laramie County Cmty. ColI. Bd. ofTrs., 235 F.3d 1243, 1246
(10th Cir. 2000). We review whether the FCC's decision to include an established business relationship exception
violated the Administrative Procedure Act under the arbitrary and capricious standard. See Friends of the Bow v.
Thompson, 124 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 1997). Finally, we review de novo a district court's decision that an
agency lacked authority under the controlling statute to act, keeping in mind that the courts owe deference to a
federal agency's interpretation ofa statute it administers. See Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Dabney, 222
F.3d 819, 824 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council. Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984».
m. FIRST AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
The national do-not-call registry's telemarketing restrictions apply only to commercial speech. Like most
commercial speech regulations, the do-not-call rules draw a line between commercial and non-commercial speech
on the basis ofcontent. See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 504 n.11 (1981) ("If commercial
speech is to be distinguished, it must be distinguished by its content."); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350,
363 (1977) (same). In reviewing commercial speech regulations, we apply the Central Hudson test. Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Com. v. Pub. Servo Comm'n ofN.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); see also City of Cincinnati V.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 416, 429-30 (1993) (noting that the challenged law drew content-based
distinctions between commercial and non-commercial speech and applying more lenient scrutiny under Central
Hudson); Florida Bar V. Went For It. Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 634-35 (1995) ("This case ... concerns pure commercial
advertising, for which we have always reserved a lesser degree ofprotection under the First Amendment.");
Lanphere & Urbaniak V. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508,1513 (10th Cir. 1994) (content-based regulations disadvantaging
commercial speech are reviewed pursuant to the lesser degree ofFirst Amendment protection provided in Central
Hudson).
Central Hudson established a three-part test governing First Amendment challenges to regulations
restricting non-misleading commercial speech that relates to lawful activity. First, the government must assert a
substantial interest to be achieved by the regulation. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564. Second, the regulation must
directly advance that governmental interest, meaning that it must do more than provide "only ineffective or remote
support for the government's purpose." Id. Third, although the regulation need not be the least restrictive measure
available, it must be narrowly tailored not to restrict more speech than necessary. See id.; Board ofTrs. of the State
Univ. ofN.Y. V. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,480 (1989). Together, these fmal two factors require that there be a reasonable
fit between the government's objectives and the means it chooses to accomplish those ends. United States v. Edge
Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 427-28 (1993).
The government bears the burden of asserting one or more substantial governmental interests and
demonstrating a reasonable fit between those interests and the challenged regulation. Utah Licensed Beverage
Ass'n V. Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061, 1069 (10th Cir. 2001). The government is not limited in the evidence it may use to
meet its burden. For example, a commercial speech regulation may be justified by anecdotes, history, consensus, or
simple common sense. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 628. Yet we may not take it upon ourselves to supplant the
interests put forward by the state with our own ideas of what goals the challenged laws might serve. Edenfield v.
Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993).
A. Governmental Interests
The government asserts that the do-not-call regulations are justified by its interests in 1) protecting the
privacy of individuals in their homes, and 2) protecting consumers against the risk of fraudulent and abusive
solicitation. See 68 Fed. Reg. 44144; 68 Fed. Reg. at 4635. Both of these justifications are undisputedly substantial
governmental interests.
In Rowan V. United States Post Office Dep't, the Supreme Court upheld the right ofa homeowner to
restrict material that could be mailed to his or her house. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). The Court emphasized the
importance of individual privacy, particularly in the context of the home, stating that "the ancient concept that 'a
man's home is his castle' into which 'not even the king may enter' has lost none of its vitality." Id. at 737. In
Frisby V. Schultz, the Court again stressed the unique nature of the home and recognized that "the State's interest in
protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacy of the home is certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized
society." 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988) (quoting Carey V. Bro~ 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980». As the Court held in
Frisby:
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One important aspect ofresidential privacy is protection of the unwilling listener.... [A]
special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy within their own walls, which the State may
legislate to protect, is an ability to avoid intrusions. Thus, we have repeatedly held that
individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and that the
government may protect this freedom.
Id. at 484-85 (citations omitted). Likewise, in Hill v. Colorado, the Court called the unwilling listener's interest in
avoiding unwanted communication part of the broader right to be let alone that Justice Brandeis described as "the
right most valued by civilized men." 530 U.S. 703, 716-17 (2000) (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, 1., dissenting)). The Court added that the right to avoid unwanted speech has special
force in the context of the home. Id.; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) ("[I]n the privacy
of the home ... the individual's right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights ofan intruder.").
Additionally, the Supreme Court has recognized that the government has a substantial interest in preventing
abusive and coercive sales practices. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1993) ("[T]he First Amendment ...
does not prohibit the State from insuring that the stream ofcommercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as
freely.") (quoting Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.s. 748, 771-
72 (1976)).
B. Reasonable Fit
A reasonable fit exists between the do-not-call rules and the government's privacy and consumer protection
interests if the regulation directly advances those interests and is narrowly tailored. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at
564-65. In this context, the "narrowly tailored" standard does not require that the government's response to protect
substantial interests be the least restrictive measure available. All that is required is a proportional response. Board
ofTrs. of State Univ. ofN.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
In other words, the national do-not-call registry is valid if it is designed to provide effective support for the
government's purposes and if the government did not suppress an excessive amount of speech when substantially
narrower restrictions would have worked just as well. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564-65. These criteria are
plainly established in this case. The do-not-call registry directly advances the government's interests by effectively
blocking a significant number of the calls that cause the problems the government sought to redress. It is narrowly
tailored because its opt-in character ensures that it does not inhibit any speech directed at the home of a willing
listener.
1. Effectiveness
The telemarketers assert that the do-not-call registry is unconstitutionally underinclusive because it does
not apply to charitable and political callers. First Amendment challenges based on underinclusiveness face an uphill
battle in the commercial speech context. As a general rule, the First Amendment does not require that the
government regulate all aspects of a problem before it can make progress on any front. United States v. Edge Broad.
Co., 509 U.S. 418, 434 (1993). "Within the bounds of the general protection provided by the Constitution to
commercial speech, we allow room for legislative judgments." Id. The underinclusiveness ofa commercial speech
regulation is relevant only if it renders the regulatory framework so irrational that it fails materially to advance the
aims that it was purportedly designed to further. See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 489 (1995); see
also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564 ("If a regulation "provides only ineffective or remote support for the
government's purpose" it cannot be said to bear a reasonable fit with that purported objective). Cf. City of Ladue v.
Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994) (underinclusiveness provides a basis for a First Amendment claim when it constitutes
an "attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people").
In Rubin, for example, the Supreme Court struck down a law prohibiting brewers from putting the alcohol
content of their product on beer labels, purportedly in an effort to discourage "strength wars." 514 U.S. at 478.
However, the law allowed advertisements disclosing the alcohol content ofbeers, allowed sellers of wines and
spirits to disclose alcohol content on labels (and even required such disclosure for certain wines), and allowed
brewers to signal high alcohol content by using the term "malt liquor." Id. at 488-89. Under these circumstances,
the Court concluded that there was little chance that the beer label rule would materially deter strength wars in light
of the "irrationality of this unique and puzzling regulatory framework." Id. at 489.
Likewise, in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, the Court struck down a law prohibiting commercial
newsracks on public property, purportedly in order to promote the safety and attractive appearance of its streets and
sidewalks. 507 U.S. 410, 412 (1993). However, the ban applied to only 62 of the 1,500 to 2,000 newsracks in the
city, thus addressing only a "minute" and "paltry" share of the problem. Id. at 417-18. Moreover, the challenged
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ordinance was not enacted in an effort to address problems posed by newsracks, but was actually an "outdated
prohibition against the distribution ofany commercial handbills on public property ... enacted long before any
concern about newsracks developed." Id. For these reasons, the Court held in part II of that opinion that "the city
did not establish the reasonable fit we require." Id. at 417-18.
Yet so long as a commercial speech regulation materially furthers its objectives, underinclusiveness is not
fatal under Central Hudson. For example, in Edge Broadcasting the Supreme Court approved a regulation that
prohibited broadcasters in North Carolina (which did not permit lotteries) from broadcasting lottery advertisements
on the radio, even as applied to a broadcaster located near the border of Virginia (where lotteries were legal) whose
audience consisted of92.2 percent Virginians. 509 U.S. 418,423-24,431-33 (1993). The Court found it
determinative that the regulation prevented lottery ads from reaching about 127,000 North Carolina residents (7.8
percent ofEdge's listeners):l0
It could hardly be denied ... that these facts, standing alone, would clearly show that applying
the statutory restriction to Edge would directly serve the statutory purpose of supporting
North Carolina's antigambling policy.... [T]his result could hardly be called either
"ineffective," "remote," or "conditional." Nor could it be called only "limited incremental
support" for the Government interest.
Id. at 432 (citations omitted). The Court rejected Edge's argument that the regulations banning lottery advertising
by in-state radio failed materially to advance the government's interests because North Carolina residents were
already inundated with lottery advertising from other sources, such as Virginia radio and television programs. Id. at
434-35. "[T]he Government may be said to advance its purpose by substantially reducing lottery advertising, even
where it is not wholly eradicated." Id. at 434; see also Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 511
(1981) ("[P]rohibition ofoffsite advertising is directly related to the stated objectives of traffic safety and esthetics.
This is not altered by the fact that the ordinance is underinclusive because it permits onsite advertising.").
As discussed above, the national do-not-call registry is designed to reduce intrusions into personal privacy
and the risk of telemarketing fraud and abuse that accompany unwanted telephone solicitation. The registry directly
advances those goals. So far, more than 50 million telephone numbers have been registered on the do-not-calllist,
and the do-not-call regulations protect these households from receiving most unwanted telemarketing calls.
According to the telemarketers' own estimate, 2.64 telemarketing calls per week - or more than 137 calls annually-
were directed at an average consumer before the do-not-calllist came into effect. Cf. 68 Fed. Reg. at 44152
(discussing the five-fold increase in the total number of telemarketing calls between 1991 and 2003). Accordingly,
absent the do-not-call registry, telemarketers would call those consumers who have already signed up for the registry
an estimated total of 6.85 billion times each year.
To be sure, the do-not-calliist will not block all of these calls. Nevertheless, it will prohibit a substantial
number of them, making it difficult to fathom how the registry could be called an "ineffective" means of stopping
invasive or abusive calls, or a regulation that "furnish[es] only speculative or marginal support" for the
government's interests. See also id. (noting the effectiveness of state do-not-calliists in reducing unwanted
telemarketing calls).!!
Furthermore, the do-not-calliist prohibits not only a significant number ofcommercial sales calls, but also
a significant percentage of all calls causing the problems that Congress sought to address (whether commercial,
charitable or political). The record demonstrates that a substantial share ofall solicitation calls will be governed by
the do-not-call rules. See H.R. Rep. No. 102-317, at 16 (1991) ("[M]ost unwanted telephone solicitations are
commercial in nature."); 68 Fed. Reg. at 44153-54 (the high volume and unexpected nature of commercial calls
subject to the national do-not-call registry makes those calls more problematic than nonprofit calls and solicitations
based on established business relationships).
10 In the North Carolina counties Edge served, its broadcasts accounted for about 11 percent of all radio listening. Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 431-
32.
11 It is unclear from the record exactly how many telemarketing calls will be blocked by the do-not-call regulations. Most significantly, we have
not been provided with data as to how many of these unsolicited sales calls would be permissible under the established business relationship
exception. In applying Central Hudson, however, we are entitled to rely on anecdotal evidence and make the common sense observation that the
do-not-calilist will apply to a substantial number of telemarketing calls. See Went For It, 515 U.S. at 628; cf. 68 Fed. Reg. at 44153-54
(suggesting that the volume of calls exempted under the established business relationship exception most likely will be relatively low compared
to the volume of calls subject to the do-not-call restrictions); 68 Fed. Reg. at 4631 (noting that telemarketers expect to layoff up to half of their
employees in response to the do-not-call regulations).
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The telemarketers asserted before the FTC that they might have to lay off up to 50 percent of their
employees if the national do-not-call registry came into effect. See 68 Fed. Reg. at 4631. It is reasonable to
conclude that the telemarketers' planned reduction in force corresponds to a decrease in the amount ofcalls they will
make. Significantly, the percentage ofunwanted calls that will be prohibited will be even higher than the percentage
of all unsolicited calls blocked by the list. The individuals on the do-not-calllist have declared that they do not wish
to receive unsolicited commercial telemarketing calls, whereas those who do want to continue receiving such calls
will not register. Cf. 68 Fed. Reg. at 4632 (under the national do-not-call regulations, "telemarketers would reduce
time spent calling consumers who do not want to receive telemarketing calls and would be able to focus their calls
only on those who do not object").
Finally, the type of unsolicited calls that the do-not-calllist does prohibit - commercial sales calls - is the
type that Congress, the FTC and the FCC have all determined to be most to blame for the problems the government
is seeking to redress. According to the legislative history accompanying the TCPA, "[c]omplaint statistics show that
unwanted commercial calls are a far bigger problem than unsolicited calls from political or charitable
organizations." H.R. Rep. No. 102-317, at 16 (1991) (noting that non-commercial calls were less intrusive to
consumers' privacy because they are more expected and because there is a lower volume of such calls); see also 68
Fed. Reg. at 44153. Similarly, the FCC determined that calls from solicitors with an established business
relationship with the recipient are less problematic than other commercial calls. 68 Fed. Reg. at 44154 ("Consumers
are more likely to anticipate contacts from companies with whom they have an existing relationship and the volume
of such calls will most likely be lower.").
Additionally, the FTC has found that commercial callers are more likely than non-commercial callers to
engage in deceptive and abusive practices. 68 Fed. Reg. at 4637 ("When a pure commercial transaction is at stake,
callers have an incentive to engage in all the things that telemarketers are hated for. But non-commercial speech is a
different matter."). Specifically, the FTC concluded that in charitable and political calls, a significant purpose of the
call is to sell a cause, not merely to receive a donation, and that non-commercial callers thus have stronger
incentives not to alienate the people they call or to engage in abusive and deceptive practices. I4,;. cf. Village of
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980) ("[B]ecause charitable solicitation does more
than inform private economic decisions and is not primarily concerned with providing information about the
characteristics and costs ofgoods and services, it is not dealt with as a variety ofpurely commercial speech."). The
speech regulated by the do-not-calllist is therefore the speech most likely to cause the problems the government
sought to alleviate in enacting that list, further demonstrating that the regulation directly advances the government's
interests.
In sum, the do-not-calliist directly advances the government's interests - reducing intrusions upon
consumer privacy and the risk of fraud or abuse - by restricting a substantial number (and also a substantial
percentage) of the calls that cause these problems. Unlike the regulations struck down in Rubin and Discovery
Network, the do-not-calliist is not so underinclusive that it fails materially to advance the government's goals.
2. Narrow Tailoring
Although the least restrictive means test is not the test to be used in the commercial speech context,
commercial speech regulations do at least have to be "narrowly tailored" and provide a "reasonable fit" between the
problem and the solution. Whether or not there are "numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives" is a
relevant consideration in our narrow tailoring analysis. Went For It, 515 U.S. at 632. A law is narrowly tailored if it
"promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." Ward v.
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989). Accordingly, we consider whether there are numerous and
obvious alternatives that would restrict less speech and would serve the government's interest as effectively as the
challenged law. See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565; Edge Broad., 509 U.S. at 430.
We hold that the national do-not-call registry is narrowly tailored because it does not over-regulate
protected speech; rather, it restricts only calls that are targeted at unwilling recipients. Cf. Frisby v. Schultz, 487
U.S. 474, 485 (1988) ("There simply is no right to force speech into the home of an unwilling listener."); Rowan v.
United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970) ("We therefore categorically reject the argument that a
vendor has a right under the Constitution or otherwise to send unwanted material into the home ofanother."). The
do-not-call registry prohibits only telemarketing calls aimed at consumers who have affirmatively indicated that they
do not want to receive such calls and for whom such calls would constitute an invasion ofprivacy. See Hill v.
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716-17 (2000) (the right ofprivacy includes an unwilling listener's interest in avoiding
unwanted communication).
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that speech restrictions based on private choice (i.e. - an opt-in
feature) are less restrictive than laws that prohibit speech directly. In Rowan, for example, the Court approved a law
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under which an individual could require a mailer to stop all future mailings ifhe or she received advertisements that
he or she believed to be erotically arousing or sexually provocative. 397 U.S. at 729-30, 738. Although it was the
government that empowered individuals to avoid materials they considered provocative, the Court emphasized that
the mailer's right to communicate was circumscribed only by an affIrmative act of a householder. Id.at 738.
"Congress has erected a wall- or more accurately permits a citizen to erect a wall- that no advertiser may penetrate
without his acquiescence.... The asserted right ofa mailer, we repeat, stops at the outer boundary of every person's
domain." Id.
Likewise, in rejecting direct prohibitions of speech (even fully protected speech), the Supreme Court has
often reasoned that an opt-in regulation would have been a less restrictive alternative. In Martin v. City of Struthers,
the Court struck down a city ordinance prohibiting door-to-door canvassing, noting that the government's interest
could have been achieved in a less restrictive manner by giving householders the choice of whether or not to receive
visitors. 319 U.S. 141, 147-49 (1943) ("[T]he decision as to whether distributers ofliterature may lawfully call at a
home ... belongs ... with the homeowner himself. A city can punish those who call at a home in defiance of the
previously expressed will of the occupant.,,).12 More recently, in Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y ofN.Y., Inc. v.
Village of Stratton, the Court struck down a permit requirement for door-to-door advocacy, while noting that
another section of the ordinance allowing residents to post "No Solicitation" signs provided ample protection for the
unwilling listener. 536 U.S. 150, 153, 168-69 (2002); see also Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Env't,
444 U.S. 620, 639 (1980) ("[T]he provision permitting homeowners to bar solicitors from their property by posting
signs reading 'No Solicitors or Peddlers Invited' suggests the availability ofless intrusive and more effective
measures to protect privacy.") (citations omitted).
The idea that an opt-in regulation is less restrictive than a direct prohibition ofspeech applies not only to
traditional door-to-door solicitation, but also to regulations seeking to protect the privacy of the home from
unwanted intrusions via telephone, television, or the Internet. See United States v. Playboy Entm't Group, Inc., 529
U.S. 803, 815 (2000) (opt-in targeted blocking of offensive television programming "enables the Government to
support parental authority without affecting the First Amendment interests of speakers and willing listeners....
Simply put, targeted blocking is less restrictive than banning...."); cf. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 860, 879 (1997)
(striking down an absolute prohibition against making certain sexually explicit material available to minors on the
Internet on the grounds that it curtailed the speech of adults, contrasting that regulation with the alternative of
facilitating parental control of such material).
Like the do-not-mail regulation approved in Rowan, the national do-not-call registry does not itselfprohibit
any speech. Instead, it merely ''permits a citizen to erect a wall ... that no advertiser may penetrate without his
acquiescence." See Row~ 397 U.S. at 738. Almost by definition, the do-not-call regulations only block calls that
would constitute unwanted intrusions into the privacy of consumers who have signed up for the list. Moreover, it
allows consumers who feel susceptible to telephone fraud or abuse to ensure that most commercial callers will not
have an opportunity to victimize them. Under the circumstances we address in this case, we conclude that the do-
not-call registry's opt-in feature renders it a narrowly tailored commercial speech regulation.
The do-not-call registry's narrow tailoring is further demonstrated by the fact that it presents both sellers
and consumers with a number ofoptions to make and receive sales offers. From the seller's perspective, the do-not-
call registry restricts only one avenue by which solicitors can communicate with consumers who have registered for
the list. In particular, the do-not-call regulations do not prevent businesses from corresponding with potential
customers by mail or by means ofadvertising through other media. Cf. Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S.
618,633-34 (1995) (holding a 30-day post-accident ban on attorney solicitations narrowly tailored, fmding it
relevant that ample alternative channels for advertising legal services were available).
From the consumer's perspective, the do-not-call rules provide a number of different options allowing
consumers to dictate what telemarketing calls they wish to receive and what calls they wish to avoid. Consumers
who would like to receive some commercial sales calls but not others can sign up for the national do-not-call
registry but give written permission to call to those businesses from whom they wish to receive offers. See 16
C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B)(i); 47 C.F.R. § 64.1200(f)(9)(i). Alternatively, they may decline to sign up on the
national registry but make company-specific do-not-call requests with those particular businesses from whom they
do not wish to receive calls. See 16 C.F.R. § 31O.4(b)(1)(iii)(A); 47 C.F.R. § 64. 1200(d)(3). Therefore, under the
current regulations, consumers choose between two default rules - either that telemarketers may call or that they
12 The Court in Martin suggested that one kind ofregulation of home solicitation that would pass constitutional muster would be a regulation
"which would make it an offense for any person to ring the bell of a householder who has appropriately indicated that he is unwilling to be
disturbed." 319 U.S. at 148.
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may not. Then, consumers may make company-specific modifications to either of these default rules as they see fit,
either granting particular sellers permission to call or blocking calls from certain sellers.
Finally, none of the telemarketers' proposed alternatives would serve the government's interests as
effectively as the national do-not-calliist. Primarily, the telemarketers suggest that company-specific rules
effectively protected consumers. Yet as the FTC found, "[t]he record in this matter overwhelmingly shows the
contrary ... it shows that the company-specific approach is seriously inadequate to protect consumers' privacy from
an abusive pattern ofcalls placed by a seller or telemarketer." 68 Fed. Reg. at 4631.
First, the company-specific approach proved to be extremely burdensome to consumers, who had to repeat
their do-not-call requests to every solicitor who called. Id. at 4629. In effect, this system gave solicitors one free
chance to call each consumer, although many consumers fmd even an initial unsolicited sales call abusive and
invasive ofprivacy. Id. at 4629-30; cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) ("To say that one may
avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent language is like saying that the remedy for an
assault is to run away after the first blow. One may hang up on an indecent phone call, but that option does not ...
avoid a harm that has already taken place."). Second, the government's experience under the company-specific
rules demonstrated that commercial solicitors often ignored consumers' requests to be placed on their company-
specific lists. 68 Fed. Reg. at 4629. Third, consumers have no way to verify whether their numbers have been
removed from a solicitor?s calling list in response to a company-specific do-not-call request. Id. Finally, company-
specific rules are difficult to enforce because they require consumers to bear the evidentiary burden of keeping lists
detailing which telemarketers have called them and what do-not-call requests they have made. Id.
The telemarketers' objection that the company-specific approach should have been more vigorously
marketed to consumers is unavailing because the flaws the FTC identified are inherent in the company-specific rule.
More consumer education simply could not have cured the ineffectiveness of the former system. Similarly, even if
we were to agree with the telemarketers' argument that violations of the company-specific list were not adequately
enforced, the national do-not-call program improves upon failures of the company-specific approach that were not
caused by any lack ofenforcement. Unlike the national registry, the company-specific approach gave a vast number
ofpotential solicitors one shot at each unwilling consumer and was significantly more difficult for consumers to use.
Moreover, the national do-not-call registry will be easier to enforce than the company-specific rules because there
will generally be no dispute as to whether a certain telemarketer is prohibited from calling a particular number.
Finally, the telemarketers argue that it would have been less restrictive to let consumers rely on
technological alternatives - such as caller ID, call rejection services, and electronic devices designed to block
unwanted calls. Each of these alternatives puts the cost ofavoiding unwanted telemarketing calls on consumers.
Furthermore, as the FCC found, "[a]lthough technology has improved to assist consumers in blocking unwanted
calls, it has also evolved in such a way as to assist telemarketers in making greater numbers of calls and even
circumventing such blocking technologies." 68 Fed. Reg. at 44147. Forcing consumers to compete in a
technological arms race with the telemarketing industry is not an equally effective alternative to the do-not-call
registry.
In sum, the do-not-call registry is narrowly tailored to restrict only speech that contributes to the problems
the government seeks to redress, namely the intrusion into personal privacy and the risk of fraud and abuse caused
by telephone calls that consumers do not welcome into their homes. No calls are restricted unless the recipient has
affrrmatively declared that he or she does not wish to receive them. Moreover, telemarketers still have the ability to
contact consumers in other ways, and consumers have a number ofdifferent options in determining what
telemarketing calls they will receive. Finally, there are not numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives that
would restrict less speech while accomplishing the government's objectives equally as well.
C. Discovery Network
As should be clear from the foregoing discussion, the telemarketers' reliance on Discovery Network is
misplaced. In Discovery Network, the Supreme Court applied Central Hudson to strike down a municipal policy
directly prohibiting freestanding commercial newsracks on public property. 507 U.S. at 412,416. It concluded that
the regulation - which did not similarly restrict non-commercial newsracks - did not bear a reasonable fit to the
city's interests in promoting safety and the attractive appearance of the city's public areas. Id. at 412,417. In
particular, the Court emphasized that 1) the regulation applied to only a "minute" and "paltry" share of the total
number of newsracks in the city, id. at 418, and 2) the regulation's distinction between commercial and non-
commercial speech bore "no relationship whatsoever to the particular interests that the city has asserted." Id. at 424
(emphasis in original).
The trifling number ofnewsracks regulated in Discovery Network suggested that the policy did not
materially advance the city's interests, and this aspect of the regulation was not justified by evidence demonstrating
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that despite their small numbers the commercial newsracks disproportionately caused the problems the city sought to
remedy. The Court held, in essence, that a regulation that has only a minimal impact on the identified problem
cannot be saved simply because it targets only commercial speech, which occupies a lower place in our First
Amendment jurisprudence. The Court concluded that the "low value" of commercial speech was "an insufficient
justification for the discrimination against respondents' use of newsracks that are no more harmful than the
permitted newsracks, and have only a minimal impact on the overall number ofnewsracks on the city's sidewalks."
Id. at 418 (emphasis added). Under a straight-forward application of Central Hudso!!, the Court struck down the
city's newsrack ordinance because it failed directly to advance the city's interests.
Both of the factors the Court emphasized in Discovery Network are absent in our case. First, while the
regulation in Discovery Network applied only to a minute and paltry number of newsracks, the do-not-call registry
blocks a substantial amount ofunwanted telemarketing calls. See supra part III(B)(I). Second, while the distinction
between commercial and non-commercial speech in Discovery Network bore no relationship whatsoever to the
city's asserted interests, the do-not-call registry's commerciaVnon-commercial distinction was based on findings that
commercial telephone solicitation was significantly more problematic than charitable or political fundraising calls.
Id.; see also FTC v. Mainstream Mktg Servs., Inc., 345 F.3d 850, 856-60 (10th Cir. 2003). Additionally, the
government had evidence that other alternatives (company-specific restrictions) failed in the commercial context,
but had no comparable experience involving the failure of company-specific restrictions with respect to charitable or
political callers. See supra part III(B)(2); 68 Fed. Reg. at 4637.
D. Summary
For the reasons discussed above, the government has asserted substantial interests to be served by the do-
not-call registry (privacy and consumer protection), the do-not-call registry will directly advance those interests by
banning a substantial amount ofunwanted telemarketing calls, and the regulation is narrowly tailored because its
opt-in feature ensures that it does not restrict any speech directed at a willing listener. In other words, the do-not-
call registry bears a reasonable fit with the purposes the government sought to advance. Therefore, it is consistent
with the limits the First Amendment imposes on laws restricting commercial speech. 13
IV. OTHER ISSUES
The telemarketers also challenge various other aspects of the do-not-call registry. In turn, we consider 1)
whether the fees telemarketers must pay to access the registry are constitutional, 2) whether it was arbitrary and
capricious for the FCC to approve the established business relationship exception, and 3) whether the FTC had
statutory authority to enact its do-not-call rules. 14
A. The Do-Not-Call Registry Fees
To obtain the phone numbers ofconsumers who have signed up for the national do-not-call registry,
telemarketers must pay a modest annual access fee determined by the FTC. Currently, the fee is $25 per area code
ofdata, except that the first five area codes are provided free of charge and the maximum annual fee is capped at
$7,375. 16 C.F.R. § 31O.8(c). The telemarketers argue that this fee unconstitutionally imposes a revenue tax on
protected speech. We disagree.
It is well-established that the First Amendment protects against the imposition of charges, such as a license
taxes, for the enjoyment of free speech rights. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1943).
Nevertheless, the government is permitted to exact a fee in order to defray the cost oflegitimate regulations, even
though such a fee incidentally burdens speech. See id. at 114 n.8. In Murdock, for example, the Court struck down
an ordinance that required Jehovah's Witnesses to pay licensing fees in order to distribute religious materials door-
to-door, explaining that the regulation was "not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the
13 Our conclusion is consistent with other circuits' decisions approving similar telecommunications regulations. See Missouri v. American Blast
Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649 (8th Cir. 2003) (upholding TCPA regulation prohibiting unsolicited commercial fax advertising); Destination Ventures,
Ltd., v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 972-75 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding ban on prerecorded commercial
telemarketing).
14 The telemarketers' challenge to the do-not-call registry fees was raised below in case No. 03-1429, although the district court did not reach this
issue. The challenge to the FCC's established business relationship exception has been raised only in case No. 03-9594, in which we review the
FCC action directly. The telemarketers' challenge to the FTC's statutory authority to enact its do-not-call regulations was raised below in case
Nos. 03-1429 and 03-6258. In case No. 03-1429, the district court declined to reach this issue; in case No. 03-6258, the district court held that the
FTC lacked statutory authority.
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expenses ofpolicing the activities in question." Id. at 106, 113-14. The Court employed the same reasoning in Cox
v. New Hampshire, upholding license fees of up to $300 to take part in a parade or procession because the fee was
held "to be not a revenue tax, but one to meet the expense incident to the administration of the act and to the
maintenance ofpublic order in the matter licensed." 312 U.S. 569, 570-71, 576-77 (l941).
Accordingly, we recently approved the Utah Charitable Solicitations Act - which requires charitable
fundraisers to register with the state and pay $250 for a permit - because that fee offsets increased regulatory costs
associated with the act. American Target Adver., Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1246, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 2000). We
held that "a regulatory fee may be constitutional only if it serves a 'legitimate state interest''' and that defraying the
costs of a regulation aimed at protecting citizens from fraud is legitimate. Id. at 1248-49. Such fees may be
imposed to defray both administrative expenses (such as processing and licensing costs) and the cost of enforcing
the regulations. National Awareness Found. v. Abrams, 50 F.3d 1159, 1166 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[E]nforcement power
is necessary to ensure that the purposes of [the regulations] are served.").
The Do-Not-Call Implementation Act authorized the FTC to collect fees for fiscal years 2003 to 2007,
requiring that "[s]uch amounts shall be available for expenditure only to offset the costs ofactivities and services
related to the implementation and enforcement of the Telemarketing Sales Rule, and other activities resulting from
such implementation and enforcement." Pub. L No. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557 at § 2 (2003). In enacting the fees
regulation, the FTC stated it was authorized only "to assess fees sufficient to cover the costs of implementing and
enforcing the do-not-call provisions of the Amended TSR." Telemarketing Sales Rule Fees, 68 Fed. Reg. 45134,
45141 (July 31, 2003). The FTC estimated the costs of implementing and enforcing the national do-not-call registry
at $18.1 million for fiscal year 2003. Id.
The record conclusively demonstrates that the do-not-call registry fees are to be used only to pay for
expenses incident to the administration of the do-not-call registry, as required by Murdock and Giani. The FTC
explained that the costs of the do-not-call registry fall into three major categories. First are the actual costs of
developing and operating the national registry, such as the costs of handling consumer registration and complaints,
transferring information from state lists to the registry, ensuring telemarketer access to the registry, and managing
law enforcement access to appropriate information. Id. Second are the costs of enforcement efforts, such as
domestic and international law enforcement initiatives to identify and challenge alleged violators, and consumer and
business education efforts. Id. Third are the increased costs ofagency infrastructure and administration, including
changes in information technology structural support necessary to handle anticipated increases in consumer
complaints and requests from law enforcement agencies for access to such complaints. Id. The FTC decided upon
the $25 per area code fee in order to ensure that it would collect the amount necessary to defray these costs. 15
Therefore, we hold that the registry fees are a permissible regulatory measure designed to offset projected
expenses incident to the administration and enforcement of the national do-not-calllist, not an unconstitutional
revenue tax.
B. The Established Business Relationship Exception
The telemarketers next argue that the FCC's established business relationship exception is arbitrary and
capricious in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 5 U.S.c. § 706. In particular, they contend that the
FCC failed to give appropriate consideration to the anti-competitive effect that this exception may have on
telecommunications markets. We conclude that the FCC did in fact address this concern, and that the FCC's
exception for established business relationships is not arbitrary and capricious under the APA.
The arbitrary and capricious standard of review is a narrow one, and we are not empowered to substitute
our own judgment for that of the administrative agency. City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415,424 (lOth
Cir. 1996). "Generally, an agency decision will be considered arbitrary and capricious if 'the agency had relied on
factors which Congress had not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the
problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. '" Friends of the
Bow v. Thompson, 124 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,43 (1983)).
15 First, the FTC estimated that about 10,000 telemarketing firms would seek access to the list, and that the average telernarketer would pay to
obtain about 73 area codes of data. 68 Fed. Reg. at 45141. Under those estimates, the expenses incident to the list would amount to about $25
per area code provided, excluding those that would be provided free of charge. Recognizing that its fee schedule is based on estimated figures, the
FTC also emphasized that these fees would need to be reexamined periodically and adjusted to reflect the FTC's actual experience in operating
the registry. Id. at 45141-42.
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The Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. § 251 et. seq., required local telephone monopolies to
make their facilities and services available to competitors for negotiated or arbitrated prices, and directed the FCC to
establish regulations to advance local competition. The FCC enacted its do-not-call rules under different statutory
authority, the TCPA, which specifically authorized the FCC to establish a national database of residential telephone
subscribers who object to receiving telephone solicitations. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(3).
When an agency is charged to enforce overlapping and at times inconsistent policies, it cannot act single-
mindedly in furtherance ofone of those policies while wholly ignoring the other. Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316
U.S. 31,46-47 (1942); McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67, 80 (1944).
The FCC rule sufficiently addresses the telemarketers' concerns about the established business relationship
exception. In its notice of rulemaking, the FCC asked for comments on the anti-competitive effect this exception
might have on the telecommunications industry. See 68 Fed. Reg. at 44159. The FCC received responses indicating
that such an exception would favor incumbent telephone service providers who would be able to market new
services to their larger customer base. Id. at 44159-60. Also, the FCC noted some respondents' concerns that this
anti-competitive effect would be particularly strong because telephone solicitations are currently the primary
mechanism for selling telecommunications services. Id. at 44159. The FCC then considered several proposed ways
in which such an anti-competitive effect could be mitigated, rejecting each of them.
First, the FCC considered a proposal to narrow the established business relationship exemption so that no
telecommunications company could call its customers to advertise different services. Id. at 44160. However, the
FCC cited comments in its administrative record emphasizing the importance of "flexibility in communicating with
... customers not only about their current services, but also to discuss available alternative services or products." Id.
Accordingly, the FCC concluded that limiting telecommunications companies' ability to market new goods or
services to existing customers would not be in the public interest. Id.
Second, the FCC considered a proposal that the Commission revise the definition of established business
relationship so that all providers of telecommunications services would be deemed to have such a relationship with
all consumers, even if they had not in fact had any preexisting business connections. Id. Third, it considered an
alternative proposal that the definition ofestablished business relationship be revised to exclude companies who
have historically been dominant or monopoly service providers, at least until such time as the new entrants to the
telecommunications industry sufficiently penetrated the market. Id. The FCC concluded that these proposals would
not adequately fulfill Congress' mandate to protect residential telephone subscribers' privacy rights to avoid
telemarketing calls to which they object: "To permit common carriers to call consumers with whom they have no
existing relationships and who have expressed a desire not to be called by registering with the national do-not-call
list, would likely confuse consumers and interfere with their ability to manage and monitor the telemarketing calls
they receive." Id.
The FCC then explained the factors it believed would limit the established business relationship
exception's anti-competitive effect. First, it noted that all providers of telecommunications services - incumbent
carriers and new competitors alike - may contact competitors' customers who have not signed up for the national
do-not-call registry. Id. Second, consumers who have signed up for the do-not-call registry still have the ability to
place their carrier on a company-specific do-not-calllist, thereby overriding the established business relationship
exception. Id. Finally, the FCC emphasized that telecommunications providers are still free to use other means of
marketing their products to consumers, such as direct mailings. Id.
The FCC's rule demonstrates that the agency did not simply ignore the potential anti-competitive effect of
the established business relationship exception or its duties under the Telecommunications Act. Rather, the FCC
analyzed the possible effects that this exception may have on the telecommunications industry and explained why it
believed its rule would minimize any adverse consequences. When an agency has made a reasoned policy decision,
"we are not empowered to substitute our judgment for that of the [agency)" under the arbitrary and capricious
standard ofreview. Browner, 97 F.3d at 424. The FCC did not act in an arbitrary and capricious manner in
adopting the established business relationship exception, and we decline the telemarketers' invitation to displace the
FCC's policy judgment.
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C. The FTC's Statutory Authority
In case No. 03-6258, the district court held that the FTC lacked statutory authority to enact the do-not-call
registry. In the Telemarketing Act, Congress authorized the FTC to "prescribe rules prohibiting deceptive
telemarketing acts or practices and other abusive telemarketing acts or practices." Pub. L. 103-297, 108 Stat. 1545
at § 3. More specifically, Congress directed the FTC to include "a requirement that telemarketers may not undertake
a pattern ofunsolicited telephone calls which the reasonable consumer would consider coercive or abusive of such
consumer's right to privacy." Id. The FTC's conclusion that this language authorized it to enact the national do-
not-call registry is entitled to deference under the familiar test outlined in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council. 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).16 In light of this deference, we conclude that the FTC
did have statutory authority to promulgate its do-not-call regulations because the agency's view that the
Telemarketing Act authorized it to enact those rules is at least a permissible construction of that statute.
Moreover, even if some doubt once existed, Congress erased it through subsequent legislation. See North
Haven Bd. ofEduc. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 535 (1982) ("Where an agency's statutory construction has been fully
brought to the attention of the public and the Congress, and the latter has not sought to alter that interpretation
although it has amended the statute in other respects, then presumably the legislative intent has been correctly
discerned."); Schism v. United States, 316 F.3d 1259, 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2002) ("Congress may ratify agency conduct
'giving the force oflaw to official action unauthorized when taken. ''') (citing Swayne & Hoyt v. United States, 300
U.S. 297, 302 (1937)). In the Do-Not-Call Implementation Act, Congress directed the FCC and FTC to maximize
consistency between their respective do-not-call rules and authorized the FTC to collect do-not-call registry fees to
offset the administrative costs of the regulations. Pub. L. 108-10, 117 Stat. 557 at §§ 2-3. Furthermore, in response
to the district court's decision in case No. 03-6258, Congress expressly ratified the FTC's do-not-call regulations.
An Act to Ratify the Authority of the Federal Trade Commission to Establish a Do-Not-Call Registry, Pub. L. 108-
82, 117 Stat 1006 (2003). The FTC's statutory authority is now unmistakably clear.
V. CONCLUSION
We hold that 1) the do-not-calliist is a valid commercial speech regulation under Central Hudson because
it directly advances substantial governmental interests and is narrowly tailored; 2) the registry fees telemarketers
must pay to access the list are a permissible measure designed to defray the cost oflegitimate government
regulation; 3) it was not arbitrary and capricious for the FCC to adopt the established business relationship
exception; and 4) the FTC has statutory authority to establish and implement the national do-not-call registry.
The judgments below in cases 03-1429 and 03-6258 are REVERSED with respect to the questions
presented in this appeal, and the petitions for review in cases 03-9571 and 03-9594 are DENIED.
16 In reviewing an agency's construction of a statute it administers, we first ask whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at
issue. If so, that is the end of the matter and Congress' intent controls. If the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to this issue, our inquiry
is limited to whether the agency's interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
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I. Introduction
This chapter will focus on presenting a general overview of various defenses and potential
counterclaims available to a debtor's lawyer and strategies to litigate collection cases. Many of the topics
discussed below are treated in more detail in other chapters. See e.g., infra, Chapter 10. This chapter is
meant to familiarize the debtor's attorney with some useful tools in representing the debtor.
Representing the defendant in collection cases presents special challenges for attorneys. In many
cases debtors have a variety of legal defenses to collection actions. It is essential that the attorney for the
debtor conduct an in depth interview with the client and review all the documents related to the case in a
search for a defense or counterclaim. It is especially important for the private practitioner to review those
claims and defenses that allow for payment of fees to the prevailing party.
Most of the federal consumer protection legislation contains provisions for mandatory payment of
attorney fees to the prevailing consumer. There is generally a bad faith component to awarding fees against
the consumer. Some of the federal laws and the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act give a court discretion
to award fees. Attorney fees may even be available where statute of limitations on the debtor's claim has
passed when the claim is raised only as a set-off under the doctrine of equitable recoupment. Empire
Finance Co. ofLouisville, Inc. v. Ewing, 558 S.W.2d 619 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
It is not infrequent in a debtor's attorney's practice to find individuals who are being sued for
debts arising from high pressure sales tactics, such as time-share resort interests, health spa memberships,
and unscrupulous home remodeling contractors. All too often, elderly, low-income, or uneducated debtors
who have one asset-their home-run afoul of the "blue suede shoe" men and women of the home
remodeling industry. Some contractors will use such high-pressure sales tactics as blank contracts and then
launder the contracts by sale to an unrelated lender. The contract price may be grossly disproportionate to
the work done, or the work is shoddy or sometimes not even performed. The debtors may refuse to make
payments or not be able to afford payments and thus find themselves embroiled in a foreclosure suit. There
has been an increase in the number of foreclosures resulting from an array ofpredatory lending practices.
Another large source of consumer debt is the deficiency suit brought by automobile dealers or
their financing arms. Typically, the lowest income group must purchase cars at inflated costs and high
interest rates. When the vehicle breaks down prior to full payment of the installment loan, as so often
occurs, the vehicle is repossessed and sold at auction for a minuscule amount that does not begin to cover
the debt.
Class actions, pursuant to Rule 23 of the Kentucky and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are
another means of allowing low-income debtors to assert their rights if the creditor's actions are systemic,
but this topic is outside of the scope of this handbook.
II. Default Judgments
The debtor's attorney should not automatically be deterred by a recently entered default judgment.
Unfortunately, many of these clients do not understand the legal significance of the lawsuit, or there are
other crises in their lives (e.g., illness, divorce, loss of transportation, etc.) that cause them to disregard the
lawsuit until their wages are garnished or a lien is placed on their home. Often, this is the spur to seeking
legal assistance.
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Kentucky law pennits setting aside a default judgment. Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure ("Civil
Rule" or "CR") 55.02 allows a default judgment to be set aside "(f)or good cause shown" in accordance
with Civil Rule 60.02. Civil Rule 60.02 pennits the court to relieve a party from final judgment upon the
finding ofone ofthe following grounds: (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (b) newly
discovered evidence; (c) perjury or falsified evidence; (d) fraud affecting the proceedings; (e) the judgment
is void; or (f) any other reason of an extraordinary nature justifying relief. Civil Rule 60.02 requires that
the motion to set aside a default judgement be made within a reasonable time and provides a one year limit
on bringing a motion based upon grounds (a), (b), or (c).
The court in S.R. Blanton Dev. Co. v. Investors Realty and Management Co., 819 S.W.2d 727 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1991), set out the factors to consider in deciding whether to set aside a default judgment: "(1)
valid excuse for default, (2) meritorious defense, and (3) absence ofprejudice to the other party." The valid
excuse and meritorious defense factors are fairly self-explanatory. It is important to note that the prejudice
suffered by the plaintiff must be more than simply the prejudice of having opposition to its complaint, and
it must be more than mere delay in obtaining a judgment. "To establish prejudice, the plaintiff must show
that the delay will result in the loss of evidence, increased difficulties in discovery, or greater opportunities
for fraud and collusion." Berthelsen v. Kane, 907 F.2d 617 (6th Cir. 1990).
Many defendants will claim that they were never served with a summons, but generally speaking,
a review of the court file will indicate that service was made. This is not to say that occasionally there is
insufficient service-where, for instance, the summons is delivered to the wrong family member.
"Kentucky follows a strict adherence to the rule of 'in-hand service of process.'" R.F. Burton and Burton
Tower Company v. Dowell Division ofDow Chemical Company, 471 S.W.2d 708,710 (Ky. 1971) (citation
omitted). However, the debtor must present clear and convincing evidence to overcome the record of a
properly served summons. Nicholson v. Thomas, 277 Ky. 760, 127 S.W.2d 155 (1939).
The trial court has great discretion is determining whether the judgment should be set-aside. From
a practical point of view, the attorney, in detennining whether it is worthwhile attempting this motion,
should have a sympathetic client with a strong defense, and the judgment should be fairly recent. If the
judgment cannot be set-aside, a bankruptcy may be the only alternative to stop a garnishment or
foreclosure.
III. Venue
Generally speaking, a collection action should be brought where the defendant resides. KRS
452.480 states that transitory actions not specifically covered by another section are to be filed in the
county where the defendant resides. In Cash v. E'town Furniture, 363 S.W.2d 102 (Ky. Ct. App. 1962),
the court held that a default judgment is void where the defendant is not a resident of the county nor served
in the county of the action. However, in Goodwin Brothers v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 410 S.W.2d
714 (Ky. 1967), the court upheld a default judgment against an impleaded non-resident third party.
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act requires that a debt collector must bring suit in the place
where the contract was signed or where the debtor resides at the commencement of the action. 15 U.S.c. §
1692(i).
IV. Exemptions
There may be occasions when the debtor is likely to be permanently "judgment proof," and there
may be little reason to contest the debt or file bankruptcy. Some of the more important debtor assets from
which judgment creditors may not seek to satisfy their judgment are the following exemptions:
• household furnishings;
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••
•
jewelry;
personal clothing and ornaments up to $3,000;
one motor vehicle and its necessary accessories, including one spare tire up to $2,500
(KRS 427.010(1»;
•
•
a homestead or burial plot worth up to $5,000 (KRS
various pensions;
427.060);
•
•
•
•
retirement benefits and individual retirement accounts (KRS 61.690, KRS 161.700,
KRS 427.120, KRS 427.125);
unlimited public assistance payments (KRS 205.220);
Social Security benefits (42 U.S.C. § 407); and
SSI (42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(I».
In addition, KRS 427.010(2) and 15 U.S.C. § 1673 limit the garnishment of wages to the extent of30 times
minimum wage or 75% (net), whichever leaves the debtor with more.
Pensions and Social Security may be used, with some limitations, for child support and
maintenance obligations. The same exception does not apply to SSI, although the amount of the SSI
payment can be used to calculate the amount of child support due from the non-custodial parent. KRS
403.212.
The Earned Income Tax Credit ("EITC"), codified at 26 U.S.C. § 32 of the Internal Revenue
Code, was found by Kentucky bankruptcy courts to be exempt from a creditor's attachment or execution as
a public assistance payment. In re Brown, 186 B.R. 224 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1995); In re Goldsberry, 142
B.R. 158 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1992). However, in the case of In re Duvall, 281 B.R. 646 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
2002), two of the bankruptcy judges in the Western District of Kentucky Bankruptcy Court renounced In re
Brown. It is likely that the decision ofIn re Duvall will be appealed.
The Federal Child Tax Credit ("FCTC"), codified at 26 U.S.C. § 24, was found not to be exempt.
In re Beltz, 263 B.R. 525 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2001). The Beltz court distinguished the EITC and the FCTC,
reasoning that, unlike the BITC, the primary purpose of the FCTC is not to provide tax relief to low income
families but primarily to benefit middle class Americans.
In spite of the exemptions, debtors may find that their bank accounts have been garnished and that
they will need to go to court to have the money returned. A simple procedure has been established for the
debtor to fill out an affidavit with the circuit clerk and be given a court date to bring in proof that the funds
are exempt. Even this process may be beyond the capabilities of a number of elderly, disabled or
unsophisticated debtors such that legal assistance is required to reclaim these crucial funds. When
contacted by the debtor's attorney, some collection attorneys will return the funds if provided with proof of
the exemption. Otherwise, the debtor will need to appear at the court date that is assigned by the clerk to
prove to the court that the funds taken are exempt.
The debtor should be advised to have the exempt sources of income direct-deposited into a bank
account and never to mix money from any other source in the same account. This simplifies the proof
process, although the Kentucky Supreme Court has held that the exemption is not lost when mixed with
other money if it can be traced. Matthews v. Lewis, 617 S.W.2d 43 (Ky. 1981). As a safety precaution,
debtors may wish to keep these funds in a different financial institution than one to which they owe money.
The issue of whether a bank setoff of exempt funds is prohibited to the same extent as a garnishment or
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attachment has not been decided in this jurisdiction. However, the majority of courts that have examined
this issue elsewhere have found that setoff is prohibited. See, e.g., Tom v. First American Credit Union,
151 F.3d 1289 (10th Cir. 1998); Marengo v. First Mass. Bank, 152 F. Supp. 2d 92 (D. Mass 2001).
However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held to the contrary. Lopez v. Wash. Mut. Bank, 2002
U.S. App. LEXIS 15658, 2002 WL 1792494 (9th Cir. 2002).
v. Consumer Remedies
During the 1970s and 1980s, consumer activism gave rise to a host of state and federal laws that
provide consumers with potential counterclaims and defenses.
A. Equal Credit Opportunity Act
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act ("ECOA"), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-169lf and Part 202
of the Code of Federal Regulations apply specifically to the right to consumer credit and the procedural
safeguards involved in preserving these rights and prohibit discrimination in the extension of credit based
on race, color, religion, national origin, gender, marital status, or age. One particularly helpful provision of
the ECOA is the requirement that the creditor (as that term is defined in the ECOA, which can include
arrangers of credit) must provide specific written reasons for the denial of credit. Of course, there are
exceptions, and the attorney must review the ECOA in its entirety. This situation may arise where the
debtor's credit application (usually involving a car purchase) has been shopped to a number of different
creditors.
For more on the ECOA, see infra, Sections [10.64] through [10.71] and [10.112].
B. Fair Credit Reporting Act
The Fair Credit Reporting Act ("FCRA"), codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681- 1681u, prohibits
reporting of inaccurate or obsolete credit information and provides an individual the right to dispute the
accuracy of a credit report. Inaccurate information can give rise to damage actions by consumers against
consumer reporting agencies and furnishers of information.
The FCRA was amended in 1996 to add significant new remedies against the furnishers of
inaccurate information, who were previously not covered by the FCRA. The furnisher of information now
has a duty to correct and update the information and also must note when that information has been
disputed. Furnishers must also participate in reinvestigation of disputed information. The liability of
furnishers is generally not for providing the bad information but for failing to correct it following a
consumer dispute. The FCRA requires the creditor to follow-up an original report with notice that the debt
is disputed, and it must note that the information has been disputed in all future reports. Attorneys should
have their clients review their credit reports for compliance with this section, especially where the
consumer has legally cancelled a transaction and stopped payment because of a seller's breach.
The FCRA also protects consumers from the unauthorized use of their credit reports. The FCRA
enumerates the permissible purposes to obtain a credit report. If not specifically permitted, it is prohibited.
For example, it is not permissible to obtain a credit report on the debtor's spouse or another third person
unless the consumer is relying on the third party's income and the third party is also liable on the account.
Collecting judgments is a permissible use, but litigation itself is not a permissible purpose. In Duncan v.
Handmaker, 149 F.3d 424 (6th Cir. 1998), the attorney defending a mortgage company in a negligence suit
brought by consumers had no permissible purpose in accessing the plaintiffs' report; the business
transaction underlying the suit did not extend to the litigation of the negligence claim.
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Because credit bureaus may report accurate information, the debtors' credit record may remain
blemished with a history oflate payments even after a suit is resolved in their favor. It is good practice for
the attorney, as part of any settlement agreement, to include a requirement that the negative information be
eliminated or that the account information be deleted entirely. Consumers should be advised to check their
reports periodically to be sure that the information has not been reinserted.
For more information on the FCRA, see infra, Sections [10.55] through [10.63].
c. Credit Repair Organizations Act
The Credit Repair Organizations Act ("CROA") was also signed into law in 1996 as part of the
Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act. Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2451. It applies to contracts entered
into beginning on March 30, 1997. The CROA was enacted to regulate the activities of credit repair clinics
that promise, for a fee, to improve a consumer's credit record.
Under this act, no credit repair services can be provided until three days after a written contract is
signed. The contract must disclose certain information, including the total of all fees due, the timing and
nature of all services and the three-day right to cancel. The credit repair organization must also provide, on
a separate document, disclosure of consumer rights to self-help. Misleading statements or advice is
prohibited. The repair organization is prohibited from receiving payment until service is fully performed.
Creative consumer attorneys have successfully used the CROA against car dealers and others who make
promises of improving the plaintiffs credit record by purchasing with credit.
D. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA") applies only to debt collectors: any person
whose principal business is collecting debts or any person who regularly collects debts owed to another.
The FDCPA does not exclude attorneys, although the nature and amount of collection activities
required for an attorney to be considered a debt collector has been the subject of much litigation. In
Schroyer v. Frankel, 197 F.3d 1170 (6th Cir. 1999), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "for a
court to find that an attorney or law firm 'regularly' collects debts for purposes of the FDCPA, a plaintiff
must show that the attorney or law firm collects debts as a matter of course for its clients or for some
clients, or collects debts as a substantial, but not principal, part of his or its general law practice." In that
case, the court found that the firm was not a debt collector because collection cases made up only two
percent of the firm's business and it did not employ individuals full-time for the purpose of collecting
debts.
Although the FDCPA generally excludes creditors collecting their own debts, the debtor's attorney
may be able to pursue an action through tort law or the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act. A Kentucky
Attorney General opinion states, "although the FDCPA applies only to third party debt collectors, it serves
as a guideline for determining what is an unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive practice in violation of the
Kentucky Consumer Protection Act, KRS 367.170." 1983 Ky. Gp. Att'y Gen. 2-161, Ky. OAG 83-121,
1983 WL 166379 (Ky. A.G.).
The FDCPA prohibits a number of specific activities, such as: communications at unusual or
inconvenient times; contacts with consumers following a letter to cease collection attempts; communication
with third parties, such as friends, neighbors, boss, etc.; harassing, oppressive and abusive conduct; and a
number ofother acts.
The FDCPA also provides debt collectors with various statutory obligations as well. The initial
communication sent to a consumer must contain:
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the amount of the debt;
the creditor's name;
a statement that unless the consumer disputes the validity of the debt within thirty
days of receipt of the notice, the debt collector will assume the debt to be valid;
a statement that if the consumer does dispute the debt in writing within thirty days,
the debt collector will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of the judgment; and
a statement that, upon the consumer's written request, the debt collector will provide
the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from
that of the current creditor.
The debt collector must also disclose on all communications that it is for the purpose of collecting a debt
and all information will be used for that purpose. The debtor's attorney should obtain a detailed history
from the client and, ifpossible, copies of all communications with the debtor.
For more on the FDCPA, see infra, Sections [10.138] through [10.146].
E. Credit Practice Rule
The Federal Trade Commission's ("FTC") credit practice rule, found at 16 C.F.R. Part 444, states
that it is an unfair act or practice for a lender or retail installment seller directly or indirectly to take or
receive from a consumer an obligation that contains a cognovit or confession ofjudgment, waives or limits
exemptions, contains an assignment of wages (with exceptions), or contains a nonpossessory security
interest in household goods other than a purchase money security interest. Although there is no private
right of action to enforce violations of this rule, the practitioner can allege that these prohibited acts also
violate the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act's prohibition of unfair acts and practices. KRS Chapter
367.
For more on the FTC credit practice rule, see infra, Sections [10.72] through [10.77].
F. Door-to-Door Sales Rule
The FTC's home solicitation rule, located at 16 C.F.R. Part 429, requires disclosure in written
form of a three-day right of rescission in the event of a home door-to-door transaction. The Kentucky law
concerning door-to-door sales, KRS 367.410, gives an individual three days to cancel the purchase of an
item costing more than $25. There is an exemption for individuals or companies that sell insurance or
goods provided in an emergency at the request of the buyer. If the consumer agrees to purchase a good at
the seller's place ofbusiness and the completion of the business transaction occurs in the buyer's home, the
three-day right of rescission evaporates. Notably, if a buyer requests that a seller appear at his home, this
request will not necessarily relieve the seller ofany obligation under this statute.
For more on FTC and Kentucky home solicitation provisions, see infra, Sections [10.46] through
[10.50] and [10.111].
G. Odometer Statutes
The Federal Odometer Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 32701-32711, was recodified in 1994 and additional
changes were made in 1996 and 1998. The governing regulations can be found at 49 C.F.R. §§ 580.1-
580.17. This act prohibits odometer tampering and, with certain exceptions, mandates the disclosure of
mileage on the title document. Automobile dealers rarely show the purchasers the actual title document as
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required, and if the purchasers can prove intent to defraud, they have a cause of action for which they can
receive three times actual damages or $1,500, whichever is the greater, plus costs and attorney fees. The
title document can provide important information to the purchaser, such as the identity of the previous
owner and notice of title brands, such as flood damage and prior wrecks.
Kentucky's odometer statute is found at KRS 190.260 through 190.320 and KRS 190.990 (4). It
also entitles the buyer to three times the actual damage or $1,500, whichever is greater, plus attorney fees
and court costs for tampering or knowingly giving a false disclosure with intent to defraud.
H. Federal Truth in Lending Act
The Federal Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601 - 1615, primarily regulates the
disclosure of information, and not the amount of interest that may be charged. The purpose of TILA is to
require that disclosures be made in a way that allows for intelligent comparison. For this reason, the
consumer must be provided with a copy of the disclosures to review prior to signing. The Official Staff
Commentary to Section 226.17 states "it is not sufficient for the creditor merely to show the consumer the
document containing the disclosures before the consumer signs and becomes obligated. The consumer
must be free to take possession of and review the document in its entirety before signing." The disclosures
must be given prior to consummation in a form that the consumer may keep.
TILA provides for damages, costs, and attorney fees for certain violations and, in some situations,
rescission of the transaction-a very powerful tool. The accompanying regulations, known as Regulation Z,
are found at 12 C.F.R. Part 226. The act regulates both open-end credit, such as revolving credit cards, and
closed-end credit (e.g., the typical car loan).
In this day of computers, large creditors rarely make mathematical errors. Most mistakes that
occur will be from the small "buy-here pay-here" car dealers and from creditors failing to include certain
extra charges (hidden interest) as part of the [mance charge. TILA and the regulations thereunder are quite
specific about what may be excluded from the finance charge. Creditors' motivation for keeping as many
charges as possible out of the fmance charge is to make the annual percentage rate appear as low as
possible. The debtor's attorney should check the math and carefully scrutinize credit insurance and other
fees and costs charged to the consumer. For more information on TILA, see infra, Sections [10.37] and
[10.78] through [10.112].
TILA allows rescission where the creditor takes a security interest in the debtor's residence. The
debtor can rescind for any reason within three business days of entering the transaction. The debtor can
also rescind for up to three years if a material TILA violation is discovered. For more information on TILA
rescission, see infra, Sections [10.78] through [10.112].
In 1994 Congress passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act ("HOEPA"), which
gives additional protection to debtors entering into certain closed-end home equity loans. HOEPA kicks in
if the annual percentage rate is over an amount based upon Treasury bond rates or if the fees and costs are
over 8% of the amount of the loan. HOEPA violations also provide the debtor with enhanced damages and
attorney's fees. For more on HOEPA, see infra, Sections [10.113] through [10.120].
I. Consumer Leasing Act
The Consumer Leasing Act ("CLA") is part of the Truth in Lending Act. The accompanying
regulations are known as Regulation M and are found at 12 C.F.R. Part 213. The CLA only applies to
leases longer than four months and where the contract obligation does not exceed $25,000. This act
requires that certain lease disclosures be made in a particular way. There are different rules for leases
signed on January 1, 1998 and after. More consumers are obtaining vehicles by lease, and they are often
shocked to learn that when they return the vehicle prior to the end of the lease there are enormous charges.
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The CLA, in addition to the disclosure requirements, also includes substantive regulation of the early
termination charge, which must not be "unreasonable."
J. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act ("Magnuson-Moss") does not require that warranties be given,
but it regulates the content, the disclosure and the duties of those who choose to sell or provide warranties
and extended service contracts. The act is found at 15 U.S.c. §§ 2301-2312, and the FTC's governing
regulations are located at 16 C.F.R. Subchapter G, Parts 700-703. Of particular significance to the
consumer's attorney in an auto deficiency case is Magnuson-Moss' prohibition of disclaimers of implied
warranties when the dealer sells a service contract. The seller may limit but may not completely disclaim
implied warranties. Therefore, the dealer may not sell the vehicle "AS IS", which, in addition to a possible
Magnuson-Moss violation, restores the purchaser's rights to assert a breach of the implied warranty claim.
The question remains unresolved as to whether a dealer who sells the service contract of another is subject
to this restriction. A violation entitles the consumer to actual damages; there are no statutory damages.
Attorney fees to the prevailing consumer are discretionary and not mandatory.
For more on Magnuson-Moss, see infra, Section [10.53].
K. Kentucky Consumer Protection Act
The expanded consumer activism of the 1970s and 1980s has also given rise to a plethora of
remedies under the Kentucky Consumer Protection Act ("KCPA"), found at KRS 367.010 through KRS
367.993. This chapter of the Kentucky statutes was passed to protect the public interest and well being of
both the consumer and the ethical vendors in the state.
In addition to the discussion on the KCPA in this chapter in Sections [2.16] through [2.26], see
also infra, Sections [10.1] through [10.22] and [10.110].
1. Right ofAction
KRS 367.220 gives the consumer the right to bring an action in circuit court for relief. The KCPA
provides, in part:
Any person who purchases or leases goods or services primarily for personal, family or
household purposes and thereby suffers any ascertainable loss of money or property, real
or personal, as a result of the use or employment by another person of a method, act or
practice declared unlawful by KRS 367.170, may bring an action under the Rules of Civil
Procedure in the Circuit Court in which the seller or lessor resides or has his principal
place of business or is doing business, or in the Circuit Court in which the purchaser or
lessee of goods or services resides, or where the transaction in question occurred, to
recover actual damages. The court may, in its discretion, award actual damages and may
provide such equitable relief, as it deems necessary or proper. Nothing in this subsection
shall be construed to limit a person's right to seek punitive damages where appropriate.
KRS 367.220(1). The consumer's lawyer should note that the jurisdiction for original cases lies in circuit
court, although a counterclaim or defense may also lie in district court.
The Kentucky Attorney General also has the authority to bring actions on behalf of defrauded
consumers to seek restitution on their behalf. Com. ex reI Beshear v. ABC Pest Control, 621 S.W. 2d 705
(Ky. Ct. App. 1981). The utility of an Attorney General's action that results in a permanent injunction or
judgment is made evident under KRS 367.220, which provides:
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(4) Any permanent injunction, judgment or order of the court made under KRS 367.190
shall be prima facie evidence in an action brought under this section that the
respondent used or employed a method, act or practice declared unlawful by KRS
367.170.
(5) Any person bringing an action under this section must bring such action within one
(1) year after any action of the Attorney General has been terminated or within two
(2) years after the violation of KRS 367.170, whichever is later.
Therefore, it follows that the debtor would have a defense to collection activity if the Kentucky
Attorney General has been granted an injunction. In defending any collection case against a "regulated"
plaintiff (health spas, buying clubs, etc.), it would behoove the debtor's lawyer to check with the Kentucky
Attorney General's Consumer Protection Division to see if the Commonwealth may have brought, or is
contemplating, an action.
2. Prohibited Acts
KRS 367.170 declares unlawful, "unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce." The definition of "unfair" is "unconscionable." The consumer's
attorney should review the acts and practices found wrongful by the FTC and by analogy argue that they
also violate the KCPA.
3. Scope
The definition of "trade" and "commerce" is very broad: "the advertising, offering for sale, or
distribution of any services and any property, tangible or intangible, real, personal or mixed, and any other
article, commodity, or thing of value, and shall include any trade or commerce directly or indirectly
affecting the people of this Commonwealth." KRS 367.110(2). Since there are no statutory exclusions as
to the scope of coverage, insurance, banking and other credit activities are covered as well, although the
courts have limited the KCPA's application in certain circumstances. Capitol Cadillac Olds. Inc. v.
Roberts, 813 S.W.2d 287 (Ky. 1991) (not every failure to perform a contract is necessarily a violation of
the KCPA; there must be something unfair, false, misleading or deceptive or an element of intentional or
gross negligence); Miles v. Shauntee, 664 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1983) (a violation of the housing code by itself
did not constitute a violation of the KCPA); Craig v. Keene, 32 S.W.3d 90 (Ky. Ct. App. 2000) (KCPA
does not apply to individual real estate transactions); Curry v. Cincinnati Equitable Insurance Co., 834
S.W.2d. 701 (Ky. Ct. App. 1992) (KCPA is preempted by ERISA).
4. Buying Club Memberships
Under KRS 367.397 a customer may cancel buying club memberships by giving written notice at
any time before midnight of the thirtieth business day following the date on which membership was
attained. In addition, the same statute provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a) ...Such cancellation shall be without liability on the part of the member and shall
entitle the member to a refund of the entire consideration paid for the contract; or
(b) ...Such cancellation shall be on a pro rata daily basis, the member being responsible
only for that portion of the contract consideration representing the time elapsed on
the contract and being entitled to a refund of that portion of the fee representing the
days remaining on the contract at date of cancellation. If the contract duration is for
the life of the member, the daily value shall be determined by standard actuarial
tables.
KRS 367.397(1).
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Cancellation rights are non-waivable. The members' right to cancel must be disclosed in 14-point
type and in the above language. Until the club complies with this notice requirement, the customer may
cancel and receive a full refund. KRS 367.399(2).
5. Home Solicitation Sales
KRS 367.410 through 367.450 regulates home solicitation sales and largely tracks the FTC
regulation on home solicitation sales, 16 C.F.R. § 429.1. The seller must give to the buyer a notice ofright
to cancel.
Until the seller complies with the statute, the buyer may cancel. KRS 367.430(3). Former
Attorney General Chris Gorman stated in an opinion that in home solicitation sales that are a combined
sales/credit transaction, "the three-day right to cancel does not begin to run until the date that the credit
contract is signed and the consumer is given the credit disclosures required by the federal Truth-in-Lending
Act." 1992-1993 Ky. Op. Atty. Gen. 2-63, Ky. OAG 92-41, 1992 WL 540962 (Ky. A.G.).
6. Recreation and Retirement Land Sales
KRS 367.470 through 367.486 regulates recreation and retirement land sales. The seller must post
a bond (KRS 367.474(1)) or escrow 50% of the sales receipts (KRS 367.474(3)). The buyer has five days
to cancel the agreement, calculated from receipt of a mandatory notice.
7. Mobile Home Sales
KRS 367.710 through 367.775 regulates the sale of mobile homes. KRS 367.715 creates a
presumption of nonmerchantability when:
Any mobile home that, within the first twelve (12) months after delivery to the
owner has a defect which cost the owner at least four percent (4%) of the
purchase price to repair and which requires repair or replacement on three (3)
separate occasions....
Strict notice requirements are set up by KRS 367.725, which requires certified mail, return receipt
requested within ten (10) days of the defect. If there is non-compliance by the manufacturer, the consumer
has an action for the price of the mobile home. KRS 367.750.
8. Defective New Cars ("Lemon Law")
Kentucky's "lemon law" coverage is found at KRS 367.840 through 367.846, and gives the
purchaser (for purchases after July 15, 1986) or lessee (for leases after July 15, 1998) ofa new car the right
to replacement or refund at the consumer's option if, after a reasonable number of attempts, the
manufacturer is unable to repair a defect that "substantially impairs the use, value, or safety of the motor
vehicle." The manufacturer is entitled to" a reasonable allowance for the buyer's use of the vehicle" when
the refund remedy is chosen. The cut-off period is 12,000 miles or twelve months from delivery,
whichever is earlier. The purchaser must send written notification of the defect to the manufacturer. The
statute also requires the use of an informal dispute resolution system prior to litigation. See also infra,
Section [10.54].
9. Rental-Purchase Agreements
KRS 367.976 through 367.985 regulates the rent-to-own business. Many low income consumers
pay exorbitant amounts of money to acquire goods in this manner. The KCPA primarily provides for
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specific disclosures of cost and payment information to the consumer, but it also substantively regulates
some areas, such as termination and reinstatement.
10. Others
There are additional specific Kentucky statutes related to health spas, telephone solicitations,
subscriptions, negative option plans, charitable solicitations, sales of business opportunities, pyramid sales,
cremation, and pre-need funeral services and burial contracts. If any of these sections are applicable, the
debtor's attorney should check the statute for details.
L. Check Cashing
In 1998 the legislature enacted statutes regulating the check cashing industry-also known as pay
day lenders. KRS Chapter 368. Typically, a low income person needing money writes a post-dated check
that covers the amount of the loan and fee. On "pay day" the check can be redeemed by full payment, or
the check-casher may extend the time for an additional fee. Prior to the statutory enactment, the interest on
these loans was running, in some cases, as much as 800% and more.
In Hamilton v. York, 987 F. Supp. 953 (B.D. Ky. 1997), the United States District Court held that
these transactions were not excluded from Kentucky's usury statutes. In White v. Check Holders, Inc., 996
S.W.2d 496 (Ky. 1999), the Kentucky Supreme Court agreed, holding that transactions that took place prior
to enactment of Chapter 368 amendments (April 1998) were not protected from usury and RICO laws.
The statutes now protect the check-cashing company if it stays within the still very high allowable
limits: $15 per $100 check per fourteen days. However, there are certain protections for the consumer-the
most important of which may be the prohibition on convicting or threatening to prosecute a borrower under
the "cold check" laws. This information must be conspicuously displayed at the business site.
M. Uniform Commercial Code - Article 9
One source of aid for debtors facing a large deficiency following the repossession of a vehicle is
found in the notice and resale requirements of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, which were
revised effective July 1,2001. The debtor's attorney must check the statutory requirements ofKRS 355.9-
611 and 355.9-614 to determine if the client received all the proper notices. For instance, the secured party
must provide consumers a notice prior to disposition that, in addition to the specifics of the proposed sale of
the collateral, also informs the consumer how surpluses or deficiencies are handled and provides contact
information on how to obtain additional information.
KRS 355.9-610(2) is of particular importance; it mandates that "(e)very aspect ofa disposition of
collateral, including the method, manner, time, place, and other terms, must be commercially reasonable."
The burden is on the secured party to prove commercial reasonableness and reasonable notice. Holt v.
Peoples Bank of Mt. Washington, 814 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Ky. 1991). A great disproportionate difference
between the value of collateral and the amount realized at the sale of the collateral creates a presumption of
commercial unreasonableness. School Supply Co., Inc. v. First National Bank ofLouisville, 685 S.W.2d
200 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985). "(A)s a general rule the question of what is 'commercially reasonable' is a
question of fact, not a question of law." McCoy v. American Fidelity Bank & Trust Co., 715 S.W.2d 228
(Ky. 1986) (this case questioned that aspect of the School Supply Co., where it was found that this issue
was a question oflaw).
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VI. Bankruptcy
When all else fails to protect the consumer from loss of home or garnishment of wages, a
bankruptcy may be necessary. Congress has been on the verge of substantially changing the Bankruptcy
Code as it relates to individual debtors, and by the time of the printing of this handbook, major changes
may have occurred.
There are two kinds of bankruptcy that the average consumer debtor will normally consider,
Chapter 7 (a liquidation) and Chapter 13 (a reorganization). However, a Chapter 11 filing may also be
relevant for an individual debtor who is in business or may have unsecured debts exceeding the statutory
maximum for a Chapter 13. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e). The shortcoming of a Chapter 11 case is the lack of a
co-debtor stay, which is available in Chapter 13 under 11 U.S.C. § 1301. However, by the filing of a
Chapter 11 personally, with a similar reorganization plan as in the corporate Chapter 11, the debtor may be
able to preserve his or her business and personal assets.
There is little doubt that there is a "tilt" toward Chapter 13 in the Bankruptcy Code, i.e., a
legislative effort to push debtors to use this chapter by the provision of more "debtor-friendly" provisions.
First, there are the expanded discharge provisions found in 11 U.S.C. § 1322. Generally, unless there is a
violation of the good faith requirements under 11 U.S.C. § 1328, most debts can be discharged. The most
important exceptions are debts that mature after the life of the plan, chiefly mortgages, taxes and child
support.
Often, the choice of filing a Chapter 13 instead of a Chapter 7 is a matter of personal pride as well
as a consideration of the type of debts and assets. Most consumer debtors profess that they wish to pay
their bills, but their economic life has been wrecked by circumstances. The debtor may be paying his or her
bills but making no progress because of high interest rates. Collection activity, either through court-
generated garnishments or out-of-court activity, may push the debtor into bankruptcy.
A. Chapter 7
The classic Chapter 7 client is a laid off worker with a high debt load of credit cards or a debtor
with no medical insurance and high medical bills. There are few guidelines for who is eligible for a
Chapter 7, other than the prohibition against serial filings found in 11 U.S.c. § 109(g).
There are two creditor responses to a debtor in Chapter 7: (1) a non-dischargeability petition
under 11 U.S.C. § 523 or (2) a request for a denial of discharge pursuant to 11 U.S.c. § 727. Only
individuals may be granted a discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a). The exceptions to discharge or designations
of non-dischargeable debts are easily explained to the average debtor as being public policy debts and are
set forth at length at 11 U.S.c. § 523.
Some of the most common non-dischargeable debts are taxes. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(I). However,
income taxes due three years from the date the return is due are dischargeable; for example, taxes can be
discharged for 2002 after April 15, 2006. Other non-dischargeable debts include debts arising through
fraud in obtaining credit, other fraud or defalcation, and willful and malicious injury.
Although Section 523(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code bars from discharge any debts that are not
listed by the debtor, an otherwise dischargeable debt which is omitted from the debtor's schedules in a
Chapter 7 no-asset case is discharged anyway. Zirnhelt v. Madaj (In re Madaj), 149 F.3d 467 (6th Cir
1998).
11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) mandates that support or alimony is non-dischargeable. "An award that is
designated as support by the state court and that has certain indicia of a support obligation (along with any
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others that the state support statute considers) should be conclusively presumed to be a support obligation
by the bankruptcy court." Sarah v. Sarah (In re Sarah), 163 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 1998)
11 USC § 523(a)(15) makes property settlements from divorce non-dischargeable unless the
debtor cannot afford to pay without hardship or the benefit of the discharge to the debtor outweighs the
detrimental consequences to the creditor-spouse.
Student loans are non-dischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8), except in the case of undue
hardship. In Tennessee Student Assistance Corp. v. Hornsby (In re Hornsby), 144 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 1998),
the court ofappeals reversed the bankruptcy court's decision because it had failed to conduct "a meaningful
multi-factor evaluation in determining whether undue hardship existed: it failed to examine debtors'
expenses, the extent to which debtors' discretionary income could be applied to their student loans, and the
debtors' monthly budget surplus." The appellate court also held that the bankruptcy courts have the power
to fashion an equitable remedy short ofdischarging debtors' entire student loans.
B. Chapter 13
Filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy allows the debtor to pay debt out of future income while
preserving the debtor's assets. However, the debtor must have a regular source of income. Debtors may
need to file a Chapter 13 if they are time-barred from filing a Chapter 7, if they have assets above the
exemption limits or if there are non-dischargeability issues. For a Chapter 13 plan to extend past 36
months, the debtor needs a verified motion to extend the plan. The courts freely grant the extension since
the reason usually given is to fully repay the unsecured creditors.
Rules for the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Kentucky require that
the debtor immediately begin his or her plan payments by paying the proposed payments to his or her
attorney's escrow account and that the debtor maintain regular mortgage payments in a foreclosure
situation. Notably, the attorney should contract with the debtor to keep all or a portion of the escrow
payments for a fee should the plan not be confmned. Many debtors simply disappear. Having money in
escrow can save the debtor's counsel from a money-losing situation.
Local rules generally require attorneys to check the proofs of claim on file in the clerk's office the
day before the Section 341 (creditors) meeting. This allows speedier disposition of cases and allows
counsel to identify any problems.
More detailed information on bankruptcy can be found in Chapter 9 of this handbook.
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I. POST CLAIM UNDERWRITING
The claim for disability or life insurance seemed outrageous. Sure, the insured
had died. But he had died told seven lies on the application. He signed his name at the
bottom, and all the health questions were checked IINo." He told us he was a picture of
health, yet he was receiving Social Security Disability for diabetes and asthma and had
just been diagnosed with cancer six months before he signed the application. The
insurance company will simply rescind the policy, refund the premium and no attorney
in his right mind will agree to represent this man's estate.
A simple case of insurance fraud? Perhaps. But consider the following scenario
that unfolds all too frequently when people buy insurance:
An elderly couple living in rural Kentucky had just finished watching the
Kentucky Wildcats win another game when there was a knock on the front door. Not
expecting any company, the husband grabbed his cane and hobbled to the door while
his wife slowly walked to the back bedroom to make herself more presentable to the
unannounced visitor. At the door stands a well-dressed man carrying a briefcase. He is
one of the finest and most successful salesmen of the Great American Insurance
Company.
Before the salesman leaves, he has succeeded in yet another sale, his twelfth of
the day. The disabled couple is very happy. They now have something they have
desperately wanted for years, but could not obtain. They now have life insurance. It is
Ilguaranteed.1I Consequently, according to the salesman, there was no need to read all
the fine print of the application.
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The salesman is happy too. He has made thirteen sales today and his fifty-five
(55) percent commission will pay for his children's orthodontic care. He calls his boss
from his cell phone to report the good sales. The company executives are also happy
because they have $18,000.00 of premium dollars coming in for them to invest in the
raging stock market. The company is having one of its best years ever.
A few miles across town, a similar scenario unfolds. A single woman is sitting in
the local car dealership. She is about to buy a shiny red sports car. She is uncertain of
the price, but understands clearly the amount of the monthly payment. The price does
not really matter because she can make the $340.00 monthly payment. She does not
have to worry if she loses her job because of an injury. The salesman threw in a
disability policy. She is very happy.
The car salesman is equally happy because the disability premium of $2200.00
has generated a sixty (60) percent commission for him. It is all included in the financing
so it does not seem very expensive. He slides in front of her the "Truth in Lending
Disclosures," the installment contract and the insurance application. Like every other
customer, she signs them without reading.
The car dealer reports to the disability insurance company regarding the sales for
that week. They likewise are pleased at the thousands of premium dollars, which are
pouring in from the car dealerships. The company's profits have doubled, especially
since they eliminated the cumbersome and expensive underwriting department. The
insurance company vice president leans back in his chair, smiling to himself. He is
pleased that sales are at an all time high. Amazingly, claims are at their lowest in ten
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years, despite the elimination of the underwriting department. After all, the insurance
company vice president thinks, underwriting is really a waste of time. Since we sell
thousands of policies and only a few ever file claims, there is no need to worry about all
of the policies. We only need to be concerned about the policies once a claim is filed.
That is when we do our underwriting now. It is so brilliant, he thinks to himself, that
we now have ten claims people doing the work that 100 people used to do in the
underwriting department. And best yet, we hardly ever have to pay claims because we
can always find a misrepresentation on the applications. If these people are too stupid
to read what they sign, then why should he have any sympathy for them?
What is wrong with these pictures? Before an insurance company issues a policy
of insurance, the underwriting department should conduct a thorough investigation as
to the insurability of each prospective insured, using all information reported on the
application. Relegating the function of conducting an investigation as to the
insurability of the applicant to the claims department after a claim has arisen is
improper"post claim underwriting."
Of course, there is nothing improper with an investigation to uncover fraud or
misrepresentation in an application. However, improper post claim underwriting in
connection with life and disability insurance typically occurs in two ways when an
insurance company receives information on, or regarding, an application for insurance
suggesting an adverse medical condition and issues a policy without conducting a
thorough medical investigation or any medical investigation at all. Second, the
company may directly or indirectly encourage the soliciting agents to not get any
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adverse medical information. After the claim is reported, the company then conducts
an exhaustive investigation for the purpose of finding a basis for rescinding the policy
based on misrepresentation. This is an insidious practice which defeats the very
purpose of insurance for the policyholder, protection against covered loss.
Obviously improper post claim underwriting is very profitable. Every applicant
is accepted and pays a premium. Then, after it is too late for the injured or deceased
applicant to obtain substitute insurance, the claim is filed and the policy is, for the first
time, underwritten. The policy is then voided. If the application had information on it
which would have required an investigation, then it is certainly unfair for that
investigation to occur only to those policyholders who file claims.
In this wayan insurance company can receive premiums from everyone, but will
never have to pay a claim for any of the non-qualifying policyholders. Yet as to those
otherwise non-qualifying policyholders who never file a claim, the insurance company
makes a "pure" profit without any risk. Many times the insurance company will obtain
an attending physician'S statement (code"APS") from the applicant's family physician.
These APS statements are typically scant on information which might have a bearing on
the applicant's health. Then when a claim is filed, the insurance company will ask for
all of the complete medical records and find a preexisting condition, undisclosed on the
APS, that, in the company's opinion, would have compelled them to reject the
application had they known this information earlier.
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Rescission is a failure of the whole purpose of insurance and should never be
regarded as routine. If rescission is a routine practice, that means the company's basic
method of doing business and underwriting is flawed and needs correcting.
There is virtually no law in the state of Kentucky on post claim underwriting.
However, the Mississippi Supreme Court declared:
To allow (the insurer) to "sandbag" and gloss over its
investigation of (the insured's) medical history at the time of
evaluating the underwriting risk, then comb intensively for
#ve months his prior records after a claim is made, 'looking
for a defense' (even based on a condition unrelated to his
benefit claim) and then deny coverage 'in good faith' is to
invite manifest abuse of the public in such relationships.
Under such circumstances, punitive damage awards provide
the public with its best protection from such abuse of this
relationship between insurance and insurer.
Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. McGee, Miss., 444 So.2d 803 (1983).
See also Lewis v. Equity National Insurance Co., Miss. 637 So.2d 183 (1984) and
Hildebrand v. Franklin Life Insurance Co., Ill., 455 N.E.2d 553 (1983).
California has actually enacted a statute prohibiting post claim underwriting.
Section 10384 of the California Insurance Code provides as follows:
No insurer issuing or providing any policy of disability
insurance covering hospital, medical or surgical expenses
shall engage in the practice of post claims underwriting. For
the purposes of this section, 'post claims underwriting"
means the rescinding, canceling or limiting of a policy or
certificate due to the insurer's failure to complete medical
underwriting and resolve all reasonable questions arising
from written information submitted on or with an
application before issuing the policy or certificate.
A Wyoming Court in White v. Continental General Ins. Co., 831 F. Supp. 1545 (D.
Wyo. 1993), a case involving four plaintiffs who purchased health insurance from
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Continental General Ins. Co. (Continental), disapproved of the practice of post claim
underwriting. In this case, each plaintiff filled out an application and then responded to
questions from one of the defendant's underwriters in order to obtain the insurance.
The questions on the application, and the questions asked by the underwriter were all
the underwriting done by Continental. After the plaintiffs made their claims, however,
Continental's underwriters were able to find some type of preexisting condition that
would enable Continental to rescind the policies.
The Court denied Continental's motion for summary judgment, based on the
plaintiffs' evidence Continental engaged on post claim underwriting saying:
In his opposition, White contends that he raised a genuine
issue of fact on his point. His main assertion in support of
his claim of bad faith is that Continental engages in the
practice of what is referred to as "post claim underwriting,"
and that this is prima facie evidence of the absence of a
reasonable basis for denying to pay benefits under the
policy. White submitted evidence that standard industry
practice is for the insurer to do a comprehensive
investigation before agreeing to insure a person. White
alleges that Continental did not conduct a thorough
underwriting until after it had issued him a policy. He
further alleges that Continental would heavily scrutinize the
insured's application only after a claim was submitted by the
insured. At that time, Continental would then request
medical records and examine the files with a fine-toothed
comb to see if a pre-existing condition that would allow it to
refuse to payout the claim.
813 F. Supp. at 1555-1556.
In another case, Barrera v. State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co., Cal. 456 P.2d 674
(1969), the California Supreme Court said, "An automobile liability insurer must
undertake a reasonable investigation of the insured's insurability within a reasonable
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period of time from the acceptance of the application and the issuance of the policy."
The California court avidly condemned the practice of post claim underwriting in the
automobile liability insurance business.
The North Dakota Supreme Court has also condemned the practice of post claim
underwriting. In Ingalls v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Group, N.D., 561 N.W.2d 273, the
plaintiff won a jury verdict based on claims for breach of contract, bad faith, and fraud
for the defendant's refusal to pay disability benefits under the insurance policy. While
affirming the jury verdict, the Court concluded there was sufficient evidence of fraud
based on expert testimony that an insurer has engaged in post claim underwriting
when "instead of looking to pay the claim, it began to look for all things in the
application that [it] might be able to dig up that would allow [it] to rescind the policy."
Id. at 283.
Numerous cases have condemned this practice of "post-claim underwriting."
See e.g. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. Wood, 483 P.2d 892 (Utah 1971);
Gardner v. League Life Ins. Co., 210 N.W.2d 897, 898 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Sullam, 76 Misc.2d 87, 349 N.Y.S.2d 550, 569-70 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973); St. Ioseph's
Hosp. v. Reserve Life Ins., 742 P.2d 808, 815 (Ariz. 1987); Meyer v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, 500 N.W.2d 150, 153 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Krauss v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co.,
700 F.2d 870, 872 (2d Cir. 1983); Bernstein v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 458 F.2d 506,
510 (2d Cir. 1972); Bank of Oklahoma, N.A. v. Verex Assurance, Inc., 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 31132 (10th Cir. 1991); Stanford v. Veterans Life Ins. Co., 1994 U.s. Dist. LEXIS
21172 (N.D. Miss. 1994).
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CONCLUSION
Frequently, people sign insurance applications without reading them. Almost
always, the questions are read, or paraphrased, by a soliciting agent many times in a
very hurried fashion with no intent or goal to obtain accurate information regarding
past health conditions, etc. If this practice is condoned, either indirectly or directly b~
the insurance company and the insurance company has a policy of doing no
underwriting, the entire purpose of insurance is defeated. These practices should be
challenged whenever a company goes to great lengths, after a claim is filed, to find
grounds for rescission.
Every company should investigate claims thoroughly and reject claims of true
misrepresentation. However, whether an inaccuracy on a written application
constitutes a misrepresentation, requires consideration of the entire circumstances
surrounding the application process.
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II. RESCISSION OF HEALTH INSURANCE CONTRACTS - NEW RULEI
Health insurance carriers may sometimes contend that they are entitled to
rescind the Plaintiffs' health plan for a material misrepresentation, even if made
unintentionally, under the general rescission statute set forth in KRS 304.14-110
regarding rescission of insurance policies. However, the application of that general
statute to Health Plans was altered by the subsequent enactment of a more specific
statute KRS 304.17A-240 which prohibits a health insurer from discontinuing a health
benefit plan unless there is intentional misrepresentation of material fact or fraud.
The two statutes provide as follows:
KRS 304.14-110: Misrepresentations, omISSIOns, and
incorrect statements shall not prevent a recovery under the
policy or contract unless either:
(1) Fraudulent; or
(2) Material either to the acceptance of the risk, or to the
hazard assumed by the insurer; or
(3) The insurer in good faith would either not have issued
the policy or contract, or would not have issued it at the
same premium rate, or would not have issued a policy or
contract in as large an amount, or would not have provided
coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss, if
the true facts had been made known to the insurer as
required either by the application for the policy or contract
or otherwise. This subsection shall not apply to applications
taken for workers' compensation insurance coverage.
KRS 304.17A-240: (1) Except as provided in this section, an
insurer shall renew or continue in force a health benefit plan
at the option of the insured.
(2) An insurer may nonrenew, cancel, or discontinue a health
benefit plan based only on one (1) or more of the following:
(a) The insured has failed to pay premiums or
contributions in accordance with the terms of the plan or the
insurer has not received timely premium payments;
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(b) The insured has performed an act or practice that
constitutes fraud or made an intentional misrepresentation
of material fact under the terms of the coverage;
(c) The insured has engaged in intentional and
abusive noncompliance with material provisions of the
health benefit plan. 1998 c 496, section 6, eff. 4-10-98.
A. THE PLAIN MEANING OF BOTH KRS 304.17A-240 AND KRS
304.14-110 PRECLUDES RESCINDING HEALTH PLANS
UNLESS THE MISREPRESENTATION IS INTENTIONAL.
The legislature has promulgated basic rules of statutory construction and
interpretation with the following commandment: "All statutes of this state shall be
liberally construed with a view to promote their objects and carry out the intent of the
legislature... All words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and
approved usage of language...." KRS 446.080(1), (4). See also Withers v. University of
Kentucky, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340, 345 (1997). Also, "under the rule of liberal construction,
the words employed in the statute must be given their ordinary meaning."
Commonwealth v. Shivley, Ky., 814 S.W.2d 572, 573 (1991).1 Applying the above
principles, KRS 304.17A-240 and KRS 304.14-110 cannot be read in a manner which will
allow a health insurance company to rescind a policy unless it proves the much more
difficult fact of a intentional misrepresentation.
1 See also Layne v. Newberg, Ky., 841 S.W.2d 181, 183 (1992) ("[U]nder general rules of statutory
construction, we may not interpret a statute at variance with its stated language."); Coy v. Metropolitan
Property and Cas. Ins. Co., Ky. App., 920 S.W.2d 73 (1995) ("Statutory language must be accorded its
literal meaning unless to do so would lead to an absurd or wholly unreasonable result."); Lincoln County
Fiscal Courtv. Dept. of Pub. Advocacy Com. of Ky., Ky., 794 S.W.2d 162, 163 (1990) ("Where the words of
the statute are clear and unambiguous and express the legislative intent, there is no room for construction
or interpretation and the statute must be given its effect as written."); Turner v. Turner, Ky. App., 908
S.W.2d 124, 125 (1995); Regional Tail Authority v. Tackett, Ky., 770 S.W.2d 225, 229 (1989) ("Where there is
no ambiguity in a statute there is no need to resort to the rules of statutory construction in interpreting it.
The words of the statute are simply accorded their commonly understood meaning."); Alliant Health
System v. Kentucky Unemployment Ins. Com'n, Ky. App., 912 S.W.2d 452, 454 (1995) ("Where there is no
specific statutory definition, we must construe the words of the statute within their common usage.").
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Foremost, the plain meaning of KRS 304.17A-240, enacted in 1998, sets forth the
only grounds permitting an insurer's nonrenewal, cancellation, or discontinuance of a
health plan. The statute provides in part:
(1) Except as provided in this section, an insurer shall renew
or continue in force a health benefit plan at the option of the
insured.
(2) An insurer may nonrenew, cancel, or discontinue a health
benefit plan based only on one (1) or more of the following:
(a) The insured has failed to pay premiums or
contributions in accordance with the terms of the plan or the
insurer has not received timely premium payments;
(b) The insured has performed an act or practice that
constitutes fraud or made an intentional misrepresentation
of material fact under the terms of the coverage;
(c) The insured has engaged in intentional and
abusive noncompliance with material provisions of the
health benefit plan;
KRS 304.17A-240 (emphasis added). First, KRS 304.17A-240(1) provides an
affirmative commandment that "an insurer shall renew or continue in force a health
benefit plan at the option of the insured." (emphasis added). Thus, unless an exception
provided in section (2) is met, then the insured is entitled to have the health benefit plan
renewed or continued in force at his or her option. For example, if "[t]he insured has
performed an act or practice that constitutes fraud or made an intentional
misrepresentation of material fact under the terms of the coverage," then "[a]n insurer
may nonrenew, cancel, or discontinue a health benefit plan." KRS 304.17A-240(2)(b)
(emphasis added).
Note also the content of the"outline of Coverage" that was given to the client.
This is a document that may be required under state law and summarizes the coverage.
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Many times the "outline of Coverage," or even the policy itself, specifically states that
"The policy will remain in force at the option of the insured, except for the following
reasons... there is fraud or intentional material misrepresentation made by or with the
knowledge of any insured applying for this coverage... "
1. KRS 304.14-110 is not applicable to health plans having been superceded
by the later, and more specific statute, 17A-240.
Furthermore, "[i]t is... the well-established rule that a literal construction of the
statute will not be applied when such construction would defeat the purpose of the
statute, and the intention the Legislature had in mind when enacting it."
Commonwealth ex reI. Martin v. Tom Moore Distillery Co., Ky., 152 S.W.2d 962, 965
(1939). A plain reading of KRS 304.17A-240 indicates that the purpose of the statute is
to protect the contractual rights of a health plan insured. The right to continued health
insurance coverage is guaranteed, once the policy is issued, unless the insured commits
"fraud" or makes"an intentional misrepresentation of material fact under the terms of
the coverage." KRS 304.17A-240 (emphasis added). To apply KRS 304.14-110 to a health
plan, and to allow complete rescission when there is no proof of intentional
misrepresentation, would defeat the purpose of KRS 304.17A-240. Consequently,
although the literal construction of KRS 304.14-110 does not contain a scienter
requirement, the plain meaning and its purpose would only be served by applying it
consistently with KRS 304.17A-240 and requiring either "fraud" or "intentional
misrepresentation of material fact" to allow rescission.
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B. NO APPARENT CONFLICT EXISTS BETWEEN KRS 304.17A-240 AND
KRS 304.14-110; THUS, THE STANDARD SET FORTH IN KRS
304.17A-240 APPLIES~
As noted supra, applying the plain meaning of KRS 304.17A-240 and KRS 304.14-
110 does not result in a conflict.
To begin with, "[i]n construing a statute, the courts must consider 'the intended
purpose of the statute--the reason and spirit of the statute--and the mischief intended to
be remedied.'" Commonwealth. v. Kash, Ky. App., 967 S.W.2d 37, 43-44 (1997) (quoting
City of Louisville v. Helman, Ky., 253 S.W.2d 598, 600 (1952». The legislative purpose
of both statutes is to protect parties' contractual rights and prevent fraud. This
legislative purpose must be maintained in the interpretation of these statutes.
With the above in mind, it is important to note that "[a]ll statutes are presumed
to be enacted for the furtherance of a purpose on the part of the legislature and should
be construed so as to accomplish that end rather than to render them nugatory."
Commonwealth ex reI. Martin v. Tom Moore Distillery Co., Ky., 152 S.W.2d 962, 967
(1939). KRS 304.17A-240, as noted supra, protects an insured's right to continual
insurance coverage unless the insured commits "fraud" or "an intentional
misrepresentation of material fact. Courts must refrain from construing a statute in a
manner which will effectively abolish it. Commonwealth v. Wirth, Ky., 936 S.W.2d 78,
84 (1996).
C. ALTERNATIVELY, EVEN IF AN APPARENT CONFLICT DOES EXIST
BETWEEN KRS 304.17A-240 AND KRS 304.14-110, THE STANDARD
SET FORTH IN KRS 304.17A-240 STILL APPLIES.
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The Court in Combs v. Hubb Coal Corp., Ky., 934 S.W.2d 250 (1996), provided
the proper analysis for interpreting and applying apparently conflicting statutes. The
Court held:
We start with the well-established premise that in construing
legislative enactments, courts "should look to the letter and
spirit of the statute, viewing it as a whole...." City of
Owensboro v. Noffsinger, Ky., 280 S.W.2d 517, 519 (1955).
Where there is apparent conflict between sections of a
statute, courts must endeavor to harmonize its interpretation
so as to give effect to both. Kentucky Insurance Guaranty
Association v. NREPC, Ky.App., 885 S.W.2d 315 (1994). In so
doing, the reviewing court must attempt to construe the
statute in such a manner that "no part of it is meaningless or
ineffectual." Brooks v. Meyers, Ky., 279 S.W.2d 764, 766
(1955). Finally, we are required to observe the directive set
out in Commonwealth of Kentucky, Transportation Cabinet
v. Tarter, Ky.App., 802 S.W.2d 944 (1990), that each section is
to be construed in accord with the statute as a whole.
Combs v. Hubb Coal Corp., 934 S.W.2d 250, 252-53. In the event that KRS 304.17A-240
and KRS 304.14-110 are construed as to be conflicting, then KRS 304.17A-240 controls
and applies here because it is both a more specific piece of legislation and a more recent
promulgation from the legislature.
First, KRS 304.14-110 concerns insurance contracts in general. On the other hand,
KRS 304.17A-240 specifically deals with health insurance and health benefit plans. In
the case at hand, the contract at issue is one providing a health benefit plan. The
Kentucky Supreme Court has held "that where two statutes concern the same or similar
subject matter, the specific shall prevail over the genera!." Withers v. University of
Kentucky, Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340, 345 (1997). Similarly, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
dealt with an apparent conflict between statutes in Preston v. Floyd/Iohnson County
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Pilots Ass'n, Blackburn, Belhasen, Wells, Short, Latta, City of Prestonsburg,
Paintsville/Prestonsburg Airport Bd., Ky.App., 867 S.W.2d 474 (1993). There the Court
reasoned, I/[w]here two statutes are in apparent conflict, and their inconsistencies
cannot be reconciled, 'the one containing express and positive language relating to the
particular subject should take precedence over a provision dealing with a matter in
general terms.'" Preston, 867 S.W.2d at 475 (citation omitted). With this rationale in
mind, the Court held, l/[sJince KRS 183.132 specifically addresses the appointment of air
board members, it must control over the general provisions of Chapter 83A.1/ Id. Thus,
since KRS 304.17A-240 is more specific and expressly provides an insured's entitlement
to continuous health insurance coverage, it must prevail when in an apparent conflict
with KRS 304.14-110, a more general statute.
Second, KRS 304.14-110 was enacted in 1970, but its latest amendment occurred
in 1994. On the other hand, KRS 304.17A-240 was enacted in 1998 and amended by
2002 Kentucky Acts Chapters 249 and 251. Thus, KRS 304.17A-240 represents a more
recent promulgation of public policy. I/If the two statutes are repugnant to each other,
the later statute must prevail, as it is the latest expression of the legislative wil1.1/ Head
v. Commonwealth, Ky., 165 Ky. 603, 177 S.W. 731, 733 (1915). KRS 304.17A-240 is
clearly a later statute and a later expression of the legislative will. Thus, in case of a
statutory conflict with KRS 304.14-110, KRS 304.17A-240 must prevai1.
CONCLUSION
While the plain meaning of both KRS 304.17A-240 and KRS 304.14-110 evinces a
legislative intent to protect parties' contractual rights. However, the plain meaning of
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both statutes at issue supports an interpretation that is consistent with both statutory
schemes and preserves the legislative intent. Thus, the plain meaning of both KRS
304.14-110 and KRS 304.17A-240 require that a health insurance carrier prove either
"fraud" or "an intentional misrepresentation of material fact" before permitting a health
insurance carrier to rescind a contract. Alternatively, to the extent the statutes appear
conflicting and harmonization of the two seemingly conflicting statutes is not possible,
the more recent or more specific statute, KRS 304.17A-240, shall supercede the older or
more general statute, KRS 304.14-110.
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III. THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT - PROTECTING PURCHASERS OF
USED CARS - OR PROTECTING CLIENTS AND PATIENTS TOO?
Treat them fairly. Be truthful with them and do not mislead them. If you do,
and it causes damage, they can sue you and they can recover attorney's fees. They are
the consumers. But who is "you?" The consumer protection act, codified in KRS 367-
170 provides that any "unfair, false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practice in the
conduct of any trade or commerce" is declared unlawful. It is a very powerful and
underutilized tool. Typically, it is thought of as avenue for recovery for that naIve
consumer who gets ripped off by a used car salesman. Its use has been expanded in
Kentucky to include an insurance contract. But what about clients of lawyers? What
about medical patients? Can they sue under the Consumer Protection Act. It appears
the answer is yes. The statute closely mirrors the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC
Act).2 The act also protects the public from abuses arising in the course of competitive
trade. Lawyers have been held liable for unfair and deceptive business practices under
state consumer protection laws in the state of Washington. See Short v. Demopolis, 691
P.2d 163 (Wash. 1989).
The state of Washington has also held a physician liable under the Unfair and
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. In Quimby v. Fine, 724 P.2d 403, 406, a physician
substituted a procedure during a tubal ligation surgery without the patient's consent.
Since she was not advised of the risk and alternatives, she sued ten months later when
she gave birth to a child with multiple birth defects. She sued for both negligence and
215 U.s.c. § 45 (1994).
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unfair and deceptive trade practices. The Court held that the negligence claim was not
within the scope of the Consumer Protection Act, but his failure to fully disclose
accurate medical information could form the basis of an unfair and deceptive trade
practice claim. The Court's reasoning was based on the entrepreneurial activities of the
doctor's trade or business would fall within the scope of the act. The Court defined
entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of medicine to include anything that "will
increase profits and volume of patients." Id. at 406.
Texas has also allowed a claim against a physician under the Deceptive Trade
Practice Act. In Chapman v. Wilson, 826 S.W. 2d 214, 215 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992), a dentist
made false statements regarding his expertise in wisdom tooth extraction and the use of
general anesthesia. The Court held that since the dentist had made false and
misleading statements, the patient could claim a violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade
Practices Act.
Later, Texas extended the Chapman decision in Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d
239 (Tex. 1994). Before performing a breast augmentation surgery, a physician had
guaranteed the patient that she would look exactly like a photograph the physician had
showed her. The Court held that the claim against the physician for unfair and
deceptive trade practices was based upon deception and not a breach of the medical
standard of care, thus the Consumer Protection Act could be utilized in the lawsuit.
Critical to the analysis was the deceptive practice was intended to increase patient
volume and profit. In both cases, the conduct did not actually deceive the patients
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involved, but the business methods used had a tendency or capacity to deceive which is
a requirement under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice Laws.
Some states have specifically excluded physicians from coverage under their
Consumer Protection Acts. Ohio has such an exemption.3 The Pennsylvania Courts
have held just the opposite of Texas and Washington. In Gatten v. Merzi, a patient sued
her doctor, alleging violations of the state consumer protection law after undergoing
unsuccessful weight loss surgery. The Court refused to allow the action, reasoning that
an unfair and deceptive trade practice claim against a medical doctor would render all
physicians "absolute guarantors of medical results." In Gatten, the plaintiff did not
consider or argue entrepreneurial aspects of the practice of medicine as the basis of a
consumer protection claim. However, in Chalfin v. Beverly Enterprises, Inc., a federal
district court in Pennsylvania ruled that the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection laws did apply to health care providers. In this case, the law was applied to
a nursing home which had provided health services to a Medicaid patient. The court
found that the nursing home's act of evicting a patient after it had agreed to care for her,
in order to substitute a higher paying patient, could constitute a claim under the
Deceptive Trade Practice Act.
There is not much case law on this matter. Kentucky Attorney General opinions
would apply the act to an audiologist, a psychotherapist and a drug retailer. Thus,
most appellant courts in most states have not had the opportunity to consider whether
consumer protection laws would apply to the entrepreneurial aspects of the learned
3 Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 1345.01(a)(Anderson 1994).
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professions, both law and medicine. However, the Kentucky Consumer Protection
gives no hint at exempting professions from the scope of the act. Certainly, in this day
and age of high competition for dollars from HMOs and competition between lawyers,
it is certainly feasible for patients, and clients, to be deceived into courses of action
which they would not otherwise take. Like it or not, the professions have become
entrepreneurial enterprises. Consumers, including patients and clients, would benefit
from knowing that all businesses, including the learned practices of medicine and law
must abide by the same standard. No business should be exempt from treating
consumers fairly.
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IV. BAD FAITH HANDLING OF PIP -DAMAGES LIMITED TO INTEREST
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES (FOR NOW)
A recent Kentucky Court of Appeals' decision has introduced an interesting twist
to the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act (UCSPA). In Phoenix Healthcare of
Kentucky, L.L.c. v. Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., Ky.App., 120 S.W.3d 726
(2003), the Court of Appeals held that KRS §§ 304.39-210 and -220 of the Motor Vehicle
Reparations Act (MVRA) provided the "exclusive remedy" for the late payment or
failure to pay the insured's basic reparation (PIP) benefits. The holding reaches an
equitable result for this particular case, but unfortunately creates broad sweeping
precedent that tilts the legal landscape of the UCSPA too far. Close review of this
opinion demonstrates why our law professors taught us "bad facts make bad law."
In Phoenix, Dr. Hays performed an MRI on the insured, Ms. Jones, after she was
injured in a motor vehicle accident. Kentucky Farm Bureau was the insurer and a basic
reparation obligor to Ms. Jones. Phoenix Healthcare of Kentucky ("Phoenix") was the
billing agent and assignee in regard to billing and receiving payments for MRIs
performed by Dr. Hays.
On March 14, 2002, Phoenix mailed an invoice to Farm Bureau for $3,790 for the
MRI. As expected (given the size of the bill) Farm Bureau sent notice that the payment
was being withheld pending a. peer review. While Farm Bureau conducted its peer
review, it proceeded to pay other PIP bills submitted by other providers. Consequently,
when Farm Bureau decided, eight days later, to pay the MRI bill, most of the $10,000 in
PIP benefits had been disbursed, and Farm Bureau only made a partial payment of
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$2,345.95, which totally exhausted the $10,000 in benefits. The insured, Ms. Jones,
received her full benefit of $10,000 in PIP benefits. She apparently had no complaint
with Farm Bureau. The only one complaining was a medical provider, Phoenix
Healthcare, because the delay caused by the peer review left Phoenix Healthcare "out in
the cold because (Farm Bureau) had no more PIP benefits to pay OUt."4 Essentially,
Farm Bureau, at worst, was two weeks late in making payment to Phoenix. Neither the
opinion nor any of the briefs discuss why an MRI would cost $3,790. Phoenix sought
punitive damages against Farm Bureau, even though Farm Bureau had paid out its
entire contractual obligation of $10,000, claiming that Farm Bureau had acted recklessly
in paying other medical providers and that it should have placed a "hold" on all
payments while it conducted its peer review of Phoenix's MRI bill of $3,790.
It would be extremely difficult to infer recklessness under this set of facts,
because the duties of Farm Bureau to pay PIP claims timely apply to all medical
providers and the insured. To argue that Farm Bureau should delay payment on other
claims, while it exercises its right to review Phoenix Healthcare's MRI bill, would
necessarily subject the insurer to claims by other providers of delay. Likewise, for Farm
Bureau to not investigate the propriety of a $3,790 MRI bill, without an appropriate
review, could subject Farm Bureau to a claim by the insured that her limited $10,000 in
PIP benefits had been squandered needlessly, leaving other medical providers unpaid.
In essence, the claims handling conduct of Farm Bureau was obviously far better than
the proposed conduct urged by the plaintiff.
4 Reply Brief of Phoenix Healthcare pp. 3-4.
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One cannot determine whether the Floyd Circuit Court or the Kentucky Court of
Appeals was influenced by the obvious flaws in Phoenix Healthcare's argument, but
certainly these facts did nothing to inspire the judiciary to acknowledge a remedy for
punitive damages against Farm Bureau. The Court of Appeals' opinion essentially
precludes any causes of action under the UCSPA against a PIP insurance carrier for
compensatory and punitive damages for failure to pay PIP benefits in good faith, the
remedy for violations being limited to interest and attorney's fees.
The record in Phoenix Healthcare indicates that the appellant did not file a
motion for reconsideration, or a motion for discretionary review.5 Thus, the opinion in
Phoenix Healthcare became final and was published as precedent. Thus, its holding
may not be the final answer to this important issue. This article will address arguments
not mentioned in the parties' briefs or the opinion.
In support of its opinion, the Court reasoned: lilt is well settled that '[w]here the
statute both declares the unlawful act and specifies the civil remedy available to the
aggrieved party, the aggrieved party is limited to the remedy provided by the statute.1II
Id. (quoting Grzyb v. Evans, Ky., 700 S.W.2d 399, 401 (1985)). The Court also
distinguished the case at hand from State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, Ky.,
763 S.W.2d 116 (1988) by noting:
[I]n Reeder, the court specifically held that KRS 446.070 does
not authorize a private cause of action for the violation of a
statute if the statute itself specifies a civil remedy available
to the aggrieved party. In Reeder, unlike the case at hand,
5 The record indicates that Phoenix Healthcare changed attorneys midway in the appeal.
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the statute at issue did not provide a civil remedy and
accordingly KRS 446.070 applied to the matter. (Id. at 727).
Significantly, the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act ("MVRA") contains no
"exclusive remedy" provisions that would apply to the 15 enumerated duties set forth
in the UCSPA. The Phoenix decision would remove PIP carriers from regulation by the
entire Kentucky Insurance Code (KRS Chapter 304, which encompasses the UCSPA and
the MVRA), by ensuring that PIP claims are controlled by only part of that Code.
However, as the Kentucky Supreme Court recognized in Farmland Mutual Ins. Co. v.
Tohnson, Ky., 36 S.W.3d 368 (2000):
The KUCSPA is part of a large statutory scheme entitled, the
"Insurance Code." The Insurance Code regulates the
insurance industry, and an insurance company derives its
right to do business in Kentucky from the Code. The Code
and the UCSPA within it relate to a class encompassing all
insurance companies doing business in Kentucky that are
regulated by the Kentucky Insurance Commissioner. Thus
the statute does not relate to only particular persons or
things in that class.
Id. at 380 (Emphasis added). Consequently, it is clear that the Kentucky Insurance Code
is intended to apply in toto to all insurance carriers.
In support of its decision, the Court in Phoenix cites to the Kentucky Supreme
Court's decision in The Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Reker, Ky., 100 S.W.3d 756 (2003), in
which the Court held that suits for insurance bad faith under the UCSPA were not
available against workers' compensation insurers because of the "exclusive remedy"
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, KRS § 342.690(1), despite the enactment
of KRS § 342.267 and the existence of KRS § 446.070. What separates the Workers'
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Compensation Act from the Kentucky Insurance Code, however, is that the latter does
not contain an exclusivity provision remotely analogous to the one contained in KRS §
342.690.
The first sentence of KRS § 342.690(1) states as follows:
If an employer secures payment of compensation as required
by this chapter, the liability of such employer under this
chapter shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of
such employer to the employee, his legal representative,
husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and
anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such
employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or
death.
The fourth sentence of KRS § 342.690(1) further reads:
The exemption from liability given an employer by this
section shall also extend to such employer's carrier, and to
all employees, officers, or directors of such employer or
carrier, provided the exemption from liability given an
employee, officer or director of an employer or carrier shall
not apply in any case where the injury or death is
proximately caused by the willful and unprovoked physical
aggression of such employee, officer or director.
An exclusive remedy provision this clear and explicit is not contained in the MVRA.
Indeed, the Supreme Court expressly recognized in Reker that the Kentucky
Insurance Code /I does not include an 'exclusive remedy' provision prohibiting private
causes of action for its violation./1 Id. at 763. Moreover, as noted by the Court, the
Kentucky Insurance Code is a statutory scheme that - unlike the Workers'
Compensation Act - does not contain interrelated statutes providing civil remedies for
an insurer's bad faith. Id.; see also Farmland Mut. Ins. Co., 36 S.W.3d at 380.
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Furthermore, the Code does not include a specific statutory provision explicitly
prohibiting private civil actions against insurance carriers. Id.
The Court in Phoenix also failed to discuss Kentucky Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Troxell, Ky., 959 S.W.2d 82 (1997), in which the Kentucky Supreme Court implicitly
recognized that a claim for lost wages under PIP could support a claim for punitive
damages for insurance bad faith and unfair claims settlement practices. In Troxell, the
plaintiff brought suit for recovery of UM and PIP benefits, as well as a cause of action
for bad faith. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $3000 in PIP lost
wages and $775,000 in punitive damages. On appeal, the Court recognized that the
plaintiff's"claims for bad faith and unfair claims settlement practices were premised on
both UM and lost wage theories." Id. at 85. However, because the Court found that the
plaintiff presented insufficient evidence of lost wages, and because the jury's
justification for punitive damages could not be specifically ascertained (that is, it could
have been partially based on the unproven element of lost wages), the Court remanded
the case for another bad faith trial. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court was not troubled that a
claim for lost wages under PIP could support a claim for punitive damages for bad faith
claims handling.
Furthermore, there is no law suggesting that the MVRA and the UCSPA cannot
be simultaneously applicable. The Kentucky Court of Appeals also held in Phoenix
that, "[b]ecause KRS 304.39-210 specifically applies to late payments of basic reparation
benefits, as opposed to the more general language of KRS 304.12-230 and -235," the
former statute precludes recovery under the USCPA or for punitive damages in a case
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involving basic reparations benefits. As an initial matter, it should be noted that the
Court must harmonize the law so as to give effect to all statutes, if possible. See Allen v.
McClendon, Ky., 967 S.W.2d I, 3 (1998). With this in mind, there is no inherent conflict
between the MVRA and the VCSPA that would necessitate deciding whether to use a
"specific" or "general" statute. See Reker, 100 S.W.3d at 763 (stating that it is necessary
for a specific provision to take precedence over a general provision only "when [the]
two statutes are in conflict").
Moreover, in FB Ins. Co. v. Jones, Ky. App., 864 S.W.2d 926 (1993), the Kentucky
Court of Appeals addressed the contention, supported by Gryzb v. Evans, Ky., 700
S.W.2d 399 (1985), that the passage of KRS § 304.12-235 precluded further suits under
the VCSPA via KRS § 446.070. The Court concluded that "KRS 304.12-230 and KRS
304.12-235 are different statutes which address different kinds of culpable behavior..."
"KRS 304.12-235 appears to be intended as a prod to prevent laxity in the adjustment of
claims. KRS 304.12-230, however, speaks out against more egregious behavior." Id. at
929. This decision was reached even though KRS § 304.12-235(2) provides a penalty of
12% per annum interest for a "[failure] to make a good faith attempt to settle a claim
within the time prescribed."
Similarly, KRS § 304.39-210(2) allows for a penalty of 12% per annum for overdue
payments and 18% per annum for a delay without reasonable foundation. While this
language is comparable to KRS § 304.12-235, it explicitly prohibits suits under the
VCSPA, nor does it speak to the same type of conduct that is prohibited by the VCSPA.
Furthermore, a bad faith lawsuit requires different proof than 304.39-210:
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[A]n insured must prove three elements in order to prevail
against an insurance company for alleged refusal in bad faith
to pay the insured's claim: (1) the insurer must be obligated
to pay the claim under the terms of the policy; (2) the insurer
must lack a reasonable basis in law or fact for denying the
claim; and (3) it must be shown that the insurer either knew
there was no reasonable basis for denying the claim or acted
with reckless disregard for whether such a basis existed....
Wittmer v. Jones, Ky., 864 S.W.2d 885, 890 (1993) (quoting Federal Kemper Ins. Co. v.
Hornback, Ky., 711 S.W.2d 844, 846-47 (1986) (Liebson, J., dissenting)). The
requirement of showing intent or reckless disregard in a bad faith action is different
from the requirement in KRS § 304.39-210 that only a lack of reasonable foundation for
delay be shown.
The Court notes that State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reeder, Ky., 763 S.W.2d
116 (1998) and Grzyb v. Evans hold that " [w]here the statute both declares the unlawful
act and specifies the civil remedy available to the aggrieved party, the aggrieved party
is limited to the remedy provided by the statute." Reeder, 763 S.W.2d at 118; Grzyb, 700
S.W.2d at 401. The PIP remedies, contained in KRS §§ 304.39-210 and -220, however,
only speak to "overdue payments" or overdue payments resulting from "delay ...
without reasonable foundation." They do not speak to any of the enumerated
violations set forth in the UCSPA, nor do they speak to the heightened requirements for
showing bad faith. Consequently, it is unclear how these statutes provide civil
remedies for violations of the UCSPA in PIP cases, the Court held in Phoenix.
This particularly holds true when one considers that KRS § 304.12-235, part of the
UCSPA, provides for interest and attorney's fees for "delay[s] without reasonable
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foundation" and failures "to make a good faith attempt to settle a claim." This statute,
contained in the VCSPA, does not prohibit the bringing of claims for punitive damage
causes of action-as this Court held in FH Ins. Co. v. Jones-it would appear to be just
as reasonable that KRS 304.39-210 and -220 do not prohibit such causes of action.
In conclusion, as the Kentucky Supreme Court made clear in State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Reeder, Ky., 763 S.W.2d 116, 118 (1988): "[The VCSPA] is intended to protect the
public from unfair trade practices and fraud. It should be liberally construed so as to
effectuate its purpose." Indeed, "this Court's duty in construing statutes is to ascertain
and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly." White v. Check Holders, Inc.,
Ky., 996 S.W.2d 496 (1999). Making the VCSPA inapplicable to basic reparation benefit
carriers, even when those carriers are engaged in conduct not anticipated by the MVRA,
is entirely antithetical to the idea that insurers hold a fiduciary duty to their insureds.
Moreover, it is entirely antithetical to the policy and purpose behind the MVRA itself.
See KRS § 304.39-010.
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V. PIP CARRIERS MUST HAVE "GOOD CAUSE" FOR REQUESTING AN IME.
It is clear from the facts of this case that PIP carrier lacked "good cause" for the
1MB. KRS 304.39-270(1) states as follows:
If the mental or physical condition of a person is material to
a claim for past or future basic or added reparation benefits,
the reparation obligor may petition the circuit court for an
order directing the person to submit to a mental or physical
examination by a physician. Upon notice to the person to be
examined and all persons having an interest, the court may
make the order for good cause shown. The order shall
specify the time, place, manner, conditions, scope of the
examination, and the physician by whom it is to be made.
Although the language of this statute seems to indicate that an insurer is not
required to seek a court order before requesting an IME, it also implicitly suggests that
an insurer must have "good cause" for requesting that an insured submit to such an
examination. Given the policies behind Kentucky's no-fault insurance scheme, such an
inference makes sense. This conclusion is also bolstered by language in Miller v. U.s.
Fidelity & Guar. Co., Ky.App., 909 S.W.2d 339, 343 (1995) ("As we have noted, the
insurer is not entitled to an independent medical examination upon demand.").
Here, PIP carrier's "good cause" for an examination of Plaintiff is that (a) he
allegedly had told them when reporting the accident that he was not hurt, or (b) and
that he did not seek any treatment for "several" weeks before reporting his injuries.
Consequently, PIP carrier's "good cause" for seeking an IME can be boiled down
to a suspicion based upon questionably accurate information. In Miller v. U.S. Fidelity
& Guar. Co./ the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the "mere suspicion" of an insurer
does not constitute the necessary "good cause" for a basic reparation benefits 1MB. The
G - 30
Court found that the "general averments" of an employee of an insurer were not enough
to constitute "good cause." Id. at 342. Instead, the Court cited State Farm Ins. Co. v.
Swantner, 594 A.2d 316 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (case attached), for the principle that "good
cause" for an IME could be shown by such steps as submitting an insured's medical
records to peer review evaluation or by requesting that a treating physician supplement
his medical reports in order to address an insurer's specific concerns. Id. Here, of
course, PIP carrier sought an IME without having any of Plaintiff's medical records and
did not ask the treating physicians to address any of its concerns. Consequently, the
examination should never have taken place at all, as PIP carrier had no justification for
it as a matter of law.
The Kentucky General Assembly has explicitly recognized the importance of
basic reparation benefits in the system of insurance set forth by the Motor Vehicle
Reparations Act. KRS 304.39-010 states that one of its primary purposes is "[t]o
encourage prompt medical treatment and rehabilitation of the motor vehicle accident
victim by providing for prompt payment of needed medical care and rehabilitation."
KRS 304.39-010(3). Moreover, the General Assembly has specifically acknowledged a
"right to basic reparation benefits," which is reinforced by a statutorily mandated
presumption "that any medical bill submitted [to obtain those benefits] is reasonable."
KRS 304.39-030(1); KRS 304.39-020(5)(a). Kentucky courts have further recognized that
no-fault insurance is "remedial in nature and thus will be broadly construed to carry
out its beneficial purpose of providing compensation for persons injured by
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automobiles." Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Ky. v. Baxter, Ky.App., 713 S.W.2d 478, 480
(1986) (citation omitted).
Consequently, it is clear that an insurer should not deny or withdraw basic
reparation benefits lightly. Indeed, other jurisdictions that have dealt with the policy
behind their no-fault insurance provisions have stated this proposition more forcefully.
For example, the Supreme Court of New Jersey has held that its statute "must be read,
whenever possible, to promote prompt payment to all injured persons for all of their
losses." Benyola v. Allstate Ins. Co., 568 A.2d 134, 137 (1990) (citation omitted) (case
attached).
PIP carrier may assert that it did not need "good cause" for an IME because
Plaintiff consented to the examination. However, PIP carrier's own PIP log illustrates
that Plaintiff gave his "consent" only after he was told that if he did not, PIP carrier
would force him to be examined via a court order. Of course, PIP carrier neglected to
tell Plaintiff that it could only force him to be examined if it had "good cause" for the
examination, thereby implicitly suggesting that he ultimately would be examined even
if he did not agree to do so willingly. By this conduct, PIP carrier took advantage of
KRS 304.39-270's allowance for court-ordered examinations in issuing its ultimatum to
Plaintiff, but it refused to inform him of the "good cause" requirement for such a court
order.
In effect, PIP carrier took advantage of its superior leverage and coerced Plaintiff
into "consenting" to an examination for which it had no justification. In doing so, it
presumably hoped to avoid the "good cause" requirement of KRS 304.39-270, given that
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it had absolutely no evidence to show good cause for an 1MB. KRS 304.39-270 is an
avenue for IME's that protects claimants from unsubstantiated requests for such
examinations. By using the threat of a court order as a sword to coerce an insured into
an examination to which it would not otherwise be entitled, PIP carrier has flouted and
warped the purpose of the statute entirely. Accordingly, any "consent" to an IME
obtained from Plaintiff by PIP carrier should be disregarded as a matter of law.
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VI. CONDITIONING RELEASE OF BAD FAITH CLAIMS UPON PAYMENT OF
AN UNDERLYING CLAIM -NOT A GOOD IDEA.
The client arrives in your office needing assistance in pursuing a typical
insurance claim. Perhaps it is an injury claim, or perhaps it is a property damage claim.
In either case, a tortfeasor caused damage to your client, and you proceed to
successfully negotiate a settlement with the third party's insurance carrier, Tag Along
Insurance Company of America.
The settlement check arrives in your office with a standard preprinted release.
You scan it quickly as you prepare the settlement documents and have your secretary
write the escrow account deposit slips and checks. But something in the release catches
your eye and strikes you as being wrong: not only will your client be releasing all
claims against the tortfeasor, he also will be releasing all claims against the third-party
insurance carrier.
Out of an abundance of caution, you call your law school insurance professor
(who told all of her students to call if they had any questions). You pose the question:
Why does your client need to release the insurance company? She tells you that, in
Kentucky, there is no direct action that your client could file against a third-party
insurance carrier, as carriers are merely required to indemnify the liability of the
tortfeasor. However, she reminds you that your client may have a potential cause of
action against the third-party carrier for insurance bad faith. You then remember that
Kentucky -like a number of other jurisdictions - has recognized the availability of a
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third-party bad faith lawsuit by a claimant against a tortfeasor's liability insurance
company for violations of the Unfair Claims Settlement Practices Act ("UCSPA").6
With this information in hand, you are now in a quandary. If your client releases
a cause of action that he never asserted, and for which he received no compensation,
you could be facing a potential legal malpractice suit. Accordingly, you correctly
conclude that you must inform him of this potential cause of action and get his consent
before releasing it. But then another thought occurs - why should you release the
insurance company in the first place? Your client has asserted no claim for USCPA
violations in this case. The bargain that you made was only for the tortfeasor's liability.
You discuss the matter with the insurance adjuster, and he tells you that, in his
twenty years as an adjuster, no one has ever disputed releasing the insurance company.
The insurance company always gets released and it is always a condition of the
settlement. You are told that if you want the money, you have to release the insurance
company - otherwise there is no deal.
What has happened here and what does it mean? For starters, by insisting on its
release and conditioning settlement on that release - even when no claims have been
made against it-the insurance company has arguably committed an act of bad faith,
both towards its insured and towards the third-party claimant. Although there is a
dearth of case law on this particular issue, there are cases from other jurisdictions that
support this position.
6 State Farm v. Reeder, Ky., 763 S.W.2d 116 (1988).
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sFor example, in Isaac v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.? a first-party bad faith
case, the South Dakota Supreme Court was faced with a situation where the insurance
company conditioned its offer of $100,000 upon the plaintiff's release of her bad faith
claim. In addressing the issue of punitive damages, the court remarked:
There is evidence supporting the trial court's position that
State Farm acted in reckless disregard of the rights of Isaac.
Included in the actions taken by State Farm evidencing this
reckless disregard is the fact that when State Farm did offer
their policy limits of $100,000, the offer was conditioned on a
release by Isaac of any bad faith claim that she may have
with respect to State Farm's handling of the claim. Clear and
convincing evidence existed to form a reasonable basis to
present the issue of punitive damages to the jury.8
The South Dakota Supreme Court reaffirmed this position in Harter v. Plains Ins. Co.,
Inc.,9 and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized and followed both decisions
in Athey v. Farmers Ins. Exchange.lo
In a more recent case, National Insurance Association v. Sockwell,ll the Supreme
Court of Alabama was faced with a similar scenario. In addressing the appropriateness
of a $600,000 punitive damage award, the court-citing the trial court's post-trial
order-particularly noted the insurance carrier's efforts to obtain a "2-for-1" release
from its insured:
Perhaps the most reprehensible conduct was committed by
the defendant's claims supervisor, Kathy West, who [was
the defendant's representative] at trial. West testified that
upon receipt of this lawsuit in March 1999, she reviewed the
7 Isaac v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 522 N.W.2d 752 (S.D. 1994).
8 Id. at 61.
9 Harter v. Plains Ins. Co., Inc., 579 N.W.2d 625, 634 (S.D. 1998).
10 Athey v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 234 F.3d 357, 362 (8th Cir. 2000).
11 National Insurance Association v. Sockwell, No. 1001627,2002 WL 399041 (Ala. Mar. 15(2002).
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claim file prepared by Patrice Hawthorne and immediately
concluded that the claim had been improperly denied, and
should have been paid. Nevertheless, testimony from the
attorneys who were handling Sockwell's claim at that time
indicated West made an offer of $41,000, and expressly
conditioned payment of Sockwell's underinsured motorist
claim upon her release and dismissal of the bad faith claim.
Such a conditioned offer, when West knew the claim was
due to be paid, is evidence of another, separate act of bad
faith.12
Based, in large part, on this evidence, the court affirmed the punitive damage award.
While these cases all specifically involve traditional first-party bad faith
situations, their reasoning holds up when applied to other bad faith scenarios under
Kentucky law. For example, by conditioning settlement of a claim against its insured
upon release of any claims against it, an insurance company could find itself in breach
of the implied covenant to exercise good faith in protecting its insured from an excess
judgment, as set forth in Grundy v. Manchester Ins. and Indem. Co. (Grundy 1).13 In
essence, the company would be gambling with the policyholder's money by demanding
a release that-more likely than not-the insured has no idea is being sought. This
emphasis on self-interest-at the possible risk of exposing the insured to an excess
verdict - creates an inherent conflict of interest that should be disclosed to a
policyholder, and it exposes the company to a potential common law bad faith suit
where none had existed before.
Furthermore, conditioning settlement upon insurer release - particularly where
no bad faith case has been asserted previously - almost certainly constitutes a violation
12 Id. at *24.
13 Grundy v. Manchester Ins. and fidem. Co., Ky., 425 S.W.2d 735 (1968).
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of the UCSPA, opening the insurer up to a potential bad faith suit by the third-party
claimant. Most notably, such action would appear to violate KRS 304.12-230(6), which
states that an insurer has committed an unfair claims settlement practice by "[n]ot
attempting in good faith to effectuate prompt, fair and equitable settlements of claims in
which liability has become reasonably clear." Using settlement of an underlying claim
as leverage to dispose of an actual or potential bad faith claim could not be a clearer
example of this type of inappropriate behavior.
As a practical matter, an insurance company has no right to condition settlement
upon release of a bad faith claim because this issue undoubtedly did not come up
during settlement negotiations. Why should it? Settlement of a liability insurance tort
case involves a claimant reaching a resolution with a tortfeasor who happens to be a
beneficiary of an insurance contract with an insurance carrier. The focus on any
settlement discussions would necessarily be on the underlying merits of the tort claim,
with the insurer only aiding in its policyholder's defense and indemnifying him for any
damages. The insurer's own conduct in handling the claim is a matter that is distinct
and separate from whether its policyholder is tortiously at fault for the incident in
question. Accordingly, considerations about the insurance company's behavior and
any liability for that behavior should never enter into that company's mindset when it
comes to settling or evaluating an underlying claim. Why, then, should an insurance
carrier be allowed to obtain a release of bad faith claims whenever it settles a liability
claim on behalf of its insured when it wasn't bargained for and rightfully wasn't an
issue in the first place?
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In most cases, this stance is more of a matter of principle than anything else.
Unlike the hypothetical that begin this article, rarely, if ever, will an insurance adjuster
pull a settlement offer off of the table once you explain to her why you don't release
third-party insurers. However, consistently and firmly refusing to release third-party
insurers in these cases fulfills a broader purpose by reinforcing their duty to act
promptly and in good faith. If every claimant could be leveraged, via settlement, into
releasing the third-party insurance company, there never would be any third-party bad
faith causes of action brought against insurance companies, no matter how egregious
their conduct. This would render the legal duty of good faith as to third-party carriers
virtually meaningless. However, refusing to release bad faith claims encourages good
faith behavior throughout the entire claims process-up to and including settlement.
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VII. RATES FOR CREDIT LIFE AND DISABILITY ARE SET BY STATUTE
Credit life and health insurance are unique among the various types of insurance
sold in Kentucky in that the maximum rates that may be used to compute premiums for
credit insurance are explicitly set forth by the General Assembly in KRS 304.19-380.
Unlike other types of insurance, determining the "reasonableness" of a credit insurance
rate has not been left to the discretion of the Department of Insurance; rather, the
General Assembly has made it very clear that credit insurance rates"shall not exceed"
those rates set forth by statute. See KRS 304.19-080(3)(a); see also KRS 304.19-080(7)
("The foregoing rates and procedures are deemed to be legislative prerogatives and
shall not be subject to administrative or executive change or modification."). The credit
Life or disability carrier exceeded the rates set forth by KRS 304.19-080(3) and the rate
formula it filed with the Kentucky Department of Insurance. Consequently, it
overcharged the Consumer on their credit life premium.
To understand this rate violation, one must first understand the terminology of
credit life insurance. The product sold by credit Life or disability carrier to the
Consumer was truncated, single premium net payoff debt credit life insurance. It was
"truncated" because the life insurance coverage only covered the first 60 months of a
much longer 300-month loan. The product was "single premium" because the
premium for the entire 60 months of coverage was paid up front and financed as part of
the Consumer' loan. The product was"net payoff" because the amount of coverage at
any time during the first 60 months of the loan was equal to the amount necessary to
payoff the loan.
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Here, there are two (2) errors in premium calculation on the part of Credit
disability carrier. The first error was obvious at the time the Complaint was filed-
Credit disability carrier charged a premium in excess of the maximum statutory rate.
However, based upon the affidavits tendered by the actuaries of Credit disability
carrier, it has become clear that a second error was made-Credit disability carrier used
a "rate factor" for premium calculation well in excess of the "rate factor" produced by
the formula filed with and approved by the Kentucky Department of Insurance.
Plaintiff will address each of these errors in turn.
A. CORRECT CALCULATION OF PREMIUM UNDER MAXIMUM
STATUTORY RATE
Because the type of insurance here is credit life net debt, the maximum amount
of premium that can be charged for such insurance is calculated using the monthly
outstanding balance prima facie rate set forth in KRS 304.19-080(3)(a)(3).14 The prima facie
rate for credit life net debt is therefore $0.92 per $1000 of outstanding balance.l5 With
single premium net payoff credit life insurance, the coverage purchased is just sufficient
to payoff the remaining principal on the loan. Since the remaining principal declines
with each month's loan payment, the total amount of coverage is the sum of the
remaining principal in each month of the loan. The premium is calculated by
14 KRS 304.19-080(3)(a)(3) reads as follows: A premium payable monthly at the rate of ninety-two cents
($0.92) per one thousand dollars ($1,000) of outstanding unpaid insured indebtedness ... will be deemed
the actuarial equivalent of the foregoing rates."
15 This rate is used instead of the rate set forth in KRS 304.19-080(3)(a)(1) ("For decreasing term credit life
insurance, a single premium of sixty cents ($0.60) per annum per one hundred dollars ($100) of scheduled
indebtedness ....") because (3)(a)(1) applies only to credit life gross debt. The Consumer' policy involved
credit life net debt, so the rate set forth in (3)(a)(3) applies here. Although both are prima facie rates
promulgated by the General Assembly, they are considered to be "actuarially equivalent" because they
are considered to be equal after adjustment for differences in exposure base.
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multiplying the amount of coverage in each month by the monthly outstanding balance
("MOB") credit life rate and then summing the monthly premiums. Stated differently, a
single premium net payoff credit life premium calculation is simply the sum of the
MOB premiums for each of the months of coverage.
In the book, Credit Life and Disability Insurance, the author wrote:
In almost all net payoff regulations, the MOB rate is
specified as level for all loan terms. The single premium for
each term must be calculated by computer using the
generalized formula:
n
SP =1/10 x (MOB) x ~ (In force)
n t=1 t
GARY FAGG, CREDIT LIFE AND DISABILITY INSURANCE 171 (2nd prtg. 1994) Kentucky credit
insurance statutes clearly indicate that $0.92 per $1,000 of outstanding insured
indebtedness is the maximum MOB rate allowed to be used by a credit life insurer.
KRS 304.19-080(3)(a) provides, in part, as follows:
(a) Credit life insurance. The premium rates set forth
hereunder, or actuarially equivalent, shall not exceed:
1. For decreasing term credit life insurance, a single
premium of sixty cents ($0.60) per annum per one hundred
dollars ($100) of scheduled indebtedness, or sixty-five cents
($0.65) per annum per one hundred dollars ($100) of
scheduled indebtedness if dismemberment benefits are
included in the policy.
3. A premium payable monthly at the rate of ninety-two
cents ($0.92) per one thousand dollars ($1,000) of
outstanding unpaid insured indebtedness or one dollar ($1)
per one thousand dollars ($1,000) of outstanding unpaid
insured indebtedness if dismemberment benefits are
included in the policy, will be deemed the actuarial
equivalent of the foregoing rates.
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(Emphasis added).
The single premium net payoff credit life insurance premium for an installment
loan of the type here is calculated by summing the MOB credit life premiums for all of
the months that the credit life insurance coverage is in force. In the case of the
Consumer loan and credit insurance, the term of the loan was 300 months, but the term
of the credit insurance coverage was only 60 months. It should be noted by this Court,
however, that the initial amount of coverage sold by Credit disability carrier
($31,853.00) is the sum of the amount of the loan before credit insurance ($30,000.00)
plus the amount of the credit life insurance premium ($1,853.00). The credit life
insurance was financed, so the initial amount of the loan and the initial amount of net
payoff credit life coverage was $31,853.00. However, if the $0.92 maximum MOB rate
had been used in the premium calculation, the credit life premium would have been
less than $1,853.00 and the amount of insurance coverage would also have been less
accordingly.
The correct credit life insurance premium for the Consumer's loan (of $30,000.00
before a credit insurance premium was added to the amount borrowed and financed)
should have been calculated as $1,726.99 under the maximum statutory MOB rate.
Accordingly, the total amount of the loan should have been only $31,726.99-not
$31,853.00
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A MOB rate of $0.9832 is required to produce the premium of $1,853.00 charged
Mr. Consumer by Credit disability carrier. This rate is, of course, substantially higher
than the $0.92 maximum statutory rate set forth in KRS 304.19-080(3)(a)(3).
B. ADDITIONAL DAMAGES
The cost to the Consumer' from overpaying for credit insurance is more than the
amount of the premium that they were overcharged. Because the premium was
financed, the damages suffered by the Consumer also include the interest (e.g., finance
charges) paid on the overcharged portion of the financed premium. The damages also
include the loss of the use of those funds, which could have been producing investment
income for the Consumer. To prevent Credit disability carrier from benefiting from its
illegal practices, this Court should require Credit disability carrier to pay the Consumer
the amount of the overcharge, the finance charges associated with the overcharge, and
interest on the overcharge plus interest on the sum of the overcharge plus associated
finance charges at the same rate earned by Credit disability carrier during this period.
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VIII. CREDIT LIFE- REFUND OF UNEARNED PREMIUM
Many times, the premium charged for life coverage, sold in connection with a
loan, is paid "up front" in full for a five-year premium. There is no difference in the
monthly rate of the premium. Thus, if the insured dies before the end of the term,
partial refund is due for the unused and unearned period of time that remains on the
term of the insurance contract.
KRS 304.19-090 states, in part, as follows:
(2) Each individual policy or group certificate shall provide
that in the event of termination of the insurance prior to
the scheduled maturity date of the indebtedness, any
refund of an amount paid by the debtor for insurance shall
be paid or credited promptly to the person entitled
thereto .... The formula to be used in computing such refund
shall be filed with and approved by the commissioner.
(Emphasis added). In accordance with this requirement, the life insurance contract sold
to the Consumers will specifically provides that, upon termination, "[a]ny unearned
premium will be: 1. paid or credited to The Insured; and 2. computed by the formula on
file and approved by the Insurance Commissioner To be clear about what constitutes
"termination," the contract may spell out seven events that end the term:
Term of insurance: The term of this insurance shall begin on
the Effective Date. The term shall end on the sooner of the:
1. scheduled maturity date of the debt; or
2. expiration date shown in the Schedule; or
3. end of the maximum term shown in the Schedule; or
4. date the debt is repaid, renewed, or refinanced; or
5. date of death; or
6. date a scheduled payment is more than 90 days late and
the loan is foreclosed; or
7. date of repossession.
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(Emphasis added). Despite these statutory and contractual requirements, however,
Credit disability carriers does not refund any unearned portion of the multi-year
premium upon death.
According to the group master policy form filed with the Kentucky DOl, the
refund method to be used for net payoff decreasing life coverage is the "actuarial
method," also known as the "Rule of Anticipation." (Group Master Policy, attached as
Exhibit 7, at page 6). The refund by the Rule of Anticipation method is the premium for
the remaining term of coverage, calculated using the same insurance rate and loan
terms as the original premium. Accordingly, the appropriate refund by the Rule of
Anticipation is $857.30, calculated by adding the MOB premiums for months 33
through 60 of coverage.
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IX. CASE LAW OF BAD FAITH IN KENTUCKY."
A. THE TURBULENT 80'5 - BIRTH, DEATH AND THEN REBIRTH
B. DEFINING BAD FAITH
C. TYPES OF BAD FAITH
1. Excess Verdict Against the Insured -Failure to Settle within Policy
Limits
2. First Party Bad Faith - Failure to pay insured
3. Statutory Third Party Bad Faith (UCSPA)
4.. Other Statutory Basis for Bad Faith
5. Consumer Protection Act Violation
• Reprinted with permission from Bad Faith Insurance Law in Kentucky, by M. Austin Mehr, published
by M. Lee Smith Publishing, 5201 Virginia Way, PO Box 5094, Brentwood, TN 37024-5094, (800) 274-6774.
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X. STATUTES AFFECTING DUTY OF GOOD FAITH"
A. THE UNFAIR CLAIMS SETTLEMENT PRACTICES ACT (304.12-230)
B. THE CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT KRS 367.170, 367.220
C. KENTUCKY'S PRIVATE ACTION STATUTE KRS 446.070
D. INSURANCE FRAUD ACT KRS 304.47-20
E. MISCELLANEOUS INSURANCE STATUTES
F. RICO 18 USC § 1961
• Reprinted with permission from Bad Faith Insurance Law in Kentucky, by M. Austin Mehr, published
by M. Lee Smith Publishing, 5201 Virginia Way, PO Box 5094, Brentwood, TN 37024-5094, (800) 274-6774.
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INTRODUCTION
The "American Dream" has long included in its definition the ownership of a
home. Many times home ownership for a number of reasons is out of reach for many
Americans. Therefore, renting and rental agreements creating a landlord/tenant
relationship are the housing options for many citizens. This chapter will discuss various
aspects of consumer law which have been proven to be issues for both the home owner
and the tenant alike.
There are numerous issues confronting the consumer, whether in buying a home
or renting an apartment. The issues run the gambit of substandard housing to denial of
housing due to discriminatory motives. Also at issue is the type of housing and to what
rights is one entitled to who enters into the housing agreement. This chapter will attempt
to address the issues included in rental housing, a mobile home or a stationary residence.
I. WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY
At the outset it must be mentioned that Kentucky does not recognize the doctrine
of Warranty of Habitability. This was of most recently affirmed in the case of Miles v.
Shauntee, Ky., 664 S.W.2d 512 (1983). The case arose when Ethal Miles filed a
counterclaim against her action for defective conditions existing in her rental housing.
In Miles v. Shantee the Supreme Court discussed the Common Law of the
application of caveat emptor to leaseholds. The Court recognized exception to caveat
emptor and placed the burden on the landlord to disclose a dangerous condition to a
tenant. If the Landlord conceals the dangerous condition he could be held liable for
injuries sustained by the tenants, servants or guests. Holzhouser v. Sheeny 127 Ky. 28,
104 S.W.1034 (1907). In Miles the Court refused to find that the landlord/tenant
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relationship created an implied warranty of habitability. The Court accepted the long
standing rule that a tenant "takes premises as he finds them". Citing Milby v. Mears, Ky.
App., 580 S.W.2d 724, 728 (1979) and Whitehouse v. Lorch, Ky. 347 S.W.2d 512
(1961). The Court also rejected the very creative legal argument that the landlord renting
substandard housing constitutes an "unfair, false, misleading or deceptive acts or
practices" in violation of the KRS 367.170 more commonly known as the Kentucky
Consumer Protection Act. The Court found the landlord's breach to make repairs to the
unit did not constitute an unfair, false or misleading practice under the Consumer
Protection Act. Therefore, the creative and frontal attack on the Commonwealth's
archaic reliance on "caveat emptor" in terms of safe and habitable housing fell short.
Where does that leave tenants in addressing concerns about the condition of rental
property? Certainly, units must comply with local housing codes and regulations in
municipalities that have adopted code requirements. The tenants in public housing have
a warranty ofhabitability by virtue oftheir status. However, the potential tenants in rural
areas where there are no housing codes may rent anything from a landlord at their own
peril. Understanding caveat emptor and its application it would seem to work counter to
the mandate stated in 1938 that all Americans have a right to live in "safe, sanitary and
decent housing".
II. HOUSING DISCRIMINATION
In 1964 with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 Congress outlawed
discrimination based on race, sex, national origin, age, color and religion in employment
and public accommodations. What is noticeably absent from the list of what came to be
called the "protected classes" was discrimination in housing. This oversight brought to
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the forefront in the late 1960's when the segregated communities of Detroit, Washington
D.C. and Los Angeles as well as other cities across the Nation erupted in racial violence.
Not stating that racial unrest was solely caused by the segregated housing and
lack of housing opportunities for minorities to move out of the inner cities would be a
simplistic reason for what we know as a complex problem. Nevertheless in April 1968,
Congress passed the Fair Housing Act (FHA) (42 U.S.C. §3601-3619), Title VIII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1968. The Fair Housing Act prohibited discrimination based on race,
color, religion and national origin in most housing transactions. The Act was amended to
add sex, handicap and familial status in 1974. What is noticeably absent as a protected
class under the FHA is age. While the FHA has been used to attack practices of limiting
access to individuals of advanced age it is many times utilized in the context of disability
(handicap) discrimination.
A second significant event occurred 1968 when the Supreme Court decided in
Jones v. Alfred G. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 88 S.Ct. 2186 (1968). In Jones the Court
held that the Civil Rights Act of 1866 prohibited probate as well as public racial
discrimination in housing. The passage of the FHA and the Jones decision allowed
protected classes the opportunity to move out of segregated settings and into areas that
were once off limits.
The FHA was passed again in 1988 by Congress. The most significant facts of
the 1988 Act was the change in the enforcement procedures of the Act. The Act required
that all states receiving housing monies from the government have their own FHA
Housing Act or substantially equivalent laws or run the risk of loosing Federal dollars.
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Kentucky passed the Fair Housing Act, which is codified in KRS 344.600 et. seq. in
1994.
The FHA and the Kentucky equivalent defined a discriminatory housing practice
as any act that is unlawful under these sections 42 USC §3604, §3605, §3606 and §3617.
Discriminatory practices include advertising, failure to rent, sell, steeling,
redlining and disparate treatment in terms and conditions of tenancy or ownership and
accessibility issues. The FHA is a consumer friendly statute, which allows a recourse to
the consumer in search of safe, and adequate housing.
The prospective tenant or buyer is many times ignorant to signs of discrimination,
i.e. the prospective tenant being informed that the unit had been rented when they arrived
a few minutes after the call or the prospective tenant being told that they may be more
comfortable in another part of the community. Advertising by the landlord has been
found to violate the FHA. "Adult Community" "Quiet Area" or even more obvious "no
children" have been found to violate the Act with no surprise. The issues of steering by
real estate agents, insurance redlining, predatory lending have all been found to violate
the FHA.
A particular area that has proven problematic for the landlord, but of great
assistance to the individual within the disabilities community, are the accessibility
standards adopted by the FHA and KRS 344. The statute's phrase "otherwise make
available" has been used by a qualified tenant with a disability to force a landlord to
address issues of parking spaces, recreation facilities, cleaning services that any disabled
tenant would enjoy by virtue ofthe tenancy.
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The area of accommodating the qualified tenant with a disability and the cost that
may be incurred because of the obligation has been subject to litigation from almost the
passage of the law. The consumer must be aware that the coverage of the FHA extends
for the qualified tenant with a disability to "children, parents, friends, spouses,
roommates, patients, sub-tenants or other associates who have disabilities". Additionally,
advocacy groups who want to provide housing opportunities for qualified persons with
disabilities have standing to sue if their efforts are blocked or interfered. Assoc. of
Retarded Citizens v. Dallas, 19 F.3d 241 (5th Cir. 1994). City of Edmonds v. Oxford
House, 514 U.S. 725 (1995).
The FHA is a powerful tool for the prospective consumer in search of safe
adequate housing. The anti-discrimination statute guarantees at least equal opportunity to
all individuals to rent or purchase a home. The substantive parties of the FHA and KRS
344.600 et. seq. include:
1) Coverage.
A. Definition - The FHA and the Kentucky equivalent defined a discriminatory
housing practice as any act that is unlawful under these sections 42 USC 3604(a)
§3604, §3605, §3606 and §3617.
B. FHA Prohibits discriminatory transactions having to do with dwellings.
"Dwellings" include any building occupied or intended to be occupied as a
residence or land sold with intent to construct dwelling. See. United States v.
Hughes Memorial Home 396 F. Supp. 544 (W.D.V.a. 1975) and United States v.
Columbus Country Club 915 F2d 577 (3d Cir. 1990). Case which extends
H - 5
coverage to nursing homes, retirement communities, college dormitories, resident
hotels, group homes and recreational time properties.
C. Exemptions - FHA offers seven exemptions. The seven include owner's sale or
rental of single family home, owner occupied buildings with no more than four
units; religious organizations private clubs; occupancy standards; older persons
exempted from familial discrimination.
D. Otherwise make unavailable and Traditional Discrimination 42 USC 3604 (a) and
(f)(1) KRS 344.
1) Traditional discrimination;
2) Steering;
3) Zoning ex. group homes;
E. Discriminatory Terms and Conditions 42 USC 3609(b) and KRS 344.
1) Sex discrimination;
2) Children and Playgrounds;
3) Rent;
4) Service and Facilities;
5) Discriminatory Advertisements and Notices and Statements 42 USC 3604(c);
6) False Representations of Non-Availability 42 USC 3604(d);
7) Blockbusting 42 USC 3604(e);
8) Financing and Related Transactions 42 USC 3605;
9) Access to Brokerage Services 42 USC 3606;
10) Coercion, intimidation, threats and interference.
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2) Enforcement
A. Administrative
1) HUD;
2) Kentucky Commission on Human Rights;
3) Local HAP agencies;
4) Private FHIP agencies.
B. One year Statute ofLimitations to file Administration Court action pursuant to
KRS 344 and a two year statute of limitations.
III. PRIVATE RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD
TENANT LAW
While the American Dream of owning one's home has long been a politically
adopted dream the reality is that majority of consumers are renters. Majority of tenants
are unaware of their rights and obligations as a tenant. Just as well many landlords are
unaware of their responsibilities to the tenant.
Kentucky landlord/tenant law is a mixture of haves and have nots. Many cities
have passed the Uniform landlord/tenant Act which provides added protection to the
tenant and landlords. Many localities still operate without URLTA and the rights of the
tenant/consumer suffer.
IV. ESTABLISHMENT OF LANDLORD/TENANT RELATIONSHIP
The lease signed by the landlord and tenant creates a legal relationship outlining
the obligation of both parties. The principals of contract law apply to the leases.
However, a "please purchase agreement may very well fall outside of the landlord/tenant
law. For example:
A. Establishing Existence of Tenancy
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1) Testimony oforal agreement;
2) Introduction into evidence ofwritten lease;
3) Is there a landlord/tenant relationship?
a) Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979), held that when an
installment land contract is used as a means of financing the purchased of
property, the vendor's interest, being bare legal title, is to be treated as a
lien on the property to secure payment, requiring a vendor to seek a
judicial sale of the property upon the purchaser's default. See Gamble v.
Bryant, 599 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. App. 1980.
b) Emmons v. Madden, 781 S.W.2d 529 (Ky. App. 1989), held that lawsuit
by purchaser against vendor alleging that vendor has conveyed property to
purchaser and agreed to deliver possession at time of closing but had not
vacated property was not a forcible detainer action over which district
court has subject matter jurisdicion.
Many times upon argument, the District Court in a forcible retainer action will
dismiss the landlord's action requiring him instead to file a foreclosure action in Circuit
Court. Not only will the foreclosure action delay the removal of the occupierlbuyer of
the property it will also allow the occupierlbuyer all equitable defenses allowed under the
Civil Rules.
B. The written lease can not be unconscionable.
a) Landlord can not charge late fees in an exorbitant note.
b) Landlord can not place unreasonable borders on a tenant for any reason.
H - 8
c) Landlord can enforce occupancy standards on a landlord as long as not
discriminatory.
C. Renewal of Lease
a) Lease is good for the terms stated in lease.
Example- year to year, month to month, week to week
b) Lease not renewed but hold over tenant is a "month to month" lease See Clay
v. Terrill 670 S.W.2d 492 (Ky. App. 1984).
v. TERMINATION OF LEASE
A. Lease provisions should state how a lease should be terminated by either party.
B. Early Termination of Lease
a) Good cause.
b) Mitigation by landlord.
C. Notice to terminate lease.
1) Non URLTA.
a) KRS 383.195 requires one months notice in writing to terminate tenancy at
will or by sufferance.
b) But... Pack v. Feuchtenburger, 22 S.W2d 914 (Ky. 1930), interpreting
predecessor to KRS 383.195, Reck and Riehl v. Caulfield, 112 S.W. 843 (Ky.
1908), David V. Hall, 6 Ky. 444 (1884), stated that the one month notice to
vacate must run until the next periodic rental date (example: rent is due on the
5th of the month, notice to vacate given on January 22 must run until March 5,
not just February 21.)
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c) AND ... Goodwin v. Beutel, 256 S.W.2d 532 (Ky. 1953), interpreting
predecessor to KRS 383.195, stated that non-payment of rent by tenant at will
is not a forfeiture of the tenancy, therefore it did not preclude tenant from
raising the defense that statutory one month's written notice requiring tenant
to vacate was not given by landlord.
See Clay v. Terrell, 670 S.W.2d 492 (Ky. App. 1984).
d) KRS 383.160 provides that no notice is necessary if:
1) An action is commenced within 90 days of the expiration of the lease if
the tenancy was for a year or more and was set to expire on a date certain.
If no action is commenced within that time then the term is automatically
extended for a period of one year form the original date of the expiration
of the tenancy.
2) An action is commenced within 30 days of the expiration of the lease if
the tenancy was for less than a year and was set to expire on a date certain.
If no action is commenced within that time then the term is automatically
extended for a period of 60 days from the original date ofthe expiration of
the tenancy.
3) See Masterson v. DeHart Paint & Varnish Co., 843 S.W.2d 332 (Ky.
1992).
e) Waiver of notice has been upheld in Stoll Oil Refining Company v. Pierce,
337 S.W.2d 263 (Ky. 1960). This case involved a commercial lease. Many
judges this that it is an unconscionable assertion, and provision should be held
unenforceable in a residential setting. Strength ofbargaining positions should
H -10
be a relevant item. But See Aetna Oil Coampany v. Robertson, 258 S.W.2d
464 (Ky. 1953).
f) Service of notice preferably is to be hand delivered personally to tenant.
Strongly suggest notice requirements of URLTA be followed. See KRS
383.560. But see 51 c.J.S. Landlord and Tenant Section 150(6); 50 Am. Jur.
2d Landlord and Tenant, Section 1213.
2) URLTA
a) Notice to vacate must be hand delivered to tenant or mailed by register or
certified mail. KRS 383.560(3)(c), with some exceptions noted.
b) Time period for eviction must be stated on notice.
1) Non-payment of rent - seven day notice with right to cure. KRS
383.660(2).
2) Material noncompliance with rental agreement fourteen day notice. KRS
383.660(1).
3) Periodic tenancy - seven day notice for week-to-week tenancy. KRS
383.695(1); 30 day notice from periodic rental date for month-to-month
tenancy. (like Pack). KRS 383.695(2).
4) Tenancy begun upon the termination of a written lease. KRS 383.695(3).
a) Waiver of statuary notice in a lease is prohibited. KRS 383.570.
b) The party who is relying on the URLTA municipal ordinance must introduce
certified copy into evidence. Judicial notice will not be taken of ordinances of
local governments. Butler v. Louisville and Jefferson County Board of
Zoning Adjustment and Appeals, 224 S.W.2d 658 (Ky. 1949). There is a
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limited exception to this rule that makes ordinances of a first-class city subject
to judicial notice. KRS 383.080.
D. Eviction Proceedings KRS 383.660.
1) Time period for eviction must be stated on notice.
a) Non-payment of rent - seven day notice with right to cure. KRS
383.660(2).
b) Material noncompliance with rental agreement fourteen day notice. KRS
383.660(1).
c) Periodic tenancy - seven day notice for week-to-week tenancy. KRS
383.695(1); 30 day notice from periodic rental date for month-to-month
tenancy. (like Pack). KRS 383.695(2).
d) Tenancy begun upon the termination of a written lease. KRS 383.695(2).
2) KRS 383 states that the Defendant in forcible detainer must be provided at least
three days notice of the eviction hearing.
3) Eviction is a summary proceeding possession of properly in question is the only
issue Judge or Jury will decide. KRS 383.540 confers jurisdiction or District
Court on Issues under URLTA.
A. Back rent or damages not collectible in forcible detainer actions.
B. Jury trial permitted KRS 383.210(2) but no discovery allowed.
1) Must be unanimous verdict.
2) Ifjury is ruling on Tenant's counterclaim additionally must be unanimous.
3) Effect of July decision:
(a) If in favor oftenant/landlord's eviction petitioner is dismissed
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(b) In favor of landlord the tenant has only seven (7) days to appeal the
decision.
4) Appeal
A. Seven (7) days to appeal the decision to Circuit Court KRS 383.255(1).
B. Deposit rent into Court as it becomes due. See Fickey v. Cross Creek LTD
700 S.W.2d 807 Ky. App. (1985).
C. Right of first Appeal from Circuit Court Ky. Constitution § 115.
5) Writ of Restitution KRS 383.245 Sheriff or Constable will not remove tenant's
belongings landlord or authorized agent must remove belongings to the street.
A. Landlord could be liable for conversion action if takes tenant's property
without notice or order.
B. District ofrent abolished KRS 383.680.
6) Acceptance of rent after termination notice given.
A. URLTA. KRS 383.675. Acceptance of rent with knowledge of default by
tenant constitutes a waiver of the landlord's right to termination the rental
agreement for that breach.
B. Non-URLTA.
1) Acceptance of rent for a period following the proposed termination date
operates as a waiver of the termination notice requiting that a new notice
be issued before an FED action can be maintained. See Daily v. Kelly,
200 S.W.2d 114 (Ky. 1946); Rich v. Rose, 99 S.W. 953 (Ky. 1907); 51
C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant Section 150(7), where it is noted that "a
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notice to vacate the premises on a designated day is waived by acceptance
of rent for a tenure and use beyond that date."
2) Citizens Fidelity Bank & Trust Co. v. Norfleet, 252 S.W.2d 54 (Ky.
1952); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Taylor, 45 S.W.2d 1039(Ky. 1932) held
that a ground of forfeiture is waived by acceptance of rent with knowledge
of the ground, unless circumstances are shown to rebut the presumption
arising from such a situation.
3) However, Sherrill v. Harlan Theater Company, Inc., 75 S.W.2d 775 (Ky.
1934) and Pettitte v. Smith, 87 S.W.2d 945 (Ky. 1935), arguably hold that
such acceptance of rent waives the forfeiture only if it was based on non-
payment ofrent.
4) 51 C.J.S. Landlord and Tenant Section 150(7) states that notice also will
be waived by the issuance of a new notice.
5) 12A Ky. Digest Landlord and Tenant Section 112(2); 50 Am.Jur.2d
Landlord and Tenant Section 1215 and 1216; 120 ALR 561.
6) Jurisdiction.
a) Arguably the district court does not have jurisdiction over the issues in
an eviction where the major question is whether or not the lease has
been violated. If the eviction is premised upon violation of the tenn so
a lease, then it is arguable that the issue of whether or not here has
been a violation first must be decided by the circuit court. KRS
383.540 confers jurisdiction on the district court to hear those matters
which arise under URLTA. It is not as clear that the district court has
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jurisdiction to hear URLTA jurisdiction. Once the circuit court
determines there has been a violation of the terms of the lease then a
proper notice may be given and an FED commenced upon the
expiration of the notice.
b) In an eviction proceeding, the district court does not have jurisdiction
to enter orders relating to back rent or damages. It has authority only
to enter a judgement on the issue of restitution and costs. (Exception
at KRS 383.645).
7) Retaliatory Eviction
a) URLTA
I) A landlord may not retaliate by increasing rent or decreasing
services or by bringing an action for possession after the tenant has
complained to the landlord or the tenant has become a member of
a tenant's group. KRS 383.705(1).
2) Remedies. KRS 383.705(2). Tenant entitled to remedies provided
in KRS 383.655, recovery of possession or termination of rental
agreement and, in other case, recover an amount not more than
three (3) months periodic rent and a reasonable attorney's fee. If
the rental agreement is terminated the landlord must return prepaid
rent.
3) Exceptions. KRS 383.705(3). (a) Tenant's lack of reasonable care
resulting in building/housing code violations; (b) Tenant in default
on rent; (c) Compliance with the applicable building/housing code
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requires alteration, remodeling or demolition which deprives the
tenant ofthe use of dwelling unit.
b) Non-URLTA
1) It is possible to urge, even in non-URLTA jurisdictions, that
retaliatory evictions should not only be discouraged but prohibited
as against public policy. See 40 ALR 3d 753, concerning
retaliatory eviction of tenant for reporting landlord's violation of
laws. Analogies may be drawn from the law being developed in
the area ofwrongful discharge. For instance, an eviction should be
prohibited as against public policy when it can be proved that it is
the result of the tenant's exercise of a statutory right or the
consequence of the tenant's refusal to break the law. See Grzyb v.
Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985), for an introduction to
wrongful discharge law in Kentucky.
2) It is also possible to urge that evictions carried out for illegal
purposes should not be allowed. For instance, KRS 344.360 and
344.362 prohibits discrimination in housing. Consider also the
Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.
VI. MOBILE HOME ISSUES
Mobile Homes are the residence of choice for many Kentucky resident. Mobile
Homes sales often resemble that of a car sales in comparison to a fixed housing sale. The
Mobile home sale is fact specific as to any violation ofthe law.
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A. Client usually visits a Mobile Home Dealership and is shown around. During the
visit the following will occur:
1) Oral representation about home.
2) Oral representation about financing.
3) Preparation of credit application.
4) Buyer agrees on home and financing.
5) Watch "Bait and Switch" possibility.
B. Purchase Order Signed.
1) Order may contain...
a) Disclaimer ofexpress or implied warranties.
b) Provisions limiting venue of litigation.
c) Provisions lowering statute of limitations.
May include other information such as price, down payment, trade in allowance,
finance charges, payment schedule, balance.
NOTE: The purchase order is not a Truth-In-Lending (TILA) disclosure statement.
C. Return of Consumer to sign a retail sales installment and contract security agreement.
RISA).
1. RISA may include:
a) Venue limitations.
b) One year statute of limitations.
c) Disclaimers of Warranties.
d) Disclosures requited by TILA and Kentucky Installment Sales Contract Act of
KRS 371.210 et.seq.
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e) Manufacturers warranty.
f) Arbitration Agreement.
g) Loan origination fee, check the "RISA" to see if the loan origination fees
comply with Federal Depository Institution. The regulation and Monetary
Control Act of 1982 (DIDA) 15 U.S.C. § 1735f-7(a). 12 CFR Sec. 590.
h) Beware oftaxable terms.
i) Delivery and Dealer Responsibilities.
j) Discovery and notification ofDefects.
A. ACTIONS AVAILABLE TO CONSUMER
The consumer/buyer may assert many claims against the Mobile Home
Manufacturer and Seller. Common Law negligence and negligence per se resulting from
violations of manufacturers Housing Code, 12 CFR Part 3282. The regulations set
standards for construction ofmanufacturing housing. Other causes ofAction include:
Against the Manufacturer:
1) Mobile Home Sales Act KRS 367.710 et. seq.
a) Applies to original purchaser and manufacturers only.
b) Defect within the first 12 months which costs 4% of the purchase price to
repair and which requires three separate repairs, will be presumed
unmerchantable. KRS 367.715.
c) Buyer must notify manufacturer of the defect by certified mail within ten days
following establishment ofthe defect with copy to dealer.
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d) Within ten days manufacturer must examine and notify the owner in writing
that no defect exists, or that the defect was caused by someone other than the
manufacturer, or that the manufacturer will make the home merchantable.
e) The manufacturer must provide equivalent accommodations during repair.
f) If statutory remedies fail, consumer may bring action for price plus attorney
fees.
g) KRS 367.760 is the only part of the Mobile Home Sales Act that applies to the
dealer. It requires that any dealer, manufacturer, or wholesaler making a
repair on a new mobile home prior to delivery must state in writing to the
owner the nature of the defect repaired and the cause of the damage. Use in
conjunction with KRS 446.0701 to create a negligence per se cause ofaction.
2) Consumer Protection Act KRS 367. The consumer can allege an unfair deceptive
and unconscionable trade practice when a manufacturer asserts a warranty
limitation limiting the buyer's remedies to repair and/or replace defective parts. If
successful the consumerlbuyer can recover damages courts and attorney fees.
Ford Motor Company v. Mays 575 S.W.2d 480 Ky. App. (1979).
3) Magnuson Moss Warranty Act. 15 U.S.c. 2301-2312 16 CFR 700 et.seq.
a) The Act applies to tangible personal property normally used for personal,
family or household use manufactured after July 4, 1975, when in connection
with the product a written warranty is given, or within 90 days of the sale, a
supplier sells a service contract on the product.
b) The Act contains both substantive rights and disclosure requirements. The
consumer can recover damages caused by both, but no statutory penalties are
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provided.
c) The Act contains disclosure requirements that mandate that all terms,
limitations and conditions of warranties must be fully and conspicuously
disclosed in simple readily understood language.
d) Allows consumers to recover damages including attorney fees for breach of
any written warranty, implied warranty, service contract, or disclosure
requirement of the act. See 15 USC Sec. 2310(d)(1).
e) UCC implied warranties in Kentucky only apply to the dealers as no privacy
with manufacturers. See Williams v. Fulmer 695 S.W.2d 411 (Ky. 1985).
B. CLAIMS AGAINST DEALER
1) Regulation under UCC: KRS 355.2 602, KRS 355.2 508 and KRS 355.2-601.
a) Buyer can reject for any non-conformity to the contract UCC adopts "mirror
image rule".
b) Reject must occur with in reasonable time.
c) Buyer must notify seller ofrejection and should be specific.
d) Seller has right to care non-formality.
e) Seller must notify buyer of intent to care within reasonable time-if seller facts
to care within reasonable time rejection is effective.
£) Buyer may retain goods but not alter goods.
g) Buyer's right of rejection and revocation of acceptance is not affected by
disclaimers of implied warranties Capital Cadillac Olds, Inc. v. Roberts 813
Ky., S.W.2d 287 (1991).
2) Revocation ofAcceptance.
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a) Non-conformity must substantially impair value ofgoods.
b) Buyer must notify seller of revocation of acceptance with in reasonable time.
Kentucky Courts appear to hold that the seller has the same right to care as in the
rejection context. See Ford v. Meyers 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. App. 1928).
Cherwick v. Carares 759 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. App. 1982).
c) Non-conformity to the contract rejection of revocation of acceptance are available
for any non-conformity to contract. hnplied warranty of merchantability (KRS
355.314); hnplied warrant of fitness for a particular purpose (KRS 355.2315);
Non-conformity credit, late delivery failure to install properly are examples of
non-conformities to be contracted.
d) Damages
1) Incidental and consequential damages are available to buyer who successfully
rejects or revokes acceptances. KRS 355.2715.
2) Buyer may recover for any non-conformity, determined in any manner that is
reasonable.
3) Breach of Warranty.
4) Problems with Disclaimers.
(a) See Capital Cadillac Olds v. Roberts. 813 S.W.2d 287.
(b) Plead fraud.
(c) Plead Consumer Protection Act unfair and deceptive.
(d) Unconscionably.
(e) Magnetron Moss Warranty Act.
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(f) Disclaimer not conspicuous. See General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Grad 501 N.E.2d 68 (1985).
3) Fraud
a) Elements "(a) material representation, (b) which is false, (c) known to be false or
made recklessly, (d) made with inducement to be acted upon, (e) acted with
reliance thereon, and (f) causing injury." WAHBA v. Don Corlett Motors, Inc.
573 S.W.2d 357,359 (Ky. App. 1978).
b) Must be proved by "clear and convincing evidence".
c) Reception as unfair practices under KRS 367.110.
d) Breach of obligation of good faith.
e) All VCC remedies are available for fraud or material misrepresentation KRS
355.2721.
f) Negligence claims.
g) Consumer Credit Claims (TILA, RISA, or Kentucky Installment Sales Contract
Act KRS 371.210 et.seq.
4. "Holder Rule".
The claims against the holder (bank) or mortgage company, etc.). See FTC Holder
Rule at 16 CFR 433.1. The Holder rule notice reads as follows:
NOTICE
Any holder of this consumer credit contract is subject to all
claims and defenses which the debtor could assert against
the seller of goods or services obtained pursuant hereto or
with the proceeds hereof. Recovery hereunder by the
debtor shall not exceed amounts paid by the debtor
hereunder.
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a) Meaning: The debtor can affirmatively recover all sums paid to anyone under
the contract and can offset all amounts remaining owed under the contract.
b) Consumer may sue under the "holder rule" Ford Motor Credit Company v.
Morgan 536 N.E.2d 587 (Mass 1989); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Cook 840
S.W.2d 42 (Tex. App. 1992); Eichen v. Scott Housing System 630 Fed. Supp.
1962 (M.D. Ala. 1986); Ailett v. City Finance Co. 391 S.O.2d 896 (Ca. 1980);
Thomas v. Ford Motor Credit Compo 429 A2d 277 (M.D. App. 1981).
C. CLAIMS UNIQUE TO MOBILE HOMES
1) B Seal "Habitability Claims and certain consumer claims.
a) B-Seal Claims KRS 227.550(3) means a seal issued pursuant to KRS
227.600(3).
b) KRS 227.600(3) "Class B Seal" means a seal issued pursuant to subsection (3)
ofKRS 227.600.
KRS 227.660(3) Any dealer who has acquired a used manufactured home, mobile
home, or recreational vehicle without a seal shall apply to the office for a Class B
Seal by submitted an affidavit that the unit has been brought up to or meets
reasonable standards established by the board for used manufactured homes,
mobile homes, or recreational vehicles. Those manufactured homes or mobile
homes taken in trade must be re-inspected and certified. A numbered Class B seal
shall be affixed by the dealer to the unit prior to sale. A seal will not be required
if such dealer submits an affidavit that the unit will not be resold for use as such
by the public. A dealer shall not transport or install a manufactured or mobile
home which is to be used for residential purposes which does not have a class A
or Class B seal.
See administrative regulations relevant to "B Seal" at 815 K.AR 25 :040-090.
I want to express my sincere appreciation to Prof. Robert Schwemm, Brad Christy
and Addison Parker who provided valuable assistance in developing the outline and
presentation.
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